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Abstract o f Dissertation: “’Binding Engagements’: Explaining European Integration 
from the United Provinces (1579-1795) to the European Communities (1952)”.
Mette Eilstrup Rasmussen
The dissertation seeks to offer a broad security-based explanation for regional integration. 
The central argument is that integration presents a solution to a particular time-consistency 
problem—known in the security literature as the ‘preventive war dilemma*—which arises from 
uneven growth rates among states. Conventional international relations theory offers only 
one solution to the preventive war dilemma: war. I argue that another possibility is for states 
to create a regional institution that enables credible commitment. If states can create an 
institution which constrains their actions and disables their future discretion to use force 
arbitrarily, the time-consistency problem disappears. I label this strategy o f integration, 
‘institutional binding*.
Looking at the historical record, we find several instances in which states have managed to 
solve a preventive war dilemma and avoid war by integrating with a rising challenger instead 
of balancing against it. The dissertation examines three such cases. The first is the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands (1579-1795) in which six smaller Dutch provinces chose 
integration as a way to bind a growing Holland. The second is the German Zollverein (1834- 
1871) which—in parallel with the German Bund—provided a framework for peaceful 
cooperation among the German states, which enabled them, for a few decades, to stave off 
Prussian domination. The third case is the European Communities (1952-) where integration 
has been motivated by a desire to contain a potentially resurgent Germany. In all three cases, 
a primary motivation behind integration is the desire by smaller states to establish binding 
constraints on a more powerful, rising, power in their midst. By contrast, competing 
explanations stressing external military threat or economic concerns as key motivating factor 
for integration perform less well across the three cases. The dissertation concludes that 
regional preventive conflict is a crucial factor in explaining regional integration.

I In t r o d u c t io n
Explaining Regional Integration
Regional integration is a recurrent theme in modem European history. At various 
times since the founding of the modem states system, independent states have come together 
to form communities in which sovereignty was to some extent shared. Perhaps strikingly, 
integration has often come about in the wake of sustained conflict among future integration 
partners. In 1579, seven Dutch provinces came together at the city of Utrecht to found the 
‘United Provinces'. This union followed immediately upon a period of intense conflict 
during which the largest of the provinces—Holland—invaded and plundered adjacent states 
in what has often been described as a ‘civil and religious war* among the Dutch provinces. A 
similar pattern can be observed in 19th century Germany. Germany at that time was marked 
by virulent economic and political rivalry among its many autonomous states. Yet in 1834, 
eighteen German states agreed to form a comprehensive customs union, which vested 
control over tariff levels and duty collection in an independent central institution. In June 
1950—only five years after the end of World War II—Germany and five of the countries it 
had recently invaded and occupied came together to negotiate the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSQ. In taking this step, they embarked upon a process of political and 
economic integration whose ultimate outcome was a tight confederation.
That regional integration often emerges after periods o f great instability, or even 
armed conflict, should perhaps not surprise us. After all, as John Ikenberry has noted in a 
recent book, the great moments of order formation in international relations have tended to
come after major wars, as states undertake to rebuild a war-tom system.1 Yet, the idea that 
states choose to integrate not only following, but often during periods of great conflict runs 
contrary to the predictions of most current integration theories, which see integration as 
contingent on stable and peaceful relations that in turn allow states to cooperate in the 
pursuit of economic gains. The timing of the cases of integration just mentioned therefore 
presents us with a puzzle.
This dissertation seeks to offer a broad security-based explanation for regional 
integration. Throughout the dissertation, integration is defined as the “voluntary linking in the 
political and economic domains of two or more formerly independent states to the extent 
that authority over key areas of national policy is shifted to the supranational level”.2 My 
central argument is that states’ primary' motivation for pooling or delegating sovereignty to a 
supranational institution is to establish binding constraints on one another, which will rule out 
the future use of arbitrary7 force. Specifically, integration provides a solution to a preventive 
war dilemma, which is often salient among states in close geographic proximity.
Of course, the idea that states pursue integration in order to control or h ind’ their 
partners is not novel. The notion that French desires to rule out a future war with Germany 
played a role in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ in 1952 has 
been popular with historians of diplomacy as well as non-academic writers. There is no 
question that this assertion has occupied a central place in the political oratory of Europe’s 
leaders past and present.3 *However, political scientists have all by and large dismissed this
1 Ikenberry 2001, p. 7.
** This definition is given by Matrii 1999, p. 1. Empirically, integration gives rise to what we may label 'state 
unions’ or 'confederate unions’. Such unions differ from the federal states that were the subject of many 
integration studies in the 1960 and 70s (See e.g. Hinsley 1963, Pentland 1973) in that they do not led to the 
creation of new centralized polities but allow members to retain their status as independent states. State unions 
also differ from simple free trade areas which involve limited deregulation and administrative oversight but do 
not entail significant pooling of decision powers.
3 Among those who stress French fears of German power as a driving force in the creation of ECSC are
Archer 1990, Dell 1995, Dinan 1994, Gillingham 1991 and Milward 1984.
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argument—rejecting it as political rhetoric masking the real, economic, process lying 
underneath the surface.4 One of the central contentions of this dissertation is that they are
wrong to do so.
There are two main reasons that political scientists have failed to take the idea that 
European integration has posed a ‘constructive solution to the German problem* seriously. 
First, there seem to be no good theoretical reasons for why Germany in 1950—a country 
with clear prospects for expanding its capabilities in the future—would agree to an 
arrangement that would constrain its future power. Second, it is unclear to many observers 
how the European Community (EQ5 has in fact succeeded in ‘binding’ Germany.6 This 
dissertation addresses these objections by explaining not only why other European states 
chose to bind German power, but also why Germany agreed to be bound and how the EC 
was successful in binding i t  Furthermore, by testing the argument against three centuries o f 
European history, the dissertation provides additional support not only for the German case 
but for the general theoretical argument that integration provides a way to engage and 
subsume the power of a stronger state, thereby preventing it from abusing its strength in the 
future.
I. THE ARGUMENT: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT TO
P ea ce
The main argument of this dissertation is that integration presents a solution to a 
particular time-consistency problem known in the security literature as the ‘preventive war
4 So far, only Joseph Grieco has given pride of place to the role of German power in driving European 
integration in his analysis of the achievement of EMU in terms of what he labels a ‘neo-realist inspired voice- 
opportunity thesis’ (Grieco 1995a, 1995b). I discuss this thesis in die following chapter.
** Throughout the dissertation I use the term European Communiri« (EQ to refer to the totality of the West 
European integration project which began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ in 1952 and 
culminated with the Treaty of European Union (TEU) in 1992.
6 On these critiques see eg. Risse 1998, p. 6.
dilemma’. Realist international relations theory has only one solution to the preventive war 
dilemma: war. In an anarchical system which affords no protection against the dominance of 
stronger over weaker actors, power transitions are expected to lead to war because declining 
states have a dominant incentive to attack a rising challenger before it grows too powerful. At 
the root of this preventive war dilemma lies a commitment problem. It is plausible that a 
rising state would be willing ex ante to promise not to take advantage of its military 
supenority, once the balance of power shifts in its favor, if it believed that it could thereby 
avert a preventive attack. However, since the rising state would have an incentive ex p o st to 
renege on the bargain should it gain the power to do so, it cannot make its promise credible. 
Instead, war ensues, although both sides would have preferred to stay at peace.7
I argue that war is the most likely outcome of the preventive war dilemma, but it is 
not the only solution. Another possibility is for states to create an institution enabling 
credible commitment. Insofar as states can create an institution that disables their future 
discretion to use force arbitrarily, the time-consistency problem disappears. The historical 
record provides several instances in which states have managed to solve a preventive war 
dilemma by integrating with a rising challenger instead of balancing against it. In this 
dissertation, I examine three such cases. The first is the United Provinces of the Netherlands 
(1579-1795) in which six smaller Dutch provinces chose integration as a way to bind a 
growing Holland. The second is the German Zollverein (1834-1871) which—in parallel with 
the German Bund—provided a framework for economic and politico-military cooperation 
among the German states, which enabled them, for a few decades, to avert Prussian 
domination. The third is Western Europe after World War II, where the EC emerged as a
^ Fearon 1995, Levy 1987, Powell 1999.
framework for harnessing a potentially resurgent Germany. I label this strategy of integration 
‘institutional binding*.**
The ‘institutional binding* thesis can be contrasted with (at least) three alternative 
theories of regional integration: neofunctionalist and ‘historical institutionalist’ theory, 
political economy theories, and realist arguments based on a balance of power logic. 
Throughout the dissertation these perspectives will be treated as competing hypotheses.* 9 
Neofunctionalist integration theory maintains that supranationalism is the only method 
available to states to maximize welfare. Integration is described using concepts such as 
functional and political ‘spill-over’ whereby the effects o f prior institutional choices are 
transformed into determinants of further integration. Neofunctionalism provides a helpful 
tool in constructing a comprehensive account for the process of West European 
integration. Dynamics of spill-over can be identified at various points in the history o f 
European integration. However, neofunctionalism in itself is not enough. By its very 
assumption neofunctionalist theory fails to give a satisfactory explanation for what triggers 
demand for integration at the national level— it merely assumes that once the process gets 
underway, it will become self-sustaining. Nonetheless, as Robert FCeohane and Stanley 
Hoffmann remark, spill-over and unintended consequences require prior bargains among 
states, thereby refocusing our attention on the exogenous determinants of the decision to 
integrate—determinants on which neo functionalism sheds little light.10
® The term ‘institutional binding’ has been used by Grieco 1995a, 1995b and Ikenberry 2001.
9 A third competing framework is neo functionalist theory. Neofunctionalism provides a helpful framework for 
analyzing European integration after World War II. However, because the theory relies on a narrowly 
technocratic view of politics, this framework is not easily extended to cases before Wodd War II. Instead of 
treating neofunctionalism as a general competing explanation, I have therefore chosen to present this theory as 
an alternative framework only in the case of the EG The theoretical foundations o f the neofunctionalist 
approach are discussed in the literature review in chapter II.
^  Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, pp. 1-39.
The second competing view, the ‘political economy approach’, maintains that states 
integrate in order to maximize economic gains. On this view, integration takes place in 
response to ‘increasing opportunities for profitable international exchange’.11 Specifically, 
integration provides a means to eliminate negative policy externalities, reduce transaction 
costs (e.g. by abolishing tariff barriers and others regulations) and reap benefits from 
economies o f scale.12 The political economy perspective shares with purely economic 
explanations o f integration a focus on the efficiency consequences o f policy coordination. 
But unlike strictly economic explanations which portray governments as reacting directly to 
stimuli from the international economy, political economy theories focus attention on 
societal demands, particularly from domestic producer groups.1^
The political economy approach appears to offer a convincing explanation for at least 
one major case of integration: the EC. In the early 1950s, European countries faced strong 
incentives to cooperate on rebuilding their war-devastated economies. Following the creation 
o f the EC, trade among the West European countries expanded rapidly, resulting in 
significant improvements in national welfare. The problem remains, however, that while 
there may be benefits to liberalizing trade and cross-border investment, such benefits seldom 
require strong and exclusive politico-economic unions. In fact, such unions often have 
significant trade diversion effects which may reduce the economic benefits to members.14 
Instead, gains from economies of scale and reduced transaction costs could be achieved 
through the creation o f simple free trading zones, which do not represent an extensive 
encroachment on national sovereignty. In the case of the EC, for example, it seems that if
11 Moravcsik 1998.
12 Proponents o f this view include Moravcsik 1998, Matdi 1999, Milward 1984,1992, and Keohane 1984.
1^ Moravcsik 1998, Matdi 1999.
14 Many economists have questioned whether customs unions and currency unions among states are indeed 
efficient from an economic viewpoint. E.g. Cooper and Massell (1965) and Johnson (1965) have shown that 
participation in a customs union is inferior to unilateral tariff elimination, which leads to greater trade creation 
without giving rise to trade diversion. See also Matdi 1998 p. 35, Kiugman 1991 and Cohen 1997.
policy makers had been concerned primarily with economic advantages, they would have 
engaged in less extensive cooperation in much weaker international institutions, such as the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) or the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 
Indeed, this was the outcome that producer groups in many West European countries were 
lobbying for.15 What emerged instead was a geographically narrower and institutionally more 
constraining framework which provided for cooperation on both economic, political and 
military issues. It therefore appears that additional factors are needed in order to explain why 
states choose integration.
A third approach to integration, which we may label realist, links integration to the 
geopolitical objectives of states. On this view, integration is driven not by a direct desire to 
maximize economic gains, but by the consequences that such gains may have for national 
security.16 Built on this claim, realism offers two related images o f integration. One links 
integration to the presence of an external military threat. Integration, on this view, presents a 
way to strengthen cooperation among a group of allies against a common outside enemy.17 A 
second realist argument stresses international autonomy and influence. On this view, 
integration is driven by a desire to bolster the power and prestige of a group of states vis-à- 
vis other actors on the world political stage. The problem with these types of geopolitical 
explanations is that whereas an outside threat may provide for greater cohesion among states 
in a region, there is no reason a priori to assume that it should prompt them to integrate. 
External power balancing is often realized more effectively through less restraining military 
alliances. Again, a case in point is Western Europe in the postwar period, where NATO 
provided away of balancing the Soviet Union much more effective than the EC.
15 See Moikovits & Otto 19xx.
16 Gowa 1994, Grieco 1999.
17 Mearsheimer 1990, Waltz 1979,1993, Lister 1996,1999.
The problem with existing geopolitical and political economy explanations for 
regional integration is not that they are wrong but that they are insufficient. The fact that 
there are joint benefits to cooperation (in terms of enhanced security and autonomy or 
increased economic gains) does not justify the creation of permanent political and economic 
unions. While some degree of institutionalization may be needed in order to lock in specific 
agreements, insofar as there are significant efficiency gains to cooperation, the creation of 
binding unions from which states cannot withdraw without incurring prohibitively high costs 
should not be needed to sustain cooperation. Moreover, the above theories often fail to 
explain cases of integration other than the EC. As we will see, economic gains cannot 
explain why the Dutch provinces decided in favor of integration, and external balancing does 
not account well for the case of the German Zollverein.
In this dissertation I therefore focus attention on a third explanatory factor, namely 
the existence of a regional preventive war dilemma. I show how a peaceful solution to the 
preventive war dilemma that benefits both rising and declining states calls for the creation of 
binding international institutions whose authority extends across areas of military, political 
and economic policy. And I point to a set of concrete factors (beyond mechanisms of 
repeat-play and reputation) by which institutions can impose binding constraints on state 
action. At heart, then, my proposed theory" is institutionalist. Like functionalist theories of 
institutionalization, I stress the ability of international institutions to shape state preferences 
and constrain state action. But unlike such theories, I argue that states are motivated to create 
binding institutions primarily in order to safeguard national security and only secondarily to 
reap economic advantages.
II. T hemes and Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation proceeds in eight chapters. After a brief review of existing theories 
o f integration in Chapter Two, Chapter Three presents my proposed explanation for why 
states integrate. The theoretical chapter addresses two main questions. First, under that 
conditions do states prefer integration as a  means to solve a regional security conflict? 
Second, how can we explain die concrete form of integration? The analysis of these 
questions turns on three related puzzles: First, when would a weaker state choose to bind a 
stronger partner by integrating with it? Second, why would a stronger state agree to be 
‘bound1 by accepting institutional constraints on its powers? Third, how—in practice—can 
international institutions serve to create binding constraints on state power?
The analysis proceeds in thee steps. A first step shows why—in an anarchical 
environment—preventive war is a rational response when the balance of power between two 
rivals is shifting. A second step modifies the standard preventive war theme by introducing 
the possibility for credible commitment I show that, given the option to create an institution 
that enables credible commitment, war may be avoided for scenarios in which the cost (in 
terms of surrendered sovereignty) o f creating the institution is less than the expected cost o f 
going to war. A third and final step explains how the pooling of sovereignty in a 
supranational institution enables states to credibly commit themselves to a given course of 
action in the future. I identify a range of concrete means by which international institutions 
can place binding constraints on state action. These include mechanisms for transferring 
resources from rising to declining states, and for pooling strategic resources to increase exit 
costs. The chapter ends by deriving a set of concrete hypotheses and listing their observable 
implications.
Chapters Four through Seven illustrate and test the theoretical framework of Chapter 
Two on six historical cases. The framework for testing combines a technique of what Theda 
Skocpol and Margaret Somers have dubbed ‘comparative history as the parallel 
demonstration of theory1 with a procedure of systematic comparison among similar and 
contrasting cases.18 In the first procedure, three similar cases-studies of integration are 
juxtaposed to show that the binding thesis applies convincingly to each of them. These cases 
are: The United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579-1795); the German Zollverein (1834- 
1870); and the EC (1952). With exception of the old Swiss confederation (1315-1798), these 
are the foremost examples of regional integration in modem Europe. As the reader will 
recognize, these are not all successful cases o f integration from the viewpoint of institutional 
binding. Indeed, the German Zollverein failed to prevent political domination by Prussia. 
However, cases should not be selected based on success, but on whether historical 
participants sought to find an institutional solution to the time-consistency problem that 
prompted them to conflict. In the second procedure, I contrast these ‘positive’ cases of 
integration with three ‘negative’ cases in which successful integration might have occurred 
(according to competing theories) but did not, in order to compare values on the 
hypothesized independent variable.
Chapter Four begins the empirical analysis by examining a particularly successful case 
o f institutional binding, namely the United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579-1795). I show 
that, in this case, the preventive dilemma occasioned by the ascendancy of the largest of die 
Dutch states— Holland—led to the formation of a tight confederate union that kept the 
peace among the Dutch states for more than two hundred years. The notion that the United 
Provinces emerged as a way to ‘bind’ a rising Holland runs contrary7 to most existing accounts
18 ‘Comparative history as the parallel demonstration o f theory’ involves a procedure of “juxtaposing similar 
case-histories in order to demonstrate that a given explicitly delineated theory applies convincingly to a series of 
historical trajectories which ought to fit if the theory is valid”. Skocpol & Somers 1980, p. 176.
of this case. By focusing on the Eighty Years War (1568-1648) between the Netherlands and 
Spain, historians have often portrayed the Dutch case as a prime example of regional 
integration motivated by an external threat. However, I suggest, the conflict with Spain 
cannot adequately explain integration without taking into account the simultaneous conflict 
between Holland and its smaller neighbors within the Dutch region. There is also reason to 
doubt that economic interests served as a vehicle for integration in the Dutch case. Indeed, as 
we will see, economic interdependence among the Dutch provinces was low both before and 
after the advent of integration.
Chapter Five turns to a second, less successful, case o f integration, namely the 
German Zollverein (1834-1871). In parallel with the German Bund— featuring a Diet at the 
head of no less then ten army corps—this comprehensive customs union provided a 
framework for economic and politico-military cooperation among the German states, which, 
for more than three decades, allowed the smaller German states to stave off Prussian 
domination. The fact that the Zollverein was first and foremost a customs union has led 
many observers to focus on commercial interests as a primary force in shaping integration. 
As we will see, however, economic incentives by themselves are insufficient to explain why 
the German states opted for a tight politico-economic union instead o f relying on a looser 
free trade area. To explain this outcome, we need to take account of Prussia’s rapidly 
growing strength and expansionist policies—policies which gave rise to a preventive conflict 
in the German region and which prompted other states to seek merge with Prussia on 
favorable terms before it became too powerful.19
Chapter Six analyzes a third, well-known, case of integration, namely the European 
Communities. A plethora of theoretical arguments have been forwarded to explain this
19 Prussia did of course manage to unify Germany by force in 1871. However, the outcome for other states 
was a lot more beneficial that it might have been had the Zollverein and German Bund not been in place to 
equalize power.
case, most of them focusing on economic interests, norms, and institutional mechanisms 
or—alternatively— on the facilitating conditions of the international bipolar conflict. In 
contrast, I argue that the chief driving force for postwar European integration has been the 
fear of a resurgent Germany. By analyzing the development of the EC since 1952, I 
demonstrate that each major step toward closer integration has coincided with a perceived 
growth in German power. In each case, deeper integration has been seen to render this 
growth less threatening. Economic factors have played a secondary role. There can be no 
doubt that the EC has spurred economic growth and that this growth has been an 
important factor in keeping the community together. However, economic interests alone 
have not provided a main driving force for integration. Whenever security and economic 
interest have conflicted, security interests have won out Thus, the demand from Europe’s 
"big business' for a broad FTA has repeatedly been rejected in favor of a geographically 
narrower and politically more constrictive framework.
Evidence also suggests that external threat has been of secondary importance in 
driving European integration. In the early postwar years, both France and the Benelux 
countries continued to see a resurgent Germany as a potentially greater menace than the 
more distant threat from the Soviet Union. While a serious threat from the Soviet Union 
has continued to loom over postwar Europe, the task of balancing against this threat has 
principally been served by traditional diplomatic arrangements such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)—not by the 
EC.20
Chapter Seven concludes by summarizing the main findings of the dissertations and 
by considering evidence from contrasting cases. Section I begins by condensing and
2® Of course the United States pushed for European integration as a condition for aid to Europe. However, it 
is not conceivable that Washington would have withdrawn its security guarantee from Europe, had the EC not 
materialized.
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comparing the findings o f the three case studies. Section II turns to the examination of a 
set of contrasting cases. Chapters Four through Six have considered ‘positive' cases in 
which both the hypothesized independent variable (a preventive dilemma) and the 
dependent outcome (integration) are present. However, to avoid selection bias and extend 
variation in explanatory variables, section II o f Chapter Seven briefly analyses two ‘control 
cases’ with differing values on the dependent and independent variables. The first of these 
cases is the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA). In this case there have been strong 
commercial pressures for regional economic integration. The result, so far, has been the 
creation of a loose free trading zone, the cohesion of which is low. I argue that, given the 
absence of an intelligible regional threat which can be addressed through ‘binding’ (the 
United States is already a hegemon with a massive preponderance in power and has little 
incentive to let itself be irreversibly ‘bound*), NAFTA is unlikely to develop beyond the 
current free trade area.
A second ‘control-case* case examined in Chapter Seven is Europe after World War
I. This is a particularly hard case for the binding thesis insofar as a significant regional threat 
(from Germany) was present but no integration took place. The analysis reveals that 
Germany was a strong candidate for regional hegemony. It also reveals that several attempts 
were made by France to place institutional constraints on German power. Thus, the analysis 
draws attention to debates among historians which challenge the predominant view of a 
strictly punitive French policy after World War I and stress the way in which France, until 
1921, sought to establish an institutional framework for cooperation with Germany.21 
However, several of the factors which facilitate institutional binding were lacking. First, 
France’s main allies—the United States and Britain—both resisted the idea o f imposing
21 Trachtenberg 1979, pp. 26-29, McDougaU 1979, p. 11, Jacobson 1983.
permanent institutional constraints on Germany- But most importantly, the inordinate power 
of Germany within Europe both before and after World War I meant that it had little 
incentive to let itself be "bound’.22 Hence a consistent polity to bind Germany never came 
about. Chapter Seven ends by considering the general theoretical implications of the binding 
thesis.
I l l  M e t h o d o l o g ic a l  C o n s id e r a t io n s
How reliable are the findings? To what extent should the reader be persuaded by 
evidence drawn chiefly from three historical cases-studies which are admittedly selected on 
the dependent variable? The analysis of the three case-studies which form the core of this 
dissertation adheres to four methodological principles which strengthen confidence in the 
findings. First, in addition to identifying correlation between independent and dependent 
variables, each of the case-studies offer a detailed examination of the interaction of events 
and of decision-making processes in order to reveal precisely how the independent variable 
causes the dependent outcome.23 Second, although the value of the dependent outcome 
(integration) does not vary across the three main cases analyzed in chapters Four through Six, 
there is substantial "within-case variance’ in the dependent variable to permit me to make 
comparisons within cases. Such comparison allows me to test whether high values on the 
dependent variable (integration) are associated with high values on the independent variable 
(preventive dilemma).24 Third, I seek to strengthen confidence in my findings through
22 Historians largely agree that German war potential was not greatly reduced by World War I. See e.g. 
Kissinger 1994, Gillingham 1991.
23 van Evera 1997, p. 54 and Pierson & Skocpol 2000, pp. 9-10. Process tracing allows us avoid the 
functionalist posî-boc iallacy of (implicitly) backwards inducing from the observed benefits of extent institutions 
to the underlying cause of their creation. By permitting us to explore pre-integration policy and diplomacy and 
to take into account the declared intentions of decision-makers, a case-study procedure enables us to 
demonstrate an inverse relation between effect and cause in institution-building rather than tacitly assume i t
24 This enables effective testing of a hypothesis even with small numbers of cases since it multiplies the 
number of actual observations. See van Evera 1997, p. 52n and Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2000, p. 16.
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systematic testing of the working hypothesis against competing explanations rather than 
against the null-hypothesis. To do so, I secure systematic variation in competing causal 
variables across the three cases: While all three cases of successful integration coincide with a 
regional threat, economic pressure is absent in one case (the United Provinces) and an 
external threat is missing in another (the German Zollverein). Finally, whereas detailed 
analysis is limited to three cases of successful integration, I extend across-case variation in the 
dependent variable by including a less detailed analysis of a set o f  control-cases in which 
successful integration is absent.
It may be objected that the framework for testing is still tainted by the fact that it 
relies solely on evidence from European history. Of course, integration is not an exclusively 
European phenomenon. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to include 
cases from other parts of the world. Instead I allude briefly in the concluding chapter to 
some additional cases which may be used to further test the argument.
Sources
In constructing the case histories, I have relied both on secondary sources and 
published primary sources (public statements by decision-makers, political diaries, transcripts 
o f negptiations, etc.). The main problem with relying on secondary historical evidence is that 
one is often faced with differing even competing accounts for given events. This creates the 
risk that reliance on given accounts may bias one’s findings. To alleviate this problem, I have 
sought to rely on multiple sources and to provide as detailed a documentation o f events as 
possible, using a varied selection of historical references.
An often cited critique of arguments related to "binding’ postwar Germany is that 
they are based on rhetoric sampled selectively from the self-glorifying memoirs of Europe’s 
political leaders. In testing competing explanations, I have therefore given principal weight to
evidence o f congruence between theoretical predictions and decision-making outcomes. Of 
course, in the context of social science especially, one frequently encounters the problem that 
given outcomes may be consistent with more than one theoretical argument In such cases, I 
have sought to strengthen confidence in my findings by employing a second, complementary, 
standard which seeks to establish the link between actors’ intentions and decision-making 
outcomes. This method has the advantage o f avoiding the post hoc fallacy of explaining the 
existence o f institutions solely in terms of their observed function, thereby ignoring the 
possibility o f institutional failure and unintended consequences.2  ^ By seeking to reveal 
intentions behind the demand for integration we can explain institution-building in terms of 
anticipated—not just observed—effects, and thereby demonstrate an inverse relationship 
between effect and cause rather than merely assume it. To reveal the motivations behind 
policy choices, I have relied both on the speeches and writings (public as well as private) that 
policy makers have used to justify their decisions and on published records from 
negotiations. Rather than cite political speech as conclusive evidence in favor of my 
argument, however, I use it in concurrence with Tiard evidence’ explaining why we should 
believe these arguments.
2  ^ See Keohane 1984, pp. 80-81.
II A  Review  o f  Theories of Political Integration
In this chapter, I review the main political-science approaches to the study of 
regional integration. Broadly speaking, these can be grouped into three main analytical 
categories: (1) neofunctionalist and ‘historical institutionalist’ theories; (2) political economy 
approaches; (3) realist or ‘geopolitical’ approaches to integration. With few exceptions, 
theories within each of these categories have focused primarily—if not exclusively— on 
explaining integration among West European countries in the post World War II period.-6 
However, many of the insights gleaned from these studies can be generalized in principle, 
thereby allowing us to derive from each approach a set o f general hypotheses about why 
integration takes place.
The three approaches present three distinct perspectives on integration. Roughly, 
we can distinguish different theoretical perspectives according to two dichotomies. One is 
between intergovemmentalism and a supranationalism. Whereas intergovemmentalist 
theories view member states as the primary actors in the integration process, 
supranationalist theories focus attention on the autonomous actions of institutional actors. 
A second dichotomy is between a traditional international relation approach, which 
maintains that integration is motivated by liigh politics’ and which views integration policy 
as unconstrained by domestic politics, versus a more ‘functionalist’ approach which holds 
that integration is driven mainly by economic necessity and which portray integration 
policies as amenable to domestic political pressures.
The three approaches reviewed in this chapter present distinct combinations of 
these perspectives. Whereas geopolitical or ‘realist’ integration theories see state 26
26 Although some attempts have been made at broadening the empirical scope beyond Western Europe 
these are few and far between. See Nye 1968, Haas & Schmitter 1964, Mattli 1999.
17
I AA
preferences 21s determined mainly by security-related events at the international level, 
political economy (PE) theories locate pressure for integration at the sub-national level, 
among domestic producers and *big business’ groups. Thus, whereas geo-politically 
oriented scholars portray integration as the outcome of ‘grand political designs’ enacted in 
clandestine executives in pursuit o f some version of the ‘national interest’, PE oriented 
scholars tend to see integration as emerging from the ‘normal politics’ o f  social economic 
demands and government response.27 It is important to note, however, that both 
approaches identify states as the main actors. Despite attention to social demands, the PE 
perspective shares with realism a focus on states as crucial gatekeepers in the integration 
process which either restrict or promote the ‘supply’ of integration. This stands in sharp 
contrast to neo-functionalist and historical institutionalist theories, where both demand 
and supply of integration is seen to be generated at the sub-national and transnational 
level— among political parties, technocratic elite and various supranational actors—and 
where integration is theorized as a gradual and self-sustaining process defined largely by 
unintended outcomes of path dependent choices.
Before I proceed to review the different theories within each of the three 
categories, it will be helpful to list a few criteria by which a theory of integration can be 
assessed. First, a theory of integration should explain the emergence of state preferences in 
favor of integration by pointing to a coherent set of independent factors which lead states 
to perceive that their interests will best served by pooling or delegating sovereignty to a set 
of common institutions. These factors should be derived from a general theory of state 
preferences rather than educed post-fact from observation of state actions. Second, and 
related, a theory o f integration should be able to account for timing—that is, it should
27 PE-oriented scholars like Andrew Moravcsik (1998), Walter Mattli (1999) and Alan Milward (1992) all 
explain the EC/EU chiefly as a response to increasing economic interdependence which has led to social 
demands for integration.
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explain why integration took place when it did, not sooner or later. Third, a theory of 
integration should be generalizable. The majority o f existing integration studies are geared 
towards explaining a single, geographically and historically bound phenomenon, namely the 
EC. This is not objectionable p er  se. To claim theoretical status as ‘general explanations*, 
however, the central attributes of such explications should be in principle applicable to a 
number of similar cases.28 Fourth, a convincing theory of integration should be able to 
account for both failures and successes of integration. Finally, a theory of integration 
should be able to generate probabilistic propositions about future events of the kind; “if a 
certain number of variables are present in sufficient strength then integration in area X is 
likely to occur”. 29 *
I . N E o-F u n c t io n a l ist  T h e o r y
A first framework for analyzing European integration is neofunctionalist theory. 
Neofunctionalism—like the political economy perspective— is grounded in a liberal theory 
of international relations. The context in which successful integration is expected to 
operate is economic, social and technical rather than power-oriented. Increasing 
international interdependence is seen as a main vehicle for institutionalization since it adds 
to the number o f technical problems which can only be solved at the supranational level. 
Thus, according to neofunctionalism, the growing importance in the 20th century Western 
societies of technical problems whose scope transcend the borders of any single state is the 
key development which has necessitated regional integration.
The theoretical basis of neofunctionalism is classical functionalism, pioneered by 
David Mitrany during World War II.3® Starting from the assumption that political
28 Particular explanations designed to account for a single case can qualify as general explanations insofar as 
they clearly identify the theories that govern their operation. See Mancur Olson 1982, p. 10.
29 Huelshoff 1994.
3® The seminal work on functionalism is Mitrany’s A Working Peace System (1943).
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divisions are a main source of conflict among states, Mitrany proposed to create a 
Svorking web1 of international institutions that would bring states together in close 
economic and technocratic cooperation.31 His strategy can be described as one o f “peace 
by pieces”. Mitrany believed that by initiating cooperation in low-political, functional areas, 
one would set in motion a gradual process towards closer cooperation since every function 
would generate another through a process of “functional spill-over”. Once in place, the 
web o f functional organizations would generate new political loyalties at the supranational 
level (by increasing prosperity) and gradually undermine loyalties to the nation-state. The 
result would be a lasting peace.32 3*
Classical functionalism suffered its first blow with the emergence o f the European 
Communities in the 1950s. The notion that territorial sovereignty would easily be 
abandoned in favor of supranational institutions failed to survive confrontation with the 
empirical experience of West European integration. In its place, Ernst Haas proposed a 
more explicitly empirical (and utilitarian) approach.33 The objective of integration was no 
longer 'peace through prosperity9 but simply prosperity. Self-interest and instrumental 
rationality were taken for granted and relied on for delineating actor perceptions.3  ^Thus, 
Haas in The Uniting o f  E urope writes; “Good Europeans are not the main creators of 
th e .. .community; the process of community formation is dominated by nationally
31 Mitrany 1943. See also Pendand 1975, p. 75.
32 The functionalist proposition is that political loyalties are the result o f satisfaction with the performance 
of important functions by a governmental agency. Since it is possible for peoples to be loyal to several 
agencies simultaneously, there may be a gradual transfer of loyalty to international organizations performing 
important tasks. Dogherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, p. 439.
33 Ernst Haas was the first to focus attention on ‘integration’ as an appropriate concept for describing the 
institutionalization of interstate cooperation that was taking place in Europe. See Haas 1957. Other key 
neofunctionalist texts indude Nve 1970, Haas & Schmitter 1964, Lindberg 1963.
3^ Mattli 1999, p. 23; Pentland 1975, pp. 16-17. In neofunctionalism, technological determinism is no 
longer the main driving force for integration. The emphasis now lies on the self-interest of political actors 
(interest groups, political parties, and supranational institutions) who attempt to exploit functional pressures 
for cooperation to their own advantage.
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constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their 
aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable”.35
Since its inception, the neofunctionalist approach has evolved in close symbiosis 
with the empirical development of the European integration project. The concept of 
functional spill-over—i.e. the idea that, due to high levels o f interdependence, integration 
in one area will give rise to new tasks which can only be resolved by further integration in 
related areas—has remained a key concept in successive versions of neo functionalism as 
has the notion that unintended and unanticipated consequences play a significant role in 
the integration. According to Ernst Haas, “most political actors are incapable o f long- 
range purposive behavior because they stumble from one set of decisions into the next as 
a result of not having been able to foresee many of the implications and consequences of 
earlier decisions”.36 However, periodic crises in the EC during the 1960s, which eventually 
lead to stagnation in the integration process, meant that the idea of a self-sustaining or 
‘automatic* process of ‘functional spill-over* was soon complemented by more complex 
notions of ‘political’ and cultivated’ spill-over which saw functional linkages as contingent 
on the self-interest and political will of national actors as well as pressure from 
supranational agents.37 Haas wrote in 1964 that “[only] if the actors on the basis of their 
interest-inspired perceptions desire to adapt integration lessons learned in one context to a 
new situation, the lesson will be generalized”.38 *In this respect, the autonomous actions of
3 5  Haas 1958, p. xiv.
36 Haas 1971, p. 23
3 7  The 1963-65 crisis in which supranarionality was disrupted in Tiigh politics style* by Charles de Gaulle led 
scholars to place more weight on political spill-over—ie . the mechanism by which political elites, pursuing 
their own welfare interests, develop the perception, through a process of learning’, that their interests are 
be$tserved by supranational solutions, j^ e  crjsjs giso ie{j Haas to suggest that "incremental processes...are
always subject to reversal*. The result was the introduction of new linkage concepts, including 'spill-forward* 
(the fulfillment of a postulated task for integrative purposes), ‘spill-back’ (a retreat from an original 
commitment to integration) and ‘spill-around’ (the extension of a postulated task into spheres of action not 
previously anticipated). See Nye 1971; and Pentland 1975, p. 16. For a discussion of neofunctionalism’s 
different 'phases’ see Kelstrup 1992, pp. 41-2.
38 Haas 1 9 5 4  ^pp- 4 7 .4 8 . The notion that integration depends less on functional pressures as such and
more on the interaction of political fores seeking to exploit these pressures finds a clear expression in Haas
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supranational actors (including the Commission and the European Court o f Justice) were 
seen as key. Supranational institutions would act as vital mediators in the integration 
process by ‘upgrading the common interest1 of national actors by means of issue-linkage 
and side-payments, thereby allowing the integration process to move forward.^9 •*
Despite set-backs caused by the stop-and-go nature of European integration 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the concepts of spill-over and ‘unintended consequences1 
have remained popular among many observers of European integration. Whereas many 
students of integration during the 1970s abandoned neofunctionalism in favor o f more 
general theories of international relations or political economy, arguments based on spill­
over and supranational entrepreneurship experienced a major revival with the signing of 
the Single European Act in 1986, leading to a wave of new neo functionalist inspired 
scholarship.^ More recently, a new rendition of the neo-functionalist argument has 
emerged called “Historical Institutionalism” (HI).* 41 Like previous versions of 
neofunctionalism, HI views regional integration as an incrementally constructed, partly 
unintended outcome of path dependent processes. What distinguishes HI from previous 
scholarship is a more explicit focus on how institutional developments unfold over time 
and may change the position o f states in ways unanticipated by their creators. According to 
Paul Pierson, the crucial claim of HI is that actors may be in a strong initial position, seek 
to maximize their interests and nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms that 
fundamentally transform their own positions in ways that are unanticipated or undesired.42
and Schmitter's 1966 redefinition of integration as “involving the gradual politicization o f the actor’s 
purposes which were initially considered 'technical' or 'non-controversial” .
^  In contrast to Intergovemmentalism which holds that effective power lies with the institution that acts 
last (i.e. can veto new legislation) neo-functionalism stresses the importance of agenda setting power. It 
therefore proscribes an important role for both the European Commission and Parliament See Garrett & 
Tsebelis 1996.
^  Prominent examples of the ‘revived* neo functionalist approach include Taylor 1989, Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen 1991, Sandholtz 1992,1993, Huelshof 1993, Laursen 1990.
4 1  See e.g. Hall & Taylor 1996, North 1990, Pierson 1996, and Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth 1992. See 
also Ikenbeny 1994.
4 2  Pierson 1996, p. 126.
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However, HI bears close resemblance to ‘classical* neofunctionalism via its emphasis on 
learning effects, and given its focus on incremental and frequently unforeseen 
developments rather than grand political visions as a primary determinant of integration.43
Hypotheses &  Observable Implications o f  Neofunctionalism
Three main hypotheses can be derived from neofunctionalism. First, if  neo­
functionalists are right, the expansion o f integration into new areas should somehow reflect 
disequilibria caused by prior integration, or at least follow logically form prior path- 
dependent choices. Secondly, the primary players in the integration process should be 
found above and below the nation state—among technocratic elite and supranational 
entrepreneurs—while national governments should play only a secondary role.44 *Thirdly, 
institutionalized cooperation should occur mainly on issues of a technocratic or economic 
nature rather than on strictly political issues.
Neofunctionalist theory may be seen to be corroborated by some incidents in the 
European integration process. For example, many scholars have pointed to elements spill­
over from the Common Market (EEC) established in 1958 to the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986, and from the SEA to EMU in 1992. However, the assumption of 
integration as a smooth, continuous process can quickly be dismissed. If dynamics o f spill­
over from the Rome Treaties had been sufficient to create the SEA why did it not occur 
earlier?4  ^The great importance ascribed to institutional actors is also doubtful. Although
4  ^ Pierson (1996:130-31) identifies four fundamental factors that are likely to create ‘gaps’ in member-state 
control over the integration process: the autonomous actions of European institutional actors, the restricted 
time horizons of decision makers, the large potential for unintended consequences, and the likelihood of 
changes in government leaders over time. All four factors are largely identical to the assumptions of 
traditional neofunctionalist theory.
4 4  The debate between supranationalists and intergovemmentalists has provoked a third, mo-institutionalist 
position, which holds that neither the interests of governments nor the interests of supranational and 
transnational actors alone can explain the institutional development of the EC but that, taken together, the 
interests of actors on the supranational, the governmental and the transnational level can explain institutional 
change. The problem with this approach is that it lacks a clear understanding of the interplay of interests on 
different levels. On the neoinstitutionalist position see Scharpf 1988, Zang & Wolf 19xx.
4  ^ Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, p. 19.
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neo functionalist arguments about the independent actions of the Commission and 
European Court of Justice have some merit, there is little doubt that the member states, 
acting together in the Council of Ministers, remain the most powerful decision makers. As 
Andrew Moravcsik has convincingly shown, when member-states choose to pool and 
delegate sovereignty to regional institutions it is not due to technocratic imperatives but 
because of a calculated need to promote a carefully circumscribed centralization of 
authority in order to lock in’ given agreements on which governments might later be 
tempted to cheat.46
II. Geopolitical and  Realist Approaches to Integration
Realist integration theory developed in the 1970s in reaction to the prevalence of 
liberal and functionalist theories of integration. The essence of realist or ‘geopolitical’ 
explanations for integration is in the link between regional cooperation and underlying 
national security interests. Whereas political economy approaches stress the material benefits 
from integration, the focus o f  realist integration theory is on the “externality effects” that 
such benefits may have on national security.47 * At the basis o f realist integration theory lies 
the assumption that states who are allied in the pursuit of common geopolitical goals will be 
more likely to cooperate economically as a way to generate wealth to strengthen the 
alliance.4** From this basis, realism offers three relatively distinct images of regional 
integration, each stressing a different source of geo-political threat and each resting on a 
strictly intergovemmentalist understanding of integration. The first stresses balancing against 
external military threats, the second emphasizes perceptions o f ‘global prestige and ambition’,
4i> Moravcsik 1998.
4 7  Gowa 1994.
See Moravcsik 1998, pp. 27-29. See also Gowa 1994, Grieco 1999.
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and a third—realist auxiliary hypothesis—focuses on ‘collective security’ and notions of 
‘balanced growth’.4^
The first realist explanation builds directly on classical balance of power theory. 
On this view, integration emerges primarily to reinforce balancing against an external 
enemy. One frequently encounters this type of argument in the literature on political 
leagues and confederations, where, historically, confederation has been perceived as a 
means for smaller states to boost their power vis-à-vis larger neighbors.5® The ‘external 
balancing* view is also popular in the context of Cold War Europe, where the preeminent 
threat from the Soviet Union is often seen to have provided a crucial vehicle for 
integration. Among the chief proponents o f this view are John Mearsheimer and Kenneth 
Waltz who both portray postwar European integration as a direct function of the postwar 
bipolar conflict. On one hand, European integration presented a way to strengthen the 
western alliance against Soviet threat. On the other hand, the ‘shadow cast by the 
superpowers’ facilitated integration by providing a protective mantle under which 
European states could cooperate without the fear that the greater advantage of one would 
be translated into military force to be used against the others.* 51 52 The upshot of this version 
of realism is that, in the absence o f both a powerful external threat and a bipolar 
international structure, European integration can be expected to relapse— indeed this has 
been the prediction of several realist scholars in the immediate post-Co Id war period.5 2
pot an overview and discussion of geopolitical approaches to integration see Moravcsik 1998, pp. 27-35.
5® This view is prevalent in the writings of Montesquieu. For recent versions o f the same argument see 
Lister 1999,1996, and Forsyth 1981.
5 1  According to Waltz, bi-polarity turned the West European democracies into ‘consumers of security’: 
“Because the security of all of them came to depend ultimately on the policies o f others.. .unity could 
effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved”. (Waltz 1986, pp. 58-59, and 1979, pp. 70-71). 
Similarly, Mearsheimer has argued that the bipolar conflict created a hothouse’ in which European 
integration chould flourish. Mearsheimer 1990, p. 47.
52 E.g., Mearsheimer argued in 1990 that “without a common Soviet threat and without the American night 
watchman, Western European states will again be viewing each other with greater fear and suspicion as they 
did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War”. Mearsheimer 1990, p. 47.
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A second realist explanation views integration as a way to bolster the power and 
autonomy of integrating states in a world dominated by large ‘global* powers. On this view, 
postwar European integration aimed to bolster the political prestige and influence of 
European countries in a world dominated by superpowers.33 The ‘political autonomy and 
prestige’ explanation has gained increasing popularity at the end o f the Cold War. The 1989 
collapse of bipolarity and the almost simultaneous deepening of European integration 
manifest in the move to EMU presented a challenge to realist arguments based on 
conventional military7 balancing logic. However, realist scholars have been quick to argue 
that the persistence of European integration reflects a desire to balance the growing 
economic and political power of Japan and the United States and thereby prevent a decline 
in Europe’s global position * 34 *Observationally, this explanation may be seen to overlap with 
a liberal political economy perspective insofar as it sees integration as a way to secure 
competitive advantages for a regions’ firms and businesses. However, the underlying 
motivation for integration differ in the two approaches. On a realist view, integration 
presents a way to ‘balance’ against the economic and political power of other states. State 
preferences are determined directly by competitive pressures from the world political- 
economy and do not reflect demands from domestic businesses and producer groups such 
as they do in the liberal view. Also the realist focus is on relative gains vis-à-vis third parties, 
rather than on the maximization of absolute welfare gains for regional member-states.
“,3 The goal o f creating a 'third super-power’ is often associated particularly with the policy of General 
Charles de Gaulle. See Kolodziej 1974 and 1990. For a discussion of this view see also Moravcsik 1998,p. 
30.
3 4  The “economic balancing” explanation of integration is spelled out by Wayne Sandholtz and John
Zysman (1989) who argue that the 1992-process was triggered by a shift in the distribution o f economic
power resources from the US to Japan, allowing Japan to assume a leading role in a number of key high-
technological sectors. A similar account of the 1987 European Single Act (SEA) is offered by Geoffrey
Garrett (1992) who attributes the market liberalization process initiated by the SEA to a felt need for
increasing European competitiveness vis-à-vis the US and Japan. For similar arguments see also Gowa 1994,
Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, p. 22, Grieco 1995b, and Kahler 1995, p. 83.
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A third ‘geopolitical* explanation—which may be termed a realist ‘auxiliary 
hypothesis’ insofar as it draws heavily on institutionalist theory—abandons the focus on 
external threat or international ‘prestige* in favor of a focus on power-relations within a 
region. This explanation comes in two forms. One version—which is consistent with the 
binding thesis set forth in this dissertation—sees integration as a way to anchor and bind a 
powerful state through ties of economic interests and shared rules and norms. Hence, in 
the context of Western Europe, it is often said that integration presented a way to bind 
Germany to the Western bloc and prevent a German-Soviet détente and to ensure that 
Germany would not use its preponderant power to bully its neighbors. As argued in the 
previous chapter, this argument has largely failed to capture the attention of political 
scientists, who tend to dismiss it as mere political rhetoric. So far, only Joseph G ri eco has 
given the fear o f power German power pride of place in his analysis of the adaptation of 
EMU in terms o f what he labels a ‘neo-realist inspired voice-opportunity thesis’.^  
Building on Hirshman’s theory on ‘voice and exit*, Grieco proposes that weaker states may 
favor institutional ties with a stronger partner as a way to influence its policies and avoid 
political subordination.^6 Consistent with this hypothesis, he maintains that the decision 
to adopt EMU was driven by a desire to introduce greater symmetry in ‘voice opportunity* 
in monetary matters than existed within the European Monetar)7 System (EMS) where the 
German Bundesbank played a ‘hegemonic role\57
A second realist argument which focuses on power-relations within a region as a 
key factor in explaining preferences for integration is what Grieco has labeled the “relative 
disparity shift hypothesis”. This hypothesis suggests that relative stability of power *57
Grieco 1955a, 1995b.
56  Grieco 1994a, 1995b, p. 34. According to Grieco’s voice-opportunity thesis, “if states share a common 
interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but 
still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities 
for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by 
stronger partners.”
5 7  Ibid 1995b, pp. 34-36.
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capabilities (which depends in part on gains from regional cooperation), and expectations 
that such stability will persist, contributes to the establishing and deepening o f regional 
institutions. The intuition is that when patterns of cooperation are associated with stability 
in relative gains (or ‘growth’), states will be less afraid that institutionalizing those patterns 
might lead to long-term power imbalances. By contrast, when power relations are unstable, 
declining states will resist institutionalization for fear that this will lock-in an asymmetric 
relationship and further undermine their position. Institutionalization is no longer seen as 
a way for weaker states to achieve voice and avoid domination, but rather as a means to 
cement a given pattern of exchange; states will only agree to do so when national growth- 
rates are relatively balanced within a region.58
Essentially, this second auxiliary hypothesis may work best as a ‘complementary’ 
thesis to one of the two ‘balancing* explanations. Thus, one might imagine that a group of 
states would be more inclined to agree on integration as a means to balance against an 
outside challenger if patterns of cooperation within the region were associated with relatively 
even growth rates. This explanation runs contrary to the binding thesis which argues that 
integration takes place in reaction to uneven growth rates and is not dependent on a previous 
history of balanced growth.
Hypotheses and Observable Implications o f  Realist Integration Theory
From the above versions o f the realist argument, w e can derive a set o f concrete 
hypotheses about the timing and shape of regional integration. First, according to a  realist 
intergovemmentalist perspective, important developments in the integration process 
should be traceable exclusively to grand intergovernmental bargains whereas periods o f 
consolidation are of little interest. In contrast to neofunctionalist theories which focus on 
unintended effects o f previous decisions, the realist perspective holds that it is exclusively
58  Grieco 1999.
intergovernmental bargains that create and change the rules of the game.59 Second, as 
noted by Andrew Moravcsik, if realists are right, the timing o f intergovernmental bargains 
should reflect a response to major geopolitical problems while bearing little relation to 
fundamental economic trends or changes.60 If integration is spurred by external military 
threats (or by bipolar conflict) we would expect a positive correlation between the intensity 
of international (bilateral) conflict on the one hand, and regional integration on the other. 
If integration is driven by concerns of ‘political autonomy and prestige’, we would expect it 
to be preceded by increased international competition—along economic and political 
dimensions—combined with an actual or anticipated decline in the relative political clout 
and/or economic competitiveness of the states seeking closer ties. Finally, if integration 
presents a means to anchor and bind a stronger state within a region, we would expect 
institutionalization to correlate with increasing disparities in the distribution of capabilities 
among regional states.
What observable implications would tend to confirm a geopolitical reasoning about 
integration? The timing of an event can provide some indication about its probable cause. 
However, correlation does not suggest causation p e r  se. Therefore to accept a geopolitical 
argument in favor of integration we must also supply evidence that integration can indeed 
be seen to have posed a solution to the geopolitical problem at hand. For example, while 
we may readily accept that an external threat provides incentives for states to deepen their 
cooperation, it does not follow that balancing against such a threat calls for the creation of 
a regional integration scheme in which sovereignty is pooled, as opposed to a less 
restraining military alliance which allows states to remain independent.61 Unless it can be
^  Pierson 1996, p. 130.
Moravcsik 1998, p. 34.
6  ^ To save their theory, many realists have argued that integration is not fundamentally different from inter­
state alliances. In fact, some maintain that cooperation among W est European states is not irreversible and 
does not involve any crucial relinquishment of state sovereignty (e.g. Mearsheimer 1990a). Vet, this seems 
implausible in light of recent research. Current scholarship shows that European institutions have authority
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shown that efficient balancing against third parties requires the creation o f regional political 
unions rather than conventional alliances, the causal link between exterior threat and 
regional integration seems tenuous at best.
The thin causal link between forms of external threat on the one hand and regional 
integration on the other hand constitutes a major weakness of received geopolitical 
integration theory. It is not clear why balancing against an external military threat would 
require economic and political integration. Historically we see that whereas states show a 
greater propensity to trade with states with whom they are allied than with states whom 
they see as posing a threat, trade only nominally increases the cohesion o f existing military 
alliances.62 Evidence with respect to the timing of integration in relation to external threat 
is also dubious. Whereas European integration in the 1950s may be explained as a reaction to 
Soviet threat, this factor was less important in the 1980s and 1990s. Integration in the latter 
period may be rationalized as a result o f increased competition from American and Japan 
producers.63 However, this explanation runs into the problem that competition from the 
U.S. and Japan was fierce also in the early 1970s—a period during which European 
integration stagnated.64 This casts doubt on the notion that integration constitutes a form 
of balancing.
Joseph Grieco’s realist Voice-opportunity thesis’ holds more promise. In contrast 
to explanations based on balancing o f power, the voice-opportunity hypothesis is able, in 
theory, to account both for the timing o f  integration as well as for its concrete form. In the 
case o f  the EMU, for example, Grieco shows why an actual monetary union (as opposed to
far beyond the competence we normally associate with international institutions. Keohane & Hoffmann 
1991, p. 10.
See Gowa 1994.
63 See e.g. Garrett 1992 and Sandholtz and Zysman 1989.
64 As Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann note, Europe faced serious economic challenges in die late 
1960’s from the US and in the 1970s when a combination of US political and economic policies and events 
in the Middle East produced turbulence in markets for money and oil. Had Europe unified itself more 
strongly in the 1970s, one could have explained those actions in terms o f economic instability and crisis. See 
Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, pp. 22-23.
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more ad hoc forms of monetary coordination) was ne cess ary in order to secure a permanent 
voice for the smaller states. The problem with Grieco’s theory, however, is that it does not 
offer a convincing explanation for why Germany—the dominant European state—would 
agree to be bound within EMU, nor does it explain how an institution such as EMU in fact 
serves to constrain German power in the long run.65 These are some questions which I 
address in the following chapter.
I ll Political Economy Approaches to Regional integration
Whereas geopolitical theories of integration focus on the security7 externalities 
which may flow from integration, political economy (PE) accounts explain integration 
simply as a means for enhancing material welfare. Integration is seen as a way for 
governments to reduce transaction costs, reap economies of scale and restructure general 
patterns of economic policy externalities to their mutual advantage.66 In contrast to the 
geopolitical perspective where preferences for integration are seen to emerge within closed 
executives and to be driven by ‘grand strategic goals’, the PE approach expects pressure for 
integration to emerge primarily from domestic producer groups who respond to 
opportunities for profitable international trade and investment by demanding increased 
liberalization at the regional level. Governments respond to such pressures within the 
limits set by the states’ various political and budget constraints.67
Grieco offers to possible explanations for why Germany would agree to provide its smaller partners with 
‘voice opportunities’ in monetary affairs. First, he argues, despite a belief that EMU would lead to a 
reduction of German influence in monetary' affairs, German ofScials might have had reason to believe that 
they would still be able to defend key German monetary objectives, including price stability. Second, he 
suggests that Germany at the end of the 1980s has come to believe that it needed to accept some limitation 
on its influence on European monetary affairs as the price for fostering a more effective European coalition 
against Japan. (Grieco 1995a). The first explanation is problematic because it suggests that German policy is 
not in fact constrained by EMU. The second explanation suggests that balancing against an external 
threat—not binding of German power—created the impetus for EMU.
66 Moravcsik 1998, p. 35, Mattli 1999, cpt. III.
67 Moravcsik 1998, p. 35.
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The focus on economic efficiency implies that the PE perspective is, broadly 
speaking, functional: The intensity and form of integration follows the functions that 
governments must perform to keep their firms and economies competitive in a rapidly 
changing world economy.68 Yet, unlike purely functionalist approaches, the PE 
perspective is not apolitical. The focus is on distributive as well as efficiency effects of 
policy coordination.69 As a result, state preferences in favor integration are not determined 
solely by shifts in world economic circumstances which give rise to opportunities for 
profitable international trade and investment, but instead reflect the impact of such shifts 
on the constellation of competing preferences at the domestic level .7®
In the following I focus primarily on two recent contributions within the PE 
approach to integration. The first is Walter Mattli’s ‘efficiency view of integration’, the 
second is Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovemmentalism (LI)7^ These contributions 
are singled out because they represent the most comprehensive recent attempts to 
generate a framework for explaining, not only how states form preferences in favor of 
integration, but also how governments pursue those preferences at the regional level.
Walter MattU's \efficiency mew o f  integration\
According to Mattli’s theory, integration can be conceived as ‘an exercise in 
internalizing the externalities that affect cross-border trade and investment in order to 
reduce transaction costs’.72 The starting point for his theory is the assumption that 
technological and political changes create functional pressures which lead to a demand for 
integration within states. As new technologies increase the scope of markets beyond the 
boundaries of a single state, actors who stand to gain from wider markets—usually ‘big
68 Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, p. 18.
6 9  Moravcsik 1998, p. 36.
7 0  Moravcsik 1998, pp. 37-38.
7  ^ Matti 1999, Moravcsik 1993 and 1998.
7 2  Mattli 1999, pp. 12-3.
32
business’ groups—will seek a change in the existing governance structure to realize these 
gains.7,5 For example, Mattli explains integration in 19th century Germany as a result o f the 
building of the railway and the innovation of steamboats which expanded the distance 
across which individuals and firms could profitably trade with one another. This lead to a 
strong demand for new political and economic arrangements that would enable German 
merchants and producers to increase cross-border transactions and improve their 
competitiveness.73 4 *
However, for integration to prosper, ‘supply’ conditions must be satisfied as well— T 
that is, political leaders must be willing to accommodate demands for integration. 
Assuming that political leaders value state autonomy and power, but premising that 
politicians’ ability’ to hold on to power depends on the strength of the national economy, 
Mattli defines a first supply condition as ‘economic hardship’. Leaders of economically 
successful states are unlikely to pursue integration because their expected marginal benefit 
in terms of improved re-election chances is minimal. In economic crisis, however, leaders 
will be inclined to support integration as a way to enhance economic efficiency and thereby 
increase their popularity.73
A second supply condition—drawn from hegemonic stability7 theory—focuses on 
international leadership. Integration, even among states who share a substantive interest in 
controlling negative externalities, can be obstructed by collective action problems. A 
condition for successful integration therefore lies in the presence of an undisputed leader 
among the states seeking closer ties, which can serve as ‘focal point’ in the coordination of
7 3  Ibid. pp. 46,58.
7 4  Mattli 1998, p. 115.
7 3  Ibid. pp. 44-50. For similar analyses of political leaders’ preferences with respect to integration see e.g. 
Grossman & Helpman 1994 and Milner 19xx, p. 87. The assumption that technological change creates 
pressures which lead national business groups to demand integration, and the notion that integration supply 
is contingent on the harmony of integration effects and the self-interests of political leader bears some 
resemblance to a neo-functionalist logic.
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rules and policies and ease distributional tensions via side-payments.7  ^ Only when both 
conditions are satisfied—domestic demand for and political will to supply integration as 
well as strong leadership at the international level—will integration be successfully 
implemented. Once underway, however, an integration process may become self- 
sustaining insofar as “the successful provision of a new governance structure is likely to 
further market integration, hence putting the structure under pressure to adapt”.* 77
Andrew Moravcsik V Uberai IntergovemmentaUsm
A second PE approach—which may be said to be a hybrid between a liberal and a 
realist approach insofar as it combines a society-centered approach of preference formation 
with intergovemmentalist bargaining theory—is Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovern- 
mentalism (LI).78 The LI framework presents a tripartite model of integration grounded in 
a liberal theory of international interdependence. The first level presents an explicit theory 
of national preference formation. At this level, foreign policy goals are formulated in 
response both to the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence 
and to shifting pressure from domestic constituents. The dominant actors at this level are 
organized domestic producer groups, reacting to rising opportunities for trade.7  ^ Thus 
Moravcsik argues with respect to postwar European integration that “existing scholarship 
greatly underestimates the extent to which national policies have been driven by the desire
7  ^ Manli 1999, pp. 51-56. Mattli concludes that “if  political leaders are willing to initiate an integration 
process, chances o f sustained success are greatest if  two strong integration conditions are satisfied: First, a 
regional group stands to reap important gains from integration; second, the group is lead by a country able to 
serve as an institutional focal point”. Ibid. pp. 64-65.
7 7  Ibid. p. 49. This assumption bears dose resemblance to a neofunctionalist logic.
7 8  “Liberal Intergpvemmentalism” is laid out by Moravcsik in a series o f artides 1991,1993,1994,1995 as 
well as in a recent book The O rna forEurepe, 1998.
7  ^ Ibid., p. 39. According to Moravcsik, European leaders have “consistently pursued economic interests 
—primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macro-economic 
preferences of ruling government coalitions— that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the 
global economy.” The influence on producer interests on national preferences is not direct, however. These 
interests are promoted “within the broad constraints set by a general demand for regulator protection, 
economic efficiency and fiscal responsibility”. Ibid, p. 3-
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to promote exports”.80 At the second level, the outcome of interstate negotiations is 
explained using an intergovemmentaiist bargaining theorv focused on asymmetrical 
interdependence. At this level national executives are the supreme actors —  societal actors 
exert influence only through the domestic political structures of member states. 
Negotiation outcomes are seen to reflect the relative bargaining power of states which is a 
result o f relative opportunity costs, itself a function of export potential.®1 The third level 
employs a functional theory of institution-building to explain why states decide to pool or 
delegate sovereignty to international institutions instead of relying on ad hoc cooperation. 
The incentive to institutionalize interactions is explained by reference to Transaction Cost 
Economics which analyzes institutions as a functional means to overcome informational 
and other collective action problems among states , thereby enhancing the credibility of 
commitments.®-
Hypotheses Observable Implications o f  the Political Economy Perspective
If the PE thesis is correct, integration should follow new trends in economic 
circumstances which allow states to reap joint benefits from cooperation that could not 
previously be obtained.®® Specifically, integration should be associated with ‘rising 
opportunities for profitable cross-border exchange’, brought about either by rising 
international interdependence or by technological innovations which increase the practical 
scope of economic and political cooperation.®^ When such conditions hold, we expect
Moravcsik 1998, p. 87.
®1 Relative bargaining power is determined by patterns of asymmetric interdependence. Those states that 
will be least harmed by the non-agreement outcome gain most in negotiations. Moravcsik 1998, p. 87.
®“ Pooling and delegating of sovereignty is seen to bolster the credibility of international commitments 
because it raises the visibility and costs of non-cooperation and establishes records of reputation. Moravcsik 
1998, pp. 74,93. See also Keohane 1984, North 1990.
In order to account for the tim ing of integration, PE explanations must demonstrate that positive 
economic gains from integration were not previously available to states. If it cannot be shown that 
opportunities for gains from cooperation have arisen that were not previously present, we are still left with 
the question of what served as a trigger for integration.
®"* Moravcsik 1998.
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national preferences for integration to reflect an outflow o f societal pressures— most 
notably in the form of demands for liberalization by organized producer groups.
Going a step further, we may also glean some hypotheses about the functional 
shape of regional institutions. If the PE perspective is correct, we would expect the bulk of 
institutionalized cooperation to take place in areas of economic activity. Integration should 
be aimed explicitly at getting rid of major stumbling blocs to economic exchange such as 
high tariffs, detailed regulations, or fluctuating exchange rates. Institutionalized cooperation 
on strictly political or military issues, by contrast, is not explained by the PE approach 
unless such cooperation is shown to be critical in supporting economic exchange. Another 
way of stating this is that we would expect to see states pool or delegate sovereignty to 
regional institutions only to the extent that doing so can be expected to enhance politico- 
economic efficiency.
At first sight, West European integration may be seen to offer excellent evidence 
for these assumptions. Since 1958, the major intergovernmental bargains have been 
primarily o f an economic nature, focusing on reducing barriers to trade, managing 
exchange rates etc. Nonetheless, the European integration process as a whole has not taken 
quite the form and shape that PE theory would lead us to expect. The first integration 
initiative, the European Coal and Steel Union of 1952, had little background in commercial 
concerns. In general, if  member states had been concerned exclusively, or even primarily, 
with commercial advantage it is plausible that they would have engaged in less extensive 
cooperation, for example via the creation o f broad FTA, which would have offered more 
opportunities for European producers to expand their exports of goods and services. The 
fact that European integration has been confined to a geographically more narrow and 
politically more constrictive framework suggests that a full explanation for integration must 




In this chapter I have presented a brief overview o f the main political science 
approaches to regional integration. As we have seen, each approach gives rise to a set of 
concrete hypotheses and observable implications regarding the underlying motivations for 
integration. A weakness of many current integration theories, however, lies in the lack of 
an integrated approach which can illuminate the tradeoff between national autonomy on 
the one hand, and the benefits—be they economic or security-related—from integration 
on the other hand. As I have shown, existing approaches often have problems in 
accounting for both the timing and concrete form of successive integration initiatives. 
When will opportunities for profitable exchange compel governments to surrender 
sovereignty to international institutions? How damaging must transaction costs be before 
national governments are persuaded to abandon control over key policy-making tools in 
order to eliminate such costs? Under what conditions will states choose integration over a 
simple military alliance as a way to balance against military threats? To say that received 
theories of integration fail to offer a convincing answer to these questions is not to say that 
these theories are wrong, only that they may be insufficient. To adequately explain both 
the timing and form of major integration initiatives, I argue, one must take account o f an 
additional explanatory factor, namely that of a regional preventive conflict. Only by 
focusing on security concerns nithin regions can we provide a satisfactory explanation for 
both the timing of integration (in response to regional power fluctuations) and its concrete 
form (binding agreements which reduce the returns to power and raise the costs o f exit 
from institutional arrangements). Nevertheless, my choice o f focusing on preventive 
conflict as a key causal factor should not be seen as a whole-sale rejection of the 
explanatory variables emphasized in existing theories. My argument is not that “A not B 
mattered”, but rather “both A and B may have mattered, but A mattered most”.
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III. A  T h e o r y  of In st it u t io n a l  B in d in g
“Peace is not the end o f  struggle, but thefiner organisation i f  i t” (Chades Merriam)85
I. INTRODUCTION
The central argument of this dissertation is that integration can best be explained as 
a solution to a particular time-consistency problem known as the preventive war dilemma. 
At the root of the preventive war dilemma lies a commitment problem. In situations of 
power transition, rivaling states who could in theory gain from peaceful bargaining 
nonetheless wage war on one another because they cannot trust each other to uphold a 
deal ex  post. However, as I illustrate in this chapter, integration can solve the commitment 
problem by enabling states to credibly commit ex ante to a peaceful course o f action ex  post. 
By pooling sovereignty in supranational institutions states can establish binding constraints 
on one another which rule out future use of arbitrary force by making it either physically 
impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to pursue national objectives by means of force.
The idea that states pursue integration in order to constrain one another’s power is 
not novel. For example, it is widely agreed that French desires to rule out a future war with 
Germany played a key role in the creation of the European Community o f Steel and Coal 
Community (ECSQ in 1952.86 Similarly, the linkage between German re-unification (and 
the fear this caused in France) and the move to European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1992 
is acknowledged by many observers.**? However, no attempt has been made at developing 
these assertions into a general theory of European integration—let alone a theory which
Charles Merriam, “Systemic Politics”, 1945.
Among those who stress French fears of German rearmament as a driving factor in the creation of the 
ECSC are Archer 1990, Baun 1996, Dell 1995, Dinan 1994, Gillingham 1991, Hogan 1991, Ikenberry 2001, 
p. 42, Lynch 1984, Milward 1984, and Poidevin 1991. This reading is contested by Moravcsik 1998.
8?  See e.g. Baun 1996, Cole 1993, Dinan 1994, Haglund 1991, Saeter 1995, Sandholtz 1993, and Yost 1990.
i u u n LiuufHAiuouikKiyJWWMKWWWWWWRHi
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might account for other cases of integration as well.88 Missing is a theoretical framework 
which gives the argument about French desires to ‘bind' German power via integration a 
clear analytical basis and which could be extended—in principle— to similar cases. Such a 
framework would have to answer three questions: First, under what conditions will weaker 
states attempt to tie down a stronger, potentially threatening state by integrating with it? 
Second, when will a stronger state agree to accept institutional constraints on its powers? 
Third how, in practice, can international institutions serve to bind states to a given course 
of action thereby enabling credible commitment? This chapter offers an attempt at 
providing such a framework.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical assumptions 
which underlie the analysis. The following three sections explore the relation between the 
preventive war dilemma and the incentive for states to institutionalize their political and 
economic interactions. In section III, I present a simple version of the standard preventive 
war scenario, showing why preventive war is a rational course of action when the balance 
of power between two military rivals is expected to shift. In section IV, I modify the 
standard commitment problem by giving states the option to create an institution that 
enables them to credibly commit ex ante to a given course of action ex p o s t  In section V, I 
specify the key conditions that an institution must meet in order to enable credible 
commitment and spell out a number of concrete ways in which international institutions 
can be engineered to fulfil these conditions. Section VI proceeds to address some possible 
objections to the binding argument. Section VII concludes by deriving a set of concrete
88 References to security interests remain ad  h oc in most accounts of European integration E.g., Baun 
(1996) argues that European integration has proceeded according to two separate logic: the logic of‘securin’ 
and geopolitics’ on one hand and the logic of 'interdependence and economic necessity’ on the other hand. 
In the early postwar years, securin’ interests were the primary motivation for integration, whereas by the late 
1950s economic interests had become the main driving force. This remained true until the late 1980s when 
the end of the Cold war “made the logic of security on ce again the predominant driving force of European 
integration”. Baun 1996, p. 7.
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hypotheses about the conditions in which the binding thesis would lead us to expect 
integration. . ,
II. B a sic  A s s u m p t io n s
The theoretical framework is based on two key assumptions about the nature of 
international relations. First, states are the primary actors in international politics. Second, 
states can be conceived as rational, unitary actors. For our purposes, ‘states’ can be 
defined simply as ‘territorially defined organizations that provide protection for their 
constituents in return for revenue’.89 The assumption that states are rational implies that 
they choose instrumentally among different policy options based on which option is most 
likely to maximize their interests.9® The assumption that states are unitary, on the other 
hand, implies that states act in international affairs with a ‘single voice’.91
The first step in explaining regional integration is to explain what determines state 
preferences. Following Andrew Moravcsik, I define state preferences as “an ordered and
89 This definition is given by Gilpin 1981, pp. 15-17. Several forms of political organization fit h is  definition.
The polities analyzed in this study range from city-states and dukedoms to contemporary nation-states. These 
polities frequently lack many of the characteristic commonly associated with modem nation-states. However, they 
all share certain features (such as a firm territorial basis within which they constitute the only legitimate source of 
authority, and autonomy vis-a-vis outside actors) which makes it appropriate to speak of them as 'states’.
99 The standard definition of instrumental rationality requires that states ‘make logically correct calculations, 
using all available information to pursue well-defined goals’. (Snidai 1986, pp. 38-39, Morgenthau 1978, p. 5, 
Harsanyi 1986, p. 83). Some may object that the assumption that actors consciously calculate the costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of actions is unrealistic. This objection is valid, I believe, when we talk about 
consumers in a market, but carries less weight in the realm of international cooperation and conflict. It is 
widely agreed that the higher the stakes of a decision, the greater the likelihood that decision-makers will 
behave rationally in the sense of using all available information to produce a utility maximizing response 
(Stam & Bennett 1999, p. 2, de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, pp. 12-17). Moreover, the fact that foreign policy 
derisions often result from bargaining among a limited number of people increases our confidence in the 
rationality of these decisions. Archer 1988, Stam & Bennett 1999.
9 1 Moravcsik 1998, p. 21. Theories based on a unitary actor assumption differ in whether they assume that 
states are also unitary internally—i.e. whether the process of foreign policy making is constrained by 
competition between different domestic interests. A 'weak' unitary actor assumption views foreign policy 
goals as resulting from the give and take of domestic politics. E.g. Moravcsik (1998:22) takes the unitary 
actor assumption to imply that “once particular objectives arise out of...domestic competition, states 
strategize as unitary actors vis-à-vis other states in an effort to realize them”. This view rests on a ‘thin’ 
rationality account which insists only that states act with short-term instrumental rationality, but which does 
not assume that state preferences are uniform or coherent across issues or over time. The assumption made 
here is somewhat stronger Assuming the existence o f a hierarchy among foreign policy and domestic policy 
goals we can assume that important foreign policy decisions are relatively unconstrained by domestic politics.
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weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes that might result from 
international political interaction”*9- Also, I distinguish between state preferences over 
substantive outcomes on one hand, and state choices of ‘strategies’ or ‘policies’ on the 
other hand. Preferences over outcomes reflect fundamental state objectives which are 
exogenous to a given political environment By contrast, choices between different 
strategies reflect considerations about how to best achieve these goals within a given 
political context* 93
I assume that states have a serial or lexical preference ordering. This is an order 
which requires states to satisfy the first principle in the order before they can move on to 
the second, the second before the third, etc. A principle does not come into play before 
those previous to it have been met or no longer apply.94 * The primary interest of states 
which must be satisfied before other objectives can be pursued is ‘national security’. 
National security interests include perceived threats to a state’s sovereignty or territorial 
integrity. Security interests may also reflect threats to a state’s economic system, which are 
seen to carry a risk o f serious economic deprivation. Such threats impinge on national 
security because economic activity, qua surplus-creating productivity and surplus-derived 
capability, is ultimately decisive for administrative proficiency and military preparedness.93 
For example, the threat of a complete economic collapse currently facing Russia can be 
seen to constitute a threat to its national security.96
In periods in which a state is externally secure it will be free to respond to other 
concerns. These include strengthening the power of the state vis-à-vis potential threats to 
its authority from within a domestic society, and responding to demands from its
9  ^ Morave sik 1998, p. 24.
93 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 24-25.
94 Rawls 1991, p. 41.
93 Li ska 1990, p. 311. See also Gilpin 1981, pp. 18-19, Kennedy 1987, pp. 539.
96 This looming economic collapse threatens both the external and internal security of the state.
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constituents for increased material welfare or other benefits. Thus, with a rough 
simplification, we can express state preferences in terms of three principles:
1) control over an external security environment (defense against attacks)
2) control over domestic society (defense against insurgente) ; i
3) ability to satisfy demands from constituents (responsiveness)
It is important to note that a lexical preference ordering does not preclude that 
states can pursue two or more goals simultaneously. However, goals can be pursued 
concurrently only when they are not in direct competition with one another. If a state’s 
efforts to maintain control over an external security environment conflict with the 
demands from key domestic constituents, constituents* demands will be satisfied only if  the 
principle of national security has already been satisfied. As we will see in chapter VI on 
the European Communities, for example, pressures from domestic producer groups for 
new economic policies in the wake o f World War II were allowed to influence the 
formulation of foreign policy goals only after the problem of national security had been 
adequately addressed.
The assumption of a lexical preference ordering, headed by the principle of 
national security naturally raises the question: When is a state secure? At what point can 
states move on to pursue other, secondary, goals? Realistically, states can never achieve 
absolute security, defined as the absence o f conceivable external threats to their existence. 
Instead, we assume that states strive to satisfy some minimal condition of external security, 
defined as the maintaining o f control over external events which may threaten their 
immediate survival. Control in this case can be distinguished from formal sovereignty. A 
state’s sovereignty can be understood as consisting of: a) a set o f legal competences over 
given issue areas; b) a legitimate monopoly on the use of force within its jurisdiction; and 
c) formal recognition by other states. While formal sovereignty is important to states, it is
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less important than actual control over events which may threaten its external security. In 
other words, states do not preserve sovereignty at all costs. Indeed, a main argument of 
this dissertation is that in situations in which a state’s national security is threatened, it may 
agree to relinquish some of its formal sovereignty if by doing so it can establish more firm 
control over the factors that impinge on its external security.
III. T h e  P r e v e n t iv e  W a r  D il e m m a  a n d  th e  P r o b l e m  o f  C o m m it m e n t
In this section, I present the elementan' logic of the preventive war dilemma which I 
argue lies at the root of regional integration. Historically, preventive wars have been 
prominent. According to leading balance of power theorists, the majority of wars between 
the great powers in the past centuries have started as preventive wars not as wars of 
conquest.97 The theoretical significance of the preventive war dilemma derives from the 
importance of changing power differentials between states, arising from uneven growth rates. 
In an anarchical system which affords no protection against the dominance of stronger over 
weaker actors, war is the only way to balance power. From this premise derives the 
assumption that most international wars are preventive in nature, aimed to forestall 
dangerous disequilibria in the distribution of power before they occur.98
9 7  See Taylor 1954, p. 166, Morgenthau 1985, p. 202, Carr 1939, Levy 1987 and Claude 1962. The 
preventive axiom is contested by Organski who argues that in recent history is has been the challengers 
(Italy, Germany, Japan) who attacked the dominant nation and its allies long before they equaled them in 
power. This, he argues, contradicts the logic of prevention. See Organski 1968, p.375, Organski & FOugler 
1980, p. 61, Thompson 1983.
9 8  Most conceptualizations of preventive war rely on a notion of a declining state’s perception of the 
inevitability, or at least high probability, of a future war in which a challenger’s power will have surpassed its 
own. However, as Jack Levy has shown, preventive motivation may apply even in the absence of an 
immediate danger of being surpassed in strength- Armed prevention may be attributable not only to a 
current 'imbalance' in military position but also to the projection of a future imbalance and to a 
corresponding perception by some states that only a preventive war can guarantee their long-term security. 
See Levy 1987, p. 88 and 2001. See also Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1989, p. 146. The link between uneven 
growth rates and preventive war is explored by among others Taylor 1971, p. 166, Dehio 1963, Levy 1987, 
Morgenthau 1985, p. 202, Aron 1966 and Gilpin 1981. For an empirical test of the relation between uneven 
growth and war, see Siverson & Tennefoss 1984, Powell 1996, de Mesquita & Lalman 1988.
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At the root o f the preventive war dilemma lies a commitment problem. Consider 
two neighboring states, one whose power is rising and who seeks to revise the status quo, 
another whose power is declining and who is satisfied with the status quo. Given its 
relative growth, at some point in the future, the rising state will be able to establish a 
dominant position, meaning that it is able to use its preponderant capabilities to prevail in 
future distributive conflicts.99 In this situation, what should the declining state do? The 
standard answer is to wage a preventive war while the rising state is still relatively weak. 
The reason is inter-temporal inconsistency. Rationalist theories of bargaining and war tell 
us that—as long as states incur a positive cost for going to war—it will be possible, in 
theory, to reach a negotiated solution which leaves both sides better off than going to war 
is possible in theory.10° For example, it is plausible that a rising state, while still weak, 
would be whiling ex  ante to promise not to take advantage o f its future military superiority if  
it believed that it could thereby avert a preventive attack against it. However, since the 
rising state will have an incentive, ex post, to renege on the bargain should it gain the power 
to do so, it cannot make its promise credible in the absence of third-party enforcement.101 
Instead, war ensues, although both parties would have preferred to stay at peace.
To see why preventive conflict often results in war, and to comprehend how such 
conflict can instead be solved peacefully, it is helpful to provide a formal illustration o f  the
99 A common definition of dominance or ‘hegemony’ is a situation in which one state is able to lay down
the law to others’ hence depriving them of their ‘autonomy or capacity to make their own decisions’ (Aron 
1966). In formal terms, hegemony is often defined simply as preponderance in resources. Hence Wight
(1977) defines hegemony as “a situation in which a single state can measure strength against any combination 
of other states” and Niou, Ordeshook and Rose state that hegemony arises when one state “gains control of 
exactly half the resources in the system”. (Niou et al. 1987, pp. 76-78). Although such formal definitions are 
tainted by the fact that they assume that resources translate directly into power they nonetheless provide a 
useful approximation for when a state can be said to be dominant.
10 0  Fearon (1995) has argued that, as long as both sides in a conflict suffer a real cost for fighting, war is 
always inefficient ex post since both sides could be made better off by agreeing on the same outcome without 
incurring the cost of fighting. Insofar as states share similar probability estimates about the likely outcome 
of a war they should therefore be able to agree, ex ante, on a bargain what will leave both sides better off than 
going to war. See also Powell 1999.
1 0 1  Fearon 1995 and 1998 identifies this problem as a commitment problem. A similar analysis is given by 
Levy 1987, pp. 96-98.
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preventive dilemma. We can model the preventive war problem as a simple two-period 
game with full information. The game has two players; a rising potential hegemon, H, and 
a coalition o f status quo states, C, which we shall assume to act like a unitary actor.102 
Both players are assumed to be risk-averse. Both the rising potential hegemon and the 
declining coalition have preferences over a set of issues represented by a one-dimensional 
space. The rising hegemon prefers outcomes closer to the right side of the spectrum, 
whereas the coalition prefers outcomes to the left.103 We may think of this spectrum as 
representing control over an economic resource—such as territory— such that the right 
side of the spectrum represents full control by the hegemon, and the left side represents 
full control by the members of the coalition. We can also conceive of the spectrum as 
representing political autonomy. The left side represents absolute autonomy for declining 
states, whereas the right side represents a situation in which the autonomy of declining 
states has been eliminated by the hegemon (domination). Outcomes in the middle 
represent various forms of shared sovereignty.
The game is played over two periods. At both points in time, t, the would-be 
hegemon makes a demand X  which represents a revision of the status quo by granting it 
control over more of the resource in dispute. The coalition can either accept this demand 
or fight it in war. The rising hegemon is assumed to win a war (and the coalition to lose it) 
with probability P/.104 The probability of prevailing in war is a function of states’ physical 
resources. Since the rising hegemon’s power is growing relative to the coalition’s, the 
probability that H will win a war is assumed to increase between the first and second
1 0 2  This is admittedly a strong assumption which will be relaxed below.
1 0 3  Rasmussen & Verdier 2001. See also Fearon 1995, p. 387 and Pow'ell 1999, p. 119.
1 0 4  I assume that states estimate the probability of success in war according to their relative share of 
capabilities. See Levy 1987, de Mesquita & Lalman 1992.
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period (P2>P,). The dinner of a war gets to impose its preferred solution in all subsequent 
periods.1^
F ig . 1
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[Full Autonomy] S.Q. Xi XU [Domination]
Imagine that in Period 1, the rising hegemon makes a demand for X i (a moderate 
improvement over the status quo). The coalition can either accept this claim as the new 
status quo or question it on the battlefield. C accepts the demand if  its utility for the 
revised status quo is greater than its expected utility for going to war. The value to the 
coalition o f challenging the demand is equal to the expected value o f winning the war 
minus the one-time cost of fighting. (1-Pj - Cc). Hence, the maximum demand that the 
rising hegemon can make in Period 1 without inviting a war is Xt (this is equal to C s 
expected payoff from war or its ‘reservation payoff). If the coalition accepts the 
hegemon’s demand, the game proceeds peacefully to Period 2 at which point H can make a 
second demand. Given that the rising hegemon’s power is growing at a faster rate than the 
coalition, it will be able to make a claim In Period 2, X that is greater than its initial 
demand. Again, the coalition can choose to accept the demand or fight. C’s utility for 
fighting is 1-P2 -  Cc.
The ‘game’ is solved by backward induction. If the change in H’s power between 
Period 1 and Period 2 is substantial and the increase in its demands for revision therefore 
large, we see that the coalition’s utility for accepting X a is less than its utility for war in *
This simplifying assumption amounts to saying that the winner will be able to prevail in all future 
distributive conflicts. O f course, this assumption is contingent on an ‘absolute' victory and as such may be 
rather unrealistic.
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Penod 1. Moving back to Period 2, we see that the coalition—knowing that by accepting a 
demand for X. in Period 1, it will invite a demand of X, in Period 2—will reject the 
demand for Xt and go to war. The intuition is simple: Because war is the ultimate means for 
settling disputes among states, and because a state whose power is rising will have an increasing 
chance of winning a war, other states will reject its demands for a ‘peaceful revision of the 
status quo* since those demands may continue to increase in proportion to its growing power. 
Instead they will seek to avert domination through balancing power (via preventive war). The 
only scenario in which war will not be the dominant outcome is if  states highly discount 
the future106, or if  the one-time cost of war is so high that states are indifferent between 
the risk of domination and the risk of armed confrontation.107
IV . In t e g r a t io n  a s  a  So l u t io n  t o  W a r
Standard realist international relations theory offers only one solution to the 
preventive war dilemma: war. In a world where might is right, states are expected always 
to react to looming threats by balancing power—if necessary in coalition with other states 
who also feel threatened.10® However, balancing of power and war is not the only options 
available to declining states in a power transition. Alternative options include 
‘bandwagoning’ and ‘binding*. Historically, states have sometimes sought to ward off 
danger by allying with a rising challenger instead of balancing against it or by seeking to
106 I have assumed that states do not discount the future at all.
107 If the one-time cost of war is extremely high—i.e. if war is assumed to involve a nuclear holocaust— 
then war may not be a feasible option and the preventive dilemma disappears.
10® While balance of power theorists, including most contributors to recent debates about balancing, 
disagree about what kinds of states balance and what it is they balance against, one thing they agree on is that 
the great powers in the system will balance against a state that threatens to achieve a position of hegemony 
over the system. Both those who argue that states balance against power (Waltz 1979) and those who argue 
that states balance against threats (Walt 1987, Healy and Stein 1989) reach this conclusion, because a state 
strong enough to threaten hegemony will almost certainly be the greatest single threat to the interests of any 
other great power. The same logic may lead to the prediction that non-great powers in regional systems Mill 
balance against a state in the region that threatens to achieve a position of hegemony in the region. See Lew 
2001, p. 5.
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‘hide* from a threat by opting for neutrality.1(99 If successful, strategies of balancing and 
hiding may present a low-cost alternative to balancing. However, such strategies often 
back-fire. By aligning itself with a would-be aggressor or by staying aloof from a
hegemonic conflict, a declining state invariably increases the resources at the challenger’s
disposal and thus places its trust in its continued benevolence and forbearance.1^  
Bandwagoning will therefore tend to be eschewed by all but small and weak states who 
cannot muster enough force to balance against danger.111
W ar is the most likely outcome of a preventive dilemma, but it is not the only 
solution. Risk-averse states may prefer another possibility, namely institutional binding. 
This strategy implies embedding a rising state within a common institution which places 
constraints on its future power. As we saw in the previous section, the preventive war 
dilemma is rooted in a time-consistency problem. Because declining states cannot trust a 
rising challenger to remain benign, they will attack preventively to guard against the 
possibility of a future conflict in which the challenger’s power will have surpassed their 
own. But imagine for a moment that states could in fact make a credible commitment not to 
abuse their future power. Imagine, for example, that rising and declining states could create 
an institution which would resolve all future issues in accordance with the present balance o f
Paul Schroeder (1994) argues that, in modem history, most states have sought to protect their vital 
interests by seeking to hide from or bandwagon with threats rather than rely on self-help. Other proponents 
of the bandwagoning theory include Schweller 1994 and Rosecrance & Lo 1996. Whereas Schroeder 
maintains that states bandwagon because they cannot afford to balance, Schweller charges that states may 
bandwagon in pursuit o f profit. The notion that states bandwagon is disputed by many authors who point 
out that empirically, the evidence in favor of bandwagoning is scant As Stephen Walt has argued, if it were 
true that states prefer bandwagoning to balancing we would expect to see an international system in which 
hegemony was relatively easy to achieve. Walt 1987, pp.18,29, Snyder 1997, pp. 158-160. See also 
Moigenthau 1955, pp. 43-44.
Moigenthau 1985 p. 169.
1 1 1  Small states may be frequent ‘defensive’ bandwagoners. With narrow territories and few resources, 
small states often lack the strength to balance. Moreover, weak states add little to the strength of a defensive 
coalition but incur the wrath of the more threatening state nonetheless.Faced with a threat on their borders, 
small and weak states may seek to ward off instant catastrophe by allying with the source of threat. 
However, such policies are often followed by a quick reversal of strategy as soon as the balance o f power 
begins to shift. See Rothstein 19xx, pp. 25-26, Schroeder 1976, and Moigenthau 1985, pp. 43-44.
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power, and which would remain unchanging in the face of future changes to the underlying 
distribution of resources. In this case, a preventive war would be redundant
To see why, consider figure 1 above. This figure illustrates that, while it finds itself in 
a vulnerable position, the rising hegemon has an interest in proposing to limit its future 
demands in order to prevent an attack against it. Assuming that the coalition will only fight if  
its utility for war is greater than for bargaining, it follows that C would refrain from going to 
war if it was forever guaranteed its first-period reservation pay-off (Xi). In Period 1, the 
rising hegemon’s expected utility for war is less than from a negotiated settlement (Xi). Thus, 
H has an incentive to promise in Period 1 not to make demands beyond X. in Period 2 if it 
can thereby persuade the coalition not to wage war or otherwise take action to halt its 
growth. The problem is, of course, that the rising hegemon has no interest in fulfilling this 
promise once it becomes dominant. If the coalition allows the game to proceed peacefully to 
Period 2, H will claim Xu regardless of its prior incentive not to do so. The coalition fights a 
preventive war to avoid this outcome. It is easy to see, however, that if an institution could 
be created that enables the rising hegemon to commit not to take advantage of its future 
strength to demand excessive revisions, then it may thereby succeed in making its growing 
power more acceptable to other states. In turn, this may allow it to escape the wrath of a 
preventive attack.112
This simple insight expresses the fundamental logic of institutional binding: Since 
fluctuations in power continue to occur, the only way states can avoid preventive wars is by 
finding ways to make power-fluctuations less consequential. An institution enabling 
credible commitment is an institution that reduces the returns to power— either by 
establishing constraints on the accumulation of resources, or by setting clear limits to what 
states who gain a preponderance in resources will be able to achieve with those
This is consistent uïth the findings of Fearon 1995 and Wagner 1986.
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resources.113 This solves the dilemma of preventive motivation. As John Ikenberry has 
argued, if  power can be ‘tamed’ by making it less consequential, then this reduces the stakes 
of distributive conflict: “Losers realize that their losses are limited and temporary—to 
accept those losses is not to risk everything, nor will it give the winner a  permanent 
advantage”.114 In this case, preventive motivation recedes.
The following section (section V) explains how international institutions may be 
engineered to constrain and reduce the returns to power. Before I turn to this question, I 
consider the precise circumstances in which institutional binding is likely to be a preferred 
response to preventive conflict. When considering the likelihood o f binding, two important 
points must be kept in mind. First, for institutional binding to be a viable option, both 
sides in a conflict must prefer a negotiated solution to war. Second, binding entails certain 
costs. As we will see, in order to enable credible commitment, states must pool or delegate 
control over key national policy instruments to a common institution. Whereas successful 
balancing promises to uphold the full sovereignty of states, institutional binding—from the 
viewpoint of national sovereignty—implies a second best solution in which states 
surrender a  limited amount of sovereignty in order to remove the risk of an all or nothing 
conflict.115
*"?i
The L ikelihood o f  Institutional Binding
The above analysis shows that, given the possibility of credible commitment, states 
may be able to find a negotiated solution to the preventive war dilemma. But when are 
they likely to do so? In theory, as long as states incur a real cost for fighting, a negotiated 
solution always presents a possible improvement over settling disputes through war. 
However, since the crafting of a binding institution is costly (states must agree to a partial
1 1 3  Ikenberry 2001, p. 29,32.
1 1 4  Ikenberry 2001, p. 32. See also Przeworski 1991.
115 Forland 1997, pp. 243-244.
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surrender of sovereignty) we can assume that institutional binding will only be preferred by 
states when the cost o f balancing is high. If the one-time cost of war is low and the chance 
of victory high, the voluntary surrender of sovereignty to a supranational institution in 
order to avoid a war will seem less attractive. As the perceived costs of balancing rise, 
however, so does the appeal of a negotiated agreement.
What determines the perceived cost of balancing? Three factors may influence the 
expected cost of preventive action against a rising threat. First, the extent to which states 
are averse to risk. Second, the existence of competing security goals to which scarce 
resources must be devoted. Third, the degree of collective action problems among allies 
which must be solved in order to make balancing effective.
1. risk-aversion
One factor that may influence the incentive to bind rather than balance is the 
extent to which states are averse to risk. If states are risk-acceptant, they may prefer the risky 
lottery of war over institutional binding. By contrast, the more states are averse to risk, the 
more likely they will prefer an institutionalized solution which safeguards the status quo (at 
the cost of a one-time reduction in sovereignty) while removing the risk of an ‘all or 
nothing' confrontation.116 This logic is similar to Charles Glaser’s observation that if states 
are uncertain about the outcome of an arms race which they would like to win, “risk-averse 
states would prefer an arms control agreement that accepted the current military status quo 
to gambling on prevailing in the arms race”.117
States’ acceptance o f risk may vary as a function o f several factors. One factor that 
may be of importance is historical memory. The memory of past failures of balancing may
116 Risk aversion implies that states are hostile to gambling. It means that states will prefer a 50:50 split of 
whatever is at stake in a conflict to a 50:50 chance at all or nothing (i.e. at winning or losing the war). See 
Fearon 1995. In addition to risk-aversion it must be true that states must value to future. If states place very 
little value on future outcomes the commitment problem disappears.
117 Glaser 1994/1995, p. 59.
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strengthen the incentive for declining states to respond to present threats with binding 
rather than balancing.118 The same may be true for the experience of costly wars. It is 
often argued that great wars make states more sensitive to the costs of fighting.119 In a 
similar vein, Robert Jervis has argued that hegemonic wars tend to undermine the belief in a 
functioning balance of power. The often long and destructive struggle against a potential 
hegemon may weaken the assumption of balancing as a cheap or effective tool for managing 
threat, he argues.120 After such wars states will therefore be more apt to create institutional 
frameworks for cooperation to help prevent a reemergence of the threat121 As we will see in 
chapter VI, this was evident in postwar Europe where the experience of two costly and 
largely ineffective wars fought to prevent German hegemony lead to a  U-turn in the strategies 
employed by Germany’s neighbors to deal with new perceptions of hegemonic threat. 
Historical memory may also impact the risk-aversion of a rising state. The memory o f  
previous failures to improve its position through war may persuade a revisionist state to 
chose modest but sure gains through negotiation over the lottery of war. This has clear 
implications for institutional binding The recent experience of costly and indecisive wars 
serves to increase the risk-aversion o f states and thereby enhances the appeal of institutional 
binding as a ‘safe’ way to solve a preventive dilemma. The greater the risk-aversion of both 
rising and declining states, the greater the room for a negotiated solution.
2, high opportunity costs
A second factor that may affect states’ preference for binding is the presence o f an 
extra-regional threat. Military confrontations among states in a region divert resources
118 Other factors which may impinge on risk-aversion (but which are not easily generally able) derive from the 
domestic environments of states. Shifting domestic circumstances may increase or decrease the opportunity 
costs to governments o f international conflict.
119 The more costly the previous wars the less likely are decision makers to press for new confrontations. 
Jervis 1985, Gochman 19xx, p. 101.
120 Jervis 1985.
121 According to Jervis (1995) this explains why great power ‘concerts* tend to emerge in the wake of major 
wars.
52
from other vital functions such as balancing against threats external to the region. Since 
states will usually attempt to not weaken themselves on two fronts at once, the presence of 
an outside threat may increase the attraction of binding as a means to solve a regional 
conflict. This is similar to the conventional realist claim that regional integration is 
motivated by external threat. However, it is important to note that the incentive to bind 
arises in response to a preventive security dilemma among regional states. The presence of 
an external threat may heighten the appeal of institutional binding because it increases the 
opportunity cost of a war between rising and declining states within a region, but external 
threat is not in itself a sufficient condition for binding to occur.
3. collective A ction Problems in A lliances: The Limits o f  balancing
A third factor which makes binding more likely as a strategy for dealing with 
geopolitical threat is collective action problems within alliances. In traditional balance of 
power theory, balancing against rising states is supposed to be virtually automatic. 
Especially, balancing of power is expected to be smooth when a group of states face a 
direct threat of domination. In the words o f George Liska, “the question of with whom to 
ally and how much are never simpler than in the case when the precept of the balance of 
power is clearest—in the event of a bid for hegemony”,122 123However, looking at the 
historical record, we find that preventive coalitions have often been slow to form. Classic 
examples include the Napoleonic wars where an effective counter-alliance against France 
was almost twenty years in the making, Prussia's forceful unification o f Germany in 1870 
virtually unopposed by her competitors, and the slow mobilization o f a coalition to halt the 
advances of Hitler’s Germany.12^
1 2 2  Geoige lisk a  1962. See also Levy 2001.
123 these cases, see Aron 1966, pp. 27-28, Posen 1984.
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Preventive coalitions are slow to form because they supply a public good. If a 
rising challenger is defeated by one state, all benefit equally. Therefore, individual states 
may choose to stay aloof from a preventive coalition and let others bear the costs of 
defending the status quo.124 The quandary o f ‘free riding’ or ‘buck passing’ can be 
especially troubling in cases of regional power transition where a number o f states are 
threatened by a rising challenger, but where only some o f them are required to take action 
in order to defeat the challenger. In such cases, individual states may be tempted to 
remain passive in the hope that others will act instead.125 Historical examples of free­
riding are numerous. Britain and France each sought to ‘pass the buck’ prior to the 
outbreak o f World W ar II by adopting overly defensive stands.126 Similarly, balancing
1 2 4  The public nature o f military alliance goods is addressed at length by the so-called ‘economic theory of 
alliance’ pioneered by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser (1966). The kernel o f their argument is that 
alliances produce benefits that are both indivisible and non-exdudable which makes them prone to collective 
action problems. The economic alliance theory is commonly accepted as offering an explanation for two 
characteristics of military alliances: 1 . the tendency for larger, wealthier states to supply a disproportionate 
share of the benefits enjoyed by all members; 2 . the tendency for alliance members to fail to meet the goals 
that they set themselves for forces-in-being and defense spending. (Thies 1987). As demonstrated by Snyder 
(1984,1997) the public nature of alliance benefits may also explain the fact that effective alliances are often 
slow to form in the first place. For a discussion of the public nature o f alliance goods see Blanning 1986, p. 
186, Christensen & Snyder 1990, de Mesquita & Singer 1973, Jervis 1995, Levy 1981, Morrow 1993, Posen 
1984, Schroeder 1994, p.132, Taylor 1987, p. 8 . For a critique of the public goods approach to military 
alliance, see Boyer 1993, Sandler & Cauley 1975, Sandler 1977 and Wallace 1987. Critics of the economic 
alliance theory charge that military alliances render multiple services o f both private, impurely public and 
purely public nature. While this is true for defensive alliances, there is reason to believe that alliances aimed 
at prevention closely approximate die qualities of a purely public good: The main benefit of prevention—the 
removal threat—can be enjoyed by states whether or not they have helped to affect it and from which 
individual states cannot be excluded.
1 2 5  To illustrate, we may conceive of alliance formation as an »-player game o f public goods provision in 
which a threshold level o f contribution must be met before any of the good is provided. Contributions 
above the threshold do not provide more of the good but only lower the cost for each participant. In this 
game, if others contribute sufficiendy, an individual state X  maximizes its payoff by free-riding on the 
balancing efforts o f others. Conversely, if  others contribute insufficiently, X maximizes its payoff by 
contributing to the alliance provided that its contribution is pivotal (See Taylor 1987). The game has no 
dominant strategies. However, it is not difficult to see that individual states will be tempted to withhold their 
contribution, hoping that others will deal with the problem.
1 2 6  Aron 1966, pp. 27-28, Posen 1984. Posen argues that France during World War II sought to pass the 
costs of balancing against Germany to Britain by adopting a strictly defensive policy and by signaling that lest 
Britain intervene, France would not be able to defend its own borders. Given its own defensive advantage 
Britain ignored these signals and did not intervene until the last moment
54
against Napoleonic France was characterized by widespread attempts at free riding, either 
by refusing to subsidize allies’ war-efforts or by declaring neutrality.127
The problem o f free riding is compounded by ‘relative gain concerns’ among 
defending states and by fear of defection. Members of ad hoc preventive coalitions will 
often regard each other as temporary allies but as long-term competitors. As a result, 
relative gain concerns may arise among allies who worry about the benefits accruing to 
their partners and about what effect those benefits may have on the balance of power once 
the contest is over.128 * This increases the temptation to ‘pass the buck’ in the hope of 
improving one’s own position by letting ones’ rivals ‘bleed each other dry’.12^  Concern 
over relative gain may also lead states to defect from an alliance if they believe that their 
partners are being strengthened disproportionately.13^  To illustrate, a common justification 
for betraying an ally in the 18th century European balance of power system was the claim 
that the ally now presented the real danger to the balance o f power.131
1 2 7  For a discussion of allied policies during the Napoleonic wan, see Blanning 1996, pp. 187-191 and 
Kissinger 1957.
1 2 8  Relative gains concerns are often salient in ad hoc alliances in which a number of states pool their force 
for the specific purpose of preventing a dangerous shift in the balance of power. In contrast to permanent 
alliances, such coalition are temporary, composed of states that have little or no shared interests other than a 
common hostility towards the enemy. The reinforcement of an ad hoc ally may therefore be seen as a long­
term threat. Aron 1966, pp. 27-28, Waltz 1979, p. 167, Snyder 1984, p . l i ,  1997, p. 56, Christensen 1997.
12  ^ Christensen & Snyder 1990, pp. 141,159. A prominent example of free-riding motivated by ‘intra- 
alliance relative gains concern' is Stalin's diplomacy during World War II, which was premised on the belief 
that even if Germany should succeed in defeating France a victory would leave the Soviet Union in a 
strengthened position, (see also footnote no. 32). Another example is the failure of an effective balance 
against Prussia in 1870-71. According to James Morrow, the main reason that Prussia was allowed to unify 
Germany was that France and Austria had conflicting territorial claims in Italy which made France reluctant 
to reinforce Austria and tempted it to try to enhance its own political by standing aloof from the mutual 
bloodletting of the two German powers. For a good account of this problem see Morrow 1996, pp. 208-209
13® Most analysts of public goods provision treat defection and free riding as coeval. However, the two 
problems are separate: Free riding denotes a strategy o f  ex ante non-contribution (often chosen in an attempt to 
compel others to act) whereas defection involves reneging on an agreement ex post. In the standard public goods 
literature problems of defection are often assumed away. Once production of a public good is secured, 
unilateral incentives to defect are held to disappear. Yet, this may not be true for preventive alliances. Because 
a state is always more certain of its own intentions than those of its allies, the costs of alliance are inherently 
more certain than the benefits. Fear of getting a ‘suckers payoff may induce states to play risk-averse 
strategies and defect from an alliance preemptively \f they fear defection by others. E.g. Lisa Martin (1993) has 
shown that cooperation may fail even in games with an ‘assurance' structure if one or more players fear that 
other participants have preferences orderings that resemble a PD rather than an assurance game. On 
defection from alliances see Snyder 1997, p.10, and Morrow 1996. Sabrosky (1980) reports that, historically 
only about 30% of formal alliances have been honored in conflict.
1 3 1  Schroeder 1994, p. 7.
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Collective action problems among allies imply that, although alliances of defending 
states do fight preventive wars, they tend to so do belatedly and inefficiently.13-  Delays in 
balancing give challenging states a head start, both in building up their internal power and in 
expanding externally by piecemeal conquest* 133 Moreover, collective action problems often 
reduce the effectiveness of allied campaigns, resulting frequently in indecisive victories that 
leave much of an enemy's potential for growth intact134 This has ramifications for the 
possibility of institutional binding. To the extent collective action problems weaken the war- 
making capability o f a coalition this will tend to heighten the appeal of binding as an 
alternative to war.135 After all, institutional binding (as opposed to balancing) holds the 
advantage o f not only constraining a rising state, but of also constraining the policies o f 
declining states by raising the cost to all participants of reneging on an agreement. This form
13^ The problem of delay in balancing is discussed by Glenn Snyder. He shows that, although delays occur, 
balancing likely triumphs in the end. The reason is that, as a challenger gains in power, the cost of non­
agreement among defending states increases, thereby diminishing the incentives to free-ride. Assuming that the 
costs of non-agreement rise faster than the perceived costs of joining an alliance, balancing likely triumphs in 
the end (Snyder 1997, p. 51). In addition we may assume that as the threat from a challenger grows, the chief 
purpose of an alliance shifts from prevention to the provision of defense against a possible attack from the 
challenger. This implies that there are now private benefits to allying. This may explain the apparent paradox 
that states often pass up the opportunity o f an effective preventive strike deciding to go to war only later, 
when the expected costs o f confrontation are relatively higher.
1 3 3  Posen 1984. For example, it is a common argument o f historians that the weak and sporadic balancing 
by Britain, France and the Soviet Union before World War II contributed to Hitler’s policy of incremental 
expansion in Central and Eastern Europe which made it ultimately more costly to restore the balance of 
power. See Levy 2001, p. 9.
1 3 4  As an example, France emerged from the Napoleonic Wars with augmented borders, and Germany 
after World War I quickly regained its strength. According to Geoffrey Blainey, indecisive victories greatly 
enhance the risk that war will break out again. (Blainey 1986, p. 1 1 1 ). In addition to indecisive victories and 
the tendency for defensive coalitions to fall apart as soon as a war is over, the frequent failure to fully subdue 
challengers may also be due to the fact that losing states accelerate their recovery after a defeat. A.F.1C 
Oiganski and Jacek Kugler find that, in the wake o f war, winners show a lower rate of recovery in 
capabilities depleted by war than losers. (Organski & Kugler 1980, p.106). A possible explanation is that 
loosing states incur the destruction of obsolescent plants and industrial equipment. Another explanation is 
psychological; a defeated population living in the midst o f destruction will recall the status quo antebellum 
and be very' motivated to recover.
1 3 3  Taking formal account of this factor would require modeling the preventive dilemma as a ‘nested’ or 
‘two-level’ game: on one level a coalition of status quo states would play amongst themselves to coordinate 
their strategy via-a-vis a rising challenger (the ‘alliance game*); on another level they would play as a group 
against the challenger (the 'balancing game*). The greater the problems of collective action in the alliance 
game, presumably, the greater the appeal o f striking a bargain in the balancing game, (the extent to which 
collective action problems would impede agreement in the alliance game would be a function of threat in the 
balancing game).
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of credible commitment becomes particularly attractive in situations where defending states 
have difficulty in coordinating their strategies.
Whereas collective action problems may strengthen the incentive for declining states 
to chose institutional binding over balancing, such problems do not increase the incentive 
for a rising state to accept binding. For the rising hegemon, the incentive structure remains 
unaltered: If declining states are sufficiently foresighted to table their demand for binding at 
an early point in the rising state's carrier, the rising state will consent.136 Of course, given 
that time is working in its favor, a rising state will not accept permanent constraints on its 
power unless it is convinced that failure to do so will result in an injurious preventive attack. 
In other words, the threat of prevention must be believable even in the presence of 
collective action problems among declining states. This is in fact the case. Collective action 
problems may increase the cost of balancing and therefore lead defending states to prefer 
negotiation over war. However, since the ultimate cost of remaining passive is ‘elimination*, 
even a costly war is preferred to passivity. If the rising state rejects negotiation, the coalition 
will therefore still have a dominant incentive to strike preventively. Collective action 
problems therefore do not eliminate a rising state's incentive to accept binding. However, 
insofar as the rising state knows of the coalition’s difficulties, this may lower the value to 
declining states of a binding agreement, because the rising hegemon will only agree to a 
binding mechanism that freezes future power at a level that takes into account the coalition’s 
low expected utility for war.
136 The notion that declining states can anticipate the adverse implications of collective action problems and 
act rationally to minimize these implications assumes a high degree of strategic foresight. To get a rising 
potential hegemon to accept institutional binding, declining states must initiate negotiations at a point when 
the rising state is still militarily inferior and therefore has an incentive to acquiesce. This raises a question 
about state rationality: If declining states foresee that collective action problems will prevent effective 
balancingand compel them to seek accommodation with a rising challenger, is it not reasonable to expect 
that they will abandon a self-defeating policy of free riding and defection to strengthen balancing? Yet, this 
misinterprets the nature of a collective action problem. Collective action problems are characterized by the 
fact that what is individually rational leads to a collectively sub-rational outcome. Although states realize that 
individually dominant strategies can result in ruin for all, the structure of private incentives is such that they 
are unable to coordinate on a better outcome.
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V. C r e d i b l e  C o m m i t m e n t s  q u a  I n t e g r a t i o n
In the preceding section I have shown that—given the possibility of creating 
institutions that enable credible commitment—states may succeed in solving preventive 
dilemmas peacefully rather than through war. I have argued that this outcome is most 
likely to be preferred by both rising and declining states when the costs o f balancing are 
thought to be high. The question now arises: How does institutional binding become 
possible? How can states negotiate an agreement that both sides prefer to war and how, in 
the absence of third party enforcement, can this agreement be made credible? To solve the 
preventive war dilemma, a regional institution must perform two tasks: (1) it must resolve 
future issues in conformity with die ex ante power distribution thereby curtailing the 
opportunity for future leading state(s) to dominance (‘freeze the balance o f influence’); (2) 
it must be binding—that is, something must prevent states from declaring it null and void if 
they no longer wish to abide by its rules. This section explains how these two conditions 
may be fulfilled,
(1) Institutional Binding: ‘Freezing the Balance of Influence’
The key to solving the preventive war problem is to sever the relation between 
physical capabilities and political power. To make preventive war redundant, an institution 
must effectively reduce the returns to power so a stronger state cannot use its 
preponderant resources to dominate weaker states.137 Strictly speaking, what is required is 
the creation of a decision-making mechanism that institutionalizes a new power 
distribution (counted in political influence) which reflects the present military balance 
among its members, but which remains separate and unchanging in the face o f subsequent 
fluctuations in the distribution of military resources. A simple way o f achieving this is to 
institute a joint assembly where state representatives vote on behalf o f their countries and
1 3 7  On institutional constraints on power, see Lister 1996, p. 34 , and Ikenberry 1998, p. 45 and 2001, p. 29.
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where decisions are binding on members. The political balance of power in the assembly 
(defined by a set of voting rules) is set to reflect the military balance at the time the 
institution becomes effective. Thereafter, all decisions which impact the future decision- 
power of states within the institution are subjected to unanimous rule, such that each state 
has the option to veto changes. In practice this means that decisions on all issues which 
may single-handedly affect the resolution o f other issues—such as institutional reform, 
acceptance of new members, etc.—will be subject to unanimity. By contrast, day-to-day 
decisions which do not influence decision-making power in the future can be subjected to 
qualified majority voting with each state disposing o f a vote weighted to reflect its power at 
the time of binding.138
The joint assembly governs a set of competences that have been delegated by its 
constituents members. However, an equally important task o f a binding agreement is to 
safeguard national control of the competences that have not been delegated. After all, the 
aim of institutional binding is to protect state sovereignty, not to eliminate it; states agree 
to transfer limited sovereign rights to a central institution in order to prevent absolute 
centralization through hegemony, not to replace hegemony with a framework of central 
government. For this reason, we expect non-centralisation to be the rule, meaning that most 
issues which are not related to the task of binding and constraining power will be left to be 
determined by member states individually.* 13  ^ This also implies that whereas states may 
delegate authority over a limited and specified set o f issues for the purpose of enhancing 
mutual control, they will never surrender the power to delegate.
13 8  Rasmussen & Verdier, 2001.
13  ^ Elazar 1979, pp. 14-15. It is important to note that non-centralization is not the same as 
decentralization. Decentralization implies the existence of a central authority that can decentralize or re­
centralize as it desires. In a non-centralized system, however, power is so diffused that it cannot be 
legitimately centralized or concentrated without unanimous consent.
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An institution can draw up voting rules that reduce the returns to power in 
principle by formally equalizing political influence. However, to solve the preventive war 
problem the institution must be binding upon members—that is, something must prevent 
states from declaring it invalid when it rules against their interests. To analyze the role of 
international institutions in enabling credible commitment, it is necessary first to define 
what we mean by the term 'commitment'. In ordinary language, a commitment is a pledge 
or guarantee whereby a state or other actor agrees to behave in a given, pre-specifled 
manner. ’Credibility' can be defined simply as the likelihood that a policy commitment will 
be carried out. According to Kenneth Shepsle, credibility comes in two forms: 
‘motivational’ and ‘imperative’.14^  Motivational credibility relies on compatibility between 
commitments and future incentives. Commitment problems arise from the fact that while 
states may wish to commit to a given conduct ex  ante, their incentives ex  p o st are not always 
compatible with honoring such promises.140 41 Motivational credibility is achieved whenever 
this divergence between ex  ante and ex  p ost incentives does not develop—i.e., when 
honoring a commitment continues to be compatible with a  state’s self-interest. A more 
exacting definition equates credibility with the ability of states to pre-commit to actions 
which may be time-inconsistent by disabling their discretion to act otherwise. On this view, 
a credible commitment can be defined as “a physical act or move that forecloses all options 
but one”.142
The conception of credibility that underlies most liberal institutionalist theory is a 
loosely motivational one. In the new institutionalism, international institutions are generally 
understood as arrangements o f rules and values that dispose states to act in certain ways,
(2) M aking B ind ing Commitments -  The Institutional Set-up
1 4 0  Shepsle 1991.
1 4 1  North and Weingast 1989, p. 4, Shepsle 1991.
1 4 2  Shepsle 1991, see also Maoz and Felsenthal 19xx, p. 1987.
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either through a sense of moral obligation or through sanctioning and reputation 
mechanisms.143 Institutionalized commitments may also acquire force through various 
forms of path dependency. Since institution-building is costly, exiting institutions are 
associated with increasing returns. This implies that even when alternative arrangements 
seem more efficient or accord more closely with the interests of powerful states, states may 
continue to adhere to existing agreements in order to avoid the cost of re-negotiation.144
The notion of credibility implicit in most institutionalist theory is too weak to enable 
cooperation on important issues of national security'. Standard motivational mechanisms 
designed to lock-in particular agreements—such as reputation records, socialization and sunk 
costs— do not serve to make agreements binding. First, these mechanisms are usually weaker 
at the international level than in domestic polities. Second, while these mechanisms may 
increase the cost to states of reneging on an agreement, they do not foreclose this option. 
The fact that it is costly to re-negotiate an agreement will not persuade a potentially dominant 
state to abide by established rules if it prefers no rules at all. Therefore, to achieve binding, 
institutions cannot rely on motivational factors alone. Instead, they must institute physical 
constraints on state power which disable the discretion to violate an agreement. This may 
sound like an impossible claim. However, there are several ways in which institutions can 
achieve binding. Three general paths can be identified: (1) transfers o f resources among 
states; (2) exit costs; (3) efficiency gains.
Path 1: Tran f e n  o f  Strategic Resources (power adjustment)
One way of preventing a rising state from taking advantage o f its future military 
superiority is to make sure that it never acquires military superiority. To ensure this, states 
could delegate to an institution the task of maintaining the ex ante balance o f power by means 
of control over the allocation of strategic resources. If we assume that military power is a
143 Snyder 1997, p. 169.
1 4 4  See e-g- Ikenberry 2001, p. 70.
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function o f economic resources, an institution could keep military power in check simply by 
transferring economic resources from a potential hegemon to declining states. To enhance 
the efficiency of this practice, the institution might be empowered to target certain strategic 
resources. Crude military capacity depends on the supply of raw-materials and on the output 
of certain war-related industries such as coal and steel production or, more recently, nuclear 
energy production and certain high technology factors. Through deciding the allocation of 
such resources, an institution could equalize the military potentials of its members.
O f course, to the extent that military potential is not a direct function o f a set of 
easily identifiable strategic resources this allocation mechanism may not be a fully 
dependable means for preventing power inequalities. A more reliable way o f keeping a 
hegemon from abusing its power advantage, therefore, would be to pool the means o f 
violence and place them under joint control. A  single army in which national forces would 
serve under supranational command would severely limit the ends to which individual 
states could apply force without consent from their partners. Yet, to be effective, military 
binding does not have to fully eliminate the independent military resources of states. What 
is required is merely that the use of military force within a community is rendered infeasible 
or forbiddingly costly. A less controversial way o f achieving binding would therefore be to 
increase military interdependence. Geographical dispersion o f the armament industry (with 
one country manufacturing steel, another building tanks, still another planes) and other 
forms of specialization of military tasks would serve to make national militanes dependent 
on each other for their proper functioning.145 Similarly, sharing o f equipment, joint 
exercises, coordination of command and control systems, and exchanges o f military 
personnel would serve to increase military interdependence and reduce the risk of war. 
Finally, constraints on ready military capacity could be achieved through integrating certain 143
1 4 3  Division of labor may also be established for certain ‘strategic* industries which lend themselves easily 
to war-making such as civilian aviation and car-manufacturing, or high technology.
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administrative functions. Troops must be fed and transported. Consequently, joint control 
over major routes and means of transportation (airfields, railroads, and communication 
infrastructure) which can be used to move troops and supplies along the front are 
important means for achieving militar)7 "binding’.
Path 2: Exit Costs
The practice of transferring or pooling strategic resources among states aims at 
disempowering powerful states so they will not be able to challenge the status quo. 
Another, complementary, way to achieve binding is through exit costsM 6 Exit costs may be 
accomplished through an exchange of ‘hostages’ (defined as ‘reciprocal acts designed to 
safeguard a relationship1) or through ‘irreversible investments’ which raise the costs to 
states of leaving an institution.* 14^  For example, a "hostage’ could be created through an 
exchange of military forces which would be trapped behind enemy lines if an agreement 
was terminated. A less radical method would be to pool national currencies and thereby 
increase the cost of exit from an institutional arrangement by the amount it would cost to 
print and circulate a new currency.
Another means for creating ’hostages' is foreign direct investment (FDI). For 
example, Joshua Aizenman has shown that FDI may function as a commitment 
mechanism that reduces the chances of nationalistic commercial policies.148 This happens 
because FDI increases capital mobility and diversifies production thereby creating special 
interests abroad which reduce the gains associated with nationalistic market policies. 
Market deregulation also facilitates international mergers and joint-ventures which serve to 
increase exit costs. In particular, joint ventures carry weight in sectors of strategic
14^ On ‘exit costs’ see Hirshman 1970 and Ikenberry 2001, p. 41.
14"7 Oliver Williamson has defined ‘hostages’ as ‘reciprocal acts designed to safeguard a relationship and
support a contemporary exchange’. (Williamson 1985, p. 168).
14^ Aizenman 1992.
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importance to the state such as research and development and high-technology production. 
Finally, institutionalized cooperation in and o f itself may serve to constrain states over time 
because actors adopt to the new rules of the game by making extensive commitments 
based on the expectation that these rules will continue. Such adaptations may help to lock 
in given arrangements by drastically increasing the cost o f a policy reversal.149 In more 
general terms, any form of cost associated with violating an international treaty—  
reputation, audience cost, and so forth—will tend to reinforce exiting arrangements for 
binding by heightening the cost of exit.
Path 3: "Efficiency Gains
A third and final way to achieve binding is through efficiency7 gains. In the 
previous section we saw that, for institutional binding to be a viable option, both sides in a 
conflict must find that they can gain more through institutionalized cooperation than 
through war. This can be secured in one of two ways; either by raising the expected cost of 
war, or by increasing the benefits from institutionalized cooperation. The third path for 
binding fulfills the second condition. Logically, a rising state would accept to be bound by 
an institution if the institution generated efficiency gains o f the same order that the state 
could hope to gain through war, and if these gains were strictly contingent on the 
continuation of the institution .^  Such gains may result from increased factor 
productivity. The creation of integrated markets which facilitate free movement of goods,
services and other factors of production may raise productivity and thereby......Such
efficiency gains strengthens binding because they are contingent on the continuation of the
institution insofar as they presuppose a diminution in the risk of w a r .........It is commonly
accepted that a reduction in the risk o f war favors commerce and foreign investment. The
^ 9  This idea that institutionalization creates sunk costs which make for some form of ‘path dependence’ is 
consistent with the HI approach. See e.g. Pierson 19%, pp. 144-146.
^50 Rasmussen & Verdier 2001.
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creation of integrated markets which facilitate free movement of goods, sendees and other 
factors of production along with the pooling of military resources (which preclude a return 
to hostilities and increase the confidence o f investors) would raise productivity. Such 
efficiency gains would be contingent on the continuation of the institution insofar as they 
presuppose a diminution in the risk of war. In this way efficiency gains operate as an 
auxiliary binding mechanism which raise the opportunity costs of reneging on an 
agreement15*
The Relationship Between Military and Economic Binding
This section has described three general paths through which institutional binding 
can be achieved. These paths rely both on military and economic means for enhancing 
credibility of international commitments. Initially, it seems that militar)' means for binding 
(such as the pooling of armed forces) present the most tangible commitment to peaceful 
cooperation. To the extent states give up control over their independent militaries, the use of 
force to settle disputes becomes impracticable. However, effective binding depends on 
constraining economic potential as well. Whereas great powers are generally identified by 
their military might, in the long run, power depends on economic wealth as well as military 
resources.* 152 To achieve effective binding, a regional institution must therefore place 
constraints on both the economic and military capacities of states.
On one hand, economic binding may appear easier to achieve than military' 
binding. While some forms of economic binding (such as the creation of currency' unions) 
go to the core o f national sovereignty, most means for achieving economic binding (such 
as market integration and foreign investment) present a less demanding institutional 
commitment. For this reason, economic binding may be more easily available to states 
than military binding. At the same time, however, economic binding may be harder to
l a l  opcit.
1 5 2  See Gilpin 1981, pp. 19,24 and Nye 1975, pp. 325-329.
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achieve than military binding because economic ’hostages1 require greater volume before 
they restrain states as effectively as military commitments, and because economic binding 
is more difficult to oversee. Production and trade, unlike armaments production and 
armed forces, are not die monopoly o f any democratic government. They are in the hands 
of tens of millions of individuals, operating alone or through corporations. The 
multiplicity o f conflicting interests at stake in regulating economic activity gready 
complicates the effective implementation of economic binding.
Economic and military binding are designed to support and reinforce each other. 
The purpose of economic binding is to secure balanced growth among a group of states 
and to reinforce military binding by increasing exit costs. However, economic and military 
binding may also to some extent substitute for one another. The failure to achieve firm 
military binding through a pooling of armed forces will heighten the strategic importance 
o f economic binding since the potential for fungibility between economic resources and 
military power will appear more precarious. Likewise, the failure to constrain economic 
power will make military integration more important from the standpoint of binding. 
Nonetheless, to work with optimal efficiency—that is, to be truly credible—binding 
agreements should place constraints on both military and economic capabilities.
Variation in Institutional Design
This section has described three general paths through which binding can be 
achieved. Obviously, these paths represent ideal-types. What specific combination of 
strategies states will rely on in order to bind one another will tend to differ from case to case. 
First; the precise configuration of a binding institution will differ depending on historical 
context. Practicable arrangements for constraining military force vary according to 
technological development and geographical conditions. In one environment; the integration 
of land armies may be key to achieving military binding, whereas in another, pooling of the
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means of high-technology weapons production will be of primary importance. The concrete 
configuration of binding institutions may also vary depending on the character of the state(s) 
they are designed to bind. What constitutes an effective hostage or irreversible investment 
may differ from one state to another depending on opportunity costs.153 The general point is 
that for any given case o f binding we expect the institutional basis to be engineered in such a 
way as to limit discretion in those areas where states pose the greatest potential threat to one 
another. And we expect the nature of "hostages’ and "irreversible investments’ to reflect 
states’ opportunity costs in a way that increases the cost of exit.
Institutional Binding & the Bargaining Problem
A last question which must be addressed in order to establish the possibility of 
institutional binding is how states manage to reach agreement on institutional outcomes in 
the face of distributive conflict. In most cases of binding there will exist a number of 
different institutional solutions which states can implement with different distributive 
consequences. This gives rise to a coordination problem known as the "bargaining 
problem*. Bargaining problems are often salient in international affairs where privileged 
states may engage in "strategic bargaining’, meaning that they withhold their consent in 
order to obtain their most preferred outcome.154 Yet, in order for bargaining problems to 
impede cooperation states must perceive that they can benefit from delaying agreement. 
This implies that the opportunity cost of non-agreement must be low and that time must 
not be a pressing factor. Neither condition holds in the context of a preventive war 
dilemma. In situations where the power of a challenger is rising, declining states have little 
incentive to ‘hold out’ to obtain a better deal; their bargaining position will only deteriorate 
over time. Similarly, a rising state cannot benefit from delaying agreement since if it resists
A-5-> To be effective, a hostage must assume a certain prominence. There is a tipping point before which the 
quantity of hostage being traded fails to deliver binding and beyond which it does. What determines the level 
o f that point varies with each country's opportunity cost. See Rasmussen & Verdier 2001.
1 5 4  Fearon 1995, Krasner 1991.
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negotiation, the dominant strategy for declining states is to launch a preventive attack. 
Bargaining problems are therefore not likely to impede agreement in preventive conflicts. 
Nonetheless, distributive conflict may matter on the margin. Once binding is achieved 
individual states may seek—within the broad outlines of the agreement—to improve on 
the terms of the deal. In this case, states* bargaining power will be a direct function of their 
sensitivity to non-agreement. By this logic, negotiations over matters o f institutional design 
or re-design will be subject to structural biases that favor those participants who are least 
hurt by the non-agreement outcome.155
V I Some  Po ssible  Objectio n s
In this section I seek to address some fundamental questions (and potential 
criticisms) regarding the nature of institutional binding. These questions will help me to 
distinguish the binding thesis from other competing and complementary theories. A key 
issue which merits discussion is the role of democracy for binding. Two separate questions 
arise: First, to what extent does binding depend on democratic regimes? Second, does 
democracy in fact render binding superfluous? Another issue regards the long-term effects 
o f binding: Once a region has been ‘bound* and power has become less consequential, 
may we assume that forces o f socialization will come into play which propel states towards 
ever closer union? In other words, will binding ultimately give rise to more centralized 
polities? A third issue concerns the relationship between the institutional binding thesis 
and theories of hegemonic stability. A fourth and final question asks whether the binding 
thesis is able to account for enlargement.
1 5 5  Moravcsik 1998.
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A
An important question in the context of institutional binding is whether all states 
are equally able to make credible commitments? In the new institutionalist literature one 
often encounters the argument that democracies are better able to create binding 
institutions and to establish credible commitments than non-democracies.15ci One reason is 
that democratic states tend to have decentralized, transparent and permeable institutions. 
These institutions provide other states with information, access (i.e. the ability to influence 
policy), and, ultimately, reassurance.*57 Another reason that democratic states may be 
better able to establish credible commitments is that they encounter audience costs.* 15758 By 
making their commitment to a given conduct known to their domestic constituents, 
democratic governments impose high potential costs on themselves for deviating from this 
conduct.
These points notwithstanding, I see no reason to conclude that democratic states 
are fundamentally better able to establish credible restraints on their policy. Clearly, 
democratic decision-processes are more open and transparent and hence may induce 
greater trust abroad. On the other hand, responsiveness to pressure from domestic 
constituents may be seen to undermine confidence in a government’s ability to stick to a 
given polity. Indeed, according to many scholars, a main reason for democratic states to 
make binding agreements at the international level is that such agreements enable them to 
withstand internal pressure for a change in policy (the ‘strengthening the state thesis’). 
Moreover, ‘openness’ with respect to foreign policy is not a prerogative of democratic 
states. Non-democracies can induce trust via public diplomacy which renders them
Does Binding depend on Democratic Regimes?
15^ Ikenbeny 2001, p. 35,75, Fearon 1994, Deudney & Ikenberry 1999. The fact that democracies are 
more transparent and accessible and have greater institutional checks on abrupt policy shifts than non- 
democrahc states makes them better capable to inducing trust abroad the authors argue.
1 5 7  Ikenberry 2001, p. 62.
1 5 8  Fearon 1995-
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diplomatically ‘accountable’ to third parties in much the same way as executives in 
democratic states (substituting audience costs for reputation costs).159 Finally, the practical 
mechanisms which I have outlined for achieving binding (pooling of strategic military 
resources, exchanges of hostages, etc.) will constrain democracies and non-democracies 
alike. If democracies are more frequent participants in international institutional orders it is 
therefore not because they are better able to make credible commitments. However, it 
may be the case that democratic states in which individual rights are dominant are more 
sensitive to the expected costs of war than other types of states and therefore more likely 
to prefer negotiated outcomes over war outcomes.169 : ,!
Does Democracy make Binding Superfluous?
Binding does not depend on democratic polities, A more critical question, however, 
is whether democratic polities in fact render binding superfluous. After all, democracies do 
not fight. Avoiding a lengthy discussion of the validity of the democratic peace thesis, let us 
assume that democracies really do not fight one another. Does this imply that binding is 
redundant among democratic states? It does in theory. However, states who worry about 
their national security may not rest secure in the faith that democracies will never wage war 
on one another. Moreover, they may not take for granted that democracy is irreversible. Did 
other West European countries in the years after 1945 trust fully that Germany would 
develop into a stable democracy? While they had taken several measures to improve the 
conditions for democracy in the new West Germany, it would seem daring to assume beyond 
a doubt that these measures would work. Democratic polities do therefore not substitute for 
binding international commitments.
On public diplomacy as a means for inducing trust see Maoz & Felsenthal 19xx, p. 188. 
1 6 0  Stam 1999, p. 29.
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In section V, I argued that institutional binding adheres to a principle of non­
centralization. The aim of binding is to safeguard sovereignty by avoiding absolute 
centralization through hegemony—not to give up sovereignty to a new polity. As such one 
might say that complete integration into a centralized state would defy the purpose of 
binding. Yet, this does not mean that forces o f centralization will always be absent, or that 
a binding agreement will always stay within its original functional limits. Once the scales of 
the balance o f power in a region have been ‘frozen’ via binding, thereby removing regional 
threats to national security, states may move on to focus mainly on satisfying demands for 
increased economic welfare. As time passes, we may therefore expect to see an extension 
of cooperation into increasingly ‘low political’ areas of activity where economies of scale 
and other efficiency gains can be obtained. However, this extension of cooperation is not 
likely to proceed very far without running into difficult problems of re-negotiation of the 
existing framework for cooperation. Insofar as states usually have conflicting preferences 
over distributive outcomes, and insofar as national executives may differ in their 
willingness to delegate further sovereignty, we expect re-negotiation of original bargains to 
occur only in small steps and with great difficulty. Substantial transfers of additional 
sovereignty to regional institutions we expect to occur only in response to some form of 
exogenous shock which makes it necessary to deepen an existing binding arrangement in 
order to withstand a renewed possibility of threat.
Is the Binding Thesis A nother *.H egemonic Stability Theory’?
At first sight it may seem that the institutional binding thesis is roughly equivalent 
to a hegemonic stability argument. In fact, the binding thesis may appear observationally 
equivalent to the argument—made by Walter Mattli among others—that successful 
integration depends on the presence of a dominant state who creates a focal point for the
Will Binding lead to Ever Closer Union?
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integration process and sanctions cooperation. Theoretically, the institutional binding thesis 
stands in almost direct contrast to arguments based on hegemonic stability theory. Whereas 
such arguments assume that integration depends on a dominant regional power who acts as 
a ‘benign hegemon’, I argue that states integrate in order to prevent the emergence o f a 
regional hegemony—whether benign or coercive. Observationally, the key to distinguishing 
the two arguments is timing. If integration presents a way to constrain a would-be 
hegemon, then we would expect integration to take place while a potentially dominant state 
is on the rise, but before it becomes powerful enough dominate others. According to a 
hegemonic stability argument, however, we would expect integration to take place after a 
leading state has already established a preponderant position which allows it to dictate the 
terms of cooperation to others and gives it the choice of either supplying a public good 
free of charge or coercing others into supplying it.161
Can the Binding Thesis A ccount for'E nlargem ent?
A weakness o f the institutional binding thesis is that it has little to say about 
enlargement. If integration takes place in order to solve a preventive war dilemma among a 
group of states, then there is no expectation p e r  se that the arrangement should be extended 
to more members. The only case in which a binding logic may explain enlargement is if  
enlargement provides a desired strengthening o f binding by helping to readjust the political 
balance of power in a union. This possibility is conceivable, but not very likely. Instead, it 
may be more plausible to assume that enlargement of existing regional unions is driven by a 
somewhat different logic than the logic which leads to integration in the first place.162 Once 
states have satisfied their external security, they begin to focus on the goal of enhancing
1 6 1  The binding thesis is also distinct from recent arguments—by John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney and 
Charles Kupchan among others— which stress the incentives for hegemonic states to engage in voluntary 
restraint in order to make their leadership acceptable to secondary powers and prevent future challenges to their 
preferred order, (more on this later).
1 6 2  For a good discussion of enlargement see Walter Matdi 1999. In explaining enlargement Matdi stresses 
both economies of scale and the dynamic of negative externalities on outsiders.
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economic welfare. This may dispose them in favor of enlargement as a way to increase 
economies of scale. New candidates for membership, on the other hand, may be motivated 
to seek entry because they suffer under the negative impact of externalities created by the 
union (this is Mattli’s ‘second integrative response*). While the binding thesis itself has little 
to say on this issue, it assumes that new members will be accepted only insofar as they do not 
upset the carefully crafted balance between bound and binding states in an existing union.
VII C o n c l u s io n : T h e  L o g ic  o f  b in d in g
In this chapter I have sought to identify the conditions in which states will chose 
regional integration as a way to construct a new strategic balance in a region that can allow 
them to escape the collectively harmful routine of power balancing and preventive warfare. 
The institutional binding thesis explains how states can solve preventive conflict peacefully 
by creating institutions that enable credible commitment. I have argued that, by pooling 
and delegating sovereignty to international institutions, states can either ‘freeze the balance 
o f power* or sufficiently reduce the returns to power to make preventive war superfluous. 
Essentially, the institutional binding thesis therefore maintains that strategic balances can 
be wilfully constructed rather than being a perpetual product of the distribution of 
capabilities among states. At first sight, this may appear to be a radial claim. Yet, as Charles 
Kupchan observes, “history provides many examples of willful processes of integration and 
amalgamation that transformed structure*’. A  prominent example is the United States of 
America which once consisted of separate and competitive state units but which became a 
single pole through federation.163
The institutional binding explanation for integration gives rise to two basic 
hypotheses and sets o f observable implications which are distinct from existing theories of
1 6 3  Kupchan 1998, pp. 49-50.
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integration. The first hypothesis regards the emergence of preferences for integration. This 
hypothesis maintains that regional integration emerges, not in response to economic 
pressure to reduce transaction costs or as a means to address external an threat, but rather 
as a solution to a regional preventive conflict. The second hypothesis regards the success o f  
institutional binding. Here I take integration as a response to a preventive war dilemma as 
given and ask what types of arrangements render commitments credible and hence secure 
peaceful cooperation over time.
Hypotheses and Observable Implications o f  the Institutional Binding Thesis 
The central hypothesis of the binding thesis is that integration presents a solution 
to a preventive war dilemma that arises from a shift in the distribution of power among a 
regional group o f states. While institutional binding is always a possibility in theory, I have 
argued that binding is most likely when the costs of war are perceived to be high by both 
rising and declining states. I have argued that this will be the case when states are risk- 
averse, when there are high opportunity costs to balancing because a region is subjected 
simultaneously to internal and external military threat, or when there are collective action 
problems associated with forming a preventive alliance. This gives rise to the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: If faced with a preventive dilemma and if  confronted with high 
expected costs o f war, then risk-averse states may prefer institutional binding over 
balancing.
This hypothesis yields several observable implications: (1) I f  the binding thesis is 
correct, we exp ea  integration to be preceded by a period of uneven growth rates among 
states, which gives rise to a threat of hegemony and hence to a preventive dilemma. We 
expect this dilemma to result in increasing tension among regional states. In particular, we 
expect to observe a conflict pattern which pits one larger, rising state against a group o f
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declining states. (2) We expect to see evidence that declining states perceive a clear threat 
from a nsing challenger, and that they see integration as means to avert this threat. An 
indication of this could be an oscillation from a policy of balancing against a rising state to 
a strategy of integration, once it becomes clear that balancing entails high costs. (3) If the 
binding thesis is correct, we expect integration to take place swiftly (rather than 
incrementally) and to replace a relationship of conflict with one o f peaceful cooperation. 
This stands in sharp contrast to both functionalist and political economy explanations for 
integration, where integration is seen to depend on a prior resolution of potential security 
conflicts, thereby allowing states to devote their attention to cooperation on economic and 
functional tasks.
A second hypothesis which arises from the institutional binding thesis concerns the 
concrete form of regional integration. I have argued that the aim of institutional binding is 
to institute a new political balance among a group of states which is robust to fluctuations in 
the underlying distribution of material power. This gives rise to the following two hypotheses 
with respect to the form of integration:
Hypothesis 2a. Integration will aim at ‘freezing’ the political balance of power among 
member-states by adopting unanimous decision-making for all issues which may 
influence the future decision power of states.
Hypothesis 2b: Once a new balance o f political influence has been instituted, we 
expect the agreement to be reinforced by a pooling of strategic assets (including 
both military and economic resources) which obstruct the use of force and raise exit 
costs.
These hypotheses give rise to a second set of observable implications. (1) First, if 
the binding thesis is correct, we expect an integrated region's central institutions to establish a 
new political balance o f influence which roughly reflects the military balance of power at the 
time of binding. Due to the principle of unanimity, we expect this political balance to remain
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immutable in the face of underlying fluctuations in the distribution of material resources. 
Small re-adjustments to the institutional set-up may take place in order to accommodate 
possibilities for efficiency gains. However, substantial moves towards closer integration 
(that is, moves which imply a further reduction in sovereignty) are expected to take place 
only in response to shifts in the underlying balance of power which lead states to fear that 
the current level o f binding is not sufficient. Hence deepening of integration is expected to 
take place in response to changes in the underlying power distribution within a region, 
rather than in reaction to any economic or functional logic or in response to an external 
military or economic threat. (2) We expect the credibility o f the institutionalized balance of 
influence to be reinforced by a pooling of strategic resources (of both a military and 
economic nature) which serve to either equalize power potentials or to render arbitration by 
force impracticable though heightened exit costs and increased efficiency gains from 
cooperation.
The following three chapters set out to test the institutional binding argument 
against empirical evidence from three historical integration schemes in Europe. The first is 
the United Provinces o f the Netherlands (1579-1795), the second is the German Zollverein 
(1834-1866), and the third is the European Communities (1952).
TM
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IV. T h e  U n it e d  P r o v in c e s  o f  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  (1579-1795)
I . I n t r o d u c t io n
The United Provinces of the Netherlands was established on 23 January 1579 among 
seven of the seventeen provinces which then constituted the Low Countries.164 The original 
signatories were the northern provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Gelderland, 
Overijsel and Gronningen which pledged to “allie, confederate and unite themselves 
together. ..for ever remaining joined together in every regard and manner, as if  they were all 
of them but one province”.165
Two remarkable features characterized the Dutch Union. First, the striking disparity 
in size and wealth between its members. Holland accounted for over half of the population 
and wealth of the union, and its easy access to the sea provided a flourishing economic base 
which stood in sharp contrast to the poorer inland provinces of Gronningen, Overijsel, 
Gelderland, and Utrecht.166 Second, there was a marked lack of political cohesion among 
the union’s members. On the eve o f unification, the Dutch provinces were divided into two 
rival groups. On one side stood the ‘rebellious* Protestant provinces, Holland and Zeeland, 
which denounced Spanish rule. On die other side stood the ‘loyal* provinces, which 
remained allegiant to the king of Spain and to Roman Catholicism.
How can we explain the union of a group of polities that were not only at odds 
politically and religiously, but that also differed greatly in size and wealth? The most frequent
164 phe ‘Low Countries’ refers to the territory which today includes the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg as well as parts of northern France. This region consisted originally of seventeen independent 
provinces. The northern part of the region included the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Utrecht, 
Overijssel, Gronningen and Gelderland. These were the provinces which united in 1579. The center and 
southern region included the provinces of Brabant, Flanders, Mechelen, Artois, Toumai, Hainault, Namur, 
Limburg and Luxembourg.
1 6 5  Treaty of the Union of Utrecht
1 6 6  Forsyth 1981, p. 31.
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explanation for the creation of the United Provinces stresses the Dutch revolt against Spain. 
The Dutch union was formed only a decade after the outbreak of the 'Eighty Years War’ 
(1568-1648) between the Low Countries and Spain, and the two events have been 
incontrovertibly linked in the minds of most observers so that it has become customary to 
argue that the Dutch union emerged essentially as a defensive alliance against Spain.167 On 
one hand, it is tempting to dismiss this ‘external balancing’ argument simply by pointing to 
the fact that the union of the Dutch provinces lasted for more than two hundred years (until 
1795), whereas hostilities with Spain ended in 1606 and the war was formally terminated in 
1648. Yet, this would be too rash. After all, new threats and conflicts continued to emerge 
on the horizon of the Netherlands— conflicts which may be interpreted, on an external 
balancing view, as helping to sustain the union. At first sight, the notion that the United 
Provinces was created to strengthen the Dutch defenses against Spain and was upheld by the 
persistence o f external threat is therefore a compelling one. What really happened, however, 
was not only different but also more complicated.
In this chapter, I argue that the events of Eighty Years War and the creation of the 
United Provinces were indeed closely linked. However, it was not the struggle against Spain 
itself that prompted the unification o f the Dutch states, but rather the effect this struggle had 
on the power-relations among the Dutch provinces—in particular the way it exacerbated an 
already growing power disparity between Holland and the other states. During the first 
decade of the war against Spain, Holland’s maritime strength greatly increased and led to a 
vast expansion in its trade and production, serving to divert resources away from the smaller 
inland provinces. As we will see, it was this growing regional power inequality— coupled with
1 6 7  According to Boogman and van der Plaat “it has repeatedly been concluded that it [the Union of 
Utrecht] must first of all be considered as a dose and permanent defensive alliance. (Boogman & Plaat 1980, 
p. 14). Similarly, Edward Haley characterizes the Union of Utrecht as “a defensive reaction against Spanish 
oppression. (Haley 1972, p. 1 2 ).
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the simultaneous weakening of Spanish forces in the region—that led other provinces to 
seek to bind Holland thereby hoping to prevent it from establishing a regional hegemony.
To convincingly argue that the United Provinces arose from a need to bind Holland, 
two additional explanations (in addition to the defense alliance argument already mentioned) 
must be addressed and either rejected or modified* The first stresses an incipient cultural 
unity among the Dutch states. A well-known advocate of this view is the historian Pieter 
Geyl who explains the union among the Dutch provinces in terms of a nation-building 
process which he portrays as “a natural extension of an already existing community”.168 As a 
third competing hypothesis we can imagine that the Dutch union was formed in order to 
secure the commercial interests of its members. This view is generally not well articulated in 
the literature since the Dutch union arose before the emergence of a doctrine of free trade. 
Nonetheless, the explanation deserves consideration. After all, the Dutch union led to the 
establishing of a world-wide ‘trading empire’ based on mercantilist practices which greatly 
enhanced the wealth of its members.169
To show that the United Provinces was indeed a case of institutional binding, it is 
necessary to describe the complex developments in the Netherlands prior to the union. At 
the risk of trying the readers* patience, I have thus been obliged to account in some detail for 
the events that preceded unification. The chapter opens with a brief description of the Low 
Countries prior to the Revolt against Spain. Section III summarizes the main events of the 
revolt and illustrates how Holland’s prominent role in the unfolding struggle brought it close
1 6 8  Pieter Geyl (1932,1964) argues for the existence o f an ‘undivided Dutch nation’ prior to confederation 
which he argues embraced the Low Countries as a whole. The separation of the north and south Netherlands 
was the tragic outcome of warfare, not the result of cultural or political divisions within the region. This view is 
partly supported by Geoffrey Parker who also points to the existence of a distinct nationalism in the 16th 
century Netherlands which favored integration. (Parker 1977). A closely related explanation emphasizes the 
emergence in the 16th and 17th century Netherlands of a distinctly a republican theory of the state. On this 
view, the Dutch Revolt against Spain is seen a revolutionary struggle fueled by the vision of creating an 
sovereign, modem republic. See Zagorin 1982, pp. 87-89. For a critique o f this view see Tuck 1993.
169 yjjg  bu[k of literature on the commercial relations o f the Dutch Union emerged only in the 17th 
century—after the union had already given rise to a ‘trading empire’.
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to dominance in the north Netherlands. Section IV discusses two attempts at institutional 
binding among the Dutch: First, the abortive Pacification o f  Ghent (1576) which united all 
the Dutch provinces in an effort to bring peace to the region; second, the Union o f Utrecht 
(1579) which united the seven northern provinces in a lasting confederation. Section V 
concludes.
II. A B r ie f  H is t o r y  o f  th e  D u tc h  Pr o v in c e s  Pr io r  t o  t h e  R e v o lt  a g a in st  Spa in
The region which we today refer to as the Benelux countries consisted originally o f 
seventeen provinces o f  various size and political organization. The provinces of Flanders, 
Artois, Hainaut, Zeeland, Holland, Namur and Zutphen were governed by Earls; Brabant, 
Limburg Luxembourg and Gueldem were led by dukes; Friesland, Utrecht, Overijssel, 
Malines and Gronningen were led by bishops; and Antwerp was a Marquis-ship of the Holy 
Roman Empire.17*-5 These several provinces were not for the most part united by common 
history or tradition. While some had been under the suzerainty of the region’s Burgundian 
and Habsburg rulers for centuries prior to the Union o f Utrecht others were recent 
conquests. Friesland, Utrecht and Overijsel, for example, were acquired by Spain in the early 
1520s, and Gronningen and Gueldem were both added to the empire after 1530.170 71
Prior to unification there were significant contrasts among the provinces in terms o f 
culture, geography, religion and politics—many o f which persisted after unity was achieved. 
At the most basic level, the region lacked a coherent geography. In the northern part where 
the United Provinces was eventually formed, Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht were surrounded 
by the sea and cut o ff from the inland provinces by numerous rivers, lakes and bogs which 
made travel and by extension communication between east and west difficult.172 The entire
1 7 0  Agionby 1669, p. 179.
1 7 1  Smit 1970, p. 28.
1 7 2  Geoffrey Parker reports of a chronider who-writing in the mid-18th century-describes his native city 
Breda in northern Brabant as situated 8 hours west of Hertogenbosch (25 miles away), 10 hours northeast of
8 0
northern region was severed from the south by four great rivers—the Lek, Linge, Maas and 
Waal—which cut across the narrow center o f the Netherlands dividing it into two halves. 
These rivers made the north-western part of the region virtually inaccessible from the 
south.17-*
Geographical divisions were bolstered by differences in political organization. In 
most provinces, the governing system consisted of a representative assembly called the 
"States’, which embraced delegates from the clergy, nobility and the leading towns. Yet, there 
were substantial differences among the provinces with respect to the relative power of the 
three estates. In Holland, power was concentrated chiefly among the burghers.* 174 *Power 
was also vested in the cities in central provinces o f Flanders and Brabant, but in the majority 
o f other provinces, the nobility was still dominant and the clergy retained a strong position in 
the inland states where the rural sector was far stronger than in Holland.
To the extent that one can speak of the Netherlands as a cohesive region prior to the 
Dutch Union, this was the result of outside centralizing forces rather than of internal unity. 
The Burgundians who penetrated the Low Countries the second half of the 15* century set 
up a handful of central organizations designed to bridge the differences among the 
principalities and make their foreign rule more effective. The most important of these 
organizations was the "States General’—a large assembly which would periodically convene 
joint meetings of delegates from all the provinces for the purpose o f simplifying tax 
collection. However, the States General was closer to a convention of provincial embassies 
than an actual central governing forum.17  ^ When money was needed, the provincial States
Antwerp (30 miles) and 3 hours south of Geertruidenberg (9 miles)—an average speed o f 3 miles per hour in 
every direction. (Parker 1977, p. 22). For a discussion of the geography of 15th and 16th century Netherlands 
see ¿so  Limm 1989, p. 8 and Geyl 1964, p. 9.
17^ Angjionby 1669, pp. 116-117.
1 7 4  Beginning in the 14th century, the provincial governing structure in Holland consisted of two main 
offices; the ‘States o f Holland’—an assembly of representatives from each of the major towns—and a 
‘Council of State’, which served as executive. The 'States o f Holland’ included no clergy and had only one 
representative of the nobility.
17^ Rowen Rj2, p. 571, Smit 1970, p. 26.
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were convoked solely to hear a general proposition in which the reasons were set forth for 
why additional hinds were needed. Deputies from each province would then meet separately 
with the Burgundian representative to negotiate their provincial quota.176 Subsequent efforts 
at centralization by the regions’ Spanish rulers did not produce further results. Attempts at 
political reorganization were fiercely resisted by the Dutch provinces and often resulted in 
local uprisings which enabled the provincial States to wrench additional ‘privileges’ from 
their foreign rulers, thereby diminishing centralization rather than advancing it.177 In short, 
provincial autonomy remained the hallmark of political life.178
The religious unity of the Dutch provinces was equally unimpressive. Despite the 
significance often attributed to religious sentiment, in particular Calvinist ideology, as an 
instigator of the Dutch revolt against Spain, a closer look at the religious composition of the 
provinces reveals a rather fragmented picture. Chiefly, the provinces can be divided into two 
groups—one predominantly Catholic (the southern provinces); the other mostly protestant 
(the north-west). However, religion was hardly a unifying factor within either group. In the 
north, roughly one third o f the population which came to constitute the Dutch Union were 
Calvinists, Lutherans or o f other protestant faith; another third was Catholic, and the last 
third was undeclared.179
1 7 6  Smit 1970, p. 26.
177 ‘Privileges’ refers to charters in which sovereigns granted some persons or groups certain liberties. 
Particularly famous charters are the so-called Grand Privilege (1477) in which the Burgundian ruler conceded 
to a number of institutional reforms enhancing the power of local government and the ‘Joyous Entries’ (1356, 
1549) which obliged even' duke or prince to solemnly swear to respect ancient provincial rights. See van 
Gelderen 1992, p. 27. It is important to note that provincial uprisings generally remained local and isolated 
events. Provincial rivalry was of such magnitude that the States resented cooperating with each other even 
more than they resented cooperating with the foreign rulers. In 1452, for example, Philip the Fair was able to 
count support from most of his Dutch subjects when he marched on Ghent to subdue an uprising there.
1 7 8  Zagorin 1982, p. 89.
1 7 9  This estimate is based on Antwerp, the largest city of the Low Countries with some 100,000 inhabitants 
around 1565, but similar proportions are assumed to have existed in the other main cities. In some rural 
areas the composition was slightly different For example, Anabaptists constituted more than half the 
population in some areas in Friesland and some rural textile areas in southwest Handers. See Parker 1977,p. 
241, and Burrish 1742, pp. 146-149.
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A final realm in which the lack of unity among the Dutch provinces is evident is in 
their foreign policy and trade relations. All through the 16th century, trade within the Low 
Countries was limited by comprehensive customs barriers between the provinces, and the 
principalities were frequently at war amongst themselves.180 Indeed, the history of the Low 
Countries pnor to unification is one of recurrent armed hostilities among the provinces. 
Provincial strife was particularly widespread in the northern parts (the birthplace of the 
union) where Friesland and Gelderland spent most of the 15th and 16th centuries fighting 
Holland and Zeeland with Overijsel and Utrecht as both prize and battleground.181
The Rise o f  Holland
Before we can consider the Dutch revolts against Spain and the impact these revolts 
had on power-relations within the Dutch region, it will be necessary to briefly consider the 
unique position of Holland, which slowly propelled it towards regional hegemony and which 
allowed it to strengthen itself from the revolts. By the time the Dutch revolts broke out 
Holland was already a ‘great power7 among the Dutch provinces. In particular, its economic 
power was considerable. Thus, Jonathan Israel describes Holland’s political and economic 
importance in the 1550s as ranking third among the Dutch states—and rapidly growing.182
The basis for Holland’s economic growth was laid at the turn of the 15th century, as a 
sharp increase in the demand for international trade caused old modes of transportation 
along rivers and roads to give way to cheaper and faster transportation by sea.183 As a result, 
the inland provinces and cities along the Ijssel lost their commercial advantage to settlements 
closer to the coast. This geographic advantage was complemented by a somewhat 
paradoxical blessing; namely a decline in arable land in Holland which caused a wave of
180 Parker 1977, p. 34.
18 1  Ibid, p.240.
l8 ^ Israel 1995, p. 115.
183 Through the 14* century demand for trade rose sharply. Blockmans 1999, p. 72.
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migration from the country-side to the cities.184 This migration lead to increased commercial 
activity. New export goods, such as salted fish, beer and cloth were produced to support the 
growing urban population. Moreover, the decline in agricultural production meant that grain 
now had to be imported, which led the Hollanders for the first time to develop the full- 
rigged seagoing ships that would become the basis o f a subsequent burgeoning bulk-carrying 
traffic.185 Soon new trading routes were established to the Baltic, England, and along the 
Atlantic coast. These routes were used not only to import grain but increasingly also for 
freight since the Dutch could offer transportation at a lower cost than the Hansa fleets.186 
What began as a serious handicap—a long-standing grain shortage—was thus turned into a 
vehicle for economic growth.187
To begin with Holland’s growth was fairly slow. All through the 15th century, the 
center of political, economic and cultural gravity continued to lie in the south. In terms o f 
population, Ghent, Brussels and Brugges were many times greater than Amsterdam and the 
bulk of commerce and industry was concentrated south of die rivers in the provinces o f 
Flanders and Brabant.188 Yet, the seeds to Holland’s rise had been laid by a growing urban 
population. Whereas the number o f inhabitants in most northern cities declined during the 
14th and 15th centuries, urbanization in Holland continued to increase and, by 1470, forty-five
1 8 4  The decline in arable land (due to drainage problems) meant that grain now had to be imported, largely 
from Artois and, increasingly from the 15th century, the Baltic region. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Low 
Countries, history of; "Economic structure."
1 8 5  Israel 1995, p. 16.
1 8 6  From Encydopedia Britannica, Low Countries, history of, "Economic structure".
1 8 7  Blockmans 1999, p. 76.
18 8  In the late 15th century Handers was still by far the most populated province with about 750,000 people 
and a density o f 30 persons per square mile while Holland had 268,000 people and 25 persons per square 
mile. The other principalities (except Brabant) counted far fewer inhabitants. In the 14th century, Ghent and 
Brugges had populations o f 64,000 and 46,000, respectively, while the largest dty in Holland—Leiden—had 
a population of only 14,000. From Encydopedia Britannica, “History o f the Low Countries* and Israel 1995,
pp. 6- 1 2 .
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percent of Holland’s population were city dwellers—a higher percentage than anywhere else 
in the Low Countries.189
Initially, the other main powers in the region— Handers and Brabant—were 
relatively unconcerned with Holland’s growing strength. With the great rivers forming an 
effective barrier between north and south, they saw little reason to fear Holland. The small 
northern principalities bordering directly on Holland, by contrast, fought sternly to resist its 
encroachment.190 But while there was no lack of antagonism towards Holland, these states 
were not well placed to oppose i t 191 In the face of Holland’s expanding power and the 
seeming indifference of their southern neighbors, the smaller states in the north had only one 
recourse: to form alliances directed against Holland in northern Germany and the Baltic. In 
1441 Kampen joined the Hanseatic League while Deventer and Zwolle—already members 
of the League—tightened their links with Lübeck and other Hansa cities.192 Yet none of 
these alliances succeeded in halting Holland's economic expansion.
Entering the 16th century, Holland began to take advantage of its growing economic 
strength to expand territorially. In 1506-08 it waged war on Gelderland, and in 1523 it 
invaded and subdued Friesland, bringing these provinces formally under the suzerainty of the 
Spanish empire. Meanwhile, capital and labor continued to flow into Holland’s towns.193 
While Flanders and Brabant were still the most economically developed provinces, by the 
m id-lö* century, Holland was not far behind.194 North of the rivers, Holland was 
unquestionably dominant. More than half the population and wealth of the north 
Netherlands was now concentrated in Holland, which was four times more populous than
189 '¡qie number of people living in cities was 36%in Flanders and 31% in Brabant. It should be noted, 
however, that the cities of Holland were still relatively small compared to southern cities. The leading towns 
were still Ghent, Brussels and Bruges. See Israel 1995, pp. 1 1 -1 2 .
1 9 0  Israel 1995, pp. 12-3.
1 9 1  De Vries.
1 9 2  Israel 1995, pp. 18-19.
1 9 3  Geyl 1964, pp. 43-44.
1 9 4  Israel 1995, p. 115.
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the second largest northern province, Gelderland.195 Holland, it seemed, was on the way to
becoming a local hegemon.
I ll The Dutch Revolts against Spain (1568-1577).
It is against the backdrop of Holland’s growing power that the impact of the Dutch 
Revolts must be understood. The Dutch Revolts refer to a series of uprisings which took 
place in the Netherlands between 1568 and 1577 in opposition to Spanish rule. The causes 
o f these revolts were many and varied. Historians have portrayed the revolts, with varying 
degrees of emphasis, as a struggle between the forces of Protestantism and Catholicism; 
between nationalism and foreign (mis)rule; between the forces of bourgeois progressivism 
and reactionary absolutism. Social and economic factors also played a role in the uprising— 
especially among the lower classes. The Spanish wars with France (which increased the tax 
burden in the Low Countries), the epidemics, the poor harvests and the hard winters—all 
this combined to produce despair among the masses and ripen them for protest.
This chapter takes no particular position on what caused the Dutch Revolt. It 
appears that the causes o f  the revolt differed across the region, even from town to town. As 
noted by one observer, “not the whole of the Netherlands rose in revolt, some men, some 
groups, some towns, some areas did, at different times and for different reasons”.196 Indeed, 
in order to understand the impact o f the Dutch Revolts on the prospects for institutional 
binding it is crucial to realize that the revolts did not engulf the whole of the Low Countries. 
During the revolts, rebellious forces were mainly concentrated in Holland and Zeeland 
where the escalating struggle was as much a “contest between Holland and her troublesome 
neighbors over whom it felt every right to preside” as it was a struggle against Spanish
1 9 5  Forsyth 1981, p. 31.
1 9 6  Kossman & Mellink 1975, p. 1 .
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imperialism.19  ^ In fact, as we will see, on many occasions, other provinces collaborated with 
Spain to contravene Holland’s hegemonic aspirations. The revolts were therefore “a long 
drawn out process of estrangement not only between the Low Countries and the sovereign 
residing in Spain.. .but also between the various parts of the Netherlands”.* 198
The effect of this struggle was dual: The Dutch Revolts served to weaken Spanish 
power in the Low Countries and at the same time strengthen Holland’s position vis-à-vis its 
neighbors. As I will illustrate below, it was this growing threat of hegemony by Holland, 
combined with the weakening of their main ally in the fight against Holland’s hegemony, 
namely Spain, which lead the smaller Dutch provinces to abandon a strategy of balancing 
against Holland and seek to bind it instead.
The F irst Revolt
The seeds of the First Dutch Revolt were sown in 1531 when Charles V—the 
second Habsburg ruler of the Netherlands199 20—returned to the Netherlands to initiate a 
process of further centralization. To make his in-absentia rule more effective Charles 
appointed a new Governor-General to rule over the assembled provinces and established in 
each province a governor (Stadholder) which functioned as the chief representative of the 
King.^ OO As before, this process of centralization was met with fierce resistance from the 
provincial States who regarded Charles’ actions as a direct attack on their ancient privileges.
19^ Israel 1995.
1 9 8  Kossman& Mellink 1974, p. 1 .
1 9 9  Burgundian rule in the Netherlands ended in 1482 when the succession of Mary of Burgundy by her son, 
Philip I, placed the Netherlands under the Habsburg dynasty. In 1506, Philip I was succeeded by Charles V. 
Charles began his carrier as sovereign of the Low Countries by leaving the Netherlands in favor of Spain were 
he was crowned King and later Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Before leaving die Nethedands he 
appointed his Aunt, Margaret of Austria, as governess. He returned temporarily to the Nethedands in 1531 to 
reorgani2e his in-absentia rule.
200 Charles V also instituted three collateral councils which were separate from the States General. These 
were the Council o f State (Raad van Staate) in which members of the high nobility could advise the 
Governor, the Secret Council in which permanent officials dealt with everyday administration, and a Council 
of Finance and enacted new legislation which ordained mandatory guidelines for dealing with legal problems, 
thus limiting the prerogatives of local magistrates. On the process of centralization under Charies V, see 
Blockmans 1999, p. 120, Israel 1995, p. 37 and Trevelyan 1930.
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Discontent was especially outspoken in Holland and Zeeland where Protestant beliefs were 
gaining ground in contrast to Catholicism and served as a rallying point for opposition. As 
Charles continued to press his centralization effort, political unrest in these provinces 
increased.
Meanwhile, the power of the Spanish Empire was steadily deteriorating* The 
prolonged conflict with France (which flared up after 1540), and the war with the Ottomans 
(which began in 1551) both placed considerable fiscal demands on Spain and made it 
increasingly difficult to devote men and resources to subdue the uprising in the 
Netherlands.201 The debt of the Spanish crown increased from two million guilders in 1544 
to seven million in 1556, and in 1557, Charles’ successor, Philip II, was forced to declare a 
moratorium on state interests payments to service debts.202 This was the first of a series o f 
bankruptcies to be declared by Spain.
The Dutch were quick to draw the conclusion from Spain’s strategic dilemma: as 
long as the Turks threatened, Philip could do little in the Netherlands.203 Encouraged by 
Spain’s financial trouble rebel activity intensified and resulted in several violent clashes 
between provincial rebellious groups and the Spanish military. The first general uprising 
took place on April 5, 1566 when a thousand armed nobles— led by William of Orange204 
and Count van Egmont o f Holland— marched through the streets o f Brussels and forced 
their way into the Court of Margaret of Parma, Philip II’s sister, who he had recently
2 0 1  Parker 1977, p. 53.
2 0 2  Blockmans 1999, p. 151-
203 Throughout the Revolt there was a dose connection between Philip’s Mediterranean problem and his 
policy in the Netherlands. The war with the Ottomans was a great burden on Spain’s finances and the Dutch 
took advantage of this. They knew from letters exchanged between Spain and the central government in 
Brussds that Philip’s principal concern after 1559 was the Turkish maritime threat It even seems that the 
Sultan took initiative, in 1566, to establish a direct contact with the Dutch opposition. Parker also suggests that 
the Dutch opposition exchanged envoys with the Sultan on one occasion in 1574 in order to coordinate their 
attacks on Spain. See Parker 1979.
2 0 4  In 1559 Philip II tried to tighten his political grip on Holland and Zeeland by appointing William of 
Orange—a favorite advisor—as Stadholder of Holland Zeeland and Utrecht William functioned as 
Stadtholder until 1566 when his personal ambition for political leadership in Holland and his dismay for the 
policies of Spain led him desert die royal cause and toffer his services to the rebels instead. See Rowen 1988 
and Trevelyan 1930.
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appointed Governess o f the Netherlands.20  ^ Here they submitted a Petition requesting the 
relaxation of edicts and ordinances against Calvinists and other protestants and demanded 
that the King respect provincial rights, in particular the ju s  de non evocando which required that 
citizens be put on trial in their own town or region rather than in Brussels.205 06 207*It was on this 
occasion that the Dutch rebels got the byname ‘Guex’ or ‘Gueuzen’ (beggars) as Count 
Barlaymont—a confidant of Margaret—caustically said of the assembled nobles; “Ce ne fout 
que des Geux!”
The ‘march of the nobles’ was followed in August 1566 by the ‘breaking of the 
images’ (beeldenstorm) in which statues and paintings were pulled down from the Catholic 
churches.20  ^ Together these events convinced Philip that stem measures were needed to 
restore order. In April 1567, he send 10,000 troops to the Netherlands led by his trusted 
general the Duke of Alva.20® Upon arriving in Brussels, Alva immediately began to capture 
the nobles who had participated in the uprising. A special Council of Troubles was erected, 
soon re-dubbed the ‘Council of Blood’, which put an estimated 12,000 people on trial. More 
than a thousand people were executed, and tens of thousands were sent fleeing into in
205 The ‘march of the nobles’ has its origin in the so-called “Compromise”—a union among the Nobles 
made in January 1566 for the purpose of resisting the inquisition. It is known that more nobles had signed 
die ‘compromise’ in Holland than in any other province. However, estimates of how many nobles participated 
in the march vary greatiy. William Aglionby puts the number at 500 while other sources speak of as many as 
3.000. (Aglionby 1669, p. 40 and Israel 1995, pp. 57,151). The text of the Pension is reprinted in Rowen 1972, 
p. 30. The ‘Compromise of the Nobles’ is reprinted in Kossman & Mellink 1974 p. 59.
2 0 6  The Petition protested the Inquisition not on basis o f religious belief per se, but on the ground that it 
violated ancient provincial rights, in particular the ju s  de non evocando. See van Gelderen 1992, pp. 111-117.
207 The beeldenstorm began in Antwerp and spread to a number of other towns in the south. However, 
the beeldenstorm in the south was brief (it ended within a month) and was carried out in a remarkably 
orderly way. In contrast to the violent casting down o f Catholic churches in Scotland and France, the 
destruction in die south NL appeared to be the work o f a small band of determined men—perhaps as few as 
fifty to a hundred many of ■whom appears to have been paid off by Calvinist leaders. (Israel 1995, p. 151 and 
Parker 1977, p. 78-9; see also Philip van Marmix (1567) “Godsdienstige en kerkelijke gescriften” or “A true 
narrative and apology of what has happened in the Nethedands in the matter of religion in the year 1566. By 
those who profess the reformed religion in that country.” Edited and translated in 1871 by J.J.van 
Toorenenbeigen and reprinted in Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 78). By contrast, the iconodasm in the north 
involved massive popular participation. It continued from August into the late autumn, engulfing still larger 
segments of the population. In the end, the destruction reached such proportions that Margaret was 
compelled to concede freedom of Protestant worship in all places where it was already practiced*
20® Rowen 1988, p. 574.
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neighboring countries.209 In response to these cruelties a general revolt arose in towns in 
Holland, Zeeland and West-Friesland which threw out the Spanish garrisons and renounced 
their obedience to the Spanish king.210 These provinces were now in open revolt.
In the fall o f 1567 the first stroke of w ar occurred between the forces of the Spanish 
Governess and the rebels (or ‘Geuxen1) led by the Prince of Orange. The clash resulted in a 
severe defeat for the rebels and Orange hastily retired into Germany. During the following 
winter (1567-68) he distributed various pamphlets in the Netherlands trying to persuade the 
people to rebel by reminding them that they owed no obedience to the foreign rulers.211 
From his birthplace in Nassau-Dillenburg he organized several attempts to invade the Low 
Countries to gain a base against the Spanish forces.212 A small army led by his brother, Louis 
of Nassau, enjoyed a modest victory over the Spaniards in the province of Gronningen in 
1568 [this battle is considered the beginning of the Eighty Years War] but this modest 
success was far out-weighted by the complete failure of a campaign led by William himself in 
Brabant. In the end, the rebel course found few sympathizers outside the provinces o f 
Holland and Zeeland. Left without broad support and with no military successes, the prince’s 
armies soon disintegrated.213
2 0 9  Martin van Gelderen reports that during Alva’s regime approximately 50,000 people sought exile, mainly in 
Germany and England, van Gelderen 1992, p. 40.
2 1 0  Temple 1687.
2 1 1  William Orange, “Varantwoordinge, veridaringhe ende waerschowinghe des Princen van Oraengien” 
(Sept. 1858) reprinted in Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 84. In this letter, written in 1568 after he was exiled to 
Germany, Orange reminds the Dutch people that "princes as well as the subjects of the country have always 
had to commit themselves by a formal contract and to swear a solemn oath that they would maintain the 
rights and realize them” and that if  this oath is broken there is a natural right to resist princely rule. Another 
similar pamphlet was written and distributed in November 1568, in which Orange seeks to persuade the loyal 
Dutch provinces that the Duke of Alva is not acting on the Spanish King’s command.
2 1 2  Orange attempted as many as four invasions during the winter. In 1568 an army of French Huguenots 
with whom Orange had hastily concluded an alliance attacked into the southern Netherlands. At the same time 
a smaller army from England attempted an invasion of Flanders and troops o f German mercenaries pushed 
westwards into Limburg and Friesland. To complete the four-fold invasion Orange himself led a large army 
into Brabant from his castle in Dillenbuig. Each invasion failed, however, due to lack of support from the 
Dutch population outside Holland and Zeeland. See Parker 1977, p. 109.
2 1 3  Zagorin 1982, p. 100.
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The Second Revolt
While the first Revolt brought no major victories for the Dutch rebels, it served to 
give the rebellion a territorial base—the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland—and a 
political leader: William o f Orange.214 215*Between 1569 and 1572 Holland and Zeeland became 
the stronghold of a renewed insurgent effort. While most other provinces abandoned their 
opposition to Philip II, rebel activity continued in these two provinces whose Calvinist forces 
carried out frequent attacks on Brabant and Flanders attempting to stir up rebel forces in 
these provinces.
At the same time, the position of Spain worsened. The revolt of the Moriscos of 
Granada which has broken out in 1568 continued into 1571, and just as it seemed this revolt 
would finally be crushed, war broke out again in the Mediterranean 21 ^  As before, the Dutch 
rebels were quick to exploit Spain’s weakness. In April 1572 a group of ‘Guex’ surprised the 
town Brill in southern Holland. This move was o f considerable strategic importance because 
the port controlled the mouth of both the Meuse and the Waal. The Geux then took Dort, 
Flussing, Veere and Enkhuizen in Holland and Zeeland, Upon hearing this news most towns 
in Holland joined the rebellion 21&
The successful insurrection by the beggars encouraged Orange to renew his war 
effort. He now asked the States of Holland and Zeeland to recognize him as governor and 
raise money for his armies. On 19 July 1572 the said States gathered for the first time by their 
own authority and accepted Orange as their Stadtholder.217 Thus empowered, Orange now
2 1 4  van Gelderen 1992, p. 164.
2 1 5  Parker 1977, pp. 129-130.
2 1  ^  Some authors contribute the outbreak of the second revolt not to the invasion of the sea-beggars but to 
the imposition in 1571of a new tax—the tenth penny—which was highly unpopular. See e.g. Kossman & 
Mellink 1974, p.14 and AgjUonby 1669, pp. 45-50.
2 1 7  Orange send a deputy* to this meeting of the States to ask them to accept him as their governor. The 
deputy was instructed to “inform the assembly that...without the States His Highness shall not endeavor to 
do or command anything that concerns the provinces or that may be harmful to them.. .On the other hand 
His Highness hopes that the States assembled there shall bind themselves not to enter into any accord, 
compact or agreement, wither with the king himself or with any one who might or could pretend to have 
received an order or commission from His Majesty’'. The instructions, written in July 1572 are edited by R.C.
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negotiated for help from Germany, England, and from the French Huguenots.218 In the 
summer of 1572 a Huguenot force occupied Mons in Hainault and an army from Germany 
invaded and occupied the important city of Zutphen. Fearing that the French would use the 
opportunity to invade the Netherlands, Alva immediately sent most of his troops south 
thereby giving time to the Hollanders to strengthen their positions in the north. Within six 
weeks almost all of Overijsel, Drenthe and Friesland were in the hands of the rebels and by 
the end of the summer only a handful of towns in the north were still under control of the 
central government in Brussels.219
Despite the initial success the rebels failed again to gain a decisive advantage. In July, 
a Huguenot force of 6,000 left Paris and marched straight into a Spanish ambush at Mons. 
Almost the entire force was destroyed—many by the Dutch peasants who still saw France as 
the traditional enemy and would rather side with Spain.220 After this setback the rebels 
rapidly lost their grip on the conquered territories. In the south, only a few towns had joined 
the rebellion and they now hastened to come to terms with Spain. Likewise, many of the 
territories in the northeast welcomed the Spanish soldiers back as liberators. Only a few 
towns in Gelderland sided with the rebels, but after the defeat of one o f them, Zupthen, also 
they rushed to realign themselves with Spain.221
The Third Revolt
The Second Revolt drew a sharp division between rebels and pro-Spanish forces. 
The realignment of the majority o f the Dutch provinces with Spain left Holland and Zeeland 
isolated, and from 1573 to 1576 these provinces fought a solitary war o f attrition against the
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Cartons voor de geschiedenis can den Nederlandschen Vrijheidsoorlog, II (the 
Hague, 1898) and translated into English in Kossman and Meilink 1974, pp. 98-101.
2 1 8  ‘Huguenots’ was a term of abuse used by Roman Catholics to designate French Calvinists in the 16* 
century.
2 !9  P a ie r  1977,p. 136 and Anglionby 1669, pp. 49-50.
2 2 0  Parker 1977, p. 137.
2 2 1  Parker 1977, p. 141.
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Spanish military.--2 During these years, the war—which was initially fought by Holland 
against the Spanish generals—often took the form of a struggle between Holland and 
Zeeland on one side, and the rest of the Dutch provinces on the other. The term ‘domestic 
war’ appears frequently in documents o f the time, and it is clear that political divisions within 
the region were in many respects sharper than the division between the Netherlands and 
Spain 2 23 Many Dutch provinces simply concluded that the Spanish yoke was preferable to 
the supremacy o f Holland and refused to give the rebels assistance. Holland, by contrast, 
sought to coerce other provinces into supporting its rebellion (or at least to refrain from 
aiding Spain) by pointing out that soon it would be dominant and those provinces who had 
sided with Spain would suffer. The growing conflict between Holland and its neighbors is 
particularly well illustrated by a memorandum from the States of Holland sent to the States 
of each of the loyal provinces in 1573. In this memo Holland calls on its neighbors to join 
the revolt by underscoring the weakness of Spain and by threatening the consequences of a 
continued war with Holland:224
Why do you not gird yourself up with manly courage and join u$ at last in shaking off this unjust 
and unbearable yoke from our necks in concerted action? For if the Duke has been able to 
accomplish so little up till now, although we were set against each other and the greater part of 
the country helped him, what will he be able to accomplish if in perfect harmony we cooperate in 
chasing these foreign tyrants and rulers out o f the country? ... if  you would only withdraw your 
help from him and even if  you would never draw your swords against him yourselves, what 
would he be able to do?...
Later in the missive, the tone becomes more threatening
If you continue to conspire with the Spanish tyrant.. .and to help him with money and other means, 
one of three things is sure to happen; either this war will remain undecided for a time, or God will 
give us total victory over our enemies, or finally they will gain the victory over us. But in all three 
cases the war will necessarily min and destroy the country...In the second case, if God gives us 
victory over our enemies, this will be accompanied by frightful massacres of innumerable good 
inhabitants used by the duke of Alva for his purposes, for as long as he can get money and men, he 
will certainly not stop trying to extirpate and ruin us completely. So that it will not be possible to 
overthrow him without horrible bloodshed.
2 2 2  Ibid. p. 138.
2 2 3  The problem of civil war was discussed in letters exchanged between William of Orange and Mamix in 
1573. Orange and his supporters tried to argue that they were not fighting a civil war against the provinces 
loyal to the legitimate and conciliator}' government but rather were defending a constitution common to the 
whole of the Netherlands. For an English translation of this exchange see Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 23.
224 “Sendtbrief der ridderschap, edelen ende steden van Hollandt aen die Staten van den lande van 
herwaerts overe”, September 1573 (Knuttel). Reprinted in Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 102.
93
What had emerged is best descried as a precarious preventive war dilemma. On one 
hand, the loyal provinces wished to prevent Holland from rising to dominance. Gelderland 
and Friesland had already received a taste o f Holland’s growing might. They, and other 
provinces, were now determined to prevent Holland from further expanding its power. 
Preventive action, however, was complicated by two factors. First, the position of their main 
ally in the fight against Holland, namely Spain, was weakening. Second, while an alliance with 
Spain was preferable to letting Holland achieve regional dominance, this was by no means an 
ideal choice. Surely, Spain could be expected to use an alliance to further tighten its political 
hold on the provinces that accepted its help.
Holland, on the other hand, sought to stave off an alliance between the loyal 
provinces and Spain by appealing to a ‘common interest’ among the Dutch provinces, and by 
assuring its neighbors o f its benign intention. Both sides were in a vulnerable position. 
Although it may seem that the rebellious provinces were worse off due to their minority, in 
reality they had several advantages. First, the geography of Holland and Zeeland provided a 
strong natural defense. The rivers that cut across the center of the Netherlands made it 
difficult for an army to cross to the north without travelling far inland.225 Moreover, their 
organization was superior. To strengthen the war effort, Holland and Zeeland had tightened 
both their financial and political organization.226 A new Financial Council was set up in 
Holland, and the system o f representation in the States was changed to involve every part o f 
the province in the war planning.227 Finally, in June 1375, the two provinces signed a treaty 
which established a single military command, placing Orange unequivocally at the head o f
2 2 5  Zagorin 1982, p. 103.
2 2 6  The war effort war mainly financed by Holland which, in contrast to the much poorer Zeeland, enjoyed 
outstanding public credit. Rowen 1972, pp. 161-163.
2 2 7  Originally only six cities in Holland held the right to vote in the States. (Dordrecht, Harlem, Leiden, Delft, 
Amsterdam and Gouda). The States now added twelve others. The pretence of this reform was to facilitate 
communication among the cities in order to secure the proper maintenance of arms, but according to Guido 
Benri-voglio, an Italian diplomat writing in the late 16* century, “die true and more hidden end was...that every 
part of the province might by its own proper engagement make the insurrection the more universal. 
(Bentivoglio 1598, p. 5.) See also Aubeigdu Maurier 1682, p. 39.
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affairs.228 At the same time, tolls between the two provinces were abolished, a common duty 
was levied on imports, and a trade blockade was invoked vis-à-vis Antwerp and other
Spanish controlled cities.229 230
The strength o f Holland’s financial system and its geographic favor allowed the 
rebels to hold out against the Spanish forces. In the spring of 1574, Holland defeated a 
Royal fleet in the Zuiderzee and soon thereafter rebel forces launched another large-scale 
invasion of the East Netherlands. Meanwhile, Spain was hit once again by financial crisis. 
The defensive advantage o f the Dutch rebels made the conflict costly for Spain. The total 
expense of the Spanish army in the Netherlands is estimated at 1.2 million florins per month 
between 1572 and 1576—a huge sum by that time’s standards.239 But Spain was not alone in 
feeling the burden of the rebellion. The war with Holland led to a heavy increase in taxes in 
the provinces that remained aligned with Spain. Moreover, the rebel’s strong defenses meant 
that the bulk of the fighting between rebels and pro-Spanish forces was diverted to 
neighboring provinces where the war led to economic stagnation and declining populations. 
Thus, in Overijsel between 1572-79 many farms were laid waste and up to twenty percent of 
the agricultural land was abandoned as a result o f the war. Similarly, Gelderland and Overijsel 
saw their trade greatly damaged by the obstruction of the shipping traffic on the Ijssei.231 
The situation was equally dire south of the rivers, where the ports o f Flanders were 
continually besieged by rebel forces, meaning that all foreign merchandise had to be 
unloaded in Holland and Zeeland.232 Hence, while the war caused economic ruin in most 
provinces, Holland and Zeeland profited.
2 2 8  van Gelderen 1992, p. 166.
2 2 9  Bentivoglio 1598, p. 15. To interrupt supplies to the Spanish forces, heavy taxes were levied on merchants 
in Holland and Zeeland to pass form there to Antwerp—a practice which greatly lessened the traffic to that 
city, while increasing Holland and Zeeland’s revenues. Israel 1995 and Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 23.
2 3 0  See Parker 1979, pp. 48-49.
2 3 1  Ibid., p. 193.
2 3 2  Bentivoglio 1598, p. 15.
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By the end o f 1574, the combined burden o f financing the war both against the 
Dutch rebels and die Ottomans had stretched Philip’s finances to the point that he could no 
longer service his mounting debts. Starved of funds the Spanish troops began to mutiny and 
plunder the Dutch provinces they were supposed to protect.233 Soon many Spanish soldiers 
were leaving, their positions swiftly being occupied by Holland’s rebels.234 Contemplating his 
deteriorating financial situation Philip now began to consider peace with the rebels. He was 
not overtly optimistic about what a peace overture could bring him; “We are in great need 
and our enemies know it well, so that they will not wish to make a settlement”, he told his 
advisers.235 But when the Turkish fleet—possibly prompted by Orange’s diplomacy—  
captured Tunis, Philip authorized his new governor, Don Louis de Requesens, to negotiate 
with the rebels.236 Formal talks began at Breda in March 1575 but were broken off as the 
parties failed to agree on the fate of the Spanish forces in the Netherlands. A renewed 
Spanish offensive was undermined by another wave o f mutinies, and in September 1575, 
Philip once again declared bankruptcy. The flow of money from Spain to support the war in 
the Netherlands now completely stopped.
IV. TWO ATTEMPTS AT INSTITUTIONAL BINDING: THE PACIFICATION OF GHENT 
(1576) a n d  t h e  U n io n  o f  U t r e c h t  (1579).
In the previous chapter I argued that an impending hegemony can facilitate regional 
integration if  declining powers decide to ‘bind’ a rising state instead o f balancing against it. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I show how the looming hegemony of Holland—helped 
along by the Dutch Revolt against Spain— led to two attempts at binding Holland 
institutionally. The first was the Pacification o f Ghent—a loose union instituted in 1576 in a
2 3 3  Israel 1995, p. 185.
2 3 4  Parker 1977, p. 164.
235 Ljmm> 1989, p. 45.
236 ggg jsrae] 1995, p. 183.
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failed attempt to institute a general peace among the Dutch provinces. The second was the 
far more successful Union of Utrecht (1579).
The ratification o f  Ghent. 1576
The third Dutch revolt which ended in 1576 expelled almost the entire Spanish 
force from the northern Dutch provinces. By doing so, it added to the desolation of 
Holland’s neighbors which were not only ravaged by Holland’s troops but also plundered 
by the fleeing Spanish soldiers originally supposed to protect them. The mutinous troops 
naturally discredited Spain’s authority in the Netherlands. According to Geoffrey Parker, 
“the Netherlands were bound to question the governments’ chances of ever winning the 
war by military means”.287 In fact, the Spanish themselves questioned their chances of 
prevailing over the Dutch rebels. The governor Requesens wrote to his brother in the 
autumn 1575;
I cannot find a single penny, nor can I see how the king could send money here, even if he had 
it in abundance. Short of a miracle, the whole military machine will fall in ruins so rapidly that 
it is highly probable that I shall not have time to tell you about it .288
Spanish authority in the Low Countries was dwindling. If there had ever been a wish 
among the Dutch provinces for a general alliance against Spanish supremacy", it seems that 
the need for such an alliance was now greatly diminished. Indeed, for many provinces, the 
immediate dilemma was the power vacuum created by the collapse of Spanish power and the 
room for maneuver this left for Holland. Conscious of Spain’s deteriorating position and the 
growing strength o f Holland, the loyal provinces now decided to make their own peace with 
the rebels. In September 1576, the States General took the decisive step of assembling on its 
own initiative at Brussels where they appointed a delegation to negptiate an armistice with 
Holland and Zeeland on behalf of the fifteen loyal provinces. Negotiations were initiated at *238
-37 Parker 1977, p. 173. In March 1576, the sudden death of Requesens further added to the Spanish 
desolation. According to Herbert Rowen, “When Requesens died, Spanish authority in the Low Countries fell 
apart.” Rowen, “What kind of Revolution”, p. 578.
238 Parker 1977, p. 169.
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Ghent, and on 8 November the so-called "Pacification’ was signed, instituting a general peace 
among the Dutch provinces. This happened only a few weeks after Requesens’ successor as 
Governor, Don Juan, had been authorized by the Spanish king to withdraw the remaining 
Spanish troops from the Low Countries and recognize the States General as an independent 
authority.239
The Pacification of Ghent constituted a first, vague attempt at binding Holland. O f 
course, one might ask whether the Pacification was not merely an attempt at forming an 
alliance to drive out the Spanish at a time when they seemed vulnerable—an interpretation 
which would support the standard realist claim that regional integration is undertaken in 
order to balance more effectively against external threat. The evidence does not support this 
interpretation. The negotiations between Holland, Zeeland and the remaining provinces were 
couched in a language which strongly suggests that the future peace among these parties was 
o f primary concern—not cooperation against Spain. There were no specific clauses in the 
treaty aiming at strengthening the Dutch defenses against Spain. Instead, the treaty stipulated 
how peaceful coexistence between the rebellious and loyal provinces could be secured after 
the Spaniards left. The two sides agreed to cease fighting, to maintain the religious status quo 
in all provinces, and to refer disputes to the States General which from now on was to 
function as an independent governing assembly.24^ The treaty obliged Holland and Zeeland 
to halt their expansion and to refrain from attempts to impose their religion or political 
idiosyncrasies on other territories. In return, the loyal provinces would assist Holland and 
Zeeland in overseeing the swift departure of the remaining Spanish troops as agreed with the 
Spanish king.241 In essence, the Pacification obliged the pro-Spanish provinces to keep from 
allying with Spain against Holland and Zeeland. However, the treaty did not oblige them to
2 3 9  Ibid, p.177.
240 gy  the terms of the Pacification Catholicism remained the official and the sole permitted religion in the 
loyal provinces, whereas Calvinism continued to be permitted by Holland and Zeeland.
2 4 1  Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 32.
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actively balance against Spain or to denounce Spanish rule at large. The loyal provinces were
free to continue their allegiance to the king of Spain and to Roman Catholicism while
Holland and Zeeland remained defiant o f both. The following are excepts from the treaty:
It has been agreed that immediately after the departure of the Spaniards and their adherents 
and after law and order has been restored, the two parties will be bound to do their utmost to 
convoke an assembly o f the States General....The Assembly must setde the affairs o f the 
provinces in general and in detail, not only the matter and exercise of religion in Holland and 
Zeeland...[also] the restitution of the strongholds, artillery, ships and other things belonging to 
the king which during the said disturbances were taken by Hollanders and Zeelanders.
...henceforth the inhabitants and subjects on both sides, no matter which province they come 
from...will be allowed to move freely, to come and go, to live and to travel everywhere for 
commercial and other purposes, in all freedom and security. However those of Holland, 
Zeeland or others whatsoever provinces they may be, shall not be allowed to disturb the 
common peace and quiet outside the provinces o f Holland, Zeeland and associated places, or
in particular to attack the Roman Catholic religion and practice.. .” 2 4 2
The Pacification o f Ghent was the first attempt at institutional binding in the Low 
Countries. The Ghent treaty instituted a peace between Holland and Zeeland on one hand 
and the fifteen loyal provinces on the other, which put an end to an internal war that had 
ravaged the Netherlands since 1572 However, the Pacification failed to resolve the 
fundamental conflict among its members. Politically, the compromise reached at Ghent 
resulted from a highly unstable combination of forces: Holland and Zeeland were essentially 
revolutionary, bent on opposing Spanish authority. They were not prepared to let themselves 
be restrained by the common States General.243 The authorities of the southern and north­
eastern provinces, by contrast, were moderate and conservative. Predominantly Catholic their 
sympathy continued to lie with Spain rather than with the rebels: "They were unhappy at 
finding themselves at odds with the monarchy and certainly indisposed to withstand it to 
extremes”.244 The institutional framework of the Pacification was too weak to hold these 
improbable partners together. Apart from establishing an independent governing assembly 
and adopting a common standard for deciding the value of money, the Pacification did little
2 4 2  From articles III and IV o f the Pacification o f Ghent.
243 Geyl 1932, p.152.
244 Zagprin 1982, p. 112.
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to secure cohesion among its members. It did not provide for any degree of economic 
integration to reinforce the fragile political association. But most importantly, it failed to 
place a real check on the military power of Holland. There were no provisions for pooling 
military forces or for exchanging ‘strategic hostages* which would raise the costs o f settling 
disputes by force. In terms o f the logic of institutional binding outlined in chapter III, the 
Pacification instituted a new balance of political influence but failed to secure a credible 
commitment to abide by this balance through a pooling of resources and basic interests. 
Given this weakness, it was only a matter of time before the agreement would break apart.
The first major conflict erupted over the choice of a new Governor to head the 
States General. Holland and Zeeland pointed to William of Orange, whereas the loyal 
provinces wished to appoint the former Spanish governor Don Juan. After a failed coup at 
Antwerp in which Don Juan sought to seize power, a compromise was found by appointing 
the Archduke Matthias, a nephew of Philip II.245 But Holland was not satisfied. Angered by 
the failure to elect Orange, the States o f Holland used all their political clout to subvert the 
authority of the Archduke. Matthias was forced to govern in cooperation with a special 
‘Council of State* nominated by the States General and he was barred from submitting any 
policies to the States General without first seeking the advice o f the Council. He was also 
kept from appointing generals of his own choice or raising soldiers.246 So severe were the 
constraints on the Archduke’s powers that he soon became known as the Tuppet 24
24^ In 1577, the loyal provinces made Don Juan sign die so-called Perpetual Edict1 whereby he endorsed 
the Pacification of Ghent and pledged to withdraw the remaining Spanish forces. In return, the States 
General (except Holland and Zeeland) accepted him as Governor and avowed their loyalty to the Spanish 
Crown. Embittered, Holland and Zeeland withdrew their deputies from the States General, thereby causing 
all decision-making to ground to a halt Frustrated with the gridlock Don Juan attempted to solidify his 
power by a coup. His plot failed, however, and, somewhat ironically, served to resolve the situation by 
making his leadership unacceptable even to the southern provinces. Parker 1977, pp. 183-187. On Holland’s 
reaction to the Edict see “Advice and Answer o f the Prince o f Orange and the States o f Holland and 
Zeeland to some articles concluded in the form of a Perpetual Edict, 19 February, 1577*' reprinted in 
Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 135.
2 4 6  Limm 1989, p. 49. For the text of the articles by which the Archduke Matthias was accepted as Governor 
see Kossman & Mellink 1974, p. 144.
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Iheavily circumscribed.
Governor*.2"*7 In this way the powers of the central authority were from the b
The conflict over appointing a governor brought to the surface a more fundamental 
rift among the members o f the Pacification. At root, most of the southern provinces
against Holland and Zeeland. On the other hand, Holland and Zeeland kept up their practice
groups from Holland continued to attack towns in Flanders, Brabant and Gelderland where 
they arrested and dispelled Catholic magistrates and clergy. These violent practices led to the 
outbreak of renewed warfare, causing a growing polarization among the union’s members.
The Walloon provinces were the first to leave the union, which they claimed had 
ignored its founding treaty, the Pacification of Ghent.249 In the autumn 1578, Hainault send 
deputies to Artois proposing a defensive union among the two provinces, and in January 
1579 they opened collective peace talks with Spain.250 Soon they were joined by Walloon 
Flanders who also invited Spanish troops to re-enter its territory.251 The treachery o f the 
Walloon states signaled the end of the Pacification. Before long, the rest of the southern 
provinces withdrew from the union. A few o f them were forcefully retaken by Spain, but
much o f Spanish treasure as of deep divisions within the Netherlands.255
2 4 7  van Gelderen 1992, p. 139, Limm 1989.
2 48  Geyil932,p. 152
2 4 9  Boogman 1980, p. 11.
250 por {he tej-t 0f Treaty of Arras see Rowen 1972, p. 71.
2 5 1  Parker 1977, pp. 190-195.
2 d 2  By 1578 Don Juan had been replaced by his deputy, Alexander of Parma, as the king’s representative.
Parma’s political purpose in the Netherlands was appeasement—at least of the Catholic population. He was 
authorized to grant advantageous terms to the provinces that returned to obedience. See Rowen 19xx, p. 581
and Zagorin 1982, p. 121. Knowing that Philip needed their support the Walloon leaders exploited the
situation to wrench important concessions from the Spain. Philip consented to lowering taxes and withdrawing
remained loyal to Spain. This was signified by their frequent siding with the new governor
of spreading Calvinism in opposition to Spain.247 48 Despite the formal cease-fire, armed
given the renewed hostilities with Holland most States accepted Spanish protection 
voluntarily.252 *As Geoffrey Parker notes, royalist gains of that time were the fruit not so
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After the breakdown of the Pacification» die Dutch provinces once again stood 
divided. The south had returned to Spanish control. However, the northern provinces now 
remained under firm control of the rebels. The Spanish troops were unable to advance north 
of the rivers and Philip soon gave up re-invading those parts of the Low Countries. Thus, a 
seemingly permanent division had been created, severing the region in two and leaving the 
small northern provinces to be forcefully drawn into the power system of Holland.* 254
The Union o f  Utrecht
The ‘armistice’ effected by Pacification o f Ghent gave the rebels in Holland a respite 
and the opportunity to consolidate their position. From 1578 onwards no hostile armies were 
able to penetrate Holland’s defenses. In stark contrast, Gueldem, Overijsel and Gronningen 
were for years on end the places where the war between Spain and the Dutch rebels was 
actually fought: “Armies marched and counter-marched over their countryside, and their 
towns were fortresses possessed by one side and besieged by the other”.255 Holland’s 
position was also strengthened by a massive inflow o f both capital and skilled labor from the 
south. It is estimated that at least 100,000 people migrated from the southern to the northern 
Netherlands after 1567. Most of them took refuge in Holland.256
The growing split between north and south left Holland’s small neighbors facing a 
growing threat. Realizing the futility o f forging new alliances with Spain, the small inland 
provinces decided instead to seek a negotiated settlement with Holland. In July, Gueldem 
restated a proposal made earlier by Holland for creating a union among the northern
all foreign troops. Nonetheless, the troops were soon called back by the provincial States to strengthen their 
defense against rebel insurrections from die North.
2 5 5  Parker 1977, pp. 189.
2 5 4  Smit 1970, p. 51.
2 5 5  Price 1994, p.229.
2 5 6  Parker talks of 100,000 people while others put the number higher. (Parker 1977, p. 254). See also Smit 
1970, p. 51 and van Geideren 1992, p. 57.
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provinces.-57 The proposal was immediately welcomed by Holland. Although is was 
increasingly powerful in the North, Holland’s position was far from secure. With most of 
its forces still tied up in the struggle against Spain which presented a serious strain on its 
resources, Holland’s interest was in finding a quick, low-cost solution to the conflict with 
its neighbors.* 258 *Holland also had an economic interest in forming a union. Strong in 
manufacturing but far from self-sufficient in agricultural produce and raw-materials, 
Holland’s growth depended on trade. A union among the Northern provinces was 
attractive since it promised both to meet Holland’s defensive needs and to provide an 
agricultural backland to fuel its growing manufacturing businesses. All this would come 
without haring to conquer neighboring territories—an option which, at the moment, 
seemed too costly to contemplate.
On 23 January 1579, after elaborate negotiations, a treaty of union was drafted 
among the seven northern provinces. On the day of ratification only a small handful of 
the provinces (Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Gelderland) actually signed the treaty. 
Utrecht did so only after the States of Utrecht had forcefully subdued several parts of the 
province which remained opposed to joining with ‘the enemy’.25  ^ And the States of 
Gelderland signed only after a failed attempt to obtain a renewed alliance with Spain.26  ^
Yet, after this somewhat hesitant founding, the remaining provinces soon returned to the
2 i)7 Israel 1995, p. 199. A proposal for a northern alliance had been made by Holland in 1576. At that time, 
though, other provinces showed little enthusiasm for uniting and operating as military bulwark for their 
more powerful neighbor Instead they continued to balance against Holland. Boogman & van der Plaat 1980,
pp. 1 1 -1 2 .
2 5 8  In particular, a coalition with Gueldem with its four large rivers was deemed of strategic importance for 
Holland’s defense. See e.g. Boogman 1980, p. 11. While it was cleady not beyond Holland’s means to seize 
Gueldem by force, doing so would have been cosdy and nsky given the defensive advantage on both sides 
and the continued conflict with Spain.
25  ^ E.g., the city of Amersfoort (Utrecht) had to be taken by force several weeks after the general ratification. 
Gronningen signed the union only after a failed attempt at renewing its alliance with Spain. See Parker 1977, p. 
200 and Boogman 1993, p. 6 .
2^9 Boogman & van der Plaat 1980, p. 13
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bargaining table. Friesland joined the union in June, and Overijsel and Gronningen joined 
later that same year, bringing the number of members to seven.261
The Union o f  Utrecht constituted an attempt at binding an increasingly powerful 
Holland. The union cannot easily be explained in terms of an effort to enhance the efficiency 
o f military balancing against Spain. Indeed, many o f the union’s smaller members were not 
engaged in balancing externally. One might ask whether the timing of the union is not 
consistent with an explanation stressing bandwagoning by the smaller Dutch states to 
Holland at a  time when it seemed increasingly likely that Spain would be beat out of the 
region. However, as we will see below, the concrete institutional structure of the Dutch 
Union belies this logic. The Union of Utrecht represented a favorable bargain for both rising 
and declining states in the Dutch region. By integrating Holland at a time when it was still 
relatively weak, the smaller Dutch provinces won significant advantages. As partners in a 
union they all received political rights that were formally equal to those of Holland. This was 
very different from the fate of the provinces o f Brabant and Flanders who continued to rely 
on a strategy o f balancing. In December 1579, Holland sent its troops into northern Brabant 
who immediately countered by signing a treaty o f  reconciliation with Spain.262 Spanish help 
failed to arrive, however, and Holland managed to conquer a good part of Brabant’s territory 
together with several areas in Flanders and Limburg. These areas became part of the Dutch 
union as so-called “Generality lands”. They received no representation in the union’s central 
institutions but were ruled effectively as conquered territories.263
2 6 1  Aitzema 1653 and Aglionby 1669, p. 61.
2 6 2  Parker 1977, p. 196.
2 6 3  This was unlike Drente which was also not represented in the central institutions because it was so poor 
and small that others were not willing to give it equal representation, but which had an autonomous 
provincial government On the status of Generality lands see Blockmans 1999, p. 148, Parker 1977, p. 249, 
Price 1994, p. 211.
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The Institutional Structure o f  the Union o f  Utrecht
The Treaty of Utrecht was far more comprehensive than the Pacification of Ghent. 
The provinces pledged to unite ‘as if  they were but one province’. The union bound its 
members to adopt a common foreign policy, to establish a joint military force, to harmonize 
monetary policies and to abolish all internal custom-barriers.264 There was no right to secede 
from the union, and individual provinces were forbidden from making any agreement for 
peace, war, or alliance with foreign states without the consent of the union.265
Institutionally the Dutch Union was quite unique. The center of the union—or, to 
use the Dutch term, the ‘Generality’—consisted of two institutions: the States General and 
a Council of State. The sovereign power of the union was vested in the States General 
where decision-making was based on a principle of formal equality. Individual provinces 
could appoint as many deputies as they wished to the States General but each province had 
only one vote. Thus, in principle, a small province like Overijsel had the same 
representation as Holland.266 * Important decisions of war, peace, alliance and treaty 
revisions were all made by the States General and were subject to unanimity. Other 
decisions were frequently subject to majority rule. However, each province retained a veto 
in the States General with respect to issues that were judged to be of importance to its 
internal affairs.26^
The States General was the main governing body of the Dutch union but since this 
large assembly was not always in capacity to meet at short notice (gathering deputies from
2 6 4  For the articles of the Union of Utrecht see the appendix to this chapter.
2 6 5  Articles III and X of the Treaty of Utrecht
2 6 6  Since the provinces could send as many deputies as they wanted the numbers gathered in the general 
assembly were often great. For example, the assembly held to ratify the truce made with Spain in 1609 is 
reported to have consisted of some 800 people. Usually, however, each province sent but a few deputies. 
Temple 1687, p. 68; Burrish 1742, p. 124.
26^ Aglionby 1669, p. 80-8. According to Price (1994) the central question of whether the provincial States 
remained sovereign in the sense that they could resist ordinances from the States General was never 
completely resolved because it was in the provinces interests to assert both the indissolubility of the Union 
and the autonomy of its members at the same time. However, in practice the States General was seen in 
most matters as superior to the States.
all the provinces was time-consuming and costly), a Council of State was established in 
1584 to function as executive.268 In contrast to the States General, the composition of the 
Council was based on proportional representation. As die largest province, Holland sent 
three deputies, Zeeland, Friesland and Gelderland each two, and Utrecht, Overijsel and 
Gronningen each one.269 Deputies voted by personal vote and were bound by oath not to 
put the interests of their own province above the good of the union.270 The primary role 
o f the Council was to execute the resolutions of the States General and to prepare the 
union’s budget. Each year, the Council would make an estimate o f necessary funds and 
present it to the States General for approval. The States General would then demand 
contributions from each o f the States based on their proportionate size. As the wealthiest 
o f the provinces, Holland contributed fifty-eight percent of the total budget, Fnesland paid 
twelve percent, Zeeland nine, Utrecht and Gronningen each six, Gelderland five, and 
Overijsel four percent.271
The Union of Utrecht instituted a careful balance of political influence between its 
members. This balance was based first and foremost on under-representing the power of 
Holland. Whereas Holland bore more than half o f the financial burden of maintaining the 
union, it had the same formal representation in the States General as other provinces and 
enjoyed only slightly greater representation in the Council of States. Thus, whereas Holland
268 The Council of States was added as a subordinate executive council after William’s assassination in 1584. 
The Council derived ultimately from the body of the same name in the Habsbuig system after the 
reorganization of 1531. The Council had a President, twelve provincial deputies, a treasurer, and three 
secretaries. The presidency changed every week, being held by a representative of each province in turn. The 
president would propose subjects to be debated and collect the votes, but had no special rights of decision.
2 6 9  Temple 1687 and Price 1994, p. 216.
2 7 0  Temple 1687, p, 68 . The Council usually met separately—only in matters of particularly importance 
would it convene with the States General. On such occasions the General Commander o f the army, the 
superintendent of the treasury, and the Treasurer General would also be present The superintendent of the 
treasury was the person who controlled and kept account o f all public expenses. The Treasurer General was 
the person who actually held the keys to the public treasure.
2 7 1  Drenthe, a small associated member of the union, contributed 1%. See Temple 1687, p. 73. In addition to 
these contributions, the States General had several other sources of revenue— the most important being the 
taxes imposed on the ‘Generality lands’ and convoy and licensing fees levied on merchant ships. See Forsyth 
1981, p. 34. Every three months, the Council would send to the States o f each province a compendium of all 
the Generality’s consultations. The Council also administered the Generality lands.
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represented more than fifty percent of population in the Dutch Union it controlled only 
twenty-five percent of votes in the Council.
The political balance instituted by the Treaty of Utrecht did not exist only on paper. 
To make their commitment binding, member-states agreed to pool their military forces in a 
joint supranational army, thereby creating a powerful enforcement tool. The joint army 
served both the Generality and the individual States, each of the latter undertaking to 
maintain a given corps o f troops. Every regiment swore a dual oath of allegiance—first to 
the States General, next to their individual province. Troops were paid by the States General 
who decided on their garrisoning and nominated all high officers. It was the States General 
that held the command over the union’s land forces, and in time of war a deputation o f the 
States General would accompany the chief commander into the field without whose advice 
he could not lawfully begin any military enterprise.272 273Whereas military operations on land 
(where the provinces could potentially constitute a threat to one another) were tightly 
controlled by the union, military defense at sea was naturally dominated by Holland. Naval 
defense was organized by five admiralties, whereof three were in Holland, one in Zeeland 
and one in Friesland. Each admiralty consisted o f seven councilors chosen by each province 
and the navy was commanded by the union’s general governor in his title of Admiral 
General.27-*
The tight pooling of military force was a main strength of the Union of Utrecht. The 
fact that military forces were fully integrated made it virtually impossible for states to 
envisage the use of force to adjudge regional disputes. The pooling of military force also 
provided the Generality with an important means of enforcement That the union did indeed 
posses powers o f enforcement is evidenced in the collection of the union’s budget. If a
2 7 2  Rowen 1972, p. 41. The only military powers to be retained by the individual provinces were the 
command of forts and other (defensive) military establishments within their own territories.
2 7 3  Price 1994, p. 218 and Burrish 1742, p. 139.
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province failed to provide the sums agreed to by the Generality, the Council of State had a 
right to ‘execute’ which meant that it could either billet soldiers or take hostages among the 
representatives from the province.274 While this practice was seldom used, the threat was 
not empty. In 1599, for example, Generality troops were sent into Gronningen to force it to 
pay its share o f the budget.27^
Pooling of military force was a crucial aspect of binding in the Dutch union but it 
was not the only aspect. The commitment to sustained peaceful cooperation was also 
rendered credible through increasing costs of exit effected through the establishing of a 
common currency, a common foreign service, and common standards for weights and 
measurements, etc. Finally, over time, the binding nature of the union came to rely on 
efficiency gains, primarily of an economic nature. Once peace and tranquility had been 
secured in the Dutch region, the provinces were free to concentrate their energy and 
resources on commercial activity. The result was the creation of a maritime trading empire 
which greatly enhanced the wealth of the region. However, it should be noted that the 
advantages from the union’s increased external commercial activity mainly accrued to 
Holland, thereby giving this state an additional incentive to maintain the strong ties to its 
smaller neighbors.
The Union o f Utrecht presented a strong binding force on all its members to the 
benefit of its smaller and weaker members. However Holland, as the largest state, naturally 
enjoyed certain privileges. For instance, Holland had a large influence on foreign policy. It 
was the Grand Pensionary of Holland, rather than the Union’s Griffer276 who served as
2 7 4  Hart 1993, p. 82. In addition to the quota contributions die States General had several sources of 
‘independent' revenue, the most important being the taxes imposed on the ‘Generality lands' and convoy and 
licensing fees levied on merchant ships.
27^ Israel 1995, p. 291.
276 'phe Qriffer was a *head secretary' that attended all meetings o f the States General and handled its 
correspondence which gave him a potentially important role in foreign polity.
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Minister for Foreign Affairs.277 This meant that although the appointment of diplomats fell 
formally within the competence of the States General, in practice Holland appointed all 
ambassadors save a few.278 Holland also contracted most foreign loans which served to 
enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis other states. Still, one would be mistaken to conclude 
that Holland’s influence was unrestrained. Perhaps the most spectacular display of the 
union’s ability to directly restrain Holland took place with the arrest in 1618 o f two leading 
officials of the States of Holland, Oldenbamevelt and Grotius. This crisis grew out o f a 
doctrinal dispute between liberal and orthodox tendencies within the Reformed Church in 
Holland, which led to widespread popular violence. In response to the unrest, the States of 
Holland passed the so-called “Sharp Revolution” (Scherpe Resolutie) empowering reformed 
churchmen to protect themselves by hiring their own troops (waardgelders). This was in 
direct violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, and the States General authorized the Governor- 
General, Maurits o f Nassau, to intervene.279 2801 Maurits ordered the immediate arrest of 
Oldenbamevelt and Grotius. Both men were tried and condemned by a special court set up 
by the States General. One was beheaded, the other exiled28® Thus, while Holland was 
strongest of the provinces it was not free to act as it pleased. In the words J.L. Price, the 
Generality system “forced Holland to take the views, needs and interests of its fellow 
members of the union extremely seriously”.2®1
2 7 7  Forsyth 1981 and Boogman & van der Plaat 1980, p. 25.
2 7 8  Ibid, p-25.
2 7 9  Rowen 19xx, p. 125 and Price 1994, p. 272, Price 1994, pp. 266-267.
280 Tucfc 19 9 3 , pp. 180-193. This trial was not the only example of the States General exercising jurisdiction 
in cases where the Union felt to be affected. In 1621, Jacob Mom and four other nobles from Geldedand 
were tried by a special Generality court, charged with conspiring to betray the town o f Tid to the Spanish. 
The trials and executions went ahead despite passionate protects from Gelderland at what it regarded as a 
serious infringement of its autonomy. (Price 1994, p. 285). An even more spectacular case occurred in 1650, 
when Generality forces were sent to occupy Amsterdam after it refused to furnish the Generality with troops 
and military equipment See "Historical Remarques” 1675, p. 7. See also Rowen 1972, pp. 17-41, Aitzema 
1653, p. 92.
2 8 1  Price 1994, p. 280.
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V C o n c l u s i o n
The Union of Utrecht did not end the struggle for influence in the Netherlands. 
According to Jonathan Israel, even after unification, “politics frequently revolved around 
tension between the dominant province of Holland and the rest of the provinces, which 
continually strove to protea their local interests”.28-  However, the Union of Utrecht 
embedded this struggle within an institutional structure which set clear limits on what 
winners of distributive conflias could do with their gains, thereby lowering the overall stakes 
of such conflicts.
The Union of Utrecht presented a favorable bargain to both rising and declining 
states in the region. On one hand, the union permitted the declining inland provinces to stop 
worrying about oppression by a growing Holland. On the other hand, the union enabled 
Holland to concentrate its resources on expanding its international trade instead of fighting 
off its regional competitors. Quoting J.L. Price, “provincial independence gave the lesser 
provinces protection from their powerful ally, and at the same time allowed Holland to 
mould the policies ot the new state in accordance with its own wishes and needs”.288
By entenng into a binding union with Holland, declining states obtained a lasting 
guarantee against future exploitation—something which a preventive war held only a low- 
prospect of securing given the unavailability of strong, reliable allies. Moreover, by binding’ 
Holland at a time when Spanish forces were still on Dutch ground, the declining provinces 
achieved highly favorable terms of institutionalization. The formal political equality of these 
provinces—expressed by their veto in the union’s governing assemblies—gave them a 
significant voice in regional politics. This stands in stark contrast to the so-called ‘generality 
lands’ which were forcefully conquered by Holland at a later time. 283
2 8 2  Israel 1995, p. 6 .
2 8 3  Price 1994, pp. 239,280.
Given the equal status accorded to the members of the Dutch Union is not hard to 
see why the declining states felt that they gained from the arrangement. What may be less 
obvious is why Holland accepted the deal. At first sight it may seem that Holland could have 
won more by simply conquering its smaller neighboring states. However, as we have seen, 
Holland’s position was not one of absolute strength. Caught in a drawn-out war and facing a 
combination of its enemies, Holland could by no means be certain to prevail. Indeed, had 
Spain managed to bring order to its finances, the war in the Low countries might have 
quickly taken a different turn. Moreover, by agreeing to an arrangement of institutional 
binding, Holland obtained several benefits which it might not have been able to secure 
through conquest. Apart from safeguarding its external security, a stable peace in the Dutch 
region allowed Holland to focus on fulfilling its economic potential. Indeed, Holland was 
the locus of the Dutch economic miracle. By the beginning of the 17th century Amsterdam 
alone accounted for more than three quarters of all Dutch trade to the Baltic and also 
dominated trade to other destinations.284 Other provinces largely failed to emulate this 
economic expansion.285
Both the timing and institutional structure of the Dutch Union fit the binding thesis. 
I will now consider the merit of competing explanations. The argument in favor of an 
emerging Dutch nationalism’ can be relatively easily dismissed. As we have seen, neither 
religion, nor political structure or common history seem to have provided a basis for a lasting 
union among the Dutch provinces.286 To the extent that the provinces that united at Utrecht 
shared a common history, this was a history o f mutual conflict rather than cooperation. The 
‘nationalism’ argument is further belied by the fact that the union failed to foster a 
community in the sociological sense. As Jonathan Israel observes, “during most of the
2 8 4  Huggett 1971.
2 8 6  Price 1994, pp. 222,228.
2 8 6  Parker 1977, p. 241.
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history o f the United Provinces, allegiance and identity were based on provincial, civic, and 
sometimes local rural sentiment rather than attachment to the Republic as a whole”.287
What about the external balancing explanation? As I said previously, it is tempting to 
reject this argument off hand. As we have seen, the Dutch did not stand united against a 
common enemy. Rather than act as a unifying force, the struggle against Spain pitted the 
Dutch against one another, province against province, town against town. There is also the 
factor of timing the Dutch union came about at a time when Spain appeared to be already 
losing its grip on the northern Low Countries, seemingly reducing the need for such an 
alliance. One might point to the fact that the war between the United Provinces and Spain 
continued formally for another five decades as critical evidence that external threat was 
indeed the reason d'etre of the Dutch Union— or at least the glue that held it together. 
However, an important objection to this argument is that, after 1588, the war between Spain 
and Holland was mainly fought outside Europe, where it took the form of a conflict over 
colonial trade. As Geoffrey Parker observes, “after that time, there can be no doubt that 
Spain no longer aspired to conquer the United Provinces by force” but rather was “striving 
to improve its overseas trade”.288 I conclude, therefore, that although the Eighty Years W ar 
was an important factor for the founding of the Dutch Union, this factor alone cannot 
explain the timing and form of integration.
Still, the most important evidence against the notion that the Dutch Union 
constituted a means for balancing against Spain (or an attempt to ‘bandwagon’ with Holland 
if we turn this logic around) lies in the actual form of the Dutch Union. The treaty of 
Utrecht did not aim to explicitly bolster the strength of the Dutch defenses against Spain or
2 8 7  Israel 1995, p. 6 .
2 8 8  Parker 1977, pp. 264-265. Of course, one might suspect that this outcome was obtained precisely because o f 
the existence of a successful defensive union among the Dutch provinces which turned the threat away from 
Dutch territory. The strongest evidence against this argument is the form of military cooperation instituted by 
the Dutch union. The pooling of military force was focused mainly on integrating land-forces which might to 
used by one province against others. Defense at sea, however, continued to be provided chiefly by Holland 
alone. See Huggett 1971, p.45, and Price 1994, p. 230.
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to enhance the Dutch capacity to employ force against third parties in general. Indeed, the 
fact that land-forces were fully integrated and relied on unanimous consent for their 
deployment, whereas defense at sea was left almost exclusively to Holland seems to defy this 
proposition. Moreover, if  the Dutch union was intended as a means for effective balancing 
how do we explain that it involved far-reaching political and even economic integration? And 
why did the union provide an equal voice for smaller states whereas Holland’s powers were 
vastly underrepresented? These unanswered questions cast doubt on the balancing 
explanation.
A final possible explanation is that the Dutch Union emerged to secure commercial 
advantages for its members. At first sight, this is a plausible explanation given the later 
economic success of the union. However, at closer inspection, it is difficult to argue that 
pressure for commercial cooperation should have led to the formation of a confederate 
union among the Dutch. Although there were strong ‘artificial’ barriers to trade within the 
Dutch region (i.e. high tariffs) which may be seen to have created pressure for integration, it 
is important to note that trade among the provinces was first and foremost limited by 
geographic barriers (an obstacle which integration would do nothing to overcome). In fact, 
most forms o f exchange between the provinces were quite restricted until the end of the 16th 
century.289 The lack of economic interdependence casts doubt on the alleged pressure to 
break down barriers to trade. Moreover, the union did not in fact entail significant economic 
advantages for all o f its members. In economic terms, the land provinces (Gelderland, 
Overijssel and Utrecht, even Gronningen) provided a sharp contrast to the dynamism, 
innovation and wealth of Holland. In the words of J.L. Price, “Holland was the locus of the
2 8 9  Parker 1977, p. 34.
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Dutch economic miracle: Zeeland and Friesland were far behind, and the rest not even 
placed”.290
The economic importance of the Dutch Union in 17th century Europe is well known 
and has been the focus of much scholarship. However, many scholars have found fault w ith 
the extremely decentralized and rigid political system of the Dutch union. The lack o f central 
administration in many areas in the Dutch union was an anomaly in the 17th century Europe 
when centralizing, absolutist governments were the norm. However, if we accept the notion 
that the fundamental purpose o f the Dutch Union was to prevent hegemony by Holland, 
then its institutional structure becomes more intelligible. In light of its purpose, namely to 
solve a preventive war dilemma while safeguarding provincial independence, those aspects o f  
the Dutch political system which many historians have seen as its chief weaknesses 
(decentralization and fragmentation) can be interpreted in part as its strength.
2 9 0  Price 1994, pp. 222. Price suggests that the weaker economies of the inland provinces might have 
benefited from a different—less liberal—economic policy than the one pursued by Holland. (Price 1994 p. 
228).
V. T h e  G e r m a n  Z o l l v e r e in  (1834-1866)
I. In t r o d u c t io n
The German Zollverein was a wide-going economic union which was created in 
1834 alongside the existing German Confederation (‘Bund’), and which lasted until 1866 
when the German Confederation was dissolved. At its inception, the Zollverein combined 
eighteen states within a single customs and administrative barrier. During the more than 
three decades of its existence, the union expanded its membership to include most of the 
larger German states with the exception o f Baden, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, 
Nassau and Brunswick.
Historians have sometimes described the Zollverein as the first non-political union 
among independent states.291 However, the Zollverein did not emerge in a political 
vacuum. In reality, the Zollverein was a parallel—an ‘economic complement’ so to speak—  
to the German Bund which provided for both internal and external military security for the 
German states.292 *Thus, according to Murray Forsyth, economic union among the German 
states was “a means o f strengthening and cementing an already existing defensive 
confederation, of providing it with down-to-earth material foundations”.29^
When looking at the political-economic context in which the German Zollverein 
emerged, the formation of a far-reaching economic union seems puzzling at first. After the 
collapse of the Continental System in 1815 most European states reverted to a narrow 
economic nationalism. Protectionist and isolationist forces also prevailed in Germany
2 9 1  See e.g. Price 1912/1973, p. 1. Jacob Viner in his famous study o f custom unions described the German 
Zollverein as ‘an interesting exception to the more general historical rule that political unions precede 
economic unions’. Viner 19xx.
2 9 2  Forsyth 1981, pp. 174-75
29^ Forsyth 1981, pp. 160-61. Similarly, according to Huber, the Zollverein constituted “a confederation 
within a confederation, a Bund within a Bund”. Huber 1957, p. 289.
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where economic and political *kkinstaaterei> characterized relations among the various states, 
and where economic interests remained highly divergent.294 Thus, whereas the agrarian 
states and the free cities in northern Germany generally favored free trade, states in the 
south and south-west of Germany generally preferred strong protectionism.2^  How can 
we explain the coalescing of these divergent economic interests into a single economic 
union?
Two main explanations exist for the economic unification o f Germany. The first 
maintains that the demand for integration arose from a desire to reduce economic 
transaction costs. Germany in the late 1820s was in need of drastic economic 
reconstruction. Interstate commerce was thwarted by antiquated restrictions, poor 
communications, and high postwar tariffs, all of which placed the German states at an 
absolute disadvantage vis-a-vis their European neighbors.296 Thus, from an economic 
efficiency perspective, there were goods reasons to undertake market reform. At the same 
time, argues Walter Mattli, improvements in the means of transportation—such as the 
innovation of steamboats and railroads—served to lower the physical costs o f transacting 
in the German market. Together these factors put pressure on political leaders to adjust the 
scale o f political and economic organization.297 The second explanation for the creation o f 
the Zollverein maintains that economic integration was driven by increasing nationalist
294 See Benaerts, pp. 63-72. See also Price 1949, p. 253; and Kiesewetter 1987.
29  ^ Kiesewetter 1987, p. 94. Baenarts 1933.
296 While the continental system had favored the rise of new industries to produce for the home market 
maybe of these were shut down again with the end of the Continental system and the re-introduced of more 
competitive British goods.
297 Mattli 1999, pp. 114-115. According to Mattli, "the railway served not only to reduce transaction costs 
and widen markets, but also provided the single most powerful stimulus to Germany’s industrial 
development and growth...In short, the integrating effect of the railway is beyond doubt”. Mattli also 
stresses the introduction of the steamboat in the first half of the 19th century. Yet, it is doubtful whether the 
impacts of either means o f transportation—especially the railway which was constructed after 1835—could 
have made themselves felt in 1834 at the time of the founding of the Zollverein. See Roussakis 1968, p. 81.
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sentiment throughout Germany. Thus, Arnold Price depicts economic integration 
essentially as a means employed by German nationalists to achieve national unification.298
I argue that neither of these explanations fully grasp the logic behind the German 
Zollverein. While there were certainly liberal forces pushing for the abolishing of trade 
barriers within Germany, economic integration cannot be explained purely from a desire to 
reduce transaction costs. Instead, I suggest, the German Zollverein—like the United 
Provinces before it—-was essentially driven by a hegemonic conflict in which a great power, 
Prussia, threatened the economic and political independence of a group of declining states. 
The hegemonia! potential of Prussia had been acknowledged by the great powers at the 
Congress of Vienna (1815) where a Confederate structure had been imposed on Germany 
with the dual aim o f strengthening Germany against future French revanchism and 
preventing the emergence of a Prussian hegemony within Germany. The German Bund, 
however, remained a rather weak association in which most of the rights of sovereignty 
remained in the hands of the member states. Designed essentially to defend the interests o f 
the secondary German states as well as the Habsburgs, the powers o f the Bund related 
mainly to security and defense, whereas provisions for economic cooperation were left 
out.299
Nonetheless, it soon became clear that the main threat posed by Prussia was its 
economic power and its willingness to use this power to pressure other states into 
compliance. The first blow to Prussia’s neighbors came with the Prussian Tax Law of 1818 
which abolished duties within Prussia and introduced a new external tariff barrier. 
Combined with a set o f new transit dues, this tariff put great economic pressure on 
neighboring states by suppressing their trade to the large Prussian market and by raising the
298 See e.g. Price 1949, p. 253, and Roussakis 1968, p. 16.
299 Price 1949, p -18, and Forsyth 1981, p. 48.
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prices o f manufactured goods on which they heavily depended.300 In turn, this had the 
effect of robbing these states o f necessary income. In the first half of the 19th century 
customs policy was still largely synonymous with fiscal policy.301 Tariffs and duties w ere 
indispensable means for collecting state revenue and in many places accounted for up to 
seventy per cent o f a government’s income. The importance of effective customs 
collection can therefore hardly be overemphasized and the loss of receipts from tolls and 
customs was potentially detrimental to a state. In practice this meant that Prussia’s 
aggressive commercial policy could not help but appear threatening to other states.
Initially, other German states sought to counter Prussia’s aggressive economic 
policies by balancing against it. In 1828, Bavaria and Württemberg set up a rival customs 
union in southern Germany, and the same year, the Middle German states established a 
similar association— the Middle German Commercial Union. By 1834, no less than four 
separate and competing tariff unions were in existence in Germany.30-  These unions 
emerged in direct opposition to Prussia’s policies. Yet, none o f the competing schemes 
could match the efficiency of the Prussian system. First, the smaller states lacked 
economies of scale in their customs collection.303 Second, their resistance was rendered 
ineffective by collective action problems, which lead to the piecemeal defection of many 
smaller states to the side of Prussia. Eventually the negative effects o f  Prussia’s 
commercial policy led declining states to seek accommodation with Prussia. In 1834, the 
members o f the South-German customs unions took the decisive step of joining Prussia in
300 Mattli 1999, p. 116.
301 Hahn 1984, p. 34.
303 These counted the Prusso-Hessian customs union (1828), the South German Zollverein (1828), the 
Middle German Commercial Union (1828) and the Steuerverein or ‘Tax Union” (1834).
303 An estimate by the Prussian Zollvereins-pioneer Ludwig Kühne based on the divergent experience of 
the Prussian and Bavarian unions maintains that the less the relation between the size of a state and the 
length of its borders, the more revenue accrues from customs-barriers. In Prussia the ratio of area to border 
length was 21% which according to Kühne roughly equaled the size of the administrative costs to revenue 
(other authors estimate Prussia's administrative costs as low as 14%). For smaller states like Württemberg, 
Bavaria and Hesse-Cassel the greater ratio of border-length to territorial size meant that administrative costs 
as a percentage of total revenue was closer to 50% , sometimes even higher.
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the German Zollverein and within a few years, the majority of the German states followed 
suit. In this way, argues Murray Forsyth, “Prussia’s modernizing expansionist and 
hegemonial policy provided the impetus towards the., .creation o f the Zollverein”.30**
The states that merged into Prussia’s customs system generally gained from doing 
so. After the formation of the German Zollverein, revenues everywhere increased 
dramatically, saving the smaller states from ultimate economic ruin.304 05 The Zollverein 
placed other states at relative economic parity with Prussia and also allowed them to 
exercise influence on Prussia’s economic policies. Thus, for a while, the Zollverein 
improved their relative standing. Prussia also gained from the merger both through 
increasing customs revenues and, more importantly, through a marked improvement in its 
international bargaining position.306
In the end, however, the German Zollverein was a failure. Ultimately, the economic 
and military constraints provided by the Zollverein and the German Bund proved too weak 
to prevent Prussia from effecting the desired unification of Germany.307 Yet, whereas 
Prussia did eventually manage to unify Germany against the wish o f most secondary states, 
Prussia never succeeded in turning Germany into a fully centralized state. Despite the use 
o f force—which was at any rate limited— the unification of Germany essentially took the 
form of a political compromise in which the major secondary states retained substantial 
political autonomy. Thus, Germany remained a highly decentralized state in which each of 
the ‘Lander* was able to maintain a high level o f autonomy, privilege and status.
304 Forsyth 1981, p. 166.
305 Henderson 1983, p. 141; Mattii 1999, p. 121.
306 Mattii 1999.
307 Paradoxically, the political and military confinements entailed in the German Bund may be said to h a «  
been weakened by the success of the Zollverein which effected the practical expulsion of Austria from the 
German sphere.
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Outline o f  Chapter
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description o f the 
creation and form o f the German Bund. Section III discusses the effects o f the Prussian 
Tax Law o f 1818 and describes the reactive formation of two rival customs unions in 
southern and central Germany. Section IV discusses the formation of the German 
Zollverein in 1834. Section V concludes by reflecting on the relative importance o f  
economic versus political motivations for the creation of the Zollverein.308
II. T he  Cr e a tio n  o f  the G erm an  B und  (1815-1866).
The Germany that emerged in 1815 after the Congress o f Vienna included thirty 
eight states ranging in size from the ‘great power’, Prussia, through the smaller kingdoms 
of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and Hanover; through duchies such as Baden, Nassau, 
Oldenburg and Hesse-Darmstadt; to the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Frankfurt- 
am-Main. Although many of these states had been strengthened territorially by the 
revisions made under Napoleon, the ultimate champion of the new German order was the 
kingdom o f Prussia.309 O f 208,780 square miles of German territory 134,616— more than 
half—was under Prussian control. The second largest German power was Bavaria, whose 
territories comprised a large chunk o f the southeast portion of Germany. Next in line by 
order of size and population was Württemburg, Saxony and Baden.310 (See Table).
308 Before I proceed to section I, a caveat is in order. This chapter has been based mainly on secondary 
sources. As such my interpretation relies on evidence regarding the timing of events rather than on 
motivation. This is a weakness in the chapter which I hope to correct in the future.
300 At the turn of the century, Germany was fragmented into about 350 sovereign dominions (imperial 
towns, ecclesiastical territories, principalities and counties) o f varying size and strength. All of them owed 
formal allegiance to the Emperor, but in practice these territories enjoyed almost perfect independence. Each 
state, even the tiniest, exercised the rigjbt to form alliances, to maintain its independent army, to coin its own 
money and to erect external customs barriers. In 1803, most of the German states were dissolved by 
Napoleon’s 'Reichdepulations-hauptschluss and merged into larger political entities. This arrangement was 
followed in 1806 by the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine (1806-13). The Rheinbund was 
dissolved after Napoleon’s defeat Roussakis 1968, p. 15, Henderson 1983, p. 1, Mattli 1999, p. 108, 
Kiesewetter 1987, p. 82.
310 Bavaria was among the middle-sized states which had been greatly strengthened territorially by die 
geographical revisions provided for by Napoleon and later the Treaty of Vienna. Other ‘winners* were
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Members o f the German Bund and the Relative Size
Empire & Kingdoms Inhabitants AREA KM/2 % TOTAL AREA
Austria 9,482,227 195328 31.15 Outside Zollverein
Prussia 8,042362 185,460 29.59
Bavaria 3,560,000 76395 12.19
Württemberg 1,328,351 38368 3.11
Saxony 1,192,789 14,958 2.39
Grand D uchies &  D uchies
Baden 1,005,899 15307 2.44 Outside Zollverein
Mecklenburg-Schwerin 308,166 13,260 2.12 Outside Zollverein
Holstein-Lauenburg 360,000 9380 1.53
Hesse-Cassel 567,868 9367 1.53
Hesse-Darmstadt 587,995 8,414 1.34
Oldenburg 221399 6339 1.01 Outside Zollverein
Nassau 301,907 4,765 0.76 Outside Zollverein
Brunswick 225,273 3,729 0.60 Outside Zollverein
Saxe-Weimar 193,869 3,640 0.58
Mecklenburg-Strelitz 71,764 2,724 0.43
Luxemburg 154,000 2387 0.41
Saxe-Meiningen 115,000 2349 0.41
Saze-Gotha (to Coburg in 1826) 1,422
Saxe-Coburg 111,989 586 0.32
Saxe-Altenburg 95,855 I3 3 O 0.21
Anhalt-Dessau 52,947 894 0.14
Anhai t-Bernburg 37,046 827 0.13
Anhalt Kothen 32,454 622 0.11
Principalities
Waldeck-Pyrmont 52357 1 3 0 2 0.19
Lippe-Detmold 78,900 1,129 0.18
Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen 50,060 1,148 0.18
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt 53,937 958 0.15
Schwartzburg-Sonderhausen 45,125 852 0.14
Reuss-Gera 69,333 834 0.13
Schamburg-Lippe 24,000 443 0.07
Reus s-G reiz 30393 345 0.06
Hesse-Homburg 23,000 262 0.04
Liechtenstein 7,000 159 0.03
Free C ides
Lubeck 136,600 364 0.06
Hamburg 146,109 351 0.06
Bremen 50,139 263 0.04
Frankfurt on Main 47,850 
(Source: Hubert Kiese wetter).
100 0.02
Baden, Bavaria, Prussia and Württemberg who were awarded territories taken from the secondary German 
states. See Kiesewetter 1987, p. 82.
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Prussia’s pivotal position in the new Germany was largely a result o f British and 
Austrian desires to create a stable balance o f power in central Europe. At the Congress o f  
Vienna the victorious powers, on guard against a revival o f French aggression, had decided 
to strengthen Berlin to make it the defender of the Western boundary of central Europe. 
As a result, the Rhineland and Westphalia—a region destined to develop into the greatest 
industrial center on the Continent—became Prussian provinces.311 Prussia was also 
allowed to trade much o f its Polish lands to Russia in return for a large part of Saxony 
thereby giving Prussia a strategic position on both frontiers o f Germany. However, the 
negotiators at Vienna were not blind to the dangers of strengthening Prussian power. To 
prevent Prussia from assuming a position o f dominance within Germany, it was decided to 
combine the thirty-eight German states into a loose Confederation under Austrian 
presidency-312
One of the first decisions o f the Congress of Vienna was to leave the drafting o f  a 
new German constitution to the German states themselves. In the fall o f 1814, a 
committee composed of delegates from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and 
Hanover met to draft a constitution for the new confederation. Their differences in 
outlook soon became apparent. Prussia wanted a centralized structure which would allow 
it, by virtue of its preponderant size, to exercise control over neighboring states. Austria by 
contrast felt that only a decentralized form o f political union would grant it enough 
freedom of action to pursue its non German objectives.313 The secondary states, who 
were determined to fight for the independence they had gained during the period of French
311 Mowat 1973, p. 3.
312 Carr 1979, pp. 1-3.
313 See Forsyth 1981, p. 45. As a result of the territorial revisions at Vienna, the center of gravity of Austria 
shifted eastward. The bulk of Austria's territories lay outside the German Bund. Only a section of the 
Austrian Empire, namely modem Austria and Bohemia, belonged to the German confederation, while the 
other main section, the Lonbardo-Venetian kingdom, was Italian. The Austrian empire spread well beyond 
the boundaries of Germany, and it was not in Austria's interest that its German-speaking territories should 
be bound in a close union with other German states.
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hegemony, lined up behind Austria stating their strong opposition to any arrangement that 
might limit their sovereignty.
When a Confederate Act (Bundesact) was finally signed on 8 June 1815, the result 
was a weak constitution.514 In accordance with the wishes of the secondary states, the 
Bundesakt placed emphasis on the defense o f the sovereignty o f the member states rather 
than the authority o f the confederation as a whole.515 There was no central executive, or 
judiciary, only a Federal Diet (Bundestag) meeting in Frankfurt am Main to consider 
common legislation. Votes were distributed in a complicated manner such that the eleven 
larger states, including Austria and Prussia, possessed one vote each, while the other states 
shared six votes between them. This distribution was designed to neutralize the power of 
Austria and Prussia by making it impossible for them, even if they acted together with the 
four large kingdoms, to outvote and dominate the rest.516
Initially, the Diet had no executive machinery to secure the execution of its 
decrees.517 However, the Wiener Schlussakte of 1820 established a  federal army consisting 
of ten army corps which were raised and financed on a quota basis o f the member states, 
thereby creating a tool for enforcement.518 By a provision o f the Schlussakte the union was 
further empowered to take measures to preserve or restore peace, security and order within 
a member state, whether this was requested by the government in question or no t519 
These stipulations greatly strengthened the Bund, and the right to intervene in states’
514 Price 1949, pp. 18-9.
315 t^erner 1977, pp. 7,25. Roussakis 1968, p. 19. Each government represented in the Diet continued to 
enjoy full international rights alongside the Bund. They could decide upon war and peace, send and receive 
ambassadors, and make alliances with other German of foreign states, subject only to the restriction that 
these were not directed against the confederation or any of its members. Werner 1977, p. 15, and Forsyth 
1981, p. 50.
516 Forsyth 1981, p. 48, and Carr 1979, p. 4.
517 Roussakis 1968, p. 15.
518 Austria and Prussia each provided three corps, Bavaria one, and the three remaining corps were mixed 
units made up of troops from die remaining states. The normal strength of the army was abut 300.000 men. 
See Forsyth 1981, p. 49.
519 Werner 1977, p. 7
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internal affairs was used on several occasions. Still, however, the unifying effects o f  the 
Bund remained limited.320 Most importantly, the Bund did not entail any econom ic 
integration to substantiate and consolidate the political agreement.321 In the years following 
the establishment o f the German Confederation, a number of conferences were convened 
to discuss the rationalization of the German economies. However, negotiations wrecked as
the interests of the states were simply too divergent. Arnold Price,
it is almost unbelievable that negotiations were kept up for so many years, and it is easily understood 
why they failed in their purpose. Everybody was thinking first of their own state and hardly anybody 
ever considered the interest o f the Union they were going to establish...All of them refused to give
up an iota o f their own sovereignty.322
This attitude would not change until the economic ascent of Prussia compelled other 
German states to move toward closer economic cooperation.
III. T h e  P r u s sia n  T a x  La w  o f  1818 a n d  t h e  R iv a l  G e rm a n  C u sto m s  U n io n s
The economic struggle that lead to the formation of the Zollverein began with the 
introduction of the Prussian Tax Law of 1818. On 26 May, Prussia abolished no fewer that 
fifty-seven separate customs territories in favor of a single unified system of taxation. This 
law served two purposes. First, it aimed to standardize tariffs within Prussia by abolishing 
internal prohibitions to trade 323 Second, it instituted a uniform external tariff barrier. A 
10% duty was levied on manufactured goods, 30% on luxury and colonial goods, while the
320 Roussakis 1968, p. 20.
321 Price 1949, p. 18; and Forsyth 1981 p. 48.
322 Price 1949, p. 97.
323 After the territorial changes decided at the Congress of Vienna the system o f taxation in Prussia was 
more complicated than ever. The number of internal customs barriers had increased as a result o f the new 
territorial compensations and obstacles to trade were greater than ever before. This problem was sought 
remedied by bureaucratic reform and liberalization of domestic trade. The freedom to engage in trade or 
industry (Gewerbefreiheit) was introduced in Prussia in 1807 and was further specified by the trade reform 
o f 28 November 1810- This move was followed in 1818 by the Prussian Tax Law which abolished many of 
foe existing internal barriers in favor of a single external barrier. See Kohr I960, p. 442, Hahn 1984, p. 20, 
and Kiesewetter 1987, p. 92.
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import of raw-materials was exempted from taxation. Transit dues were introduced in the 
eastern and western parts o f Prussia which lay on important trade routes.324
While fairly liberal compared to the tariffs of many other European states, the 
Prussian tax law was detrimental to the economies of the smaller German states. Both the 
main east-west route between Leipzig and Frankfurt-am-Main and the roads from Leipzig 
to Poland and Russia cut across Prussian territory. Prussia also commanded the bulk o f the 
Elbe and Rhine rivers which were the primary trade routes linking South Germany to the 
North Sea. Transit dues therefore constituted a tremendous source for revenue for 
Prussia—and a formidable obstacle to the trade of other states.325 It must also be 
considered that whereas official duties on imports to Prussia were only 10-30%, in reality 
they were much higher, since they were calculated by weight, mass, or pieces rather than 
value. Since Germany experienced a general fall in prices after 1818, this meant that import 
duties calculated by value were in fact steadily rising. Thus by one estimate the effective 
duties on a great number o f articles were in fact ranging from 60% to 100%.326
The promulgation of the Prussian Tax Law was immediately met by severe criticism 
from other German states, who denounced it as a measure selfishly adopted by Prussia to 
extract revenue from its neighbors.327 Those most hurt were the small enclaves which had 
a part or all of their territory enclosed by Prussia. Surrounded by the Prussian border tariff 
and subjected to high Prussian transit dues, they found themselves effectively shut off from 
the outside world.32® But the larger German states also suffered.329 According to Walter 
Mattli, “economic deterioration in the various German territories was in most cases a direct
324 Mattli 1999.
325 Roussakis 1968, p. 52.
326 Hahn 1984, p. 21.
327 Roussakis 1968, p. 51.
328 Hahn 1984, p. 25.
329 Rousakis 1968, p. 52. Industries in the middle and southern parts of Germany—in Saxony, Baden, 
Württemberg and Bavari—had their chief outlets to the north, where their products reached the North Sea 
ports after traveling along the Rhine or the Elbe—routes now controlled by Prussia.
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consequence o f the construction of a single Prussian market”.33  ^ On one hand, th e se  
adverse economic effects may be viewed merely as an unintended consequence of P russia ’s 
internal reforms. However, some observers suggest that Prussia’s policy was not d ic ta ted  
solely by the need for a cost-effective customs system: “The idea of building up, th rough  
economic pressure and economic measures, a bloc of German states aligned to itself w as  
also present”, argues Murray Forsyth.30 31
Whether or not Prussia was consciously using the negative externalities from its 
commercial policy as a tool to ‘subsume’ surrounding states, it is clear that Prussia from the 
outset had ambitions of incorporating the small Prussian enclaves into its system o f  
taxation.332 At first, Prussia tried to achieve control over the enclaves by unilaterally 
deciding to treat the twenty two enclaves like its own territory in matters of customs 
collection. This, however, produced sharp protest both from the enclaves and from  
surrounding states who claimed a violation o f  the Bundesakt.333 Thus, Berlin decided 
instead to wait and let the economic pressure on the enclaves persuade them. Initially, the 
enclaves held stubbornly to their sovereignty. However, they soon had to realize that—  
given the superiority o f  Prussia—there was no other way to escape the consequences o f  the 
Prussian tariff-policy than to join its customs system.334 The first bilateral agreement was 
made in October 1819 between Prussia and the tiny principality of Schwartzburg- 
Sonderhausen who agreed to let the parts o f  its territory that was surrounded by Prussia be 
included in the Prussian customs system. The treaty introduced complete freedom of trade 
between Prussia and Schwartzburg-Sonderhausen in return for Prussia’s right to levy all
330 Matdi 1999, p. 116.
331 Forsyth 1981, p. 166. See also Zechlin 1967, p. 83.
332 The extension of the Prussian tariff to the enclaves was expected to contribute large sums to the 
Prussian treasury from imports duties on goods entering the endaves and to also yield administrative 
benefits by eliminating the costs involved in the administering of the Prussian customs frontier around the 
enclaves. Roussakis 1968, p.52-3.
333 See Kiesewctter 1987, p. 92-4, and Hahn, p. 26.
334 Hahn 1984.
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customs and consumption duties at the principality’s external frontier, Schwartzburg- 
Sonderhausen was to be compensated for the loss in revenue by participating in the 
proceeds of Prussia’s consumption tax. It’s right to share in the proceeds, however, was 
confined to consumption taxes and did not extend to revenues from customs duties.335
After the absorption of Schwartzburg-Sonderhausen, the remaining enclaves soon 
gave up their resistance. Before long, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Sachs en-Weimar, 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Lippe-Detmold agreed to place parts of their territories under 
the Prussia customs administration.336 More difficult, however, was the integration of the 
geographically important enclave Hesse-Cas sei which separated Prussia’s eastern and 
western provinces. The later raised a complaint before the Wiener Conference claiming 
that Prussia’s tariff policy violated its sovereignty. A bitter customs battle followed, but 
Hesse-Cassel still refused to submit to the Prussian customs scheme.33?
With most the enclaves integrated into the Prussian customs system, the turn now 
came to the other German states. Hesse-Darmstadt was first in line. The Prussian Tax Law 
had severely hurt Hesse-Darmstadt’s important linen industry by limiting its access to the 
large Prussian market and had sent the state’s economy into deep recession.338 The 
introduction o f a new boundary tariff in 1824 failed to relieve the distress and in 1825, after 
seven years of constant economic decline, the government turned to Berlin to negotiate. In 
February 1828, after three years of negotiations, a treaty was finally signed between Prussia 
and Hesse-Darmstadt by which the latter agreed to adopt Prussia’s customs and excise taxes. 
The two states further agreed to establish a joint administration for the collecting and sharing
333 Roussakis 1968, p. 54.
336 Like Schwartzburg-Sonderhausen these endaves obtained freedom of commercial intercourse and a 
proportionate share of revenue accruing from consumption taxes. See Hahn 1984, p. 26.
337 Kohr 1960, p. 442. See also Henderson 1983, p. 45, and Roussakis 1968, p. 55.
338 Henderson 1983, p. 50, and Matdi 1999, p.
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of re venues.339 The official treaty stipulated the legal equality o f the two contracting parties. 
However, Prussia’s demand for greater influence was accommodated by a set o f secret 
articles enhancing its p o w ers .^  Thus, in effect, argues W.O. Henderson, the agreem ent 
amounted to “the absorption o f the smaller country into the customs system o f  the 
larger”. ^  Nonetheless, the arrangement proves quite beneficial to Hesse-Darmstadt. A fter 
the treaty went into effect in July 1828 the small state steadily improved its finances, thereby 
sending an important signal to others about the benefits o f coming to terms with Prussia.-*42
1. The South German Customs Union
Whereas the small enclaves submitted quickly to Prussian pressure, the Tax Law  
drew a sharp response from the larger German states. Already in 1819 a deputation o f  
manufacturers from southern Germany had urged the German Diet to take action against 
what was seen as an aggressive and expansionist Prussian customs-policy. When it became 
clear to them that the Diet (which was dominated by a highly protectionist Austria) had 
neither the wish nor the power to intervene, the idea of creating a third force whereby the 
secondary states would act in concert gained in popularity.^42 In September 1819 
Württemberg and Bavaria invited representatives from Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, 394012
339 The Prusso-Hessian customs unions was the first real ‘common market’ in Europe. Darmstadt’s share 
of the revenues was to be calculated on the basis of the ratio of its population to that of Prussia’s western 
provinces. See Kohr 1960, p. 44Z See also Henderson 1981, p. 45, and Roussakis 1968, p. 55.
340 By the secret articles Hesse-Darmstadt gave her consent beforehand to future legislative changes, except 
tariff increases and fundamental legislative alternatives and to commercial treaties that Prussia might sign 
with states not neighboring Hesse-Darmstadt, as well as to reprisal measures taken by Prussia against the 
economic policy of other states. Moreover, the secret agreement gave the Prussian customs inspectors in 
Darmstadt much wider powers than those laid down in the principal treaty. See List 1915, p. 60, and Matdi 
1999, p. 147. The secret articles are reprinted in Oncken & Saemisch 1934, vol 2, pp. 207-211.
341 Henderson 1983, p. 68.
342 Roussakis 1968, p. 60. See also Matdi 1999.
343 The so-called ‘trias policy’—the idea of creating a third force in Germany to balance the preponderant 
power of Prussia and Austria—originated in the kingdom of Württemberg. Too weak itself to oppose 
Austria and Prussia, Württemberg proposed to achieve that goal by promoting closer cooperation between 
itself and other secondary states. Already in July 1819, high officials of Württemberg worked out a 
memorandum entitled “Ideen zu einem Maut- und Handelverein der suddeutschen Regierungen. See 
Oncken & Saemisch 1934. See also Werner 1977, p. 7.
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Saxony and the Thunngian states (including Hesse-Cassel)344 *346to negotiate the region of a 
South-German customs union that would halt Prussia’s economic expansion.343 According 
to Walter Mattli, their interest in a customs union ’’stemmed mostly from their mutual 
opposition to Prussia’s tariff reforms...and the desire to express in economic policy their 
growing political independence”.34^
Despite their common aversion towards Prussia, the south German states were 
unable to reach agreement. Negotiations dragged on for three years until the summer of 
1823 when it became clear that the interests o f the parties were simply too divergent to be 
bridged. A major obstacle to agreement lay in the fact that Bavaria had in mind a 
hegemonial trias which it would dominate, whereas other prospective members insisted on 
full equality with Bavaria.347 348Conflicts over territory also poisoned relations between the 
states. Bavaria had claims on lands held by both Baden and Württemberg—claims that 
would have to be either abandoned or accommodated to facilitate agreement.34** Finally, 
the negotiating parties differed in their desired degree of protectionism. Bavaria and 
Württemberg wanted a common border tariff system with a high protective tariff to shield 
their infant industries. By contrast Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony and Baden favored freer 
trade which would allow them to profit from transit trade.34  ^ With such divergent interests 
no common ground could be identified.
Negotiations for a South German union were frequently revived between 1822 and 
1828 as the pressure from Prussia grew stronger. In October 1824, Bavaria and
344 The Thunngian small states included Sachse-Weimar, the smaller Saxon duchies, the Reuss 
Principalities, Schlesingen, Zigenreich and Hesse-Cassel.
343 The outcome of the first meeting was the adoption of the so-called WitncrVunklation—a tentative 
agreement whereby the states consented to negotiate mutual freedom of trade and tariffs in the future. This 
was followed by real negotiations in 1820. See Hahn 1984, p. 26, and List 1915.
346 Mattli 1999, p. 44.
347 Hahn 1984, p. 33.
348 Werner 1977, p. 48.
•s4  ^ See, VoTgesckkhte, p. 272.
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Württemberg signed a preliminary agreement for the creation of a union. However, th e  
ensuing negotiations came to null. In February 1825 a third attempt was made w h en  
Bavaria and Württemberg invited Baden, Nassau and Hess e-Darmstadt (which had n o t y e t  
joined with Prussia) to reopen negotiations at Stuttgart. These negotiations also failed , 
mainly due to territorial disputes between Bavaria and Baden. In the end, Bavaria decided 
to form a union with Württemberg alone to prevent this state from siding with B aden 
thereby leaving Bavaria isolated.250 In January 1828 a treaty was signed between B avaria 
and Württemberg establishing the South German Zollverein.251 The South G erm an 
Zollverein never became a success, however. Its members were too small and too diverse 
to enjoy any real advantage from establishing a common external tariff.252 *During its short 
lifetime the union collected less than half the revenue per capita of the Prussian custom s 
union while its administrative costs were more than twice those of the Prussian scheme.252
2. The M idd le German Commercial Union
Once the Prusso-Hessian Zollverein was established, Prussia lost no time in trying 
to extend its influence into the center of Germany. Overtures were made to Hesse-Cassel, 
Sachse-Weimar and Nassau. As a counter-measure, Bavaria also attempted to extend its 
influence in that region.254 But rather than join the South German union, the states o f  
central Germany sought to maintain their autonomy by tightening cooperation among 
themselves. On 24 September 1828, the Middle-German Commercial Union was
250 Wemer 1977, p. 48.
251 The accession of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Prussian union caused great anxiety among the southern 
states. The British envoy MUbank wrote in 1828 that "the news of this negotiation has created no small 
alarm among the merchants and others concerned with the trade in this part of Germany who will 
undoubtedly suffer considerably by it." See Mattli 1999, pp. 142-5. Bavaria in fact had sought to keep Hesse- 
Darmstadt from ratifying the treaty with Prussia.
252 See Hahn 1984, p. 35.
252 The yearly net-income o f the South German Customs Union was only 9,5 silbergroshen per capita 
compared to 24 silbergroshen in Prussia. The low revenues were mainly due to administrative costs which 
absorbed 44% of the unions’ receipts compared to less than 20% in the Prusso-Hessian union.
254 Roussakis 1968, p -60.
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established uniting the territories lying between the Prusso-Hessian and Bavarian unions. 
This union included Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Brunswick, Oldenburg, 
Frankfurt-am-Main, Bremen, the Saxon Duchies, Hesse-Homburg, Schwarzburg- 
Rudolstadt and Schwartzburg-Sonderhausen. It counted six million people.
Like the South German Zollverein the Middle-German Commercial Union was 
clearly anti-Prussian.355 The union did not provide for a common external tariff, nor did it 
abolish internal trade barriers. The economic interests o f the members differed so greatly 
that agreement was reached only on two points: to prevent the existing customs unions 
from expanding into north and central Germany; and to divert transit trade away from 
Prussia by maintaining as many north-south trade routes as possible.356 3578To meet these 
goal, the treaty introduced a series of discriminating transit dues aimed to hamper 
commerce between the eastern and western parts of Prussia and prohibited its members 
from concluding trade agreements with members of the other two unions. About this
arrangement the historian Heinrich Treischke remarks,
never before had particularism brought forth so monstrous, so unnatural an abortion. In the form
of a huge barbed hood the area of the Union extended-.across a motley collection of territories
which, vis-a-vis Prussia, were only held together by a single common bond—fear and envy.3
Indeed, the Commercial Union seemed closer in spirit to a defensive political alliance than 
a trade union.
Also the Commercial Union was largely a failure. After its formation, economic 
conditions among its members continued to deteriorate.35® In 1829, Sachse-Meiningen 
and Sachse-Coburg reneged their obligations to the union by agreeing to create duty free
35d According to Walter Mattli, the oppositional or anti-Prussian character of this union was unmistakable. 
See Mattli 1999, p. 118, and Hahn 1984, p. 57.
356 Roussakis 1968, pp. 60-61, It was a declared aim o f the union to keep open the north-south main trade 
routes from Hamburg and Bremen to Frankfurt-am-Main and Leipzig, but to restrict traffic on the west-east 
routes in so far as they ran through Prussian territory. See also Mattli 1999, p. 118.
357 Quoted in Roussakis 1968, p. 62.
358 Matdi 1999, p. 119.
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roads trough their territories to Prussia. Soon also the Reuss principalities and Sach se- 
Weimar agreed to join Prussia. In the end, even Hesse-Cassel succumbed to the burden o f  
swindling state finances and consented to negotiate with Prussia. For Prussia this m ean t 
the opportunity at last to link its eastern and western provinces within a single  
administrative border. Hesse-Cassel was thus admitted to the Prussian union im m ediately 
and on highly favorable terms.359
IV. T h e  F o r m a t io n  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  Z o l l v e r e in
Having won over Hesse-Cassel, Prussia’s customs scheme was now complete. So  
was the failure o f the South German union. Realizing their fiasco, Bavaria and  
Wurttenberg decided to approach Prussia for a negotiated solution while they still had a  
position to bargain from.360 On 22 March, 1833 a treaty was drafted uniting the Prussian 
and Bavarian customs unions. In effect, this was the founding o f the German Zollverein. 
Simultaneous with the merger o f  the two customs unions, a number of smaller states 
negotiated to join the Prussian union. Only a few days after the general ratification, Saxony 
abandoned its trade war with Prussia and acceded to the Zollverein, and the Thuringian 
states were formally integrated on May 10th.361 Thus, when the Zollverein took effect on 
1 January7, 1834 it comprised eighteen states with a total area o f 162,870 square miles. Its 
population was 23.5 millions—approximately 15 millions were Prussians.362
The bilateral treaties which established the German Zollverein in 1834 differed 
markedly from the treaty which had founded the prior Prusso-Hessian union. The 
Zollverein created an interstate union based on the principle of formal and legal equality 
among its members. In the central legislative body— called the Customs Congress—each
359 Roussakis 1968, p. 67-8. See also Matdi (1999) for an account of the economic distress of the enclave.
360 Marriotdc Robertson 1915.
361 Hesse-Homburg, Nassau, and Frankfurt-am-Main all joined within the next two years.
362 Roussakis 1968, p. 70.
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State had one vote.36 465 Decisions were subject to unanimity and were directly binding on 
member states, ‘breaking’ state law.364 The execution of legislative decisions in the 
member states was monitored by a system o f reciprocal surveillance by which states send 
delegates to each others’ administrative offices. Prussia represented the Zollverein in all 
commercial negotiations with foreign countries (including prospective member states). 
However, both Bavaria and Württemberg retained the right to negotiate bilateral 
commercial treaties with other states outside the union.
The Zollverein put up a common external tariff—equivalent to the Prussian Tariff 
o f 1818—but instituted free trade among its members.365 Revenue from the common tariff 
system was pooled and distributed equally among the members in strict proportion to their 
population. This principle was highly favorable to nearly all o f the secondary states because 
their per capita consumption was considerably smaller than the Prussian average.366 Thus, 
in addition to granting added political influence to its smaller members, the union in effect 
provided for economic redistribution from Prussia to other states.
The Zollverein was a great economic success. In the period 1834 to 1866 in which 
the Zollverein operated alongside the German Bund, it continued to expand its revenue. 
Trade liberalization and the development of an elaborate institutional framework in which 
the technological improvements o f  the industrial revolution could flourish sparked 
unprecedented rates o f economic growth. Tax revenues increased by 71% between 1834 
and 1843 while population increased by only 22%.367 These revenues provided a welcome 
solution to the economic constraints faced by the smaller German states a decade earlier 
and provided a positive incentive for all members to continue cooperation.
363 Kohr 1960, p.448.
364 Forsyth 1981, p. 168.
365 Fest 1978. The Zollverein treaty also provided for common administrative regulations among the 
members and introduced fixed ratios between members weight, measures and coinage standards.
366 Matdi 1999, p. 123.
367 Henderson* p. 141; Mattli 1999, p. 121.
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Throughout the Zollverein’s existence, the preponderant power of Prussia w as  a t  
all times evident. As the largest power Prussia used its strength to push other states in  th e  
direction it wanted.368 Other states were compelled to adopt the Prussian customs law , 
tariffs and auditing procedures, and the collection of duties was everywhere carried o u t 
according to a Prussian system. Yet this did not mean that Prussia was free to explo it its 
partners. In fact, many observers agree that the smaller states benefited more from th e  
Zollverein than Prussia did.369 According to W.O. Henderson Bavaria, which h ad  
collected about two million florins in revenue per year from its customs union w ith  
Württemberg, obtained almost 4 million florins in its first year as a member o f  th e  
Zollverein.370 “This financial return” he argues, “made an end of any hostility that m igh t 
[have been] felt towards Prussia. The gains in revenue soothed the pain of losing com plete 
independence”.371 Thus, when the Zollverein treaties were considered for renewal in 1841 
the secondary states were generally satisfied with its performance. It was concluded that 
“throughout the years of its existence, the Zollverein had at no time violated the 
sovereignty of its member states, or the principle o f equality o f rights upon which it 
rested”. Indeed, “from a financial point o f  view, the Zollverein had been of utmost benefit 
to the constituent states”. 372
The D issolu tion o f  the Zollverein and  G erman Bund
In terms o f  the framework for institutional binding spelled out in Chapter III, the 
German Zollverein provided a halfway mechanism for binding Prussian power. On one 
hand, the new union instituted a balance o f political influence which, although dominated
368 Forsyth 1981 p. 167.
369 Roussakis 1968, p. 76, Matdi 1999, pp. 122,148.
370 Henderson 1983, p. 141.
371 Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher, “An economic History o f Europe since 1750" (1970) p. 338—quoted 
in Mattii 1999, p. 122.
372 Roussakis 1968, p. 76.
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by Prussia, gave other states a significant say over Prussian policy. In terms of constraining 
the power of individual states and binding members to abide by its rules, the union relied 
on a mechanism of financial redistribution from Prussia to other members, on high exit 
costs (effected by the adoption of a highly centralized system for customs collection and, a 
bit later, a common currency), and—above all—on efficiency gains resulting from a 
rationalization of customs collection. Apart from these economic constraints and 
incentives, however, binding remained weak. The pooling of military resources remained 
limited to the sphere o f German Bund, where the actual pooling o f  ready military force was 
moderate and where central command structures were weak.
Ironically, it was the overwhelming success of the Zollverein that contributed 
indirectly to its downfall. The Zollverein enabled the smaller German states to cooperate 
with Prussia on equal terms. At the same time, though, it provided Prussia with a 
powerful new weapon in the struggle against Austria for a  dominant position in central 
Europe.373 The gradual economic weakening o f Austria which resulted from its exclusion 
from the Zollverein, strengthened Prussia’s ambition of unifying Germany under its charge. 
In the spring of 1866 Prussia concluded a military alliance with Italy directed against 
Austria.374 *Austria immediately responded by securing a promise o f French neutrality in 
the event of war. In May Prussia escalated the crisis by ordering its troops into Schleswig- 
Holstein to expel the Austrian forces there. Austria now asked the Diet of the German 
Bund to mobilize the federal army against Prussia. Despite warnings from Prussia that a 
vote in favor of the Austrian motion would be regarded as a direct declaration of war on 
Prussia, most members o f the German Diet took Austria’s side.373 The vote was taken
373 In the words of Albrecht-Carrie, "die political exclusion of Austria was prepared in the field of 
economics, effected militarily, and consummated diplomatically”. Albrecht-Carrie 1970, p. 53.
374 Carr 1979, p. 103.
373 Braunschweig, the Free Gties, Luxembourg, Mechklenburg, Oldenburg and die grand-ducal Saxon 
houses voted again the motion
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01114th June. The same day, Prussia announced its withdrawal from the German Bund and 
on the following day Prussia delivered ultimatums to Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel, 
ordering them to stop mobilization. When they remained silent, Prussian forces invaded 
them on 16 June 1866. This was followed by a declaration of war on Austria on June 
18.376
The war o f 1866 was astonishingly brief. Austria had the support o f all the larger 
north German states and was expected to win easily. However, Prussia’s m ilitary 
organization proved superior.37?  Within the first three days, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse- 
Cassel were occupied, giving Prussia control over most o f north and central Germany. The 
decisive battle took place on July 3 at Königgratz where the Austrian armies were defeated 
by the Prussians.376 *78 By the terms o f the ensuing peace Austria was forced to acknowledge 
the dissolution o f the German Bund. Prussia annexed Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfurt-am-Main and imposed a treaty o f union on the 
seventeen German states north o f the Main under Prussian leadership.379 With this, the 
German Bund and Zollverein were destroyed and the effort to avoid Prussian hegemony 
had failed.
V . C o n c lu sio n : T he  Zo llv e re in  a s  a  C a s e  o f  B in d in g— Su c c e ss  o r  Fa ilu re?
The events that led to the formation o f the German Zollverein follow a pattern 
similar to the United Provinces. A rising state, Prussia, was expanding its power at the 
expense o f a group o f lesser, declining states. Like the declining states in the United
376 Hudson 1891.
0 ' '  The Prussian victory was due not to great numerical superiority, but rather to the meticulous planning 
of Moltke and to the superior fire-power of the new needle-gun. See Carr 1979, p. 105.
378 Until 1866 most observers believed that Austria would easily defeat Prussia based on the largpr Austrian 
army (528.000 versus 355.000 men). However, Austria was in the situation that her unwieldy army needed 
seven to eight weeks to mobilize whereas the Prussian army needed only three weeks. Morrow 1993, p. 215.
37^ As a result o f the annexations, Prussia after 1866 comprised four-fifths of the population and the 
greater part of the territory north of the River Main. The four southern States; Bavaria, Baden,
Württemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt remained outside the North German Confederation. See Craig 1978, p. 
12.
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Provinces, the declining German states were to some extent protected by an external ally, 
Austna, and by the military and political framework of the German Bund which was 
designed to prevent Prussian hegemony over Germany. However, Prussia’s strength lay as 
much in its economic strength as in its military efficiency. Prussia used this strength to seek 
to subsume other states under its economic and administrative system. Initially, other states 
sought to balance against Prussias’ preponderant economic power through the formation 
of rival customs unions. However, conflicting interests among the large and diverse group 
of declining states made balancing ineffective. Realizing that they would not indefinitely 
withstand Prussian pressure they chose to merge with Prussia at a time when it was still 
constrained within the German Bund. In doing so, they generally gained favorable 
conditions.38  ^The Zollverein not only placed other states at relative economic parity with 
Prussia, it also gave them important influence on Prussia’s economy policy.
As in the case of the United Provinces, the motivation for declining states to ‘bind’ 
a rising hegemon by merging with it on favorable terms is not difficult to grasp. What is 
more puzzling is why Prussia granted favorable terms to other states in order to gain their 
cooperation. Why not just conquer them? Several factors are important. First, although 
Prussia was economically superior it did not reach military preeminence until decades after 
the Zollverein was created. Prussia was painfully aware that its ambition of leadership in 
Germany depended on averting a ‘total balance’ of German states against it.-380 81 For this 
reason it was prepared to ‘appease’ declining states with economic concessions. Another 
motivation for Prussia to extend its customs system to other German states was to exclude 
Austria economically from the German sphere— a goal which was directly advanced by the 
Zollverein.382 Finally, there were significant efficiency gains to cooperation—gains which
380 Henderson 1983, p. 141; and Mattli 1999, p. 121.
383 Liska 1964, p. 76.
382 Harriot 1915, p. 32, Price 1949, p. 298. According to Price, “The Zollverein united the German states 
in bonds of mutual economic interests, it united them under the leadership of Prussia, and it accustomed
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may have been seen to make Prussia indifferent between conquering other states o r  
cooperating with them on equal terms. For example, the Zollverein improved Prussia’s 
bargaining position and retaliation power on the wider international scene, enabling it to 
wring important trade concessions from neighboring protectionist countries, such as 
France and Belgium.383 Thus in the end, the Zollverein— like United Provinces—appears 
as a compromise between a rising power and a group of declining states. While this 
compromise proved highly advantageous to Prussia it is apparent that the declining states 
were able to gain important concessions by moving to institutionalize cooperation with the 
rising power while it is still relatively weak.
As we have seen, the German Zollverein failed ultimately in binding Prussia’s 
growing power. As such we may ask whether the case is not in fact disconfirming the 
binding thesis. However, cases need not be successful in order to reveal information about 
the motivation behind a poliq\ The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests 
that economic integration in 19th century Germany w*as motivated by an incentive to bind a 
rising Prussia. The actual form o f integration also supports this reading. Whereas 
integration was geared towards enhancing economic efficiency, the Zollverein was also 
engineered to secure more balanced growth among the German states, and a high degree o f 
centralization effectively prevented exit from the union. The economic binding undertaken 
in the German Zollverein did not prevent the breakdown of the German Bund. Yet, 
despite its ultimate failure to prevent German unification under Prussian leadership, the 
Zollverein can in many ways be seen as a political and economic success. The Zollverein 
insulated the smaller German states from economic exploitation and prevented Prussia
them to the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic body.” To Hamerow the defeat of Austria through the 
Zollverein was a conscious goal of Prussia: “Prussia’s considerations with respect to the formation of the 
Zollverein were far from exclusively economic”. Prussian statesmen recognized that a customs union led by 
Prussia would have important implications in a future struggle for supremacy in central Europe”. Hamerow 
1958.
383 Matdi 1999, pp. 124-25.
138
from starving them of funds. Through the Zollverein, the secondary powers obtained 
favorable economic conditions combined with significant influence on Prussian policy. 
This meant that when German unification was finally forced through by Prussia the 
process took the form of a compromise as much as an act of coercion. Despite Prussia’s 
aspirations to the opposite, the structure o f the North German Bund and the subsequent 
German Empire fell far short of a centralized state. To obtain the consent o f the chief 
secondary states, Prussia was compelled to grant them important concessions. Bavaria and 
Württemberg obtained a series o f special privileges giving them in effect an equal voice 
with Prussia. These included the right to a permanent seat on the military committee o f 
the Bundesrat, separate representation at peace negotiations and the chair of a committee 
on foreign affairs. The two states were also allowed to keep control of their armed 
forces.384 Also the minor German states retained significant autonomy within the 
institutional structure o f the German Empire. The federal basis o f the Empire was 
enshrined in the executive body o f the Bundesrat which was endowed with considerable 
power and prestige. Prussia had seventeen o f the fifty-eight votes, Bavaria had six, and the 
smaller states had each one vote, meaning that, theoretically, Prussia could be outvoted on 
constitutional and military questions.385 Thus, rather than an overt expression o f Prussia’s 
near hegemony, the German Reich was essentially “an uneasy compromise between the 
forces of conservative federalism .. .and the military might o f Prussia”.386
384 See Craigh 1978. Craigh aigues that, “As a practical politician, Bismarck knew that the concessions he 
had made, while offensive to some, were the most effective way of breaking down the resistance o f the 
southern governments”. Bismarck brought pressure to bear on the Bavarian monarch, Ludwig II, to accept 
King William to become German emperor; in return Ludwig received an annual subsidy o f 300.000 gulden, a 
transaction which only became public many years later. See Carr 1991, pp. 121-22.
385 The German Reich had two houses: the ReicbsUg, representing the people, and the Bundesrat, consisting 
o f representatives o f the member states. The federal basis of the Empire was enschrined in die executive 
body of the Bundesrat which was endowed with considerable power and prestige. Its consent was necessary 
for all legislation, it could veto constitutional changes, and supervised foreign policy. The Reichstag was 
composed of 397 members elected by universal manhood suffrage. In theory the Reichstags ability to reject 
any bill seemed to make it an important reservoir of power, in practice, however, the power of the lower 
house was circumscribed. All legislative proposals were submitted to the Bundesrat first and to the Reichstag 
only if  they were approved by the upper house. See Carr 1991, p. 126.
386 Carr 1991, p -125.
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VI The European Communities
‘The special trait of the Franco-German relationship is that it had been riddled with conflict because it 
is not primarily an alliance of two friendly powers against outside forces, but rather a way for one 
power to control the other and for the other power to control itself.”
-P. McCarthy, F rance-G em ary, 1985-93. The S truggle to C ooperate (1993).
I. In t r o d u c t io n
On 9 May 1950, less than five years after France’s liberation from German 
occupation, French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, announced a proposal to place the 
entire Franco-German coal and steel production under the control of a supranational 
institution. The pooling of French and German heavy industry interests, he submitted, 
would be the tirst step in the direction o f a fully integrated Europe that would make war 
between the two former antagonists “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”.38  ^
The so-called Schuman Plan led to an epochal reconciliation of France and West Germany 
which was the starting point for a series of constitutive bargains among the West European 
states that led, first, to the creation o f the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1952, and that culminated—some forty years later—in the signing of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1991.
What were the underlying motivations for the series of steps between 1951 and 
1992 towards an ‘ever closer union* among the West European states? In this chapter I 
argue that the process o f West European integration since 1952 has been conditioned by 
three concerns: first; the need to prevent German preponderance; second, the necessity of 
economic development; third, the aspiration to find the unity’’ needed to secure Europe’s 
status in a world dominated by superpowers. O f these concerns, the desire to avoid German 
hegemony has been the most decisive. The wish to obtain a guarantee against renewed 
German aggression runs throughout the history o f European integration. This desire has 387
387 Declaration by Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950.
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primarily been championed by the countries that suffered most under German occupation 
during World War II— France, Italy and the Benelux states—whereas countries that were 
less affected by the war, including Britain and die Scandinavian countries, have proven less 
willing to surrender autonomy for the sake o f cementing peaceful relations.388 Economic 
concerns and external threat have played a secondary role. The desire to gamer commercial 
advantages has been an important force in shaping European integration and in sustaining 
popular support for the European project, but economic concerns in and of themselves 
have not provided a primary impetus for integration. Indeed, had European policy makers 
been concerned exclusively with economic advantage they would likely have engaged in less 
extensive cooperation in much weaker, and geographically more inclusive international 
institutions. Today’s Europe would be radically different
‘External pressure’-i.e . military threat from the Soviet Union and the American 
‘security umbrella’—has also been secondary in driving European integration. While the 
shadow cast by the superpower conflict has certainly impacted the European integration 
process, it is not the case, as some realists contend, that it has facilitated integration by 
removing or suppressing fear of uneven gains in the minds o f European leaders.389 To the 
contrary, fear of uneven gains and the desire to make sure that such gains will not be used in 
the future, as they have in the past, to achieve a decisive military or economic advantage, have 
been at the core of European integration.
In this chapter, I examine each major step towards deeper integration in postwar 
Europe in light of the institutional binding thesis. The picture that emerges bears close
388 According to William Wallace, the British and Scandinavians less conscious o f their unavoidable 
dependence on Germany and o f the link between economic relations and central security concerns were 
ambivalent about the underlying politico-security thrust in 1949-1950 and reman ambivalent today. (Wallace 
1991, p- 60). Similarly, Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth explain the difference in attitudes towards 
European integration between France and the Benelux on one hand and Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries on the other hand in terms of these countries’ different experiences during the war. See lipgens & 
Loth 1985, p. 25.
389 See Waltz 1979, p. 70 and 1993, Mearsheimer 1990a and 1990b.
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resemblance both to the United Provinces and the German Zollverein, Like these regions, 
Europe after World War II was subject to a preventive war dilemma. World War 11—like 
World War I—had failed to solve the problem of German power. Although militarily 
defeated, Germany still had the potential to become the strongest European state 
economically and demographically and hence the capacity to once again threaten the 
territorial integrity of its neighbors.390 This problem afforded two possible solutions: either 
prevent Germany from ever growing military powerful again by destroying its potential for 
war; or devise an institution that would enable Germany to commit not to bully its 
neighbors in the future.
During the early postwar years, the second solution slowly gained acceptance 
among European policy-makers. It found its expression first in the French Schuman Plan o f 
May 1950. Faced with the inevitable rehabilitation of Germany’s industrial capacity, France 
proposed to place the very foundation of Germany’s economic system and war-making 
potential— the production of coal and steel— under joint supranational control. Six months 
later, when the United States called for German rearmament, France responded with a plan 
for a European defense community. And in 1955, when Germany gained the right to develop 
nuclear energy for non-military purposes, France proposed the creation of a European 
Atomic Energy Community. Between the early 1960s and 1989, security concerns were less 
outspoken (although not absent), thanks mainly to the firm security7 guarantee provided by 
NATO. However, in 1989, the end of the Cold War and German reunification brought 
security concerns back to the center for the integration debate, prompting France to call for a 
Treaty7 on European Union entailing political union and cooperation o f foreign and defense 
poliq7.
390 Gillingham 1991, p. 2, Kissinger 1996, p. 228.
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The question is: why has Germany agreed to this series of binding designs? Why has 
the strongest power in Europe consented to surrender sovereign prerogatives to a set o f 
regional institutions? One answer that emerges from the unfolding analysis is ‘timing’. The 
rudimentary steps towards integration were launched at a time when Germany, although 
economically recuperating, was still politically and militarily fragile. Divided and occupied, and 
subject to a greater threat from East than any other European nation, the principal goal o f 
postwar West Germany was to reclaim political sovereignty and gain the right to rebuild a 
national defense. Bonn realized, however, that political and military equality could be acquired 
only at the expense o f institutional restraints on Germany’s freedom of action. When 
Germany after 1945 agreed to let the elements of sovereignty that were being restored to it be 
immediately ‘frozen’ in the international organizations it joined—as in the case of the ECSC, 
WEU, EEC, OEEC and NATO— the primary payoff to Germany was in terms of equality 
rather than of independence.391
A second answer to why Germany has agreed to transfer sovereignty to regional 
institutions lies in changing German preferences. Postwar Germany—like other European 
states—has drawn lessons from history that have served to change its perception o f war as a 
feasible means to security or wealth. Regional integration has presented a way for Germany to 
convince its neighbors that its preferences have indeed changed. German Chancellors from 
Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl have repeatedly portrayed European integration as a way 
to alleviate fears of German ‘Alleingang’ by “binding Germany into a structure which 
practically obliges it to take the interests o f its neighbors into consideration”.392 This may 
sound to some like blunt rhetoric. We will see, however, that the prescriptive implications for
391 Hanrieder 1980, p. 17.
392 Cited in Jane Perlez, “Blunt Reasoning for Enlarging Nato: Curbs on Germany”, New York Times, 7 
December 1992, p. 18.
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institutional binding are highly congruent with the policies pursued both by German and its 
neighbors.
In addition to enabling Germany to credibly convey its benign intentions to other 
states, integration has also presented aw ay for Germany to obtain much of the security and 
wealth that it sought earlier through military expansion. Like other 'bound’ powers before it, 
Germany has gained much from integration. As the strongest and most dynamic of the W est 
European economies, and as the country with the greatest export potential, West Germany 
has benefited greatly from the common European market— its growing trade surpluses far 
outweighing the cost of its large direct budgetary contribution.393 European integration has 
given Germany a home market with sufficient scales to foster industries that are competitive 
in the world economy. Thus, although Germany has borne a disproportionate part o f the 
costs associated with constructing and maintaining the common market, in purely economic 
terms it may well be true that Germany has gained more from being immured in the EC than 
it might have won by attempting to coerce its neighbors under its exclusive leadership.394 
EMU is only the most recent example. Germany has voluntarily agreed to bind its 
economic power by handing over control o f its monetary policy to a supranational 
authority that governs through consensus. Other European states have thereby gained a 
greater input into monetary issues, and the euro, not the mark, has become Europe’s 
leading currency. At the same time, however, Germany is effectively exporting its own 
monetary policy to its neighbors. Ultimately, the EU will have a political economy crafted 
in Germany’s image.395
393 Germany is by far the largest net contributor to the EU budget In 1996, Germany’s financial 
contribution to the EU amounted to about two-thirds o f the net income of the Union, double the relative 
size of the German GDP in the EU. Matrii 1998, p. 104.
394 Hanrieder 1980, p. 11.
395 ggg K ach an  19xx.
144
The timing, avowed motivation and concrete institutional form of integration in 
postwar West Europe suggests that integration has been motivated by a desire to find a 
‘constructive solution5 to the German problem. The question remains however to what 
extent is Germany really bound? To what extent is the remarkable peace and prosperity in 
postwar Europe the result o f changed domestic preferences, the consolidation o f democracy 
and American hegemony rather than a consequence of the creation o f the EC? Or put 
differently, does the EC in fact constrain German power? The creation of the EC is routinely 
hailed as one of the most extraordinary achievements in modem world politics. Compared to 
other recent projects for international economic and political cooperation, the European 
project is indeed impressive. As an endeavor in institutional binding, however, the 
Community has been a mixed success. In previous chapters I have considered two prior cases 
o f binding; one in which the extensive pooling o f both economic and military power led to 
the firm binding of a would-be hegemon (the United Provinces); another in which the failure 
to secure adequate military binding led to partial domination by one state over others (the 
German Zollverein). The EC falls somewhere in between these two cases. While it offers 
extensive binding in the economic realm, the military aspects are less developed. As was the 
case in the German Zollverein, efforts to contain different power potentials (economic and 
military) have taken two separate roads—one which follows the logic o f binding another 
which rests on traditional diplomatic arrangements. Thus, economic binding has been 
undertaken within the framework o f the EC, while military security has been dealt with 
outside the framework o f the EC, under the auspices of NATO. So far, the two roads have 
not managed to meet. Despite repeated attempts by some members, especially France, to 
strengthen military binding, resistance from others, notably Britain, has meant that military 
integration remains incomplete. Even with the present initiatives for a common European 
defense effort, the idea that Europe could one day have a security7 regime of its own that
would tie its members together in a genuine military union is considered remote by most 
observers. The question therefore remains: Is Germany bound within Europe? The real test, 
conceivably, will come only with an eventual repeal of the American security guarantee for 
Europe.
Organisation o f  Chapter
Section II begins with a brief analysis of national preferences for integration as they 
emerged in the immediate postwar period. Sections II through VII discuss each o f the major 
intergovernmental bargains in order to reveal the extent to which major decisions have been 
tied to the problem o f containing German power. Section IIX compares the findings to 
evidence from prior cases of institutional binding. Before I proceed to section II, a caveat is 
in order. I seek in this chapter to show’ to what degree the ‘binding thesis’ is corroborated or 
contradicted by consecutive European integration initiatives. Given the enormous amount of 
evidence regarding the European integration process, the analysis is necessarily rather general 
and may do injustice to some nuances and complexities of the policy-making process. I ask 
the reader to bear in mind that this chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
history o f European integration but to demonstrate— from the basis o f theory’— how the 
overall development o f the EC can be seen to relate to the desire to control a rising 
regional power.
II. N a t i o n a l  P r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  In t e g r a t io n  in  t h e  P o s t w a r  E r a
World War II was the most destructive Europe and the world had seen. Yet, 
strikingly, elites in many West European countries emerged from the w ar advocating some 
form o f European union. During the war, anti-fascist resistance groups in many countries 
championed projects for a voluntary European federation as a means to secure peace on
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the Continent.**96 A  military confederation was at the heart of most of these projects, but 
many also stressed the need for economic integration to abate national rivalries. What was 
specific to many o f these projects was that they saw in European union the concrete 
advantage that it would prevent a recurrence o f the military hegemony of Germany.397 
While one may be tempted to discount the many war-time plans for European unity as just 
the utopian propaganda o f freedom fighters, there can be no doubt that these ideas 
influenced postwar European politics. Many leaders of the resistance movement, such as 
Altiero Spinelli, went on to become prominent political figures in postwar Europe. Due to 
their efforts, the movement for European unity gained increasing momentum at the end of 
the war, culminating in May 1948 with the so-called Hague Conference where over 800 
influential Europeans from sixteen countries— among them several former Prime Ministers 
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs—gathered to discuss an economic and political union of 
E u ro p e .^
The horrors o f World War II turned West European elite and public opinion in 
favor of regional unity. But whereas the restored governments in Western Europe shared 
in the ideal o f fostering some form of European unity, they predictably differed in their 
visions of how such unity would be achieved or how extensive it would be. Differences in 
preferences were often directly linked to countries’ experience during the war. Below I 39678
396 A great collection and commentai)* on the many wartime plans for European unity is found in Lippgens 
and Loth 1985. See also Mowat 1973, Dinan 1994, p. 11, and Stirk 1989.
397 Prominent examples from France include Leon Blum (1939) “Les conditions de la paix', Martin, “De la 
justice politique. Notes sur la présente guerre” (1940), Francis Gerard. What is do be done with Germany? which 
summarizes the ideas of resistance groups in Algiers, Philippe Viannay, For a fr e e  G iili^ation and Maurice 
Duverger, "Pas d’Europe sans L’Allemagne’, Le Monde, 9 Sept 1947. All reprinted in Lippgens & Loth 1985, 
vol. 3, pp. 275-6,336. Examples from Italy include the Ventotene Manifesto (1941) which advocated a federal 
Europe with a common European army. The manifesto later became the program of the M ovimnto Federalista 
FLuropea founded in 1943. Spinelli, ‘European Union in the Resistance’ Government and Opposition, vol. IL,1966, 
p. 325 quoted in Bulges 1989, p. 29. See also speech by Ugo Mondolfo of the PSLI on 1 December 1948 
reprinted in Lipgens & Loth 1985, vol. I ll, p. 219.
398 Thg 1948  Hague Conference established a special Five Power ‘Committee for the Study of European 
Union1 chaired by the Frenchman Edouard Herriot. The work of this committee led to the establishing of 
the European Council in 1949. See Dinan 1994, p. 12.
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briefly discuss the preferences of the key players in the European integration process as they 
emerged in the immediate postwar years.
French Preferences
France is the country that has pushed most vigorously for European integration. 
Virtually all major integration initiatives have been issued from Paris. The French desire for 
European unity' is deeply rooted in the country’s experience during World War IL After the 
war, there was strong opposition to restoring the full sovereignty7 of Germany— a country- 
blamed for aggression against France in 1870, 1914 and 1939.399 In particular, there was 
opposition to restoring German sovereignty over the Ruhr. Coal from the Ruhr had 
provided over 80% o f the German Reich’s peacetime energy requirements, more during the 
war, and steel had been the prime material for weapons production.400 Thus, prominent 
French officials quickly returned to the view o f 1918 that “the surest guarantee for the 
maintenance of peace will always consist in the limitation of the German steel potential” .401 
However, France found itself in a dilemma. French industry emerged from the war with its 
productive capacity seriously impaired. To restructure its economy, France depended on 
supplies of coal and coke from the Ruhr and on German markets for steel.402 For this 
reason, it was widely believed that the French economy would not sustain a punitive policy 
along the lines of that adopted at Versailles. Instead, the challenge was to find a strategy 
that would satisfy France’s overriding concern with security7 against Germany, while 
meeting its industrial demands for adequate supplies of coal.403
3 9 9  In the aftermath of the liberation, French leaders remained obsessed by the possible revival of the 
German danger. Charles de Gaulle, head of the Provisional Government, reminded the French on Feb. 5, 
1945 that the main goal of France must be 'to make sure that no German aggression will be possible in the 
future*, de Gaulle, Discours, p. 165. On the French preoccupation with German threat, see also Poidevin 
1991, p. 332, and La Federation, "Policy statement on Foreign Affairs”, Feb. 1947.
4 0 0  Gillingham 1991, pp. 45-6.
4 0 1  Hervé Aiphand, an official at the Quai d’Orsay in 1947, cited in Lynch 1984, p. 239.
4 0 2  On French dependence on German coal and coke, see Gillingham 1991, p. 95, Willis 1968, p. 90, 
Pounds & Parker 1957, p. 339, Lynch 1984, p. 235.
4 0 3  Pounds & Parker 1957, p. 339, Gillingham 1991, pp. 207-208.
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To begin with, France championed a policy of allied restrictions on German 
production and investment in the Ruhr—so-called ‘organic control'. This strategy implied 
gearing German recovery down to French speed, but did not involve destruction of plants.4 0 4  
Instead, the vision was to enable France to avail itself o f the resources of the Ruhr and to 
prevent the German steel industry from being reconstructed before that o f France.40  ^ A 
special organization— the Commissariat G eneral au Plan—was created in January 1946 and 
charged with drawing up a five-year plan for the French economy which would 
demonstrate how the resources o f the Ruhr could be used in the reconstruction and 
modernization of the French economy. The result, the so-called “Monnet Plan”, called on 
the Allies to increase France's allocations o f coal from the Ruhr by one million tones per 
month and to insert a clause in the peace treaty under which Germany was to deliver 20 
million tones o f coal to France every year for the next twenty years .405 *
‘Organic control' was in rough harmony with American and British Ruhr policy as it 
emerged immediately after the war. However, the onset o f the Cold War meant that 
American policy changed rapidly after 1945 when the harsh occupation policy for Germany 
was laid down.4 0 7  408Already in 1947, the United States requested that German coal and steel 
output be increased to the French level.40® German productivity was key to the common
404 Ibid-, pp. 153,207-8. Between February 1947 and 1949 France put forward several plans calling for 
Allied ownership of Ruhr coal mines and steel mills. (Dinan 1994, p. 21, Milward 1984, p. 492, and FRUS 
1948/11, CFM Files, Lot M-88, File-TRI Documents, ‘Paper agreed upon by the London Conference on 
Germany” 27 May 1948). However, plans of this sort were unacceptable to the US and to Britain in whose 
zones of occupation the Ruhr lay. (See e.g. Secretary of state, Byrnes speech at Stuttgart. US Dept of State 
Bulletin, September 15,1946, p. 501; and Secretary of State, Marshall’s speech at Moscow. US Department 
o f State Bulletin, April 20.1947, p. 694/695).
405 AN. F60/918 and A N . F60/902 See also Lynch 1984, p. 236.
4°6 Lynch 1984, pp. 236-239. A.N. F60/902. Note from Ministry of Finance, 10 March 1946.
407 Initially it was envisaged that the end of allied occupation would be predicated on merging the Ruhr’s 
industry into Europe and placing it under supervision of a single international authority. However, a major 
turning point came in May 1947 when Acheson called for a self-sustaining German economy at the earliest 
practicable date. The US now challenged France to consider ‘what contribution we can make to the develop­
ment of a Western European community in which the Germans can assume an appropriate position as a 
reasonable democracy and peaceful nation’ See Acheson to Schuman 30-10.1949 private collection quoted 
in Mowat 1973. See also Hoffmann 1995, p. 139, and Gillingham 1991, p. 149.
408 See Archer 1990,54, Gillingham 1991, p. 162.
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defense of Europe, the Americans argued.4 0 9  Furthermore, the United States did not want 
the economic deadweight of a weakened Germany on their hands.4 1 0  It was clear to France 
and its allies that precautionary action aimed at crippling German power potential was no 
more realistic in 1947 than it had been in the wake of World War I. As Foreign Minister, 
Robert Schuman observed
in 1945 there was still a strong effort to stick to the former policy o f force: Germany was without a 
government due to the total collapse of its cadres and institutions and therefore powedess. Should 
one, must one not under such circumstances seize the opportunity to create a new Germany, to give 
it a structure that would afford protection against the re-emergence o f such a big and dangerous 
power? Let us not forget that the imposed constitution and institutions which were introduced in 
hostile ammunition wagons have no prospects of las ting... I have already referred to the failure the 
laws of 1871 and 1919. A policy imposed by the victor can only create fragile and deceptive 
solutions; it is a source for new conflicts. A. peace whose single basis is mutual concessions cannot fo r  long 
withstand a new shift o f power between the opponents. Only a solution devised in cooperation between victor 
and vanquished can prevent a future territorial demand...Yet alone, it can never be enough to obtain
a lasting peace 411
Schuman distrusted the logic of power balancing. If two victorious wars against 
Germany could not be used to prevent it from threatening its neighbors again, no war in the 
future would. War today was no prevention against war tomorrow, nor was punitive peace 
clauses a means for averting future threat as was clearly shown by the failure of Versailles. He 
reported that by 1948, many French people believed that “without federal Europe no amount 
of guarantees as regards Germany will prove sufficient for keeping the peace” . 4 1 2  French 
foreign policy officials now began to work on drafting a plan for binding German power 
through cooperation rather than coercion. Their efforts focused above all on cooperation in 
the field of heavy industry. Between March 1948 and May 1950, the French press mentioned 
a dozen or so plans for cooperation in the field o f coal and steel.4 1 3  This resulted finally in
409 Thg prench desire to permanently fix Germany’s productive capacity was described in the US as 
‘suffering from a time lag’. See Statement of Douglas, May, 1918. FRUS 1948/11:155; FRUS 1948/11: 230- 
1, and statement of military Governor for Germany, General Qay. FRUS 1948/11:110.
410 General Clay wrote to the Department of the Army on 22 Nov. 1948: “If we accept the French view, to 
considerable degree we are increasing our own financial liability in Germany.” (See FRUS/1948/II: 525; 
FRUS 1948/11, CFM Files, Lot M-88, File-TRI Documents, 27 May 1948; FRUS/1948/11:135-8,291). See 
also Poidevin 1991, pp. 333-334, Gillingham 1991, p. 162, and Archer 1990, p. 20.
411 Schuman 1964, pp. 124-25 (my emphasis and translation).
412 Schuman 1964, pp. 93-94.
413 Whereas Schuman’s proposal o f 9 May 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ has 
become famous, many scholars agree that the ‘true’ origins of the coal and steel pool are to be found in
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the Schuman Plan, which brought about the diplomatic breakthrough on which subsequent 
progress towards integration has rested. This plan was followed by a series of French 
initiatives for economic and monetary integration as well as cooperation on militar)7 defense 
and foreign policy.
British Preferences
For Britain as for France, the danger of a re-emergence o f German militarism has 
been a main concern in the postwar period. According to Alan Milward, judging from the 
volume of documentation in the British Foreign Office’s archives, no question was 
considered more important to Britain’s future than that of Germany’s future.* 414 Yet, Britain 
has taken a very different approach to the German question than France—one based more 
on balancing German power through traditional diplomatic means than on binding it 
through integration .415 Consistent with jh is  preference, Britain in the early postwar years 
promoted the creation of a system of traditional alliances aimed to suppress German 
power. The first official testament to British anxiety over the prospect o f a resurgent 
Germany came in March 1947 when Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk 
which committed the two countries to ‘assist one another in the event of any renew’al o f
French diplomacy immediately following the London Conference on Germany in 1948. Shortly after the 
London accords, a number of proposals emerged for economic integration among Germany and France, and 
by 1950 numerous plans for a Franco-German heavy industry pool were in circulation, among them a 
background paper from the Quay d’Orsay’s Directorate for European Affairs referred to the possibility of 
creating a “pool’ for European steel in which France and Germany would act on equal terms and exercise 
joint control over the production o f steel in Europe. See MAE Z 1944-1949 "Direction d-Europe: 
Perspectives dune politique française a l ’egard de l’alliance”, 30 November 1949, and Monnet 1978,p. 300. 
See also Spierenbuig & Poidevin 1984, pp. 3 .15 , Poidevin 1991, pp. 252-53, Gillingham 1991, pp. 149,169. 
Upon the announcement on 9 May, a high ranking member o f the German Ministry for the Marshall Plan, 
Karl Albrecht, sent out a circular which noted that the proposition of the French Foreign Minister was 
‘anything but spontaneous and certainly the product of long-term planning’ and that Schuman had expressed 
similar ideas at their earlier meeting. See Milward 1992, p. 325, and 1984, pp. 158-159,164-165.
414 MJward 1992, p. 346, and Gillingham 1991, pp. 207-208. This finding is contested by Andrew 
Moravcsik who argues that concerns about Germany were not prominent in British documents. Moravcsik 
1998, p. 172.
41^ Consistent with a policy of balancing Britain advocated forced demilitarization and industrial 
dismantlement in Germany following the war. See Ministerial statement o f 28 March 1950, Hansard (House 
of Commons), 5th series, vol. 473, p. 324. See also Fursdon 1980, p. 70, and Gillingham 1991, pp. 207-820.
German aggression .4 1 6  Concerns over a renewed German threat were also central to the 
Brussels Treaty which was signed in March the following year between Britain, France and 
the Benelux .4 1 7  418*
Britain’s mistrust o f binding led it initially to stand aloof from European integration 
and although Britain reluctantly joined the Community in 1972 it has continued to remain on 
the side-lines o f the European project, often seeking to slow down or limit the extent of 
integration. As recently as 1990, in reaction to German reunification, British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher called for a return to a European balance o f power system in lieu of a 
move to a European union41® What explains this British skepticism toward the idea o f a 
united Europe? Many scholars have explained Britain’s initial aloofness from European 
integration by reference to its economic interests within the Commonwealth. When looking 
closer at the timing of changes in British strategy towards Europe, however, we realize that a 
full explanation o f the British stance cannot be given without attention to geo-political 
concerns. Britain’s initial reluctance to embrace European integration is tied to its war-time 
experience and geographic position. Britain never suffered the same devastation or the 
humiliation of defeat as its continental allies. During the war, Britain’s hopes were centered 
on its great allies, the United States and Russia, and away from the chaos of Europe. This 
caused British opinion to refuse to throw its lot in with an essentially unstable Europe.41^
Britain also feared that cooperation with Europe would weaken its relationship with 
the United States. According to the British official, Anthony Nutting, there existed among the 
top echelons of the British government ‘an obsessive determination to preserve the Anglo- 
American Alliance as something exclusive. This school o f thought feared that the closer we
416 Fursdon 1980, p. 30.
417 The members o f the Treaty pledged to 'take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a 
renewal by Germany o f a policy of aggression*. See Preamble of the Treaty o f Brussels.
418 Thatcher 1993, p. 21.
41 ^  Kolodziej 1974, p. 278. See also Lippgens & Loth 1985, pp. 25-27; Lipgens 1982, pp. 160, Bullen 1989, 
p. 201; and Fursdon 1980, p. 61.
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got to Europe, the more we should have to share America with Europe’ .4 2 0  Worse than 
‘sharing’ American attention was the possibility that the United States might withdraw from 
Europe altogether, leaving Britain and France to balance the Soviets and contain a potentially 
resurgent Germany. In the early postwar years, no one prophesied with any confidence that 
there would be a single American soldier in Europe within five to ten years. Both Labor and 
the Conservative party shared the view that without help from the United States it would be 
impossible to contain Germany and set Europe on its feet economically—given the poor 
state of the British economy. For this reason, Germany had to be integrated into the larger 
Atlantic Community. 4 2 1  Standing aside from exclusively European projects such as the EDC 
and EEC, it was believed, presented a way to strengthen American commitments in Europe 
whereas engaging in such projects might give Americans an excuse to disengage from 
Europe4 2 2  423
German Preferences
West Germany has been a strong supporter of European integration. While ideas 
for integration were present in Germany already during the war, West Germany got its first 
true champion o f European unity in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.42-* Keenly aware o f the
420 Charlton 1983, p. 162, Nutting 1966, p. 4.
421 See Bullen 1989, p. 203; and “Documents of British policy Overseas, Series II, vol. 1,1986. Prior to the 
1948 “International Conference on Germany' Britain tried to secure US support for a treaty directed against a 
future German threat On 22 January the British Foreign Secretary proposed that Britain and France should 
invite the Benelux countries to join them in a pact similar to the Treaty o f Dunkirk. In parallel, London 
made a secret approach to Washington suggesting that the two countries should issue a joint commitment to 
go to war with any European aggressor. (Telegram from the British Amb. in Washington, Inverchapel, to 
the US under-Secretary o f State, 27 Jan. FRUS/1948/III; and FRUS/1948/ 11:12,61).
422 See Trachtenberg 1999, p. 117. British policy-makers again and again stressed the need for an Amr. 
involvement "Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet without assurances of support", they argued. 
See "Inverchapel, to the US Under-Secretary o f State”, 27 Jan. 1948, FRUS/1948/11:12,61. See also 
Uppgens 8c Loth 1985, vol. I ll, p. 633,715; Bullen 1989, p. 201, and Fursdon 1980, p. 61.
423 Dunng the war, the ideas for European union which circulated in France and Italy were taken up by 
German resistance groups such as the Heidelberg Action Group, which listed international control over the 
Ruhr and of German war-potential as one of its main policy goals. The program of the Heidelberg group 
states that, “we realize that the fullest guarantee must be provided against the repetition of a German policy 
of aggress»on...In addition to disarmament there must, we believe, be a system o f inti, control over German 
war potential... But we would regard it as fatal economically and psychologically, if  such control were in any 
way to involve the isolation of the Ruhr district from Germany.’ They call instead for international control 
over the Ruhr. See Statement of the Heidelberg Action Group, October 1947 printed in Lipgens 8c Loth
depth of international fear and mistrust toward the new Federal Republic, Adenauer 
understood better than anyone that shared sovereignty pointed the only way to German’s 
international rehabilitation .4 2 4  His first gesture came in November 1949 when he 
suggested in an interview to the Baltimore Sun that France should be allowed to invest in 
German steel-production as a way to relieve French fears of German steel as a war-making 
potential.4 2 5  His next move, in March 1950, was a proposal to unite France, Germany and 
the Benelux states in a customs union similar to the German Zollverein. A union o f France 
and Germany, he said, \vould be the best way to end their rivalry ’ .4 2 6  Apart from these 
symbolic gestures intended to signal Germany’s willingness to reassure its neighbors, the 
European integration process has not been defined by German initiative. Germany has 
been a ‘taker* of national strategy, as it were, commonly responding to the initiatives of 
others. Arguably, the first act o f German leadership in the history of the EC was the 
launching o f the European Monetary System (EMS).
Apart from the goal of regaining political equality, West Germany’s preference for 
integration has also been defined by the need to obtain security its territory.4 2 7  West 
Germany was the Cold W ar frontier. Any Russian thrust would likely be on its territory. 
Without a defense force o f its own, Germany depended for its security either on a European 
defense or on permission from the Allies to raise its own troops. Only by giving credible 
assurances against future German aggression could Bonn build enough V ertrauenskapital to
1985, p. 498. After the war, these ideas soon found their way into political circles in the new FRG. Thus, the 
CSU Party Congress of 1946 adopted a 30-point political program which called for a supranational 
community o f European states and for economic union. CSU Party Congress, 14-15 December 1946. See 
Lipgens & Loth 1985, vol. 3., pp. 374,406-07,479^181.
424 Dinan 1994, p. 22.
42:5 “I am aware that France sees German steel production as a war-making potential”, Adenauer said. “My 
government is therefore prepared to allow French investments in Germany industry as high as 40%.” 
Schmidt 1997, p. 81; Adenauer 1965, pp. 254-260,311-312.
426 This proposal was communicated through the American journalist, Kingsburrv-Smith. See Adenauer 
1965, pp. 311-315.
427 Kocs 1995, p. 16.
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obtain French approval, first to rebuild the German defenses, and later to pursue détente with 
the Eastern bloc without inviting political retaliation from its West European neighbors.
Benelux Preferences
As in the case of France, an overriding concern among the Benelux countries in the 
postwar years has been fear of a resurgent Germany. After its liberation Holland, which was 
almost completely destroyed by the vrar, began immediately to search for an international 
guarantee against a future threat from Germany. Holland's situation was complicated by the 
fact that, more than any other country, it depended on trade to Germany. Many Dutch 
politicians therefore saw the solution in political and economic integration with Germany. 
Integration, they argued, would give Holland and other West European countries an 
opportunity to influence German economic policy over which they would otherwise have no 
say and would bind Germany permanently to the West, thereby preventing it from 
reemerging as a threat in the future.42**
These views were mirrored in Belgium and Luxembourg. Reports worked out 
between 1941 and 1944 by the Belgian government in-exile concluded that, rather than 
return to a policy of neutrality—a policy which had failed twice in the last twenty-five years—  
postwar Belgium should base its security on active participation in international organizations 
and regional unions.428 2 9  At the 1948 conference on ‘German Problems' held in London, the 
Benelux countries jointly stressed the need to prevent a future German threat while keeping 
the German economy strong. This, they argued, could best be secured through a
428 por a detailed account see Verheyen 1993, p. 65, Voorhoeve 19xx, p. 186, and Armin Heinen, 
“Netherlands Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on EU” in Lippgens & Loth 1985, vol. 
3, pp. 245-256- See also FRUS 1948/11:92; and FRUS 1948/11:24.
429 The London based "Commissions pour les Etudes d’après-Guerre” led by Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri 
Spaak was commissioned to study postwar problems. See Fitzmaurice 1993, p. 97, and Lipgens & Loth 1985, 
pp. 269,556.
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deconcentration of German economic and political power, and by its incorporation into a 
framework for European integration.4^
Throughout the postwar period, the Benelux states have been ardent supporters o f 
integration. Notwithstanding an initial reluctance to embrace the principle o f supra- 
nationality—a principle which they feared would diminish the influence of smaller states—  
the overall postwar record of the Benelux governments shows a common passion for 
strong supranational institutions which they have come over time to perceive as the 
protectors of small countries.430 3 1
Italian Preferences
The last o f the six ‘founding members’ o f the EC is Italy. Also in Italy the desire 
for European unity has been defined by a need to prevent a resurgent Germany. As in 
other countries this need found its expression already during the war. According to Altiero 
Spinelli, “ the Italian anti-fascist resistance movement accepted that it would be preferable 
to give a federal structure to Europe since this would solve the problem of co-existence in 
peace and freedom with Germany” .4 3 2  But unlike France and the Benelux countries, Italy’s 
preference for integration, like that of Germany, has been determined also by a general 
desire to regain international prestige and influence—a result o f Italy’s far-reaching loss of 
sovereignty during the war.4 3 3  Finally, European integration has presented a remedy for the
430 FRUS 1948/11,26 Feb:155; and FRUS 1948/11,29. Feb.
431 Soetendorp 1999, p. 35.
432 Spinelli, ‘European Union in the Resistance’ Government and Opposition, vol. II, (1966-7) quoted in Burges, 
1989,29. In his speech to the 3*1 National Congress o f the Movimento Federal:sta Europea, 23 April, 1950, 
Spinelli talked about the German question ‘the most crucial of all European problems’. He warned that 
intergovernmental solutions would not suffice to constrain Germany or to prevent future conflicts over the 
resources o f the Ruhr. Instead, federalist solutions were called for. Another prominent Italian federalist,
Ugo Mondolfo, also pointed to federation as a way to solve the German problem: ‘If Germany becomes part 
of a federal organization and thus gives up her sovereignty, especially in military matters, she can again 
become a major factor in the economic prosperity o f Europe without endangering its security, he argued.
See Lipgens, vol. I ll, pp. 235-239
433 Lippgens & Loth 1985, p. 457. According to Lipgens, due to the far-reaching loss of sovereignty, many 
Italians thought that the recovery of full sovereignty was less important than the raising of Italy’s status that 
would follow on her membership of supranational organizations or a European federation.
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enormous burden o f underdevelopment in the central and southern parts of Italy. Looking 
beyond the Marshall help, integration offered Italy the means of economic development, an 
outlet for its population surplus and solidarity with economically and militarily stronger 
countries. Successive Italian governments have therefore been consistently and strongly 
pro-European.
This brief overview has meant to give a sense of how security against a potentially 
resurgent Germany—not just against the Soviet Union— continued to be a pressing 
concern for European policy-makers throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. The rhetoric of 
postwar European leaders strongly suggests that they continued to view the ‘German 
problem* as real. But to what extent were ideas bout European unity as a means to peace 
just rhetoric that got washed out in the general rush to secure commercial advantage? In the 
remainder of this chapter I examine to what degree actual policies with respect to European 
integration have matched the professed intentions of postwar leaders.
I l l  The European Coal and Steel Community - 1952.
Bv 1949 it stood clear that the French desire for ‘organic control’ o f the Ruhr was 
inconsistent with American conceptions o f West Germany’s role in an allied defense. 
Thanks to a lifting o f restrictions in the American and Britain occupation zones, German 
industrial production, which had been at 37% of the pre-war level in 1947, had risen to 80% 
o f that level by 1949 and was increasing by 15% per year as opposed to 9.2% for the 
Community as a whole .4 3 4  Alarmed at this development, French government official, Jean
Monnet, wrote in a memorandum to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in May 1950:
the continuation of France’s recovery will be halted if the question of German industrial production 
and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved... Already Germany is asking to increase her 
production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall refuse, but the Americans will insist Finally, we shall 
state our reservations but we shall give in. At the same time, French production is leveling off or even 
falling...If France does not speak and act now, what will happen? A group will form around the United 
States, but in order to wage the Cold War with greater force. The obvious reason is that the countries






of Europe ate afraid and are seeking help. Britain will draw closer and closer to the United States; 
Germany will develop rapidly, and we shall not be able to prevent her being rearmed.
A few days later, on 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman announced the French government’s plan 
for merging French and German coal and steel production under a common institution 
which would be open to the participation of other European countries. The explicitly stated 
goal was to “prevent Germany from once again using the Ruhr district’s industrial strength to 
support aggression” but “to employ the areas resources for the benefit of Europe as a 
whole” .4 3 5  To this end, Schuman suggested to create a common higher authority’ in which 
West European states would together decide the allocation o f industrial resources. The 
pooling o f coal and steel production, he argued, “will be the first step in the federation of 
Europe, and will change the destinies o f those regions which have long been devoted to the 
manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims”.43  ^
Schuman’s proposal was neither novel nor unique, but it was presented with unique 
skill. In the words of John Gillingham, the 9 May message was “couched in language that 
barred easy exit from the negotiations and established a framework for them” .4 3 7  The 
participating governments were asked to agree in principle to surrender sovereignty as a 
condition for entering the negotiations. The fact that the plan was confined to coal and steel 
coincided in part with a ‘functional’ line o f reasoning. Both Monnet and Schuman believed 
that greater progress could be made with respect to integration if  cooperation was confined 
to a single sphere .4 3 8  However, the choice of coal and steel did not express a mere 
functionalist logic. Coal and steel were the very basis of the West European industrial
435 Declaration of Mr. Robert Schuman o f 9 May 1950. For the fidi text see Hill 2000.
436 Opcit.
437 Gllingham 1991, p. 231, and Mason 1955, p. 9.
438 The approach of Schuman and Monnet is often described as ‘functionalist* or ‘incremental federalist*. 
Both men understood that only a gradual approach to the pooling of sovereignty would have a chance of 
surviving. Yet, both men advocated integration not only in areas that were believed to foster spill-over 
effects but in areas that were central to national security. However, neither f  the men were willing to rely 
solely on the forces o f functional necessity to move the process along. Instead pushed for political 
agreement transfers of sovereignty. See Diebold 1959, p. 15, Burgps 1989,pp. 44-46, Monnet 1978, pp. 384- 
85, Mowat 1973, p. 87.
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economies, and it was widely believed that no country could wage war without an 
independent coal and steel industry.4 3 9  A  heavy industry pool would also provide other 
states a share in German industrial potential, thus serving the double objective o f enhancing 
security and facilitating the recovery of their economies.4 4 0  Among members of the French 
Parliament, Schuman’s plan was therefore seen not simply as a question of transferring a 
functional problem to the supranational level but as a question o f national security.4 4 1  * The
majority in the Parliament readily accepted the view of Alfred Coste-Fleuret,
Germany is in full growth, but this is a growth which has never stopped. It is precisely at the 
moment when we could conceive some fears about this development, that the Schuman Plan 
intervenes opportunely to stabilize die situation and to take from the German state, as it does from
the French, the disposition over their heavy industry for war-purposes.
Security concerns were at the heart o f the European debate over ECSC. On the same 
day as he announced the coal and steel plan to the French Assembly Schuman appealed 
directly to Adenauer in a personal letter to show sympathy for the dilemma of French 
security. In France, he explained, there was still fear that Germany when it recovered would 
attack France. ‘Any form o f (re)armament would show itself first in an increased 
production of coal, iron and steel’. I f  one made an arrangement like Schuman had 
proposed, that would enable both countries to notice the very first signs of armament, ‘then 
this would have a very calming effect in France’ .4 4 3  The German response to this line of 
argument was positive. While it may seem that trading the autonomy of the large West 
German steel industries for the autonomy of the much smaller French industries by 
subjecting both to a common higher authority would be inimical to Germany, it should be 
remembered that West Germany did not posses actual autonomy over its industries but only
439 Archer 1990, p. 54, Dell 1995, p. 15, and Baun 1996, p. 12, Milward, 1984, pp. 392-195, and Gillingham 
1991, pp. 45-46.
440 Poidevin 1991, pp. 333-334.
441 See Milward 1984, p.14, and Schwabe 1988. See Schuman I9xx, p.178; Adenauer 1965, pp. 327-328-
44^ Grosser 1957, p. 65.
443 Adenauer 1965, pp. 326-328.
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poten tia l autonomy.4 4 4  The Schuman plan promised to end allied restrictions on coal and steel 
for industrial use .4 4 5  Still, Bonn praised the plan for its political rather than economic value. 
To Adenauer,
there existed no better opportunity for removing the French doubts about the peace-lovingness of 
the German people, than to merge production of coal, iron and steel, the basis for rearmament.44^
He told the German Bundestag that “the political meaning of the ECSC was infinitely larger 
than its economic purpose” .4 4 7  These arguments were echoed in the Benelux countries, 
where the Schuman Plan was greeted as “a breakthrough in French policies towards
Germany” . 4 4 8  A Dutch Foreign Ministry memorandum stated that
from the political point of view, [the Schuman Plan] must be acclaimed very vociferously, because it 
creates the capability for Europe to profit by Germany’s strength without being threatened by i t 44^
The Americans were equally impressed. In the view of the Department of State;
There appears in the Schuman Plan the far-seeing statesmanship which, to build a framework for 
enduring peace, would sacrifice elements o f national sovereignty over people and industries 4-^
Only Britain remained skeptical. On 13 June, Prime Minister Ernst Bevin declared 
that Britain would not join in the negotiations of a coal and steel pool. It is “neither 
possible nor desirable under existing circumstances to form a complete union, political or 
economic”, he argued. “The European peoples do not want a supranational authority to 
impose agreements” .4 ^ 1 What explains this British skepticism? First, while French leaders 
had come to mistrust balancing of power, Britain was suspicious o f a strategy of binding. 
Britain was strongly opposed to surrender control over a vital resource like coal and steel
444 Forland 1997, p. 246.
443 'phe Bundesrat’s approval of the ECSC was made conditional on assurances from the occupying powers 
that when the ECSC became operative, the Ruhr Authority would be eliminated and the restrictions on steel 
production lifted. See Weigall & Srirk 1992.
446 Adenauer 1965, pp. 328,338.
447 Speech by Adenauer to the Bundestag 12 July 1952. See also Weigall and Stirk 19xx.
448 Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker quoted in Kersten 19xx, pp. 286.
Kersten 19xx, pp. 286-287. Milward 1992, p. 83 argues that Belgium’s strongest reason for accession to 
the treaty was the desire to secure peace between France and Germany.
450 US Dept, of State, July 1951. See also Acheson 1965 p. 383.
4^1 See "European Unity. A Statement by the national Executive Committee of the British Labour Party”, 
24, May-12 June 1950; and Nutting 1966, p. 29.
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which Prime Minister Ernst Bevin insisted was of crucial importance for national defense. 
In the event o f war with the Soviet Union, London assumed that Western Europe would be 
quickly overrun and that Britain, alone of the European states, would be fighting alongside 
the United States. No arrangement could be made with other European states which could 
undermine an independent British defense effort* 4 ^ 2  The British also saw the proposed 
ESCE as a threat to the Atlantic alliance. Only cooperation with the United States could 
stabilize Europe, they felt. Certainly it seemed implausible that France, Italy and the Benelux 
countries alone could succeed in binding German war-potential simply through cooperation. 
“I cannot help feeling”, said Macmillan, “that there is a great possibility that when the French 
Parliament and people realize that it means going in without Britain, they may shrink from 
handing over their rather weak and largely obsolescent industry to German control. For, in a 
few years, that is what it will mean”.4^
To what extent can Britain’s rejection o f the coal and steel pool on grounds of 
‘national sovereignty’ be seen merely as a cover for a deeper concern with giving 
preferentiality to Commonwealth trade? 4 ^ 4  British trade with the Commonwealth in 1950 
was far greater than its trade with the Continent Yet, neither coal nor steel figured among 
the principal exports o f the Commonwealth.4^  Moreover, British coal and steel production 
was highly efficient compared to production on the Continent. Thus British industry— as 
opposed to industrial groups on the Continent—perceived a great advantage in a single 
market for coal and steel. What Britain opposed was the establishing of a supranational 
authority with powers to decide on the allocation of industrial resources and with a clear
452 Bullen 1989, p. 202.
4^3 Macmillan 1969, p. 204.
4^4 According to Desmond Dinan (1994, p. 25), British officials thought that too dose an involvement in 
the process o f European integration would jeopardize London’s strong political and economic orientation 
towards the declining empire and the emerging commonwealth and would threaten the ‘spedal relationship’ 
to the US. Similar views are expressed by Griffith & Ward 1955, p. 10.
•455 Nutting 1966, p. 105.
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agenda of furthering political integration. It is unlikely that the British government would 
have opposed the ECSC had it merely been designed to liberalize trade in coal and steel. 
Indeed, on 8  August 1950, British Conservatives put forward a counter-proposal to the 
ECSC, involving a loose association of coal and steel producers headed by a body 
representing the various production sections; a kind of pool, in fact, under the control of 
the Committee of Ministers o f the Council of Europe.4 5 6  However, the Bntish counter­
offensive was brought to a quick halt as the Council of Europe adopted a resolution in 
favor o f the Schuman plan. Political concerns, it seems, were set to triumph over economic 
ones.
The N egotiations o f  the Schuman Plan
The public (and private) rhetoric of European statesmen suggests that they saw 
ECSC as a political project designed to bring peace to the Continent. But what were their 
real motivations? We can get a good sense o f such motivations by looking at the different 
stands taken during the negotiations of ECSC. In France, the preparation of the Schuman 
Plan was treated as a matter o f 'national security’. Only a small handful o f officials knew 
about the existence of the plan before it was made public on May 9. These officials were all 
from the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs rather than the Ministry of National Economy. In 
drafting the plan, Schuman also acted with great discretion to sidestep possible objections 
from French industry which might have led to a weakening o f the proposal.4 5 7  While 
organized industry7 groups were normally consulted about a proposal of this nature, in this 
case they were not even notified o f its existence 4 5 8  This is not surprising, because once the
456 See Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994, pp. 18-19. The British countered the Schuman Plan with the so- 
called ‘Macmillan-Edes Plan’— a proposal for a looser, intergovernmental framework for coordination of 
coal and steel production. France naturally disliked the plan. Schuman wrote to Macmillan on 8 August, 
that “ Cooperation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought 
is a fusion of the interests of the European peoples and not merely another effort to maintain an equilibrium 
of those interests through additional machinery for negotiation”. Macmillan 1969, p. 204.
457 Spierenburg & Poidevin 1994, p. 5.
458 JM MAG 18/4/2, Aubrun to Monnet, 5 August 1950.
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plan was made public, they overwhelmingly opposed it. French industrialists claimed that 
despite a low ceiling on German production, the competitive disadvantage of French steel 
would mean that the bulk of investment would flow to the Ruhr. The main driving force in 
the anti-ECSC campaign was the National Associations of Steel Industries.4 5 9  *461 Beginning in 
July 1950, the Steel syndicate and the steel industry’s employer organization, the C onseil 
N ational du Patronat Francois (CNPF), whipped up opposition to the Schuman Plan and “by 
the end of the year, protests o f the ECSC negotiations were registered by nearly every 
chamber of commerce in France” .4619 The chief demands the industrial associates was to be 
represented at the conference proceedings— a demand which was firmly rejected by the 
French government.46*
French negotiation tactics also suggest that the ECSC was perceived as a matter o f 
great political urgency. Schuman did not want bargaining to be bogged down by technical 
detail. French aims centered first on reaching agreement on a strong supranational High 
Authority (HA)— all other issues could be worked out later.4 6 2  This strategy, however, ran 
into opposition from the Benelux countries who objected to giving excessive powers to a 
supranational body in which they would not be equally represented. Belgium’s negotiator, 
Suetens, made it clear that while Belgium was not against surrendering some sovereignty it 
had “no intention of signing a blank cheque for an unlimited period of time” and Holland’s 
Spierenburg insisted that his country would accept a supranational body only if  checked by 
a Council of Ministers in which each country had an equal representation .4 6 3  The Benelux
459 JM MAG 18/4/2, Auburn to Monnet, 5 August, 1950. Opposition was led by the steel industry’s trade 
association, the Chambre Syndicale de la Sidéruge Française and the U mon des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières— 
both industries owned by steel interests—and by the Fédération des Industries Mécaniques et Transformatrices des 
Métaux, which represented the major steel users. See Willis 1968, p. 94.
46(9 Mason 1955, p. 3, Gillingham 1991, p. 237.
461 Several demands were made for letting the industrial associates be represented at the conference on 
ECSC See JM MAG 18/4/2, Auburn to Monnet, 5 August 1950.
462 Monnet 1978, p. 379 and Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994, p. 14.
463 Spiereburg & Poidevin 1994, pp. 13,16.
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countries also had reservations about the economic implications of* the plan.46“* Belgian coal 
was the lowest in productivity and highest in costs o f all of Europe. It was estimated that 
participation in a coal and steel pool would lead to the closing o f a least 30% of Belgians 
mines. Hence, coal mining interests, mine owners, and some labor groups in Belgium were 
strongly opposed to the plan .46 6 5  The Belgian government indicated its readiness to sidestep 
these objections but demanded to know what compensation it would be given by its 
negotiation partners.
Not surprisingly, Benelux misgivings about the excessive powers of the proposed 
High Authority resounded in Germany. Critics stated that by acceding to the ECSC 
Germany would give up control of its economy and that when it finally did regain its 
sovereignty it would be significantly impaired by the treaty.4 6 6  This led one observer to 
comment, “We are strongly pressed to sign something that others are convinced we would 
never sign without force. And we are pressed to give up things that no responsible German 
politician can give up without very strong and very pressing reasons” .4 6 7  *At the outset, the 
German negotiators therefore stated a preference for a weak High Authority that would not 
significantly interfere with the restoration o f the Ruhr or its traditional methods of 
operation.46** Over the course of the negotiations, however, the Ruhr’s role as the epicenter 
of West European heavy industry was traded in for restored German political autonomy. 
This took place specifically through the linking of Bonn’s approval of ECSC to the
464 All involved governments stressed that they saw the Schuman Plan as being of political not industrial 
value. Macmillan 1969, p. 192; Schuman 19xx, p. 178, and Milward 1992, p. 74. That the Schuman Plan was 
seen to be o f political not industrial value is underlined by the fact that the governments conceded 'in 
principle’ to the scheme, including a surrender of sovereignty, before knowing its precise contents or how it 
would influence their commercial interests.
465 Mason 1955, p. 7. Holland's industrial groups were also ambivalent. See Milward 1992, p. 437, 
Gillingham 1991, p. 233, Diebold 1959, p. 96-7,106, Fursdon 1980, p. 65.
466 Diebold 1959,p.99.
467 Baade 1951, p. 22.
46** BA B146/263, “Grundsätzliches zum Schuman Plan”, August 1950, and “unterlagen zum Schuman 
plan”, 8 Aug. 1950. See Gillingham 1991, p. 241.
1 6 4
termination of the occupation statute and abolishment of the existing International Authority 
for the Ruhr. 4 6 9
The most important controversy arose in September 1950 when the United States, 
in reaction to the recent outbreak of the Korean war, proposed to let West Germany 
contribute ten armed divisions to a European defense force. From a French perspective 
this offer came at a highly inconvenient time. Monnet worried deeply about the effect o f 
the American proposal on the German bargaining position and overall commitment to 
ECSC. “He feared that the Germans would get what they hoped for from the Schuman 
Plan by another route, which might lead them to think o f the Plan itself as something from 
the past or as a purely technical matter”.4^  Indeed, several observers claim to have 
detected a hardening of the German stand after Acheson’s announcement in September. 
The Germans now began dragging their feet in the Paris negotiations and propounded two 
new demands: a lifting of the ceiling on German steel production; and a rescue o f the 
German selling cartel for the Ruhr.471 Monnet countered by declaring that French consent 
to any form of German rearmament would be conditional on German approval of the 
ECSC treaty. At the same time he announced a new French initiative— the establishment o f 
a European army—as a means of solving the problem of German rearmament while 
enabling the Schuman plan negotiations to reach a successful conclusion .4 7 2  This broke the
469 Spierenburg & Poidevin, p. 21. During the negotiations, the German delegation managed to move France 
from a promise to liquidate the IAR after ih t ECSC took effect to a promise of abolishing it as soon as the 
treaty was signed. This was a small concession for France, since in any case, Britain and die United States were 
prepared to sacrifice die IAR This way France got something in return.
470 After September 1950 Monnet claimed to detect a hardening o f attitude on die part of the German 
delegation which he attributed to claims in Washington that the security of the West depended on rearming 
Germans. Memo from Monnet to Schuman, draft of 9 Sept 1951, memo of 16 Sept, in Correspondence 1947-1953 
and Spierenburg & Poidevin 1994, p. 19. See also Schwabe 1988, p. 39, PRO, FO 321/15865 I. Kirkpatrick 
to FO 4.10.1950, and Macmillan 1969, p. 38.
47 * Acheson 1969, p. 389.
472 Telegram from Monnet to Schuman, 14 Sept. 1950, in Correspondence, FO. 56, Spierenburg & Poidevin 
1994, p. 19.
crisis. On 18 April 1951 the ECSC treaty was signed by the Foreign Ministers and on 1
January, 1952 the treaty went into force. The preamble read:
[Hie Six governments]. ..considering that world peace may be safeguarded only by creative efforts 
equal to the dangers which menace it, desirous of assisting through the expansion o f their basic 
production in raising the standard of living and in furthering the works of peace... resolved to 
substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an 
economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided 
by bloody conflicts.. .have decided to create the ECSC.
In stitu tiona l F orm
The Institutional Binding thesis leads us to believe that when states integrate in order 
to rule out future security conflict among themselves, they will move to institute a firm 
political balance o f power which is rendered binding through various exchanges designed to 
hold states to their formal commitments. The ECSC institutionalized three groups of 
powers— large (France, Germany, Italy), medium (Belgium, the Netherlands), and small 
(Luxembourg). The treaty established a principle of equal vote allocations for states within 
each group regardless of variations in actual, underlying power and made changes to this 
distribution of power subject to unanimous approval—a principle which has been a 
cornerstone o f European institutions ever since. In practice, the Community had a fourfold 
institutional structure. At the center was the HA, which acted as an executive force. The HA 
had nine members— eight were selected jointly by die member countries and the ninth was 
chosen by the other eight. These members would act ‘in complete independence...without 
instructions from any government’. (Art 9). Beside the HA was a Council o f Ministers, 
created to mediate between the HA and member governments. All states were equally 
represented in the Council. The third institutional pillar was an Assembly in which member 
states were proportionally represented. The large states (France, Germany, Italy) each had 18 
votes, Holland and Belgium had 10 votes each and Luxembourg had 4 votes. The treaty also 
founded a European Court with jurisdiction over matters covered by the Community.
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Judging from statements by the negotiators at Paris, the perceived inroads on 
national sovereignty were significant. The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs publicly 
described the ECSC as a ‘legal body o f pre-federal structure’, and Belgium’s Paul-Henri 
Spaak called it ‘an alternative to anarchy’ .4 7 3  When asked by the US Congress whether the 
ECSC was designed to secure free trade among European states, Monnet answered “more 
than that. You must think o f us in terms o f the beginning o f the United States o f 
Europe” .4 7 4  * But what were the real powers of the ECSC and to what extent were they 
binding? The main role of ECSC was to give non-German countries a say over the allocation 
of German coal and steel. The HA was also empowered to create a balance between German 
and non-German sectoral growth. By acceding to ECSC— so it was expected— West 
Germany would give up the fruits of its natural advantage in raw materials and abandon a 
form of industrial organization whose efficacy had been amply proven and which had given 
Germany a marked advantage over other countries.4 7 3  The HA moved to decartelize the 
Ruhr and abolish the Deutscher Kohlenverkauf, the single sales outlet for coal.47  ^The HA 
also designed transfer-mechanisms through which “efficient producers”—i.e. Germany—  
would compensate less efficient ones.4 7 7  These particularly benefited France, Italy, and 
Belgium, who were exempted from many restrictions imposed on Germany 4 7 8  *The so-called 
Hirsch-Vinck Plan, called upon West Germany to pay 3,000 million Belgian Francs over a 
five-year period in order to subsidize wages and new investments in Belgium, Italy secured
473 van den Brink, “Handelingen Tweede Kamer, October 31,1951, p. 203 quoted in Mason 1955, p. 13.
474 83d Congress. Foreign relations Committee, “Hearing on the European Coal and steel Community, 
1953”. June 4-5,1953.
473 The London Economist, 10 March 1951; Hogan 1991, p. 169.
473 Diebold 1959, pp. 96-97 and 'Note”, p. 26, Gillingham 1991, pp. 424-425 and Acheson 1965, p. 389.
477 The agreement on ECSC of 14 March 1951 called upon the FRG to divide its steel industry into 24
producing companies; to limit each of them to the control of no more than 75 % of its total coal
consumption requirements and to eliminate the Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf, Subsidies in the form of fixed
transport rates for German steel products which were shipped to German steel consumers outside of a 200 
km zone from the Ruhr production center were forbidden as were special prices granted to German
shipping, railroad, electric power and gas companies. See Blondeel 1953, pp. 10-11.
47® See Bonded 1952, p. 70,1953, p. 10, Gillingham 1991, pp. 248,400-401.
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expensive German subsidies for its highly capitalized new steel mills and France was allowed 
to reduce its output at a slower rate than Germany.4 7 9
In addition to transfer mechanisms, the ECSC was empowered to prevent future 
concentrations o f industrial power in the Ruhr. The treaty gave the HA a veto (by simply 
majority) over all industrial mergers (Section 6 6 ) as well as over new investment programs 
in coal and steel. The HA also held powers over the financing of the steel industry .4 8 0  
From its own funds, which it obtained by direct taxation of member-states’ coal and steel 
industries, the HA could grant loans to both existing and new industries as it deemed 
justified to avoid or correct inequalities o f competition.481 This led one observer to 
comment: “The common market is a regulated market, not a se if  regulating one. 
Competition is not free but lo yal’.”48-  René Mayer, President o f the High Council, went 
even further in describing ECSC as a ‘balancer of economic conditions’. In a 1956 speech 
to the ECSC Assembly he said;
We can see how the Common Market tends to bring the benefits of the prevailing general prosperity to 
every country in the Community. If we compare the period 1953-55 with other industrial upswings, 
such as 1927-29,1935-37 and even 1950-52, we find that only in 1953-55 did steel production increase
in all the member countries at the same time.* 4888
In short, a mechanism had been created by which one could hope to equalize industrial 
potential across Europe and ensure that greater prosperity for all did not result in long-term 
disadvantages for some states.
4^9 Erected for prestige reasons by Mussolini and based on neither iron nor coal, it required substantial 
state protection. Consequently, Italian heavy industry presented a fairly united front against the treaty. Mason 
1955, pp. 5-6, Gillingham 1991, pp. 248,400-401, and Lutches 1951, p. 70.
480 The HA’s powers to veto financing gave it strong leverage over German industry since the largely 
demobilized German mines and mills required considerable outside investment w'hich was subject to 
approval by the HA. See Mason 1955, p. 56.
484 Section 66 of the treaty obligates the HA to take into account the size o f enterprises existing in the
community to the extent it deems justified to avoid or correct inequalities in the conditions of competition.
See Bondell 1953, p. 13.
48“ Mason 1955, p. 71.
488 Speech by Mayer, 8 May, 1956, p. 18.
Interpretation
The Schuman Plan aimed to solve a particular historical problem; to gain command 
of the resources of the Ruhr which had conveyed supremacy in Western Europe twice during 
the first half of the 20th century. By pooling their heavy industry the ‘Six’ sought in their own 
words to “substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests”. The ECSC was 
only one step towards this goal, but it was an important beginning. To Germany’s neighbors, 
the coal and steel pool offered a measure o f control over Germany’s vast industrial powers 
and secured that independent German rearmament would be impossible—or at least that 
other states would be able to detect the very first signs of such armament The reward to 
Germany for surrendering control was the recovery of control over the national industrial 
economy and improved relations with the Western Allies.
The ECSC served to bind power insofar as it froze the scales of political power 
among its members. This allowed them to decide on the allocation o f industrial resources in 
a way that equalized their heavy industry capacities. In addition to binding the industrial 
potential o f individual member states, the ECSC also tackled a pressing economic problem 
that confronted postwar Europe. Laboring to rebuild their war-tom economic, West 
European countries demanded a steady stream of inexpensive coal and steel.4 8 4  485 A large 
internal market for coal and steel would heighten competition and bring about a sought 
after rationalization o f production methods. Nonetheless, it is clear from the negotiations 
that a principal goal o f creating the ECSC was to make sure that a revival o f European 
industrial power would not allow Germany to pose a renewed threat to its neighbors.48  ^
The demands for a low ceiling on German production and the decartelization and 
dismantling of many industries in the Ruhr testifies to the fact that other countries were
484 Archer 1990, p. 54.
485 Willis 1968, p. 83.
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concerned with controlling the nature and magnitude o f German productive capacity rather 
than with increasing output per se .4 8 6
To what extent was the ECSC a successful first step towards neutralizing German 
power in Europe? Some have questioned the idea that ECSC reduced the possibility o f war 
in Europe by pointing out that, in 1952, changing technology had already begun to consign 
Franco-German heavy industry struggles to irrelevance in war. Yet, the reality is, as John 
Gillingham notes, “that there were too few atomic bombs after 1945 to have transformed 
the nature o f warfare overnight; military planning in both East and West assumed that the 
next war in Europe, though considerably more destructive than the last one, would be 
fought essentially like it, with ground forces as the decisive element of battle” .4 8 7  To the 
extent the ECSC was deficient to bind German power-potential, this was not because coal 
and steel was irrelevant to national security but rather because o f the dilution of the treaty 
which took place as a result of the disruption caused by the Korean War. Before the ECSC 
treaty took force, Washington and London had vastly lifted the ceiling on German steel 
production in their occupation zones. The HA also found it difficult in practice to prevent 
heavy industry concentrations in these zones. By the time the ECSC became operative in 
January 1952, German steel production had near tripled .4 8 8  Thus Derek Bok observed in
his assessment o f the first three years of the pool’s existence;
there is reason to believe that the consequences of the common market may prove to be quite different 
from those that were widely advertised at the Plan’s inception. To those who hoped for ‘'containment” 
of German steel, the rapid expansion, the mergers and concentrations, and the increasing levels of
investment cannot help but be disquieting.489
Monnef s grand plan looked like a failure. Yet, rather than abandon the policy of binding 
France moved quickly to propose integration in a new area, namely that o f European 
defense.
486 Gillingham 1991, p. 319.
487 Gillingham 1991, p. 360.
488 Diebold 1959, p. 96-7.
489 Bok 1995, p. 79.
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IV The E uropean  D efense Community .
The next proposal for closer integration came with the French Pleven Plan for a 
European Defense Community (EDQ. The concept was introduced in October 1950 and 
led to four years o f intense negotiations before it was definitively buried by the French 
National Assembly’s rejection of the treaty in August 1954. Given its failure, the EDC has 
often been ignored by students o f European integration, who see the faltered project mainly 
as a affirmation that security concerns have not played a major role in the integration process. 
But this position ignores the fact that intense negotiations over a common army went on for 
four years before the concept was abandoned, and that four countries—Holland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Germany—ratified the EDC while a fifth country, Italy, seemed bent on 
doing so as well. How do we explain the readiness of these countries to cede control over 
their national armies to a supranational institution? And why, in the end, did the project fail?
The concrete occasion for the EDC proposal was the American call in September 
1950 for letting West Germany contribute ten divisions to an integrated Allied defense within 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . 4 9 0  This proposal caused great anxiety in 
France where NATO—an essentially Voluntary’ organization in which national armies 
remained intact—was not seen to provide an adequate guarantee against a rearmed 
Germany.4 9 1  To forestall the reconstruction of an independent German army, French 
Premier René Pleven proposed the creation of a European Defense Community which 
would facilitate the “complete merger o f men and equipment under a single European 
political and military authority” .4 9 2  As proposed by France, EDC provided for a sweeping 
surrender o f military sovereignty to a supranational authority; German troops were to be
490 The proposal for German rearmament was put forward by Dean Acheson at a meeting of the NATO 
Council in New York, Sept 1950. France immediately warned the United States that by pushing the 
rearmament line it “might reveal serous disagreement among the allies.” Acheson 1969, pp. 439-40.
491 Zurcher 19xx, p. 83-
492 Pleven Plan for EDC, 24 October, 1950.
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recruited and armed not by the Bonn government but by a supranational European 
authority. They would be welded into a highly integrated European army that would take 
its place alongside regular NATO national armies under the direct control of a NATO 
commander. As the negotiations proceeded, however, British aloofness combined with 
German and American insistence on ‘contractual equality’ served to make the scheme useless 
as a tool for controlling German remilitarization. In the end, EDC failed, not because it 
entailed a too far-reaching surrender of sovereignty, but rather because it was not far- 
reaching enough.
The L aunching o f  th e P leven P lan
The conventional view o f the EDC project sees its initiation, development and 
eventual collapse as conditioned by events o f the Cold War. In this view, EDC is perceived 
as an attempt by West European countries to counterbalance the growing threat from the 
Soviet Union. I argue that this view is not accurate. As Macmillan argued, “it was apparent 
that this scheme [the EDC] was more calculated to alleviate the fear of the French than to 
strike terror into the Russians” .4 9 3  Of the main actors only the United States and Germany 
fixated on the threat from East, whereas France, Italy and the Benelux countries saw EDC 
mainly as a way to limit the harmful effects o f a growing discrepancy between American and 
European policy towards Germany—a discrepancy that increased markedly following the 
onset o f the Korean War.
The consensus among the allies until 1950 had been that restitution of German 
political and military sovereignty should happen gradually. No creation of an independent 
German military force would be allowed until after Germany had become an integrated part 
of a stable and secure Europe. The Korean War challenged this consensus, leading
493 Macmillan 1969, p. 220. This interpretation is seconded by Adenauer who embittered said that “the 
Western Allies, especially France, had to find an answer to the question of which was the greater danger, the 
threat from the Soviet Union or a German contribution to a EDC. Adenauer 1965, p. 345.
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Washington to call for immediate West German rearmament.4 9 4  495 Dean Acheson recalls in 
his memoirs
the idea that Germany’s place in the defense of Europe would be worked out by a process of evolution 
was outmoded. Korea had speeded up evolution.. .The real question was not whether Germany should 
be brought into a general European defense system but whether this could be done without disrupting 
everything else we were doing and giving Germany the key position in the balancing of power in
Europe 496
In September 1950, at the New York foreign minister’s conference, Acheson presented the 
Europeans with a package. If they would accept German rearmament along the lines worked 
out in Washington, the United States would pledge to increase its level of forces in Europe 
for the indefinite future .4 9 6  Impressed by the offer of enhanced American troop levels in 
Europe the British suppressed their misgivings and consented to Acheson’s proposal.49  ^ To 
France, however, the idea of accepting Germany directly into NATO was inadmissible.49  ^
Schuman pointed out that the existing NATO system based on national armies did not offer 
France adequate guarantees against a rearmed Germany."4 9 9  On 24 October, French Prime 
Minister, René Pleven, therefore announced an alternative plan for German remilitarization 
under the aegis of a European defense community which would facilitate the “complete
494 In April 1950 the US State Joint Chief of Staff officially pronounced in favor of German rearmament. 
See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings on 'Proposals to Amend the M utual 
Defense Assistance Act o f 1949, p. 22, and NSC 71/1 DNSC. Milward 1992, p. 372
495 Acheson 1969, p. 437.
496 geg Trachtenberg 1999, pp. 107-108, Fursdon 1980, p. 78, Acheson 1969, pp. 439-440. While London 
did not share the American enthusiasm for German rearmament it was feared that a rejection o f the proposal 
would lead the US to retract the offer o f increasing their troops in Europe. Britain thus restated its opinion 
that any move toward rearming Germany should be a gradual one and that priority should be given to the 
strengthening of other Western military forces, but agreed in to discuss the American proposal ‘in principle’. 
Afterwards, Bevin, wrote to Schuman; “It was with no enthusiasm that I accepted in New York the 
principle of German participation in the integrated force for the defense of Europe.. .We do not like the idea 
of German re-armament any more than the French do”. CAB 21/1897,9 October 1950; Dockrill, pp. 25, 
35-41. See also Bevin to Harvey, 9 October, 1950, DBPOII 3:141.
49^ Trachtenberg 1999, p. 108 and Bevin to Harvey, 9 October, 1950, DBPOII 3:141.
49® According to George Ball who was with Monnet on the day o f the North Korean invasion Monnet 
realized immediately that the US would now demand German participation in the defense of the W est 
Although he was initially reluctant to launch a new initiative that might compete with the Schuman Plan, 
Monnet therefore threw the machinery of the French planning commissariat into gear to devise a solution 
that would be acceptable to France. Ball 1982, p. 90-91. During the September NATO meeting, the Foreign 
Minister of Luxembourg, Joseph Bech, informed Acheson that Paris was working on a European military 
system based on the Schuman Plan. Acheson 1969 p. 444, Monnet 1978, p. 401.
499 Zurcher 19xx, p. 83.
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merger of men and equipment under a single European political and military authority” with 
a common defense budget5 ^ 0  The Community would be governed by a central political 
authority which would direct the common army as well as coordinate foreign, economic and 
monetary policy.5 *-51 German troops would serve in small contingents and be integrated (at 
the level of the smallest possible unit’ (a battalion). Coste-Fleuret in his appeal to the French 
Assembly to accept the treaty, argued
We know that the two sources of power of modem Germany in recent times are the Ruhr arsenal (to
neutralize it we have constructed the CECA) and the national Germany army, which we also w’ant to
neutralize by integrating German soldiers into the discipline of a supranational army 5®“
The Assembly endorsed the plan for a common army, but made its approval conditional on 
prior German ratification of the ECSC treaty'.
Germany was receptive to French proposals. Adenauer wasted no chance to assure 
the Allies that “the German people was willing to adopt voluntary self-constraints in order 
to accommodate the security needs o f its western neighbors” . 5 *-15 At the same time, he 
understood well that more than self-constraint was needed. The German leadership knew 
that the country’s recovery from the Nazi catastrophe depended on French goodwill. 
European integration was the price to pay to defuse French opposition to a revival o f 
German economic and militar)' power—a goal which had taken on increasing importance
with the Korean War. Adenauer welcomed the Pleven Plan by expressing his hope that
when a European army was created, French anxieties about a future war with Germany would be laid
to rest and France would consent to strengthening of the German defense.5*^ 1
Also Italy and the Benelux countries embraced EDC. De Gasperi addressed the 
Italian Chamber arguing that “the Common Army is the instrument by which peace may be 
secured between Germany and France.” “I know it is difficult”, he said, “but, turning back to
Pleven Plan for EDC, 1950.
5*^1 Fursdon 1980, p. 340-41, Dinan 1994, p. 28.
Grosser 1957, p. 66.
5*^5 Adenauer 1965, p. 260.
Adenauer 1965, p. 352.
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history, I find no other solution: history tells me that any other way tragedy repeats itself ’ . 5 0 5  
The reaction from Washington was predictably more tempered. On one hand, the Americans 
welcomed EDC as a way to gain German strength without creating a menace to other 
European states.5 0 6  On the other hand, die US State Department was concerned that the 
French plan would not allow Germany to make a sufficient defense contribution 5 0 7  508* The 
State Department therefore set up a committee under direction of Charles Spofford, 
Chairman o f  the North Atlantic Council Deputies, and charged it with working out a 
compromise between the American and French proposals. The Spofford committee’s 
recommendations were the basis for negotiations over German rearmament within NATO, 
which took place concurrently with the EDC negotiations.
Once again Britain was the odd man out. The decision had been taken in June not to 
participate in the ECSC negotiations because the request that the parties must bind 
themselves a  priori to agree on a cession of sovereignty was unacceptable to London, and 
because ECSC was seen as a threat to the Atlantic Alliance.50® To the British, the EDC 
proposal was yet another step in the wrong direction. “We cannot afford to allow the 
European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weaken instead of 
strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Adantic”, said Foreign 
Minister Ernst Bevin, “we must nip it in the bud”.50  ^ Macmillan went further calling EDC 
a ‘cancer in the Atlantic body’ which would dilute the role o f the United States for European 
security.5 1 0  Britain would not endorse the plan.
505 Fursdon 1980, p. 202.According to Fursdon a main reason why the Benelux countries favored EDC 
was that it was seen to provide added security against German aggression. (Fursdon 1980, pp. 340-341).
506 See e.g. General Eisenhower’s address to the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 26 Nov. 1951.
507 Acheson 1969, p. 459.
508 Dinan 1994, p. 25
5°9 Bevin memorandum, November 24,1950, DBPO II, 3:294 cited in Trachtenberg 1999, p. 117.
510 D0(50)100, PREM 8/1429; and speech to the House of Commons, 29 Nov. 1950. See also Dockrill 
1991, p. 49, Bullen 1989, p. 316.
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The N egotiations
Negotiations over EDC began in Paris on 15 February 1951.511 * In parallel, a 
conference was held in Petersberg (Bonn) on German rearmament within NATO. The 
‘NATO solution’—which was based on the Spofford proposal— differed from the French 
scheme in several ways. First, it divorced the issue o f a European army from ratification o f  
ECSC. Second, it broke with the French ideal of ‘complete fusion’, advocating that the unit 
for incorporation o f national troops into a unified command should be the regimental 
‘combat team’— a unit of approximately 6.000 men—rather titan the smaller French 
battalion?^- In this circumstance, it may seem strange that the French accepted to negotiate 
the Spofford proposal at all. A liable explanation is that France wanted to buy time in which 
to secure agreement on ECSC. Moreover, by dragging its feet in the Petersberg negotiations, 
France hoped to increase support for EDC. In the event, this strategy proved quite 
successful. In April 1951 the ECSC was ratified. In May it stood clear that the Petersberg 
Conference was failing due to Paris’ rejection of German demands for legal equality . 5 1 3  
Realizing that it would take years to get France to accept a NATO solution, if  indeed it would 
accept one at all, the United States therefore decided to endorse the EDC model.
Meanwhile, the negotiations in Paris proceeded with great difficulty. First, there was 
disagreement over the size of the German contribution. France insisted that the German 
military contribution should be limited to one-fifth o f the whole so it would not exceed that 
of France. Germany claimed that this was insufficient to defend Berlin .5 1 4  There was also 
conflict over the level at which the German contingents should be integrated. Germany
511 Participating were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Federal Republic. Holland initially 
chose observer status but later, in October 1951, changed their status to participants. The remaining NATO 
members sent observers. SeeFursdon 1980, p.110.
51^ The Pleven Plan proposed the 'battalion’ as the unit for integration while the original American 
proposal had called for 10 German ‘divisions’. ‘Combat teams* were equivalent roughly to one third of the 
size of a division and thus closer in spirit to the Pleven Plan.
513 FRUS 1950/III: 496-8; Adenauer, 1965, p. 371, Dockrill 1991, pp. 55,68-70, and Fursdon 1980, p. 114.
514 Acheson 1969, pp. 608-609.
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wanted national units, whereas France insisted on ‘complete fusion’ .5 1 5  A third difficulty was 
presented by the reluctance o f the Benelux countries to accept a strong supranational 
authority which would have full command over their military forces but in which they would 
not be represented on an equal footing.
The main problem, however, was the absence o f Britain. The British decision to 
stay aloof from EDC caused fear among France and its allies that a rearmed Germany 
would inevitably dominate the community.5 1 6  In Paris, this fear was magnified by the fact 
that the part of the French armies which were not stationed in Germany or devoted to the 
protection o f the French Colonial Empire were becoming more and more involved in the 
almost hopeless task of recovering and maintaining French control of Indo-China.5 1 7  In 
trying to maintain simultaneously a necessary parity with Germany in the EDC and a 
successful defense against the Viet-Minh in Indo-China it was feared that French resources 
would be stretched to the breaking point.51® During the negotiations France, Italy and the 
Benelux repeatedly pledged to Britain to associate itself with the defense community. 5 1 9  *
They also tried to obtain a guarantee from their Anglo-Saxon allies that they would 
intervene militarily if  Germany ever tried to pull out of EDC.5^  However, London 
answered each pledge by firmly refusing to merge British troops or equipment into the 
proposed European army. British officials made it clear that they saw the French plan for
515 Weigall & Stirk 1992.
516 Fursdon 1980, p. 261,Dockril 1991, p. 107.
517 Macmillan 1969, pp. 219-220.
518 Fursdon 1980, p. 208,261, DockriU, p. 154.
519 In December 1951 and again in February 1952 the French Assembly recommended that the 
government ask Britain and the United States to intervene in case of a breakdown or of a violation of die 
Treaty by a member nation. See Fursdon 1980, p.138. The British refused, but declared themselves willing 
to ‘establish the closest possible association with the EDC at all stages in its development. Acheson 1969, p. 
641, Dockrill 1991, p. 78.
5"^ Trachtenberg 1999, p. 118. See Schuman to Acheson, January 29,1952; Churchill-Ache son meeting, 
February 14,1952, Acheson to Truman, February 16 and May 26,1952, and Tripartite Declaration, May 27, 
1952; all in FRUS1952-1954,5:10,12-13,41-43,46-47,78-79,682,687. From a US perspective, the French 
demand for a guarantee against German secession was impossible. Acheson referred to Schuman’s concern 
with obtaining a guarantee as a ‘neurotic obsession*. “I could not ask Congress for any further extension o f 
the already great commitments we had undertaken to Europea pledge’*, he said. See Acheson 1969, p. 615.
177
letting national forces serve in integrated units as naive and dangerous. A song which
emerged at the British Control Commission in Bonn seems to grasp British attitude :3 2 1
Ju stin  case the Bundesmmsh
Should turn around and fig h t the French
We shall keep our units small,
So they w ill be no use a t all\
In the end, agreement on EDC was realized mostly through American pressure .521 2 2  *
In February 1952 Foster Dulles made it clear that unless there was immediate progress on 
EDC, Congress might well refuse to vote security appropriations for the ‘Six ’ . 5 2 5  France 
again appealed to London to associate existing British troops in Europe with the EDC but 
once again received a negative reply .5 2 4  Seeing no possibility for further delay, Paris decided 
to close the deal. When the EDC treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 there was little left in it 
to comfort France. Many conditions attached to the initial draft o f the treat}'' went unfulfilled, 
including the formation of a European political authority to direct the common army, and 
Britain’s participation as a counterweight to Germany 5 2 5  With regard to the composition o f 
the common army, the treaty stipulated that the basic operational unit was to be national 
divisions “made available to the Community by its Member States, with a view  to  their 
fusion” . 52 6 The nine member Commissariat would be responsible for recruiting and 
training solders, while the divisions, once trained, would be place under the command o f 
the Atlantic forces. Members were forbidden from recruiting or maintaining national
521 Charlton 1983, p. 163.
522 By 1952, France and the Benelux countries had become increasingly suspicious that an EDC which 
excluded Britain would not contain West Germany. See Willis 1968, p. 98. It is dear that the French Foreign 
Office interpreted French fears about German predominance in terms o f the imbalance of French military 
strength vis-à-vis the potential of West Germany. See Fursdon 1980, pp. 150-168.
525 ECSC members had received $7.1 billion of a total o f $13.4 billion in mutual security aid in the period from 
1948 to 1952. Faced with the American ultimatum, the French Government arranged a four day debate in the 
Assembly with a view to obtaining approval of the EDC treaty before the Lisbon meeting o f foreign 
ministers in Februarv 1952. The Assembly voted in favor of the draft EDC treaty, but once again stated as a 
condition that Britain and the United States would provide a guarantee against German secession. Fursdon 
1980, p.138-143, Acheson 1969, p. 610.
524 Acheson 1965, p. 641.
525 Kolodziej 1974, p. 259.
52  ^ Treaty on EDC, 27 May 1952
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armed forces other than for approved missions outside Europe.5 2 7  The treaty would be 
binding for fifty years.
French "Renegotiations and Rejection
In French eyes, the agreement reached at Paris in 1952 did not appear to solve the 
problem of West Germany rearmament.5 2 8  In the absence of that additional glue of 
reassurance that British participation would have provided, the EDC treaty’s safeguards 
against German remilitarization simply proved insufficient for French policy. 5 2 9  The Mayer 
Government which took office in January 1953 therefore attached several conditions to 
France’s ratification o f the treaty. First, it restated the demand for British association with 
EDC .530 Second, the Mayer government sought to ensure that the potential need to 
withdraw French forces from the common army for military service overseas would not 
interfere with die 'freezing’ of the scales o f political power within EDC by demanding that 
French voting power in the Council would be matched at all times with that o f Germany, 
regardless of what number of units France might contribute to EDC at any given time. 5 3 1
The French demand for freezing relative voting power was agreed to in the spring 
1953. During the same time, a draft treaty on a European political community was adopted 
in accordance with article 38 of the EDC treaty.5 3 2  British association, however, proved
527 See Articles 9-18 of the EDC Treaty. Fursdon 1980, p. 150-68.
528 Dockrill 1991, pp. 107,191.
529 Charlton 1983, p. 162. This interpretation is supported by British official Anthony Nutting who argues; 
“France could not at this stage put her whole trust in a Europe without Britain. She could build the case for 
the tiger, but, if  anything went wrong and the tiger broke loose, she would need the British to save her from 
being gobbled up’. Nutting 1966, p. 19, 637. See also Fursdon 1980, p. 257.
530 Furscjon 1980, p. 206, Nutting 1966, pp. 47-48.
531 The 1952 EDC treaty stipulated that the voting procedure in the Council was related to the strength o f 
EDC national contributions. However, the French wished to freeze the scale so to match their voting power 
at all times with that o f Germany. For a discussion o f the French ratification demands see Fursdon 1980, pp. 
206-208, Nutting 1966, p. 48,60, Dockril 1991, p. 115.
532 Artide 38 of die EDC treaty called for the establishment of a supranational political authority to direct 
the defense community. In September 1952, the foreign ministers drafted a statute for a European Political 
Community (EPC), and in March 1953 a draft treaty on Political Community was adopted which envisaged 
the creation o f a two-chamber European Parliament (one composed of directly elected deputies representing 
the ‘peoples united in the Community, and the other composed of senators representing the ‘people1 of each 
States), an Executive Council—the Council of National Ministers—  a Court o f Justice, and an Economic
more difficult to obtain .5 3 3  When Joseph Laniel succeeded Mayer as president in May he 
pledged not to seek ratification o f the EDC treaty un til and unless prior satisfactory 
assurances of British association had been obtained.5 3 4  Under pressure from the United 
States who wanted the EDC ratified so German rearmament could begin, Britain now 
offered to ‘consult with the EDC’ before reducing its forces and to send a British minister 
when ‘cooperation between the United Kingdom and the EDC was to be discussed*. The 
offer got a poor reception in Paris. As Major Fursdon observed, “the real issue which 
would determine ratification, was whether, in French eyes, the British [offer] marked any 
advance in political guarantees against German hegemony rather than military guarantees 
against Soviet aggression” .5 3 5  In the event, the British gesture fell far short of what France 
expected. On June 9, 1954, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the French 
National Assembly recommended the rejection of the EDC Treaty.
A last attempt was made to save EDC at die Brussels Foreign Minister Conference in 
August 1954. At the opening o f the conference, French Prime Minister Mendes-France 
informed his colleagues that the EDC in its current form stood no chance of being ratified in 
France. He proposed several amendments to the treaty. First, while national units could be 
accepted as a general rule, military forces should still be integrated in the forward zone— i.e. 
in Germany. Second, if  there were to be any change in the declared policy of the United 
States or Britain, or if  Germany were to be reunified, a new situation would be created in 
which each member state would be free to decide whether to stay in the EDC. These 
demands were unacceptable to the Germans. As Anthony Nutting remarked, in effect, 
France was asking for “a European Army for the Germans and a French Army for the
and Social Council. See Hill 2000, p. 35, and Dinan 1992, p. 28. This political structure would encompass 
both ECSC and EDC.
533 See Young 1988, p. 90 and CAB 128/26 CC (53) 14,15,23.
534 Fursdon 1980, p. 220.
535 Fursdon 1980, pp. 255-257. See also Nutting 1966, p. 637.
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F r e n c h . O n  22 August, the Brussels meeting broke up in disagreement and the following 
week the French Assembly rejected the treaty.
Some have speculated that the French demands at Brussels were purposefully made 
unacceptable so as to ‘court a rebuff and be able to reject the treaty without losing face.536 37 
This oversimplifies the dilemma in which the French found themselves. The truth is that 
France could not accept the EDC in its present form. In part, the French ‘take it or leave it 
attitude, at the Brussels Conference may be seen to reflect the fact that France was 
operating with a safety net. The French knew that if the EDC failed Britain would not 
allow unconstrained German rearmament During the talks in Brussels Mendes-France was 
aware that alternative plans were being prepared in London for incorporating Germany 
into NATO via an intermediary European framework.538 To some extent, therefore, 
France could afford to gamble to obtain an acceptable deal on the EDC without immediate 
security risk. The reality is, however, that France could not have settled for much less than 
what it asked at Brussels.
The final debate in the French Assembly on 29 August confirms the view that 
EDC was rejected because it was seen as insufficient to bind a rearmed Germany.539 It is 
instructive that both proponents and opponents of the treaty based their arguments on 
security against Germany. EDC partisans o f course stressed the dangers of independent 
German rearmament; “EDC or the Wehrmacht” was one of their slogans. However, the 
argument for containing Germany was easily turned back on itself by EDC opponents as
536 Nutting 1966, p. 67.
5 3 7  Ibid.
5 3 8  The British Foreign Office, at the beginning o f Dec. 1952 began to prepare an alternative to die EDC 
through the revision o f the existing NATO framework. Dockrill 1991,, p. 110. According to Edward 
Fursdon, three newspapers suggested that, since Mendes-France had visited Sir Winston Churchill at 
Chartwell the day after the Brussels Conference ended, he must have been aware that Britain had an 
alternative solution all prepared and Michael Chariton argues that ‘certainly within the Foreign Office there 
was an alternative plan. See Fursdon 1980, p. 292-293 and Chariton 1983, p. 163.
5 3 9  On the view that EDC was rejected by the French Assembly because of fear of German rearmament, 
see Willis 1998, p. 98. Willis argues that, by 1954, both France and the Benelux countries were increasingly 
doubtful about the ability of an EDC to adequately control West German military power.
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an argument against German rearmament under any form.540 The lack o f British 
participation was also held up as a major weakness which in the long run would undermine
the effort to contain Germany. Mr. Herriot argued before the Assembly,541
I $ay with my fullest conviction that no international negotiations aimed at secunng liberty and peace 
and be carried out without the mutual support of France and Britain..! have read the texts with 
anguish. There is nothing in them to show that Britain would be at our side to resist the strength and 
any eventual maneuvers of Germany. Britain must be at the side o f France in this matter to act with 
equal responsibility in the face of a new German threat, should it arise.
When the final vote was taken on 30 August 1954, the EDC treaty was defeated by 319 to 
264 votes.
The WEU Solution
By refusing to underwrite the EDC, France had placed the ball in Britain’s Court. 
The British opposed EDC, but they were equally reluctant to let Germany enter NATO 
without added constraints. Thus, planning for an alternative solution to EDC had been going 
on in the British Foreign Office at least since October 1951, when René Massigli, the French 
ambassador to London, had warned that France might not ratify the EDC.542 *In September 
1954, Eden announced a British ‘package* which proposed to let West Germany enter 
NATO by signing the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) o f 1948. The institutional 
structure of the BTO would be strengthened by adding a Permanent Council, a Parliament 
and an Arms control Agency, and the organization would be extended to include Germany
5 4 0  Aron & Lemer 1957, p. 13; Charlton 1983; Willis 1968, p. 98; and Fursdon 1980.
> 4 1 Edouard Herriot had earlier been chairman of the special ‘Five power Committee for the Study of 
European Union’ established at the Hague Congress in 1948 and was known to be pro-European. On the 
view that France rejected the EDC because of the failure to bring in the British, see Nutting 1966, and 
Chariton 1983, p. 162, and Dockrill 1991, p. 107.
5 4 2  On 31 O ct, Massigli told Macmillan that France probably would not ratify the EDC and Oliver Harvey,
British ambassador in Paris, agreed- Macmillan, had recorded his own doubts about this already at the end 
of May 1951. See Macmillan 1969, pp. 474-475. A  few days after returning to office in 1951 Eden told the 
journalist Iverach McDonald that if EDC failed, Britain would seek an alternative plan which brought 
Germany into a European grouping within NATO. Specifically, he mentioned the option o f ‘making mote of 
the Brussels Pact\ Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker had made a similar proposal in 1951. The idea of 
extending the Brussels Pact was also mentioned in the British Cabinet in August 1953 by Macmillan. The 
idea was not foreign to the French. In fact, Mendes-France says in Choisir that the idea of reviving the 
Brussels Treaty as a vehicle for German entry into NATO came from France, but that it seemed preferable 
to let it appear that it came from Britain, since it would then be easier for others to accept. See Young 1988, 
p. 96, Fursdon 1980, pp. 305,311-2; Macmillan 1969, pp. 480-482, and Nutting 1966, pp. 70-71.
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and Italy whose forces would thereby come under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR). The new scheme—called the Western European Union (WEU)—would not be 
the same as the EDC because there was nothing supranational about the Brussels Treaty, but 
it would have one decisive advantage for France; Britain would be in it on equal terms and 
with equal responsibilities.* 545 546
In September 1954, leaders of the Six, plus Britain, the United States and Canada 
met in London to discuss the British solution. Here Eden delivered the promise which 
Britain had withheld during the EDC negotiations, namely to ‘continue to maintain on the 
mainland o f Europe, including Germany, the effective strength o f the United Kingdom 
forces now assigned to SACEUR’ and ‘not to withdraw those forces against the wishes o f 
the majority of the BTO members’ (i.e. France and the Benelux).544 France tried, but 
failed, to also obtain agreement on an ‘armaments pool’ that would create a centralized 
European authority with exclusive responsibility for procuring and allocating military 
equipment within Europe.545 Nonetheless, the WEU instituted several safeguards against a 
rearmed Germany, including a cap on total German troops at twelve divisions which could 
not be exceeded without unanimous approval by the WEU Council (i.e. a French veto), 
and the creation of an Arms Control Agency to oversee troop and armaments levels.346 It 
was further agreed that allied forces would remain stationed in Germany not only as 
protection against the Soviet Union, but also as a reassurance against future German 
aggression. Thus, the Western powers retained the formal right to intervene in extreme 
cases if the democratic system in Germany was threatened or if  Germany was to seek to
3 4 5  Given the failure o f EDC, Mendes-France in a speech to the Council o f Europe stated that he had no 
objection to German entry into NATO via the Brussels Treaty subject to the condition that Britain would 
undertake to keep all existing British forces in Europe for the rest o f the century. See Din an 1994, p. 28, and 
Nutting 1966, p. 72.
3 4 4  Final Acts of the Nine-Power Conference held in London, Sept. 28-October 3,1954. See also Fursdon 
1980, p. 321.
5 4 5  Kocs 1995, p. 73.
5 4 6  Mortimer 1995, p. 55.
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achieve reunification or to alter her present boundaries by force.547 According to Marc 
Trachtenberg,
all this—the strengthened NATO structure, the western military presence on German soil, the 
reserved rights, the limits on German military power—added up to a system. Germany was to be 
tied to the West, and in important ways made part of the West, but her freedom of action was to be
curtailed and she was not to have the same sovereign rights as the other western powers”.54** 
France had finally obtained the long-coveted ‘guarantee’ against a resurgent Germany. As
previously, however, France remained uniquely dependent on its allies for this warrant. 
Much like in the 1920s, France got formal guarantees which remained conditional on political 
circumstances of the day. Germany still was not firmly bound.
Interpretation
The EDC was far-reaching in its ambition to ‘bind’ Germany’s potential for 
aggressive action. The proposed EDC would have permanently fused national military 
forces and would be headed by a European Defense Minister in charge of a common 
defense budget. German troops would serve in small contingents and be integrated at the 
“smallest possible unit” to secure that they would not be able to operate independently. 
This, in French eyes, was the major difference to NATO. Under the authority of NATO, 
national armies remained intact. As Robert Schuman pointed out, NATO relied essentially 
on voluntary cooperation among national military forces earmarked in peace for availability 
in war.549 This system did not offer France adequate guarantees against German 
aggression.550 The French ended up rejecting EDC because they could not get the 
Americans and the Germans to agree to their conditions. The alternative WEU and the 
promise to keep British troops in Europe provided added security for France, but did not 
represent a credible commitment to non-aggression. Nonetheless, the continued presence o f
5 4 7  Declarations by the FRG and the three western powers, 3 October 3,1954, FRUS 1952-1054,5:1352- 
1354. see Trachtenberg 1999, p. 125-127, Ruggie 1996, p. 60, and Osgood 19xx, p. 86-92. According to 
Trachtenberg, the main function of the WEU was to oversee controls on German military power.
54** Trachtenberg 1999, pp. 127-128.
5 4 0  Article 80 of the EDC treaty. See Fursdon 1980, p. 193-6.
550 gge lurcher I9xx, p. 83; Fursdon 1980, pp. 193-196.
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British and American troops in Europe and the great build-up in American power meant by 
1954 it was increasingly hard to think of West Germany as posing a short-term threat.551 
This gave ‘the six’ time to consolidate and strengthen their cooperation under the 
protective mantle of the American security umbrella*
V The T reaties of Rome
By 1955 it stood clear that military integration in Europe had failed. Yet, France and 
other European states did not perceive any immediate security threat from Germany, thanks 
mostly to NATO. NATO pacified Europe, thereby allowing European states to attempt to 
bind German power by means of increasing exit costs and efficiency gains. It would be false, 
however, to say that after the Paris agreement on WEU, security concerns ceased to be a part 
o f the momentum for European integration.552 The vision of European integration as an 
instrument to pacify Germany did not die with EDC but underpinned successive attempts at 
integration. As soon as Germany gained the right to develop nuclear energy for non­
military purposes in 1955, the French proposed the creation of an atomic energy pool.553 
The joint Benelux plan for a European economic community which was broached at the 
same time as the French proposal was also geared towards tying down German power as I 
will explain below.554 *
5 5 1  See Trachtenberg 1999, p. 123.
~>d2 Rod Piyce and Andrew Moravcsik, among others, have argued that after the Paris Agreement on WEU
took care of Europe an/ Atlantic security relationships, security concerns seized to be a substantial part of the 
momentum for European integration. Instead, economic concerns, in particular a desire to speed industrial 
development and expand trade, came to the fore. See Pryce 1987, p. 79, and Moravcsik 1998, pp. 87-89.
~ ° 3  On the perceived importance of atomic power as a source of future energy see OEEC report by 
engineer Louis Arm and; “Intra European Economic Cooperation in the Production and Distribution of 
Power (Paris, May 1955).
' >:>4 The proposal for an economic community drafted by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, 
on behalf of the three Benelux countries. For a detailed account see Verheyen 1993, p. 65; Voorhoeve 19xx, 
p. 186; and Armin Heinen, “Netherlands Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on EU”, in 
Uppgens and Loth 1985, vol. 3, p. 245-56. See also FRUS 1948/11:92; and FRUS 1948/11:24.
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The 'European Economic Community and EURATOM
The failure o f EDC destroyed the hopes of European integrationists for achieving 
the rapid unification of Europe under a new European constitution. Yet the integration 
process did not lose its momentum. Within a year after the failure o f EDC, negotiations were 
launched in Messina (Sicily) that would culminate in the Treaty o f Rome establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community 
(EQ.5:>5 The timing of the French proposal for an atomic energy community is 
straightforward. By 1955, atomic energy was gaining strategic importance and seemed poised 
to replace coal and oil as the elixir of the future.556 The implication was that coal and steel 
were liable to lose importance as the basis o f industrial power and, by extension, military 
might. Thus atomic energy cooperation was high on the French agenda. The atomic energy 
plan set forth by Jean Monnet proposed to pool fissionable materials for peaceful ends 
under a  supranational authority modeled on the ECSC, subject to safeguards to prevent 
diversion for military purposes.557 Meanwhile, France would continue its own nuclear 
weapons program under national auspices.558
3 : 0  Stiik & Weigall 1992, p. 98, Mowat 1973, p. 129-35 and Marne 1973, p. 231. The Spaak report 
advocated that the objectives of wider economic integration and atomic energy integration be realized in 
separate organization and with separate treaties
“’-rá On the perceived importance of atomic power as a source o f future energy see OEEC report by 
engineer Louis Aimand; “Intra European Economic Cooperation in the Production and Distribution o f 
Power”, Paris, May 1955.
5 5 7  Germany was prohibited from developing an independent nuclear capacity by the terms of the Paris 
Agreement See also Kocs 1995, p. 20, Dinan 1994, pp. 30-32, and Ruggie 1996, p. 61.
5 5 8  Aybet 1997, p. 8 8 . While Euratom focused initially on sharing pooling nuclear energy for industrial use it 
was also expected that the nuclear community would help the Europeans to achieve atomic independence. 
According to March Trachtenberg, “although Euratom was supposed to be devoted to peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, everyone was aware of the military implications of the project an independent nuclear 
infrastructure might ultimately mean an independent nuclear weapons capability” (Trachtenberg 1999, p.
151). In January 1957, a meeting between the German Defense Minister and his French counterpart led to a 
series of secret agreements concerning the development and production of 'modem weapons* by France, 
Germany and Italy. The proposed nuclear program was to take a form such that none of the three 
participants would hold a monopoly on the conception or construction of nuclear weapons but the 
contribution of each would be indispensable. The result of these agreements was a secret protocol signed in 
November 1957 which provided for 'German financial and technical assistance for joint atomic development 
on French soil’ while reiterating Germany’s 1954 obligation not to produce atomic weapons.
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The EEC proposal— drafted by Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak on 
behalf of the three Benelux countries—had a more explicitly economic aim. The proposal 
aimed to reduce barriers to trade and to develop a set o f supranational institutions to 
govern trade relations.559 It is important to realize, however, that the EEC did not aim 
merely at freeing trade but, like the ECSC before it, aimed at doing so in a way that would 
secure balanced growth. Specifically, the initiative was framed as an explicit response to the 
fast growth o f German economic power. The proposal for EEC came about at a time 
when all the West European economies were growing rapidly. The overall growth rate o f 
West European countries in 1954-55 was 6.7% annually.560 However. West Germany, 
however, was expanding its trade and increasing its national income at a quicker rate than 
other states.56* Already by 1953, West German national income was more than double that 
o f France and made up 48,6% o f the ECSC total.562 563What seemed unavoidable in the 
future was the economic primacy of Germany in Europe—a primacy that would lessen 
Bonn’s dependence on its European partners and enable Germany to press a more 
independent foreign policy.565 In the eyes of the Benelux governments what was needed 
was therefore a binding, step-by-step approach to economic union that would pull W est 
Germany into a European community and give other states a greater say over its economic 
policies.564 With respect to the EEC, Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak wrote to
British Premier Anthony Eden in February 1956:
Let me summarize once again the many reasons that lead me to seek the integration of Europe. First 
of all, this I believe is the real way to solve the German problem. A  Germany which is integrated in 
European entities, and through them, in the Atlantic Pact, will have defended herself against an 
individualism that too rapidly takes the form of nationalism, whose effects we know, and at the 
same time against the temptation to approach the Russians by herself ...T o  this political conception 
are added some economic considerations... It seems clear to me that in this field the future belongs
5 5 0  See Stirk & Weigall 1992, p. 98, Mowat 1973, p. 129-35, and Mayne 1973, p. 231.
5 6 0  Mayne 1973, p. 221.
5 6 1  Milward 1992, p. 119.
5 6 2  Gillingham 1991, p. 357.
5 6 3  Milward 1992, pp. 119-120.
5 6 4  Opcit
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to the large communities of mankind. Automation, the progress of technology, the increase of
production and productivity—all.. .require large markets.^ 6 3  . ■ j
Predictably, this argument fell on fertile ground among French mtegrationists. The 
government’s spokesman on Europe, Maurice Faure, argued before the National Assembly 
that the EEC would “bind Germany to the West with ‘a thousand small linkages’ thereby 
minimizing the possibility o f Franco-German conflict or German-Soviet 
rapprochement”.56 66 The point was reinforced by Pnme Minister, Bourges-Maunoury, who 
reminded his colleagues o f the importance o f  creating “a democratic and stable framework 
firm enough to guide the expansion o f  German industrial power in the direction o f the 
common interest**.567 Nevertheless, many within France feared the economic effects of a 
common European market. Political skepticism was rooted in a century long protectionist 
tradition which made France vulnerable to foreign competition.568 This skepticism was 
reinforced by the fact the French organized industry generally remained ill disposed 
towards the planned EEC.569 Whereas many French politicians favored a supranational 
economic community for political reasons, most French businesses preferred bilateral 
treaties or increased liberalization within the existing OEEC framework to a ‘community* 
solution.^70 In July 1956, business representatives in the French Economic and Social 
Council voted unanimously to relocate the early EEC talks to the OEEC.571 Initially, 
therefore, France took a reluctant stance on EEC. Indeed, untiles 1956, many French 
officials are reported to have viewed EEC as an unwanted ‘side-issue* which they would 
have to put up with to obtain support for atomic energy cooperation.572
5 6 5  Quoted in Mayne 1973, p. 251.
5 6 6  Moravsik 1998, p. 104.
5 6 7  Stirk & Weigall 1992. -
5 6 8  Charlton 1983, p. 205. *
5 6 9  Milward 1992, p. 208.
57® Parsons 2001, p. 8 .
5 7 1  Parsons 2001, p. 8 .
5 7 2  Deubner 1997, p. 207. See also Stirk & Weigall 1992, p. 92, and Moravcsik 1998, p. 105.
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German opinion was also divided. On one hand, the large competitive German 
industries stood to gain from a liberalization o f intra-European trade. On the other hand, 
Germany’s great dependence on markets outside Europe meant that an exclusive European 
customs union might be harmful to the German economy. A common external tariff based 
on averaging proposals among the Six would be much higher than a tariff set by Germany 
unilaterally.573 As a result the German preferences was for multilateral as well as regional 
trade liberalization.574 The German Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, virulently 
attacked EEC for ‘constraining German industry within a continental dimension’.575 He was 
supported by the most influential o f German economic interest groups, the Bundesverband der 
Deutsche?! Industrie.576
Whereas France and Germany decided eventually to back the Belgian proposal for 
a common market for political reasons, Britain from the outset opposed EEC on the 
grounds that it would weaken the Atlantic Alliance.577 According to Frank Figgures, under­
secretary of the Treasury, Britain was extremely concerned that participation in a European 
customs union would undermine its special ties to the United States.57** British opposition 
to EEC was not, as some have argued, based mainly on a desire to prioritize trade with the 
Commonwealth. Indeed, British trade in the 1950s was rapidly shifting away from the 
Commonwealth towards Europe.579 Instead the problem Britain saw in EEC was that it was
5 7 3  Kolodziej 1974, p. 277, Moravcsik 1998, pp. 95-97, Calleo 1978, pp. 162-166.
5 7 4  Moravcsik 1998, p.p. 88-89.
5 7 5  Ludlow 1997, p. 27. On the reception of EEC in Germany, see also Calleo 1978, p. 162-6, Adenauer 
1965,253ff, and Moravcsik 1998, p. 101.
5 7 5  At the same time, the EEC was also attacked by protectionist groups like the Deutsche Bauem-verband who 
feared that agreement on a common agricultural policy would be harmful to them ..
5 7 7  Harold Macmillan to the Cabinet, 26 April 1961. PRO, CAB128/35 Otl-M inutes of Cabinet,
26.4.1961. In Griffith and Ward 19xx.
57** Charlton 1983, pp. 171-176. Before die negotiations began in Rome several attempts had been made to 
enlist Britain in the preparatory negotiations for a general customs union. Paul-Henri Spaak personally 
traveled to London to invite Britain to participate in the Brussels talks on a ‘non-committing’ basis and the 
Belgian government directed several pleas to London to participate.
5 7 9  Moravcsik has argued that British opposition to the customs union was rational for a government that 
traded little with the Continent, had high tariffs in place, and feared competition with German producers 
(Moravcsik 1998, pp. 87-90,123). In 1950, almost 60% of British trade went to colonial and developing 
markets, while only 13% went to the Six ECSC members. However, British trade was rapidly shifting toward
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not a direct route to trade liberalization. British leaders remained opposed to entering a 
system that implied the surrender of national sovereignty and a promise to proceed towards 
political unification simply for the sake o f obtaining free trade. As British officials rightly 
commented, if  Europe wanted freer trade, the remedy lay in simply obeying some of the 
liberalization procedures of the OEEC. No new institutions were needed.5®0 In an attempt 
to sidestep the Benelux plan, Britain therefore proposed in Ju ly 1956 to create an industrial 
Free Trade Area embracing all the OEEC countries. This proposal, it was hoped, would be 
attractive to the Germans and thereby succeed in wrecking the EEC discussions.580 81
N egotiation and  Ratification
Negotiations over EEC and Euratom began in July 1956 in Rome, and the two 
treaties were signed on 25 March 1957. During the negotiations, the French government 
tightly controlled information to the domestic environment so as to dampen the impact of 
objections from organized business, and the Foreign Ministry avoided any general 
consultation o f economic interest groups to prevent its scope o f  maneuver from being 
restricted.582 The same was true in Germany where foreign policy leaders such as 
Adenauer, Hallstein and Ophuls succeeded in keeping the EEC issue out of intensive
the Continent Beginning in 1953, studies by the Treasury Board o f Trade stressed a long-term decline in 
Commonwealth trade and a corresponding rise in European exports. Moreover, Britain was experiencing a 
steady drop in the average imperial preference. According to the Head of the British Exchequer, "by that 
time [when EEC was negotiated] we were already dismantling our Commonwealth in every way. There was 
therefore “considerable importance, from a purely economic view, in Britain joining the EEC. (Chariton 
1983, p. 169-70,198). According to Alan Milward, there were occasional protests within the British 
Government about the extent to which foreign policy priorities seemed to override considerations of further 
economic welfare by rejecting EEC.
580 Nirtting 1966, pp. 83-84. Many national economists discouraged the creation o f a customs union. The 
estimated net gain from removing tariffs was generally calculated to be small and Certainly not worth the 
political effort required to create a customs union*—much less one which involved a surrender of sovereignty 
and a promise to proceed towards political unification. See Viner 1950, and Milward 1992, pp. 122-123.
5 8 1  PRO, T234/182, European Integration, MAC(56)6(Qaike) 16.1.1956. By standing aloof from the EEC 
and by proposing an alternative FTA, British leaders took a calculated risk that the customs union would fail. 
Harold Macmillan would later say about the British decision to stay aloof from the EEC that "when we 
decided at the end o f 1955 not to take part. ..we were influenced by considerations which were to be proved 
wrong. We thought they would not succeed.” Macmillan is seconded by Butler who writes; “we thought it was 
not going to work.. .That is were we were wrong, you see ". See also Griffith 1990, p. 6-7, Macmillan 1969, p. 
69, Charlton 1983, pp. 183,195; and Moravcsik 1998, p. 132.
5 8 2  Milward 1992, p. 208. See also Balassa, 19xx, pp. 93-94 and Moravcsik 1998, p. 116.
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cabinet discussions and inter-ministerial decision-making«583 When Economics Minister, 
Ludwig Erhard tried in October 1956 to persuade the German Cabinet to suspend the 
Treaty of Rome negotiations in favor to the British OEEC scheme, he was overruled by 
Adenauer and Hallstein.584
An important aspect of the EEC negotiations was the effort to reach agreement on 
a common agricultural policy, later known as the CAP. During the negotiations France 
pushed hard for a deal on trade o f agricultural products. Given the German advantage in 
industrial production, France treated agriculture as its main comparative advantage, and a 
sector that would influence how the more important French industries would develop. 
Keeping pace with the West Germans, in every sense, required the opening of West 
German agricultural markets to French products.585 As Stanley Hoffmann has argued that 
“the ment o f the CAP was to give France an agricultural Torce de frappe’ comparable to 
West Germany’s industrial might and to ‘free’ the great majority o f French farmers for jobs 
in industry and services”.586 Agricultural agreement was therefore an important piece o f 
the EEC puzzle. However, it is not the case, as suggested by Andrew Moravcsik and Alan 
Milward among others, that the CAP constituted the sine qua non o f French support for the 
EEC. The real focus remained on industrial power.58? The fact that France ratified the
5 8 3  Milward 1992, p. 198.
5 8 4  Ludlow 1997, p. 27. Once again Germany accepted integration for political reasons. Adenauer's policy 
directions to die German Ministers on 19 January 1956 read; "the Messina initiative must be seen as a step 
tpwards the creation of a community that will secure the right direction of political will and action—in the 
interest of a future reunification". Adenauer 1985, vol II, p. 253-35-
5 8 5  Vanke 2000, p. 99. ............ ...
5 8 6  Hoffmann 2000, p. 70.
58?  According to Milward, “because a final agreement depended fundamentally and inescapably on a 
lowering of domestic grain prices in the Federal Republic, we may surely conclude that the geopolitical aim 
of binding the Federal Republic to the West did not override considerations o f France's economic welfare 
or of its president’s chances of reelection.” Milward 2000, p. 77. For a similar reading, see Moravcsik 1998, 
p. 112 and 2001am 2001b, Mahant 1969, p. 126, and Baun 1996, p. 14. This view is contested by among 
others Stanley Hoffmann (2000) and Jeffrey Vanke (2000). According to Vanke, in 1958 and 1959 de Gaulle 
offered at least three reasons for having accepted the EEC, but agriculture was not among them.
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Rome Treaty without having achieved any final agreement on agricultural policy supports this 
reading.588
The course of the negotiations left France and the Benelux as the main winners. Only 
on the issue of a common external tariff did Germany secure its preferred outcome of a 
relatively low tariff. On every other issue, concessions to France seemed disproportionate.58^
France obtained the right to maintain its system of export subsidies and import duties until 
the current payments o f the common market zone had been in balance for a year. The 
French demand for respect of the territories ¿'outre m er also enabled it to get Germany, who did 
not possess a single colony, to commit to contribute the same amount to the colonial 
development fund as France ($200 mill, o f $580 mill.). Finally, France gained consent to a 
future common agricultural policy which would enable it to export agricultural surpluses to 
Germany at high prices.590
After the Rome Treaties were signed, Britain continued to press for a looser FTA 
as an alternative to the Common Market. Especially, British efforts clung to the hope that 
Germany would choose to push its interest in multilateral trade liberalization rather than a 
narrow customs union among the Six. During the summer 1958, British officials made *
several overtures to Bonn to seek its support for an industrial FTA. This caused 
considerable anxiety in France. Whereas they claimed in public that the Treaty of Rome 
was a balanced concept, unlike the FTA, in private, as Maurice Faure, then Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs told Maulding, the French were satisfied that the Germans had 
paid a high price for the common market in accepting the terms of association for the
5 8 8  While the Rome Treaties included a chapter on common agricultural policy, the CAP as we know it was 
not negotiated by until in the early 1960s. On the importance of agricultural agreement see also Milward 1992, 
p. 265, and Chariton 1983 p. 206.
58  ^ According to Alan Milward Trance got almost everything it wanted out o f the treaty’. Milward 1992, p. -
220. This view is seconded by Charlton (1983, p. 207) and Nutting (1966, p. 87-88). Andrew Moravcsik’s t
assessment is mote tempered, saying that “the treaty was a compromise, titled on the margin towards France”. i
Moravcsik 1998, p. 148.
5^  Dinan 1992, p. 327, Mahant 19xx, p. 126 and Baun 1992, p. 14.
192
French overseas territories and for French agricultural exports. One of the dangers for 
France of an FTA limited to manufactured goods was that it might make West Germany 
question the high price it had paid for the common market.59*
In the fall 1958. de Gaulle asked to meet with Adenauer to discuss Germany’s 
position on the British proposal. During their second meeting, on 26 November, de Gaulle 
made a blunt proposal: In exchange for German consent to end the negotiations with Britain, 
France would agree to support Germany’s campaign to resist Soviet pressures on Berlin in 
the ongoing Berlin Crisis.* 592 593 The effect was immediate: “Whatever the cost to Germany’s 
economic interests, the British free trade proposal would not be allowed to interfere with the 
Franco-German rapprochement”, Adenauer declared.595 In December de Gaulle vetoed the 
FTA negotiations calling on Britain to join the EEC and accept the same obligations as other 
European states.594 Germany did not protest.
Interpretation
The EEC was mainly an economic initiative. However, the motivation for this 
initiative was closely tied to a geo-strategic reasoning. The aim of the common market was 
to solidify the underlying security bargain which had been reached with the ECSC and to 
cement the European economies through exit costs and efficiency gains which would 
secure continued cooperation. In terms of generating efficiency gains and enhancing 
interdependence, the EEC was a great success. Between 1958 and 1960, trade among the 
Six grew by 50%. Much of this expansion was caused by growing trade between Germany 
and France. During the first four years o f the EEC’s existence (1958-62) Franco-German
59* Ludlow p. 36, and Lynch 1998, p. 9.
5 9 2  This meeting followed just after the November 1958 Soviet ultimatum regarding Berlin. See Kolodziej 
1974, p. 265.
5 9 3  Kolodziej 1974, p. 282.
5 9 4  Kaiser 1990, p- 25, Charlton 1983, p. 199, Milward 1991, pp. 428-429.
trade tripled and by 1970 trade among the two countries had quadrupled.595 The freeing of 
capital flows within the EEC also brought about an extraordinary acceleration of direct 
foreign investments and opening of subsidiaries abroad.596 The common market thus 
helped to bring about the tight interlocking of economic interests that both Schuman and 
Adenauer had envisaged in 1950 but which the ECSC had not succeeded in creating 
through spill-over effects.597
Euratom, on the other hand, had less relevance as an instrument of European 
integration.59® Despite substantial funding for research in the late 1950s and 1960s national 
nuclear polices continued to predominate over cooperative joint efforts. At the same time, 
the failure of nuclear energy to gain importance as source o f fuel meant that Euratom slowly 
came to be regarded as obsolete. Thus the effort to control national nuclear energy 
potentials may be described as a failure. However, this was a failure which did not have great 
impact on binding, since nuclear energy production was an area in which Germany was at no 
advantage relative to its neighbors.
The fact that the EC aimed to free trade may seem to indicate that it is best 
explained by an PE logic. However, looking closer at the agreement we see that although it 
was launched in an effort to free trade and enhance prosperity it was geared to do so in a 
way that would prevent German economic hegemony and tie German interests firmly to 
the West In a meeting with Adenauer in November 1958, de Gaulle confirmed that the 
Common market would “awaken French industry” by “obliging it to modernize”. This in
5 9 5  German sales in France rose from 4,9 bill. Francs in 1960 to 23,4 billion francs in 1970. French sales to 
Germany rose from 4.7 billion francs in 1960 to 20,5 billion Francs in 1970.
5 9 6  Investments grew rapidly during the first decade. In 1973, French investments in Germany totaled DM 
1,900 million, including both direct investments in German companies—especially in mining and metallurgy— 
and the opening of subsidiaries of French companies. German investments in France in the same year totaled 
DM 3,207 million.
5 9 7  Willis 1968, p. 100. The joint Franco-German development o f the Airbus in 1969-1974, the 
construction o f a nuclear reactor for the Franco-German Institute o f Grenoble, the hundreds o f banks, 
chemical and pharmaceutical companies, mining enterprises and automobile works that covered the 
countries with a network of cooperating groups all served to increase the cost o f any conflict between the 
two countries,
59® Deubner 19xx, p. 223.
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turn would strengthen France’s geopolitical position.^" The goal of binding Germany to 
Western Europe through economic ties was also prevalent. In late 1959 de Gaulle told 
Harold Macmillan that “I finally accepted the Common Market because it ties the Germans 
to us”.«»  The fact that the Common market would also serve as an export market for 
French agricultural good does not detract from its central geopolitical value. The evidence 
suggests that France’s main preoccupation was not with economic growth in and of itself but 
with keeping pace with Germany.
The EEC was a great economic success, but did it in fact help to bind West 
Germany to Europe? In chapter I I I  argued that efficiency gains can serve to strengthen 
binding once underlying potentials for security conflict have been resolved. As noted, 
however, not all efficiency gains have a binding property; only those that are contingent on 
the maintenance o f regional integration do. Free trade and the free flow o f factors o f 
production do not achieve binding by themselves—they merely strengthen an existing 
contractual relationship by raising exit costs. A real binding effect, however, can be 
achieved with redistributive transfers from trade Svinners’ to ‘losers’, which serve to 
equalize relative economic growth. The institutionalization of cross-country compensatory 
payments in the EEC— mainly to farmers and backward areas— can be interpreted in this 
light.
V I D e  G au lle  & E u ro pean  In t e g r a t io n , 19 5 8 -19 6 9 : C o m m u n ity  C risis
The successful conclusion o f the EEC and Euratom in 1958 secured the precarious 
binding of the ECSC by reorienting German economic interests to the EC and by 
increasing efficiency gains from integration. After this success, however, the Community 
headed for its first crisis marked by General de Gaulle’s return to power in France. Upon 59*
5 9 9  Vanke 2000, p. 90.
690 This statement is found in recently published French diplomatic documents: Documents Diplomatiques 
Francais, 1959, Vol. 2  (Paris: Impnmerie Nationale, 1995), p. 781. See Vanke 2000, p. 91.
his return to office in 1958, de Gaulle told René Mayer, the former President of the ECSC 
High Authority: “I am wiping everything out and I am starting again”.601 During his 
presidency, de Gaulle was to fight two major battles in the EC: first against the accession o f  
Britain which he vetoed in 1963 and again in 1967; and secondly against the strengthening 
of the institutional powers o f the Commission and the European Parliament which he 
successfully blocked by withdrawing French representatives from the Community.
De Gaulle’s Presidency poses a challenge to the binding theory. Here was a French 
statesman whose anachronistic championing of national independence and, above all, 
French ‘grandeur’ would desist progress towards deeper integration and reassert the central 
role o f the nation state in European affairs. Here was a French politician who had loudly 
objected to both the ECSC and EDC. Was he not concerned with binding German power? 
It is clear that de Gaulle, like other French leaders before him, was preoccupied w ith 
Franco-German reconciliation. As the leader o f two provisional governments in the wake 
of World War II, de Gaulle had pronounced the German problem to be “the single greatest 
political problem” for postwar France.602 Whereas he had left the political scene in 1946 
advocating a punitive policy towards a weak Germany, he returned in 1958 with a different 
outlook. With Germany re-industrialized and rearmed, de Gaulle abandoned a strategy o f 
balancing and embraced the then orthodox policy o f  reconciliation and rapprochement. 
What de Gaulle objected to in the EC was therefore not the goal of reconciliation and 
‘binding’ o f Germany, but the reliance on supranational institutions which he saw as 
inherently flawed. “These organs”, he said, “have their technical value, but they do not have, 
they cannot have authority and, consequently, political effectiveness. As long as nothing 
happens, they function without much difficulty, but as soon as a tragic situation appears...it 
can then be seen that one ‘High Authority’ or another has no authority over the various
601 Gerbert 1997, p. 135-6.
6 0 2  de Gaulle 1971, p. 172, and Discours, p. 165.
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national categories”.603 In other words, supranational institutions did not in de Gaulle’s eyes 
serve to create binding obligations on states. To further integration, he declared, one must 
begin with politics rather than with technical matters.
De Gaulle’s policy towards Europe had two main components. One was 
strengthening the EEC which he saw as a an important tool for modernizing the French 
economy. A second component was the construction of a “European Europe” which 
would embed Germany militarily and politically within an intergovernmentalist security 
structure while disconnecting European defense policy from the American dominated 
NATO.604 605 De Gaulle had entered the EDC affray in grand style in 1953, predicting the 
possibility o f American withdrawal from Europe and of a France unable to exert itself to 
control an increasingly strong German army o f which French troops would be mere attached 
auxiliaries.603 Now his distrust of the American security guarantee led him to try to wean 
Germany away from NATO into a European security framework.606 This distrust also 
convinced him that Britain must be kept out of the Community since, in political terms, 
Britain was more committed to the Atlantic partnership than to the goal of a united Europe.
In the summer I960, de Gaulle launched his campaign for a ‘confederate political 
union’ among the Six, and in November 1961 a draft treaty on political union was tabled by 
his representative, Christian Fouchet.607 The treaty called for a political union which would 
facilitate a common foreign and defense policy based on ‘respect for the individuality of
6 0 3  See Kolodziej 1974, p. 293, and Fursdon 1980, p. 220.
6 0 4  Vaisse 1997, p. 55, and Pryce 1987, p. 108.
6 0 5  Fursdon 1980, p. 220.
6 0 6  Cole 1993, p. 358, and Hoffmann 2000, p. 71. De Gaulle was particulady crossed by the American 
proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in Europe—a proposal which was seen in France as a not-$o- 
subtle effort to foil France’s quest for an independent nuclear deterrent Fearing that the MLF would result 
ultimately in greater German access to American nuclear weaponry France made German rejection of the 
MLF proposal a touchstone for the Paris-Bonn alliance. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou argued: *We may 
ask if such a force would not destroy Europe’. *We may even wonder whether, in the last analysis, it is not more 
or less directed against France. Kolodziej 1974, p. 87,118,319. See also Dinan 1994, p. 45 and Kocs 1995, p. 
56.
6 0 7  Kolodeizj 1974, p. 51.
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the peoples and o f the Member States and for equality o f rights and obligations’. A  
compromise on the Fouchet plan was on the verge o f being reached in the summer o f  
1961, but was derailed by Harold Macmillan’s July 31 announcement that Britain intended 
to apply for membership in the EEC.608 From this point on, the Fouchet discussions 
revolved essentially around the problem o f Britain’s relation to Europe.
The reasons for Britain’s belated bid for EC membership were manifold. From 1955 
to 1965 British exports to the Commonwealth fell from 50% to 25% of the British total, 
while exports to the Six rose from 12% to 25%.609 This put pressure on Britain to join the 
EEC for economic reasons. Still, Britain’s economic situation had not changed fundamentally 
since its first rejection o f the EC project. Trade diversion had been foreseen already in 1955 
when the initial decision was made in Britain to stay out of EEC. It seems, therefore, that in 
the British government’s decision political considerations were the controlling ones.61® In 
particular, the fact that the Six were discussing moves in the political field appears to have 
been important for Britain’s decision to open negotiations in August 1961 instead o f  
waiting for a more propitious climate on the continent.611 The plans for political union led 
to the conviction that it might be better for Britain to join EEC now and block further 
moves towards political and defense cooperation from within rather than wait and face a
6®^  On the negative impact of the British application on the Fouchet plan see also Kocs 1995, p. 39.
Ibid. p. 167. That Britain’s trading position was seen to be threatened by the EEC is also suggested by 
Lord Soames, who recalls that the Prime Minister had handed him a paper, which he himself had written 
about the future of Britain. It emphasized the rapid changes affecting the British position everywhere, and it 
ended with Macmillan concluding that Britain could no longer carry the necessary weight, economically or 
politically, outside Europe.
6 ®^ Camps 1964, p. 274.
6 1 1  Trachtenberg 2000, p. x. According to Miriam Camps, the fact that the Six were discussing moves in 
the political field was an important factor in the British decision to apply for membership open negotiations 
in August 1961 instead o f waiting for a more propitious climate on the continent. Camps 1964, p. 414. 
Macmillan clearly stated his hopes that a wider EEC would disrupt the concept o f political Six, and facilitate 
French and German inclusion in an Atlantic alliance. See Bange 2000, p. 17. Another factor which may have 
been of importance for Britain’s decision was the feet that the Americans were putting pressure on London 
to join the EEC, thereby throwing a *bridge’ to the United States. Kennedy’s ‘Grand Design’ which emerged 
in 1961 called for a commercial association, a so-called ‘open partnership’ between Europe and the US. 
Macmillan was left in no doubt by the Kennedy Administration that a British application would be seen as a 
step to preserve the Ang^o-American relationship, rather than undermine it. See Stirk & Weigall 1992, p.
115, Dinan 1994, p. 52, Pryce 1987 p. 120, Kolodziej 1974, p. 310, and Boccia 1995, p. 159.
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fa it  accompli later. This is clearly expressed in Macmillan’s appeal to the British Ministers 
assembled at the Chequers. He asked;
do the Ministers agree that an eady settlement in the context of a ‘confederate’ Europe would be
politically easier for us than later settlement with a ‘federal’ Europe? 6 1  ^
This logic made a strong impression in the Benelux countries where British membership 
was seen as crucial to secure the important link to NATO—a link which France would 
sever.* 613 Moreover, the Benelux countries were apprehensive o f the intergovernmental 
nature of de Gaulle’s proposal. The conspicuous silence about the role of the EEC raised 
fears in Holland and Belgium that the authority of existing EC institutions would be 
weakened and that the Fouchet plan would result in a kind of restored European Concert 
in which some countries— France and Germany—would be more equal than others.614 
When negotiations began in Paris in December 1961 Joseph Luns, the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, declared that it would not sign a treaty on political union until Britain had been 
brought into the EEC.615 At least this way, France and Germany would be balanced by 
Britain and the link to NATO would be secured.616
Just as Britain(s reason for seeking membership in the EEC were political rather 
than economic, so were the French reasons for rejecting the British application. The 
underlying motives for de Gaulle's veto had little to do with the detailed questions of trade, 
agriculture and institutional arrangements under discussion in Brussels.617 His decision was
61^ Bange 200 0 , p. 194.
6 1 3  Brusse 1995, p. 125. Holland also warned that whereas France would for the time being run the joint 
French-Geiman show, Germany would do so in the long run unless Britain was brought in.
6 1 4  Haglund 1991, p. 8 6 . There was also some concern that de Gaulle’s policy might weaken the tie to 
NATO without putting an adequate security guarantee instead.
6 1 3  There was a contradiction between the Dutch commitment to European unity and the acceptance o f 
US security guarantee and the unswerving determination to bring Britain into EC. Yet, when France 
reproached Holland and Belgium for being illogical in asking for both supranarionality and British entry, 
Spaak replied; “Since you do not wish to have supranationality as a guarantee for die small states and since 
you wish to construct Europe a 1’AngJaise, at least grant us the English who will be there to restore the 
balance”. Schmidt 1997, p. 141, and Kolodziej 1974, p. 303.
6 1 6  Ludlow 1997, pp. 108-109.
6 1 7  De Gaulle at first referred to technical issues to justify his opposition to British membership—many of 
which were untrue. When this did not serve to dissuade the British, he put down a political veto. See e.g. 
Hoffmann 2000, p. 69. This ‘geo-political’ view o f de Gaulle’s policy is contradicted by Andrew Moravcsik
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grounded in the belief that enlargement would undermine French leadership in Europe and 
augment American influence over the EC.618 As de Gaulle said in defense of his decision to 
use the French veto in January 1963, to allow Britain to join the EC 1963 would in all 
likelihood have served to “undermine the Community and turn the customs union into a 
broad free trade a re a ” .6 1 9 This statement was consistent with his oblique references to the 
danger o f an American Trojan Horse’ in the Community. The same reasoning was put 
forth after France vetoed the second British bid for membership in 1967.620 As for the 
Germans they were prepared to stand by the French decision.621 In a debate in the German 
Cabinet in August 1962, Adenauer said,
I judge the situation primarily from a political perspective and not from a trade-political viewpoint... I
say that tariff agreements have to remain behind political questions and the question which decides our
history is not our relationship with England, but that between us and France...6 2 2  *
With the failure of the Fouchet Plan, and the French veto of British membership 
the Community crisis thickened. In July 1965 France boycotted meetings in the EC in 
protest o f an attempt by the Commission to increase its budgetary powers and to introduce 
QMV in the Council. In March 1966, de Gaulle announced France’s complete withdrawal 
from NATO’s integrated command system— although not from the Atlantic Alliance— in 
order to base French security on an independent nuclear force.62  ^ This was followed in
who has argued that "de Gaulle’s politics towards EEC were rooted in economic interests, especially French 
agricultural interests, and that de Gaulle’s distinct geopolitical visions played a ‘secondary, largely 
insignificant role’. Moravcsik 2000a, p. 6 .
6 1 8  Ludlow 1997, p. 109.
61  ^ de Gaulle’s Press Conference at the Elysee Palace, 14 Jan., 1963; Vaisse 1997, p. 63, Salmon & Nicoll 
1997, pp. 87-90. On the French veto, see also Dinan 1994, p. 53. De Gaulle would later argue that "in 
practice... we [put] the EEC into effect to encourage the Six to concert together regularly in political matters, 
to prevent certain others, in part Britain, from dragging the West into an Atlantic system which would be 
totally incompatible with a European Europe", (de Gaulle 1971, p. 171-172).
6 2 6  Utile had changed in the British attitude between 1961-1967. Macmillan remained opposed to the political 
aims of the EC and stressed that joining the EC would not involve any fundamental change in the European 
defense arrangements or be allowed to weaken die Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle thus vetoed. See Salmon & 
Nicoll 1997, p. 98.
6 2 1  Schmidt 1997, p. 77.
6 2 2  Bange 2000, p. 205.
62^ The empty chair episode erupted over disagreement about the proper funding of the CAP. However, de
Gaulle’s September 9 news conference exposed French demands that went well beyond agriculture to include
West European political cooperation and an improvement in East-West relations. See Kolodziej 1974, p. 331.
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1967 by a French veto of Britain’s second application for EC membership, which severely 
strained relations between France and its partners 624
Interpretation
As the persistent attacks on European supranationalism indicate, de Gaulle’s 
strategy for building a united Europe differed from his predecessors’. To de Gaulle, the 
community method was ‘a wrong step in the right direction’.62  ^He wanted to replace an 
essentially weak supranational structure with a new framework based on intergovernmental 
cooperation and credible commitments, and he wanted to create a ‘European Europe’ free 
of Anglo-American influence. De Gaulle in 1965 achieved two o f his objectives; the 
dilution and delaying o f QMV; and the downgrading of the power o f the Commission.626 
However, his effort to build a ‘European Europe’ militarily and politically independent o f 
the United States and to bind Germany politically to France was frustrated. As the 1960s 
drew to a close, France was facing a politically more independent Germany determined to 
assert its interests even at the risk of conflict with France.62  ^An active German Ostpolitik 
under Willy Brandt served to reinforce the image of a Germany beyond French influence, 
and raised anxieties about the adverse strategic, political, and economic implications o f 
German-Soviet rapprochement.628 Anxieties over a revived Germany, capable of exerting 
weighty economic and diplomatic influence in the service of German national goals, were, 
by his own accounting, uppermost in de Gaulle’s thinking in his last months in office. This
What was at stake were the prerogatives o f the Commission whose vision of Europe de Gaulle branded as
essentially ‘Atlantic’. David Yost, “France in the New Europe”, p. 108-
62^ Little had changed in die British attitude between 1961-1967. Macmillan remained opposed to the political 
aims of the EC and stressed that joining the EC would not involve any fundamental change in the European 
defense arrangements or be allowed to weaken the Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle thus vetoed. See Salmon & 
Nicoll 1997, p. 98. Interestingly, Britain’s second application in 1967 came at a time when Britain had catch 
up in the sense that it growth rate was no longer much behind the EC average. See Mattli 1999..
6 2 8  The Gaulle’s attack on supranationalism reached its height in July 1965 when France boycotted meetings 
in the EC (the 'empty chair episode") in protest of an attempt by the Commission to increase its budgetary 
powers and to introduce QMV in the Councilr
6 2 6  Hoffmann 2000, p. 71.
62^ Salmon & Nicoll 1997, p. 104; Kolodziej 1974, p. 339.
6 2 8  Kolodziej 1974, p. 156, Kocs 1995, pp. 100-103.
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is often cited as a motive for his belated move towards monetary cooperation with 
Germany and is said to have changed his stand on British membership, although he left 
office before any concrete initiative could be taken.62  ^When Pompidou came to power in 
1969, however, he embarked immediately on a process of moving Britain closer to Europe 
as aw ay  to counterbalance Germany’s increasing weight in the Community.* 630
VII T he  S in g l e  E uropean  A ct ( l 986)
After the Gaulle’s virulent attack on supranationalism, integration proceeded again 
but this time more slowly. In 1972 the Community undertook its first enlargement with the 
accession o f Britain, Denmark and Ireland.63* This was followed in 1973 by the creation 
of the European Exchange-rate Mechanism (ERM), and in 1979 the EC members—except 
Britain— agreed to a European Monetary System (EMS). However, a real turning point 
with respect to economic integration did not come until the signing in 1986 o f the Single 
European Act (SEA) which launched the hitherto most ambitious round o f trade 
liberalization among the now nine member states.632
It is often said that integration in the 1970s and 1980s was driven mainly by efforts 
to spur economic growth and accommodate domestic interests rather than by geopolitical
6 2 0  See interview of C.L. Sulzberger with de Gaulle o f  Feb. 1969. In Kolodziej 1974, p. 210. p. 256.
6 3 0  Both Dinan 1994, p. 72 and Kolodziej 1974, p. 427 argue that the French decision to allow British 
membership was motivated by the desire to create more of a counterweight to Britain within the community. 
However, France skillfully linked British entry to progress on political cooperation. The quidpro quo at the 1969 
Hague Summit to discuss European Political Cooperation (EPQ was that other members agreed to closer 
foreign policy coordination in exchange for French accept of British membership. Wyatt-Walter 1997, p. 33.
63* Among the initiatives were the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism of 1970 which 
provided for foreign policy coordination among EC members, the so-called Genscher-Colombo initiative o f 
1981which led to the London Report facilitating discussions about some political and economic aspects of 
security, and the creation in 1987 of a joint Franco-German brigade, and the 1988 creation of a joint Franco- 
German Defense and Security Council. On these initiatives, see Kocs 1995, p. 139-141, and Aybet 1997, p. 
135.
6 3 2  The most important reform was an expansion in the use of QMV in die Council of Ministers on 
matters pertaining to the Internal Market A second reform gave marginally greater powers to the European 
Parliament
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goals.633 This is partly true. After 1966 the security climate in Europe changed. The 
revolution wrought by nuclear weapons— in particular France's decision to acquire nuclear 
weaponry— changed the equation and brought France a new kind of relief from its 
sempiternal fear about Germany which allowed it to refocus its attention on economic 
objectives.634 The initial effect was a slowdown in the integration process. The 
Tindemands Report on European Union which was tabled in December 1975 attributed 
the fact that the "European concept* seemed to have "lost much of its force and initial
impetus' directly to the fading of geopolitical motivation;
in 1975 the European citizen does not view the reasons for the construction of Europe in exactly 
the same way as in 1950. The European idea is partly a victim of its own successes: the 
reconciliation between formerly hostile countries, the economic prosperity due to the enlarged 
market, the détente which has taken the place of the Cold W ar. . . 635 
y.
Yet, the goal of biding Germany and securing peaceful relations in Europe through 
integration was never left completely out o f sight. For example, the view that volatility o f  
European currency market during the 1920s had exacerbated Germany's hyperinflation and 
indirectly precipitated the rise of Germany's fascism was widespread in both France and 
Germany and was referred to frequently during negotiations o f the EMS.636 Similarly, 
there are important aspects of the Single European Act which cannot be explained without 
attention to the continued goal of binding German power. While SEA is largely 
remembered for its introduction o f the idea o f a Single Market and of the "cooperation 
procedure' between EPC and the other Community institutions, it was also important for
6 3 3  Even scholars who champion a geo-political interpretation of integration, such as Michael Baun and 
Patrick McCarthy, generally point to a disjuncture between the integration initiatives of the 1950s and early 
1990s, both of which are seen to have been motivated by a desire to promote peace, and the initiatives of the 
intervening decades which are seen to have been driven primarily by ‘interdependence and economic necessity’. 
Thus, Michael Baun says of the events of 1989-90 that they “made the logic of security once again the 
predominant driving force of European integration,,. Baun 1996, p. 7— my underlining. See also Kolodziej 
1974, p. 173.1 argue that there is no such sharp incongruity between the initiatives of the 1950s and later 
moves towards deeper integration.
6 3 4  Haglund 1991, p. 109.
6 3 5  See Hill 2000.
6 3 6  Giavazzi and Giovanni 1989, p. 5, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993, p. 117.
innovations in the area o f foreign policy.637 Progress in this area—which had little to do 
with commercial goals—was a result o f French insistence on accompanying SEA with a 
revision of the Treaty of Rome and the drafting o f a separate treaty on political 
cooperation and European security.638 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was 
strongly opposed to institutional change, correctly anticipated the consequences o f French
President Mitterrand’s ‘obsession’ with placing constraints on German political power;
Like so many Frenchmen of his generation, [Mitterrand] is driven by a fear of die consequences of
German domination.. .his actions would for this very reason always be directed towards keeping the
Germans bound into the EC, where the French might be able to exercise greater influence over them.
.. .Consequently I knew that the French attitude at the forthcoming Council would be to press hard for
closer TSuropean Union” .6 3 9  *
Apart from political union, one area in which France was concerned with ‘binding’ 
German power was monetary policy. The desire to change the basis of European monetary 
cooperation arose in part from domestic political changes within France which turned 
French policy in a more monetarist, market-oriented direction. However, it also reflected 
changes at the international level. From 1979 to 1984, France had on several occasions been 
compelled to bow to German monetary priorities and abandon its expansionary economic 
policies to stay within the ERM.646 As a result, France considered for a while to leave EMS 
in order to pursue its preferred monetary policy. However, Mitterrand concluded in 1983 
that a withdrawal from EMS would be too costly for France. Instead he resolved to seek to 
bring European monetary policy under European, rather than German control through the 
transfer o f Bundesbank authority to European institutions.641
6 3 7  The SEA was entitled the ‘single act’ not because it introduced a single market but to convey the way it 
brought EPC and the Communities under the same legal umbrella for the first time. See Hill 2000, p. 13S.
63® Margaret Thatcher sought to bloc the ICG which she saw as entailing the danger of opening further 
demands for political reform. Prior to the Milan Summit she circulated a paper called "Europe: The Future” 
which called for basing market liberalization on an intergovernmental agreement outside of the treaty of Rome. 
To this other members reacted by threatening to exclude Britain from the common-market initiative unless it 
conceded to political reform. Thatcher therefore reluctantly agreed to call an ICG. See Thatcher 1993, p. 549.
6 3 9  Thatcher 1993, p. 553.
640 Between 1979 and 1984, EMS members had been forced to realign bilateral rates seven times. Baun, p. 25.
6 4 1  Baun 1996, p. 25-6; Taylor 1989; Sandholtz 1993, p. 27.
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But why would Germany, who was clearly the dominant country in European 
monetary affairs, agree to accept constraints on its room for maneuver? Here it is once 
again important to look to Germany’s geopolitical goals. The SEA was broached at a time 
where German Osipoiitik was beginning to bear fruit as is evidenced by the treaty of 
friendship between two Germanies.642 As German policy swayed towards the East, it 
became increasingly important to its neighbors to integrate it politically and economically 
into the W est By extension, it became crucial for Germany to reassure its partners of its 
unquestioned political and economic ties to the West During the 1970s, Germany had 
resisted deepening o f cooperation on both defense and monetary policy. But around 1980 
an important shift occurred. At this time, planning began in the German Foreign Ministry 
for a European relance involving a strengthening of political cooperation as a vital 
complement to a more independent German Ostpolitik.643 Deepening of both political 
and economic cooperation within the EC were important components of this policy7.
In the final analysis, the SEA was a disappointment for France and other pro- 
integrationist countries. During the negotiations of the SEA France and Italy pushed hard for 
monetary integration. When Germany and Britain threatened to tie any monetary agreement 
to the complete liberalization of capital markets by the end of 1986, however, France agreed 
to a compromise that included no concrete steps beyond existing policy7.644 645Nonetheless, 
France succeeded, to Thatcher’s great irritation, to get a reference to the gpal of an eventual 
monetary union included in the preamble to the revised treaty.64-* Apart from this modest 
step, however, the changes introduced by SEA were small. Thanks mainly to British
6 4 2  Kocs 1995, p.102.
6 4 3  Aybet 1997, p. 135, Kocs 1995, pp. 139-141.
6 4 4  Moravcsik 1991, p. 42-43. According to Moravcsik, British opposition led to a minimalist program 
limited to those procedural changes needed to liberalize the internal market. There was no real delegation of 
further sovereignty. Moravcsik 1991, p. 61-2
645 At a bilateral meeting between Kohl and Thatcher in November 1985 the two leaders had agreed to 
exclude economic and monetary union as a goal in the SEA. Kohl changed his mind when the French and 
Italians liberalized their exchange control provisions and the goals of monetary union was therefore 
eventually included in the Preamble to the SEA See Taylor 1989, p. 10; see also Margaret Thatcher 1993.
opposition, procedural reform was limited to matters directly related to the internal m arket 
Progress on foreign policy cooperation was limited to article 30 o f the Treaty which obliged 
members to ‘inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest’. 
No concrete steps were taken on defense.
IIX  T he Maast r ic t  Tr eaty  on  E u r o pe an  Un io n , 19 9 1
The Treaty on European Union (THU) signed at Maastrict in December 1991 
provides a clear expression of the logic o f institutiona] binding. While the initiative for 
TEU was rooted in events prior to the end o f  the Cold War, the form of the final treaty as 
well as the timing o f its completion were closely determined by the dual events of the end 
of the Cold War and German reunification, both of which gave new life to existing 
anxieties about German domination in Europe. The TEU fixed a timetable for the 
transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and created a political union with 
provisions for both foreign policy and defense cooperation (‘second pillar’). 
Neofunctionalist and political economy-oriented scholars have frequently portrayed TEU 
as the logical follow-up to the Single European Act, citing the chronological conjunction 
between German reunification and EMU as a mere coincidence.646 However, arguments 
for 'economic spill-over' from the SEA to EMU are not convincing. Indeed, many 
economists dispute that a currency union is necessary in order to reap the full benefits o f 
free trade.647 Moreover, not only the timing o f TEU (which followed immediately in the 
wake of German reunification) but also the political arguments invoked in favor o f the 
treaty strongly suggests a link to geo-strategic concerns.
6 4 6  E.g. Moravcsik 1998, pp. 379-381.
6 4 7  Peter Kenen, argues that the "one market, one money" approach in no was able to prove that "the 
benefits [of EMU] would exceed the costs”. Similarly Martin Feldstein has refuted die assertion that a single 
market needs a single currency, let alone a monetary union. He concludes that the main push for EMU was 
political, not economic. For a discussion see Eichengreen & Frieden 1994, p. 9.
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Initially, the link between TEU and security concerns was weak. The first step 
towards a European union was taken with the French Delors plan for a European currency 
union which was tabled in January 1988-well before anyone foresaw the end of the Cold 
War. This proposal can be seen as a reaction to the asymmetrical nature of the EMS and 
the economic and monetary dominance it allowed Germany. During the 1980s, the 
German Bundesbank had come to play what many Europeans regarded as a hegemonic’ 
role within EMS. After the failure to reach agreement on monetary integration during the 
negotiations of the SEA, Francois Mitterrand and French Finance Minister Edouard 
Balladur—backed by their Italian colleagues— continued therefore to call for a breaking o f 
German monetar}7 hegemony through the transfer of Bundesbank authority to a set o f 
common European institutions.648
But while monetary policy set the stage for EMU, it was the political events of 1989 
that accelerated the move towards both monetary and political u n io n .^  Specifically, the 
EMU—like previous integration initiatives before it—gained support in reaction to the rapid 
progression in German Ostpolitik. Perennial fears about a modem day Rapallo accord 
between Germany and Russia had surfaced at critica] times during the Cold War. The let­
up in Soviet policy in the second-half o f the 1980s redoubled such fears resulting 
immediately in pressure for new initiatives to deepen West European integration. 6^ 0 In 
retrospect, the year which marked a genuine turning point in East-West relations was 1988.
^4 8  See Le Monde, January 8 and January 15,1988. See also Tiersky 1991, p. 16, Dinan 1994, p. 159 and 
Cole 1993, p. 373. The 1988 Delors Report which launched EMU can be seen largely as motivated by the 
desire of the weaker currency countries in Europe to enhance their influence and control over German 
monetary policy. For an interpretation of the EMU along these lines see Grieco 1995a and 1995b, Baun 
1996, pp. 25-26 and Taylor 1989. Wayne Sandholtz criticizes this explanation for not accounting for German 
support for EMU. First, he argues, Germany should have been opposed to changing a system in which it had 
the predominant role. Second, greater voice for other EMS countries did not require the dramatic step of 
sacrificing monetary sovereignty to EMU but could have been realized within the existing system. See 
Sandholtz 1993, pp. 27-30,34-36.
6 4^ See Baun 1996, p. 155.
650 Dumas began to question Germany's continued Western moorings as early as 1986, after Gorbachev 
had announced a program of domestic political and economic reforms. See Genscher 1995, Verheyen 1992, 
and Thadden 1998.
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From 1987 to 1988, the Soviet Union greatly increased the number of ethnic Germans it 
permitted to emigrate to West Germany, leading to warmer relations between Moscow and 
Bonn. Gorbachev invited several leading German politicians to Moscow for official visits, 
including Chancellor Helmut FCohl, and in December 1988 Gorbachev announced a 
substantial unilateral reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.65*
The new opening in Soviet policy presented a challenge to Germany. At the end o f 
the reconcilement process with Moscow loomed the theoretical possibility for German 
reunification. However, Bonn knew that it would need full support from its W est 
European allies in order to negotiate reunification with Moscow. A strengthening o f the 
ties between Germany and its West European neighbors was therefore more important 
than ever.651 52 * As a result, Germany began to look more favorably at the French plan for 
EMU. Until 1988, the Germans had shown little enthusiasm for deeper monetary 
integration. But with the growing instability in Eastern Europe, the idea was now embraced 
for political reason. Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, indicated that he saw 
monetary cooperation as an important bargaining chip to achieve bilateral cooperation on 
foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.655 Thus, in June 1989, while increasing numbers o f  
East Europeans fled to the West via across the border between Hungary and Austria, the 
Delors Committee's plan for EMU was endorsed by all EC members, albeit with strong 
reservations on the part of Britain, and an intergovernmental conference was scheduled for 
December 1990 to discuss its implementation.
Meanwhile, the revolution in Eastern Europe was picking up speed. On 9 
November 1989 the gates to the Berlin W all were thrown open, and on 28 November,
6 5 1  Kocs 1995, p.278.
6 5 2  Aybet 1997, p. 141, Cole 1993, p. 369. A preliminary step towards deepening integration was taken with
the establishment in 1988 o f a joint Franco-German brigade as well as a Defense and Security Council which
would serve as an ‘experiment' for wider European defense cooperation leading to a future European army.
6 5 5  Baun 1996, p. 26; Sandholtz 1993, p. 31; and Financial Times, 2 1 , January 1988, p. 2 .
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Helmut Kohl announced his ten-point program for unification of the two Germanies.654 
The sudden prospect for German reunification had a profound effect on the pace o f the 
negotiations for EMU. Until the fall of 1989, the Delors Report had merely been one in a 
stream of proposals for European monetary integration that had been brought forward since 
the 1960s. But with the prospect for Germany reunification, the French initiative took on 
security policy value.655 The image of a reunified Germany once again placed the ‘German 
problem7 squarely on the European agenda. The merging of the Bwtdzswhr—already the 
largest national army in West Europe—with the East German Nationale Volksamee would 
make Germany the leading conventional military power in Europe. The new Germany 
would also be an economic giant. A unified Germany would account for 27% of the 
Community's GDP and 25% of its population. The D-Mark, already the leading European 
currency7, would likely be strengthened by the expansion o f the German markets.656 More 
importantly, Germany’s geographic location meant that its security improved more 
dramatically as a result o f the collapse of the Soviet Empire than the security of any of its 
allies. This lead to the fear that a reunified Germany would be much less dependent on its 
allies.657
The immediate reaction in both France and Britain was to oppose German 
reunification altogether. However, it quickly stood clear that this strategy was infeasible.65^
6 5 4  Chancellor’s Press Release 134/1989, p. 1141. Oman 1994, pp. 161-162.
6 5 5  Saeterl995.
6 5 6  Dinan 1994, p. 161 and Mortimer 1992, p. 10.
6 5 7  Heilman 1997, p. 34.
65^ In December Mitterrand traveled to Moscow to discuss with Gorbachev the possibility of preventing 
reunification, and on 6  December, Mitterrand and Gorbachev published a joint declaration stating that any 
altering of European borders was ‘premature’ and would have ‘destabilizing effects’. The Economist, 21 
October 1989, pp. 50,58, iV-Yl Times, December 7,1989. See also Saeter, 1995, p. 360, Kissinger 1994, p. 
229; and Baun 1996, p. 38,41; and Sandholtz 1993, p. 32. Also Thatcher also tried to stop German 
reunification by seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union. Thatcher 1993, p. 792. However, Moscow 
declined to take any concrete step to halt German reunification. When the US agreed to the two-plus-four 
formula in February 1990, it was clear that reunification could not be stopped. See Kocs, p. 214. In her 
memoirs Margaret Thatcher expresses her disillusion with the American approach to German reunification. 
Thatcher 1993, p. 795-796-
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The French policy therefore shifted towards strengthening cooperation with the new 
Germany within the EC.659 Already in October 1989, Mitterrand argued that recent 
development in Germany and Eastern Europe made it “both urgent and necessary to 
reinforce the existing institutional structures of the Community”.660 In November 1989, 
shortly after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, Jacques Delors undertook a tour of eleven EC capitals 
to drum up support for EMU.661 He found strong support for his views both in Italy and the 
Benelux countries. Illustrative is a declaration from André Szasz, deputy president o f the 
Dutch central bank, which stated that it was essential to bind Germany to EMU since 
otherwise there was the danger that “Germany in the next two decades, will become a 
different country”.662
The events of the fall of 1989 also turned Germany in favor of EMU as a means o f 
alleviating fears o f German 'Alleingang*.66  ^ Whereas the German Bundesbank and the 
Ministry o f Finance remained opposed to EMU, and although strong misgiving were voiced 
by much of the German financial and business community, foreign-policy leaders like Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher and Helmut Kohl pushed ahead with monetary integration as a way to 
demonstrate Germany’s continued commitment to European cooperation.664 *Thus, in the 
days and weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kohl and Genscher repeatedly asserted 
Germany’s loyalty to the Community.66  ^Both men were concerned that the prospect o f
6^° Saeter 1995, p. 361. Thatcher said later about the decision facing Mitterrand: “Essentially he had the 
choice between moving ahead faster towards a federal Europe in order to tie down the German giant or to 
abandon this approach and return to that associated with General de Gaulle— the defense of French 
sovereignty and the striking up o f alliances.” Thatcher 1993b, p. 798.
6 6 0  The London Economist, 21 October 1989, p. 50, cited in Baun 1996, p. 38.
6 6 1  Sandholtz 1993, p. 32.
6 6 2  Opcit.
6 6 2  On the view that Bonn acquiesced in EMU to make reunification more palatable to its partners, see e.g. 
Eichengreen & Frieden 1994, Tsoukalis 19xx, p. 208, Grieco 1995a, and Sandholtz 1993, pp. 131-132.
6 6 4  Baun 1996, pp. 28 ,37 ,60 , Kupchan 1998, p. 61.
66  ^ Kohl’s speech to the Bundestag on November 28,1989, in which he outlined a ten-point program for 
German and European unification proclaimed that “a future architecture of Germany must be fitted into the 
future architecture of Europe as a whole” In particular, the EC and the CSCE would provide the two 
essential pillars for a united Germany in post-Cold War Europe, Chancellor’s Press Release 134/1989, p. 
1141. See Dinan 1994, p. 162.
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reunification must under no circumstances be allowed to slow the pace towards monetary 
integration.666 The crucial question, Kohl insisted, was whether the Germans would 
‘commit ourselves irremovably to economic and political union’ or make possible ca 
reversion to earlier times’.667
However, German consent to EMU was no longer enough to satisfy its neighbors. 
The demand was now for political and defense integration as well. From February 1990, 
Mitterrand’s top officials were in constant contact with their German counterparts over a 
proposal for political union.668 In March 1990, the Belgian government submitted a 
proposal for a European Political Union, and on 19 April 1990, Mitterrand and Kohl 
declared in a joint letter to the Irish Presidency that the pace o f both monetary and political 
union needed to be accelerated to ‘match the rapid movement towards German 
unification’.669 670It was therefore decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGQ on political union to start in December and to run alongside that on EMU. The new 
goal of political union elicited sharp protests from Margaret Thatcher, whose objections are 
worth citing:
‘Political union’ was now envisaged alongside ‘monetary union’. In a sense, o f course, this was only 
logical. A single currency and a single economic policy ultimately imply a single government. But 
behind the concept of ‘political union* lay a special Franco-German agenda. The French wanted to 
curb German power...The French were federalists on grounds of tactics rather than conviction. 
The Germans wanted ‘political union* for different reasons and by different means. For them it was 
partly the price o f achieving quick reunification with East Germany on their own terms and with all 
the benefits which would come from Community membership, partly a demonstration that the new
Germany would not behave like the old Germany form Bismarck to Hitler” . . ,67^
6 6 6  Baun 1996, pp. 37-38. Similar statements were made by Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher who 
assured his allies that Germany was still committed to a European Germany not a German Europe and by 
Horst Telschik who stated that only further integration would help a united Germany find its identity in 
Europe. See Nea> York T im s, 17 Nov. 1989 and 14 Feb. 1990.
6 6 7  Address of 2 December 1992, Bundestag, series 12, p. 10824.
6 6 8  Moravcsik 1998, pp. 407-408.
6 6 9  See Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, p. 276; and Baun 1996, p. 46. This was followed a few days later by 
a mutual appeal by Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Dumas to the Community “to seize the moment and make a 
‘quantum leap* forward towards political union”. Financial Times, April 23,1990.
6 7 0  Thatcher 1993b.
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Unlike Mitterrand, however, Thatcher never accepted the idea that integration 
could substitute for a policy of balancing German power.* *71 Instead, she argued,
German power will be best accommodated in a looser Europe in which individual nation states
retain their freedom of action...If Germany or any other power then pursues a policy to which
other countries object, it will automatically invite a coalition against itself. And the resulting solution
will reflect the relative weight of the adversaries.**7“
W hat Thatcher was calling for was in effect a return to a traditional balance of 
power system— a position consistent with long-standing British policy on European 
integration.
Negotiation o f  the Treaty on European Union
The two IGCs on EMU and EPU opened in Rome in December 1990— only weeks 
after Germany was officially reunified. The main objective o f France, Italy and the Benelux 
countries during the negotiations was to reach agreement on political union, including a 
common foreign policy and defense policy, and to obtain an irreversible commitment from 
Germany to place its monetary policy under the authority of a European institution which 
would end German quasi-hegemony over monetary affairs. To Bonn, on the other hand, the 
primary goal was to demonstrate Germany's continued commitment to European integration 
without surrendering too much autonomy over monetary policy. Specifically, Bonn sought 
firm assurances that a common monetary policy would not endanger the German goal of 
price stability. A  concrete point of disagreement concerned the timing of the establishing of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Germany argued that it was more prudent to wait to 
create an ECB until full convergence had been obtained at the end o f Stage III. France, on 
the other hand, urged the inauguration of an ECB at the beginning of Stage II. When the go- 
slow front in Germany began to assert itself more strongly during the summer of 1990, 
Delors publicly took Bonn to task, stating that the attempt to set firm dates for EMU was a
**7 1  Moravcsik, 1998, p. 418, Thatcher 1993b, p. 813-814.
**7^ Thatcher 1993a, p. 21.
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“way of testing Germany's commitment to economic and monetary union: and arguing that 
firm dates were needed “because we have to bind Germany into Europe irreversibly”.67^
In December 1991 the EC leaders met in the Dutch town o f Maastrict and agreed to 
the TEU. In the final analysis, the Maastrict treaty represented a clear victory for those 
concerned about the strength and future orientation of a united Germany. During the 
negotiations, Germany compromised more o f its initial objectives than any other country. 
This occurred notably by accepting a concrete timetable for a single currency thereby giving 
up the D-Mark without having received any ironclad guarantees o f low inflation or basic 
monetary stability and by accepting political union.* 674
The Maastrict agreement featured a wide mix of economic, political and military 
constraints on national power which served to deepen binding. Whereas, French opponents 
of EMU argued during the referendum campaign in 1992 that supranational institutions 
and a single currency cannot really constrain German power and the country’s political 
hegemony over the continent, there can be no doubt that the EMU represented a 
significant deepening o f binding compared to the previous EMS.67  ^ The fact that EMU 
irrevocably fixes exchange rates among EU members and locates responsibility for the 
exchange against third countries in the ECB which is guided by community-wide interests 
presents a firm constraint on national policy. Maastrict also led to improvements in the area 
o f military binding. The TEU introduced a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) and 
committed members to the eventual establishment of a common European defense.676 
Although it failed to achieve any immediate progress with respect to the integration o f
67  ^ The London Economist, 29 September, 1990. Quoted in Baun 1996, p. 51. See also Diflan 1994, p.
178-
674 Cole 1993, p. 373.
67:> On French skepticism about the binding features of the EMU Risse 1998, p. 6. See also Cole 1993, p. 
368.
676 Article J.4.1 in the second pillar of the TEU (defense pillar) dedares that the CFSP “encompasses all 
questions relating to the security of die European Union, induding ultimately the definition of a common 
defense policy which could lead, at the proper moment, to a common defense.
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European militaries, the commitment to a future European defense laid down an important 
foundation for the eventual creation of an autonomous European defense structure outside 
NATO.
Interpretation
For Germany’s European neighbors—in particular France--TEU presented a means 
for anchoring a untied Germany more firmly into Western Europe. Francois Mitterrand, like 
Charles de Gaulle and George Pompidou before him, was convinced that there was no hope 
of exercising any real influence over a future united Germany from within NATO.677 When 
it stood clear that German reunification was imminent, the French government therefore 
immediately stepped up the pace towards a European union which would provide for both 
monetary, political and military cooperation.
That anxieties over German reunification were a key motivation behind the TEU is 
suggested both by the timing of the French and Benelux proposals for monetary and 
political union and by the many statements to this effect by European government 
officials.678 O f course, institutional binding is not the only plausible explanation for die 
agreement on TEU. The Maastrict agreement may also be explained by a PE logic, 
stressing the economic benefits that may follow from monetary union. The potential 
beneficial effects o f a fixed exchange rate regime for free trade are easy to grasp. The high 
costs of protection against exchange-rate fluctuations under a floating regime increases the 
transaction costs associated with all forms o f cross-border exchange. Eliminating this 
factor of insecurity will presumably facilitate the free flow o f goods and services among 
members. Moreover, a single currency will lead to savings in exchange reserves. For these 
reasons, the creation o f  EMU may be interpreted simply as an effort to reduce transaction
677 Aybet 1997,p. 170.
678 See Cole 1993, pp. 368-375 and Yost 1990.
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costs and facilitate free trade.6^  The trouble with this explanation is that the economic 
benefits from a currency union are not clear. Many economists have questioned whether 
EMU adds anything to the benefits, in terms of monetary stability, already achieved by 
EMS. Some have also voiced concerns that a rigid monetary union may lead to long-term 
economic recession. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of the PE hypothesis, the 
primary impetus behind EMU came not from ministries of finance or firms doing business 
in Europe, but from politicians concerned about the geopolitical structure of Europe.* 680 
As Jeffrey Frieden and Barry Eichengreen observe, “domestically there [was] no evidence of 
strong private sector preferences in favor o f or against EMU in France.” The same was the 
case in Germany.681 This leads me to conclude that to adequately explain EMU one must 
consider geo-strategic incentives as well as economic ones.
IX C o n c l u s io n
The preventive war dilemma has been a persistent source o f conflict in modem 
European history. Among the possible dyads, the Franco-German has been particularly 
subject to this pathology. Since 1870, France and its closest allies, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, have faced a relentlessly growing Germany unable to commit not to use its 
preponderant power to revise the territorial status quo. The result in 1914 and 1939 was 
large scale war. However, the preventive war dilemma has also been at the heart o f 
European integration. The desire to obtain a  credible guarantee against renewed German 
aggression runs throughout the history o f European integration and has given rise to 
several institutions designed to neutralize German threat. These institutions have been 
primarily championed by the countries that have been most vulnerable to German
°79 Sandholtz 1993, p. 19.
680 Kupchan 1998, p.61.
681 Eichengreen & Frieden 1994, p. 9. Similarly, Thomas Risse (1998) notes that is nearly impossible to find 
significant support for EMU among economic interest groups, particularly in Germany.
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aggression in the past— chiefly France and the Benelux states—whereas countries that 
have been less exposed to German aggression—such as the neutral European states and 
Britain— have been reluctant to embrace the ideal of European integration.
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that the timing and outcome o f the 
major intergovernmental bargains which define European integration have been tied closely 
to a desire to control and constrain German power. Some may object that this kind of 
‘power-political* approach is outmoded. Thus Alan Mihvard has argued that “to write 
about 20* century states as though they could adjust their foreign policies on [such] purely 
pragmatic grounds is a board game and no more. The EC has self-evidently had other 
functions, as well as embodying other aspirations and ideas”.682 Milward is right in saying 
that the EC has served other functions than binding German power. For example, it has 
helped to greatly improve the economic prosperity of its members. However, as I have 
attempted to show, demands for welfare improvements have often been satisfied only after 
the primary objective o f national security was met.
Of course, not all developments within the EC can be attributed to geopolitical 
change in Europe. Over time, as European states have grown to feel more secure, the goal 
o f obtaining commercial advantages has come to play a relatively larger role. Thus Europe 
today features a plethora of multi-purpose political and regulatory institutions many of 
which have nothing to do with the goal of constraining German power. Yet, at the core of 
the European integration project lies the desire to bind German power. Without this goal, I 
argue, today’s Europe would have looked markedly different. That this is the case is 
suggested both by the timing of major integration initiatives and by the concrete form of 
European integration. As we have seen, the various institutions which constitute the EC have 
been designed explicitly to freeze the balance o f political influence among member states.
682 Milward 1992, p. xi.
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The first step towards integration, the ECSC of 1952, institutionalized three groups of 
powers— large (France, Germany, Italy), medium (Belgium and the Netherlands), and small 
(Luxembourg)—with each country within a group having the same weight. This principle 
o f equal vote allocations for states within each group has remained a cornerstone of 
European institutions— despite variations in actual, underlying power. Thus, although the 
overall allocation of voting weights has changed with each successive enlargement of the 
EC, relative weights have not. Because of this rule, German institutional power (measured 
in voting share) has moved further away from its actual power as measured in GDP. In 
1952, German voting weight was 9 percent below its actual power— calculated in GDP; by 
1995, it had dropped to 16 percent.6^  The Nice Summit o f December 2000, the last one 
to date to raise the issue o f readjusting voting weights, did not chance this reality.
The political balance o f influence instituted by the EC has been rendered binding 
through a variety o f specific bargains and exchanges which have served to generate 
efficiency gains and to increase the costs of exit. Consecutive rounds o f treaty negotiations 
have also instituted various transfer mechanisms designed to channel economies benefits 
from the ‘winners’ o f the integration process to less advantaged states, thereby ensuring 
that economic growth remains balanced. However, integration o f military capacity has 
lagged markedly behind. This raises the question which I posed at the beginning of this 
chapter: Is Germany sufficiently bound within the EU? Looking at Europe today, it appears 
as though Germany is more firmly anchored in the configuration o f European politics than 
almost any other state. Yet; the fact remains that without integration o f military capabilities, 
the commitment to continued peaceful cooperation is not fully credible. Indeed, the firmly 683
683 gee Rasmussen & Verdier 2001. Within the group of the largest states, in the first constellation of EC 
membership, population size varied from 46.7 million (France) to 54 million (Germany), in 1995 this range 
was from 55.6 million to 61.2. million, the 1885 the range was 56.9 million (Italy) to 80.6 million (Germany). 
In all of these stages votes were attributed on an equal basis to the largest states, as each of them held ten 
votes in the Council. See Hosli 2001, p. 4.
established peace in Europe over the last five decades own largely to NATO—a sheer 
military alliance, subject to free riding and changes of heart Were NATO to follow the sad 
fate of the German Bund, the Europeans may find themselves in the precanous situation 
of the German states by the mid-19th century, operating a very successful trade and 
currency union, but ineffective at binding Prussia—the rising hegemon at the time.
'Enlargement
The European integration project began as a way to bind German power and this 
goal has continued to play a crucial role for successive integration steps. As it has evolved, 
however, the EC has become a guarantor o f security in a rather wider sense than that o f  
containing Germany. This is especially true with respect to Southern and Eastern 
enlargement. Both Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EC shortly after their departure 
from a period of fascism and a transformation from an authoritarian or dictatorial regime 
to a democratic system. Their accession to the EC could hardly be justified in economic 
terms; the demand o f membership was made, and accepted, in terms of democratic 
solidarity and Western and Mediterranean stability.6**4
Today, a similar series of demands and responses is taking place between the EC 
and the Central and East European Countries (CEECs).684 85 Between 1992 and 1994 ten 
(CEECs) applied for EU membership.686 The Copenhagen meeting of the European 
Council in June 1993 formally committed the EU members to enlarge the union to 
encompass these countries. However, the prospect of Eastern enlargement poses a major 
challenge to the future of the EU. Whereas countries in close proximity to Eastern 
Europe—such as Germany—support Eastern enlargement as a way to enhance security 
and stability in that region, traditionally integrationist countries such as France and the
684 Soetendorp 1999,45.
685 Wallace 19xx,p. 61.
686 These include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia
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Benelux countries have been more skeptical towards Eastern enlargement687 In France it is 
feared that enlargement will further enhance German power and influence by shifting 
Eastwards the European center of gravity both geographically and politically.688 
Economically, enlargement is also likely to benefit Germany disproportionately. In terms of 
both imports and exports Germany is the largest trading partner with virtually all countries 
in the region. France has therefore championed a cautious approach towards enlargement 
and expressed a preference for a deepening of integration before widening 689
Currently there seems to be little benefit to France and the Benelux from 
enlargement. Whereas German trade with Eastern Europe has risen sharply through the 
1990s, France, at present, is not very involved in Eastern Europe. However, this may have 
to change. As Karl Lamers of the German CDU said in an interview to the Danish 
newspaper Po&ikken in May 1996: “France has to be part of it if  they do not want to 
exclude themselves. Otherwise German influence in Europe will grow even more”.69  ^Still, 
there can be no doubt that enlargement will pose significant problems for the union. In 
absorbing all ten CEEC applicants, the EU will add nearly a third to its population but only 
4% to its GDP.691 Moreover, enlargement will necessitate a renegotiation of decision­
making procedures within the EU. How this will accept the institutional balance o f power 
remains to be seen. So far it seems that the only real advantage for France and other pro­
in tegrationist countries in accepting Eastern enlargement is that they may be able to link 
enlargement to a deepening of integration by insisting that some countries be allowed to
687 Since 1991, Germany has taken initiative to establish five Euroregions along the borders of the Czech 
Republic and Germany and had signed treaties on 'good neighbody relations' with Poland and the Czech 
Republic in 1990/91. These aims tally with German foreign policy priorities of promoting stability in Central 
Europe through both bi-lateral means and multi-lateral EU efforts at integration. See Emil Kirchner, 
‘Transnational Border Cooperation Between Germany and the Czech Republic: Implications for 
Decentralization and European Integration” . EUI Working Paper RSC No 98/504, Dec. 1998. Grabbe & 
Hughes 1998, p. 5.
688 Baun 1996, p. 157.
689 Soetendorp 1999, p. 126.
690 PoUtikken, 12 May, 1996.
691 Grabbe & Hughes 1998, p. 1.
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move ahead, for example in the area o f military cooperation. Paris has already played this 
card at the Maastrict and Amsterdam. At present, however, the challenge of enlargement 
and its effect on binding remains unresolved.
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VII Conclusion
In this dissertation I have sought to identify the forces that drive regional integration. 
My central argument is that integration is motivated by a desire to prevent violent conflict 
among states. Specifically, I have argued that integration poses a solution to a regional 
preventive w ar dilemma. The historical record of the three case studies—the United 
Provinces, the German Zollverein and the European Communities—supports this 
explanation. This final chapter begins by summarizing the main findings from each of these 
cases with respect to the sources of state preferences for integration and institutional 
outcomes; briefly discusses some additional cases, then moves on to consider the general 
theoretical implications o f the institutional binding thesis.
The previous chapters have evaluated two basic hypotheses. The first takes 
integration— defined as ‘the voluntary linking in the political and economic domains of two 
or more states to the extent that authority over key areas o f national policy is shifted to the 
supranational level’—as the dependent variable. The theory of institutional binding which I 
have laid out maintains that integration presents a solution to a particular commitment 
problem, known as the preventive war dilemma. I have argued that rivaling states who face a 
preventive dilemma but realize that they cannot improve their security through war will 
prefer a negotiated settlement whereby each side promises to abide by the status quo. 
However, given that they cannot trust each other to uphold the deal expost, agreement is only 
possible if  states can devise an institution that enables credible commitment by disabling 
states* discretion to renege on the bargain. This gives rise to a demand for integration as a 
means to lock in particular agreements.
The second hypothesis takes the success o f institutional binding as its dependent 
variable. Here I take integration as a response to a preventive war dilemma as given and go
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on to ask what types of arrangements render commitments credible and hence secure 
peaceful cooperation over time. The theory of binding maintains that, in order to solve a 
preventive war dilemma, a regional institution must not only freeze the balance of power 
(counted in political influence), it must also establish binding constraints on state power 
which prevent states from declaring the institution null and void when they no longer wish 
to comply with its rules. I have argued that this form o f binding can be achieved in three 
ways: by transferring or pooling strategic resources among states to equalize power, by raising 
exit costs, and by generating efficiency gains that are contingent on the continuation o f the 
institution.
I. Cases
The three historical cases examined in this study confirm that the most persistent 
source o f state preferences for integration is a regional security threat In each case, 
preferences for integration emerged after a period of increasing tension among a group of 
states caused by the rapid growth o f one state and the relative decline of others. In the case 
of the Netherlands, the looming hegemony o f Holland led other states to seek to bind it 
within the Union of Utrecht; in the Zollverein the rise of Prussia provided a motivation for 
economic integration; and in postwar West Europe, the fear o f a renewed threat from 
Germany has played a crucial role for the development of the EC/EU. Moreover, in each 
case, the most widely cited alternative sources for preferences for integration— external 
threat, economic interests, nationalist ideology— played a decidedly secondary role.
The three cases also confirm that integration provides a way of neutralizing power. 
In each case, integration aimed to reduce the returns to power by instituting a new power 
distribution— counted in political influence— stable enough to resist change even in the face 
o f subsequent variations in the underlying distribution of military and economic resources. 
Nonetheless, the success o f binding varies widely across the three cases. Only in one case—
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the United Provinces— did states succeed in establishing joint control over the resources that 
make independent aggression possible. In the case of the German Zollverein and—to a 
lesser extent—in the case of the EC, states failed to adequately establish control over military 
power but relied only on transfers of economic resources, on exit costs and on efficiency 
gains. This made binding less solid.
The United Provinces
The case o f the United Provinces offers perhaps the clearest support for the 
institutional binding thesis. In this case, preferences for integration emerged at a time when 
Holland was growing at a faster rate than surrounding states, thereby threatening to establish 
a local hegemony. Given the threat from Spain—which declining states exploited by aligning 
with Spain against Holland—Holland realized that it had much to lose from a local war and 
more to gain from cooperation with its smaller neighbors. There was a time-consistency 
problem however. Given that Holland was growing faster than other states, it would be able 
to use its preponderant power to dominate them in the future. To gain the cooperation of 
the declining states, Holland therefore had to make a credible commitment not to exploit its 
future strength. This was achieved by creating a set of regional institutions which directly 
limited Holland’s ability7 to abuse its preponderant capabilities. First, a common assembly—  
the States General—was instituted which gave all states an equal say in matters of importance 
to the region, regardless of their size and power. Secondly, an executive forum was 
established—the Council o f State— in which votes were weighted such that Holland, 
although it enjoyed greater representation than other states, could be outvoted by a 
combination of the other members. Hence, despite the marked disparity in size and wealth 
among its members, the United Provinces was not a hegemonic union but a union o f 
political equals.
None of the competing independent variables—external threat, economic interests, 
nationalist ideology—played a significant role in the Dutch case. There was no commercial 
pressure for market integration. It is similarly difficult to explain integration in the Dutch case 
by reference to an emerging nationalism. Neither religion, nor political culture, nor common 
history seems to have provided a basis for a lasting union among the Dutch provinces. The 
provinces that united at Utrecht did not have a history o f living in the same political 
community and their traditions were of mutual conflict rather than cooperation. Finally, the 
evidence does not support the notion that integration arose from a need for a defensive 
alliance against Spain. As we have seen, the Dutch Revolt against Spain was not characterized 
by a general uprising o f the Dutch provinces. Only Holland and Zeeland persistently fought 
against Spain, whereas other provinces on many occasions allied with Spain in order to 
contravene Holland’s hegemonic ambitions.
The United Provinces was a highly successful case o f institutional binding. To make 
the commitment to abide by the new institutionalized status quo credible, members agreed 
to pool their military forces in a common army paid for from a common budget and 
commanded by a single commander-in-chief which was chosen by unanimous consent by the 
members o f the union. This army effectively ensured that no state could use its temporary 
strength to gain a lasting military advantage over others. There were also significant efficiency 
gains from integration, resulting chiefly from the great expansion in the region’s external 
trade which followed from unification. While gains from external trade mostly profited 
Holland, other states also benefited by virtue o f  the redistributive mechanisms entailed in the 
union (Holland paid more than half o f  the union’s budget and often extended loans to others 
states). Together these factors ensured that members had neither the means nor to incentive 
to break away from the contractual agreement laid down in the Treaty o f Utrecht.
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The German Zollverein
The German Zollverein also supports the view that regional integration presents a 
way of resolving preventive conflict As in the case of the United Provinces, preferences 
for integration emerged at a time when one state (Prussia) was rising relative to others and 
posed a clear threat to their autonomy. Conscious o f Prussia’s hegemonic potential, the 
secondary German states had previously sought—with the decisive help o f Austria and 
England— to bind Prussia’s military powers within the German Bund of 1815. However, 
this loose arrangement did not offer any provisions for economic cooperation or entail 
safeguards against nationalistic commercial policies. When Prussia adopted a highly 
protectionist customs system which suppressed the trade of neighboring states, these states 
countered by forming rival customs unions. When it became clear that they could not 
match Prussia’s economic power, however, they changed their strategy and sought instead 
to negotiate a commercial agreement with Prussia at a time when Austria’s function as an 
external balancer still allowed them to obtain a favorable deal.
The institutional form of the Zollverein also supports the binding thesis. The 
Zollverein treaties rested on formal equality among its members and the central institutions 
were operated in a way that equalized power among the member states. In the central 
legislative body— called the Customs Congress—each state had one vote, and decisions 
were subject to unanimity. Revenue from the common tariff system was pooled and 
distributed equally among members in strict proportion to their population. This principle 
was highly favorable to the secondary states, whose per capita consumption was 
considerably smaller than die Prussian average. Thus, in effect, the union provided for 
economic redistribution from Prussia to other states.
The explanation which most effectively challenges the binding thesis with regard to 
the German Zollverein is the political economy perspective. Germany in the late 1820s was
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in need of drastic economic reconstruction. Interstate commerce was thwarted by 
antiquated restrictions, poor communications, and high postwar tariffs all of which placed 
the German states at an absolute disadvantage vis-à-vis their European neighbors. Thus, 
from an economic efficiency viewpoint, there were good reasons to undertake market 
liberalization. Demands for liberalization were voiced by many business communities. Yet, 
as we have seen, the call for free trade cannot adequately explain the timing o f integration. 
Throughout the 1820s, appeals from German industrialists and financiers for a reduction 
o f existing barriers to commerce resulted in the rapid build-up o f even greater barriers to 
trade as the German states threw themselves into a bitter customs battle. When economic 
cooperation was introduced in 1834 it was not embraced by the German states in the 
“positive” spirit o f securing joint gains. Indeed, as Werner Henderson notes, and as W alter 
Mattli has reaffirmed, “the States concerned, fought for their own narrow interests and 
many of them joined the Zollverein only when economic depression and empty exchequers 
made further resistance to Prussia impossible”.692
The German Zollverein aimed to equalize power between Prussia and its 
neighbors. In the end, however, the arrangement failed to prevent Prussia from establishing 
a hegemonic leadership. The reason is that the commitment to cooperation on equal terms 
was not fully credible. In seeking to control Prussia’s overwhelming economic power, the 
declining German states neglected to strengthen the military binding undertaken within the 
German Bund. Therefore, in the end, Prussia was able to break loose from the contractual 
agreement and establish hegemonic control. Still, institutional binding was not an absolute 
failure. The fact that other states came to terms with Prussia before it was all powerful 
enabled them to gain important and enduring concessions. The initial quid pro quo according 
to which the Bavarians and other secondary states agreed to Prussian leadership while that
692 Henderson 19xx, p. 112.
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leadership was still militarily unthreatening in exchange for local autonomy became the 
founding principle o f the North German Confederation and the subsequent German 
Empire. In both cases, the major secondary states retained important privileges. For 
example, Bavaria and Württemberg obtained a permanent seat on the military committee of 
the Bundesrat, separate representation at peace negotiations, as well as the chairmanship of the 
imperial committee on foreign affairs. The two states were also allowed to keep control of 
their separate armed forces.693 Thus despite Prussia’s ambitions for centralization, the 
German empire remained a highly decentralized state.
The European Communities
The timing o f integration in postwar Europe offers strong support for the binding 
thesis. Preferences for integration emerged in the wake o f two large-scale wars fought to 
contain German hegemonic ambition. Both of these wars were unsuccessful in establishing a 
lasting solution to the dilemma of preponderant German power. Therefore when the 
problem o f German power resurfaced in the years following World War II, Germany’s 
neighbors chose to seek to bind Germany within common institutions rather than attempt 
another costly and futile preventive war. This choice was conditioned not only by past 
historical memory, but also by the constraints imposed by the Cold War environment which 
raised the costs o f war and made binding relatively easier because of the external security 
guarantee from the United States.
Both the timing and form of European integration suggests that integration has 
aimed at binding national war-making capacity. The first intergovernmental bargain gave 
rise to the ECSC which established joint control over coal and steel—the very resources 
which had rendered large-scale battle possible during World W ar II. The next round of 
negotiations sought to establish supranational control over the armed forces o f individual
693 See Craigh 19xx, and Carr 1979, p. 121-125.
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member-states. Although this attempt failed, the very fact that negotiations for a common 
European army were undertaken for four years offers strong support for the notion that 
states were concerned with constraining military power.
The goal of constraining Germany’s military power was a predominant theme 
throughout the 1950s. After that point, it became clear that NATO could be counted on 
to keep the peace in Europe. America’s military presence essentially took seurity issues o ff 
the European agenda, buying time for economic and political integration to proceed. Thus, 
over the next decades—until the end o f the Cold War— initiatives for further integration 
centered primarily on deepening economic cooperation in order to increase exit costs and 
enhance efficiency gains. However, with the end of the Cold W ar and the event o f German 
reunification, the initial focus on binding military power returned, leading immediately to 
new attempts at deepening integration in the area of military defense.
Finally, the institutional set-up o f the EC confirms that European integration has 
been motivated mainly by a desire to bind German power. Germany is the strongest 
country in Europe to be sure, but its powers within the EC are not reflective o f its actual 
strength. They are ‘tamed’ by choice. As w e have seen, successive integration rounds have 
adhered to a principle o f equal vote allocations for the larger member states, regardless o f 
variations in actual, underlying capabilities. This has meant that Germany’s political power is 
much less pronounced than its actual powrer, thereby preventing it from dictating its 
preferred policy to other states.
W hat is the evidence for competing explanations? On the surface, it may seem that 
the political economy thesis offers a satisfactory explanation for postwar European 
integration. After all, economic cooperation and market liberalization have been at the 
core o f the EC project. Yet economic interests alone cannot explain either the timing or 
the form o f postwar European integration. The European Coal and Steel Community o f 
1952—the bargain which initiated the move towards political and economic integration in
228
Europe—had no important antecedents in market competition and few near-term 
economic consequences.694 Moreover, both employer and producer organizations in 
European coal and steel were strongly opposed to the treaty, casting doubt on the 
hypothesis that governments pursue integration as a way to satisfy dominant domestic 
constituents. Also instructive are the Treaties of Rome which rejected the demand from 
Europe’s big businesses for a pan-European free trade area in industrial and agricultural 
goods, and settled instead on a geographically narrower and politically more constrictive 
customs union among the Six. Explaining these outcome requires attention to geopolitical 
goals.
Neofunctionalist and Historical Institutionalist explanations also have problems in 
accounting for the integration initiatives o f the 1950s. The first step towards European 
integration, the ECSC, was not the result of an incremental process by which past 
institutional choices were transformed into pressure for further cooperation. By contrast, 
the ECSC resulted from a sweeping legal move which placed the entire European 
production of coal and steel under supranational control only few years after the region 
had been tom asunder by war. Moreover, the integrative effect o f the ECSC cannot 
possibly be characterized as an ‘unintended consequence* of the effort to cooperate on 
solving a limited technical problem. Indeed, it was made clear from the very outset by both 
Schuman and Monnet that the coal and steel pool was conceived as “a first step in the 
unification of Europe’*.695
II M o r e  E m p ir ic a l  E v id e n c e
Evidence from the three cases o f integration I have analyzed in this dissertation 
confirm the idea that regional integration is driven by a desire to constrain preponderant
694 Gillingham 2000, p. 85.
695 Dennison, 1955, p. 1. See also Spierenburg & Poidevin 1994, p. 7; Haas 1968, pp. 19-29; and Mason 
1955, p. 123.
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power. However, to adequately test the institutional binding explanation for integration 
more empirical evidence is needed. A key argument o f this dissertation is that econom ic 
interests in and o f themselves are insufficient to spur regional integration. Commercial 
incentives for institutional cooperation exist in many cases 'where integration does not 
result. Therefore a good way to strengthen the argument would be to look at cases in 
which there appears to be strong commercial preferences in favor of market liberalization 
and economic policy coordination and to compare the outcome of these cases to instances 
o f alleged institutional binding. The binding thesis leads us to believe that the former cases 
will give rise to some degree o f institutionalized cooperation but that they will not result in 
integration defined as ‘the voluntary linking in the political and economic domains o f  two 
or more states to the extent that authority over k g  areas o f national policy is shifted to the 
supranational level*.
A quick look at cases such as LAFTA, NAFTA and even EFTA can be seen to 
support this reading. In all these cases there is (has been) strong commercial pressure for 
cooperation to achieve market liberalization. Yet, no pooling o f political decision-powers 
has taken place. Instead regional cooperation has been limited to the establishing o f loose 
free trading areas in which individual states retain most o f their traditional discretion over 
trade and monetary policies—a markedly different outcome from Western Europe both in 
the 1950s and today. This outcome cannot be explained by reference to economic 
preferences alone. Indeed, there is no obvious basis for concluding that the preferences of, 
say, American and Mexican producers are inherently different from those o f their West 
European counterparts. In both cases big business wants the same thing; free trade, and in 
both cases producers have lobbying hard for the removal o f existing barriers to trade. 
Thus, from a strictly economic viewpoint we might have expected integration in the 
Americas to go further. The reason it has not, my theoretical framework suggests, lies in
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the absence of a regional preventive war dilemma which provides states with the 
motivation to surrender sovereignty for the sake of safeguarding peaceful relations.
Another, and more critical way, to further test the binding thesis would be to look 
for additional cases o f preventive war dilemmas to see if  institutional binding was in fact on 
the table. I do not argue that we should expect to see binding in all cases of regional power 
transition. Historically, most power transitions have resulted in war. However, the binding 
thesis suggests that in circumstances where military balancing is perceived as costly and 
where states are sensitive to the costs o f war, institutional binding may be a preferred 
strategy. One case which appears to fit this description quite well is Europe after World 
War I. After World War I France and its allies were facing a revisionist Germany whose 
powers were not significantly diminished by the war. Despite its defeat, Germany was still 
the greatest industrial power in Europe with enormous capital equipment and unrivalled 
technical skill. If France had its mind set on binding Germany after World War II, why did 
it not attempt the same thing after World War I?
The French response to the reestablishment of German power in the 1950s has 
often been portrayed as a stark departure from its hitherto strategy of balancing. However, 
the idea of binding German power was not new. Whereas the standard account of French 
policy after World War I assumes that a vengeful France sought to use reparations as a means 
for crippling the German economy, a re-examination of French policy has led many 
historians to reject the myth of a punitive French policy.*^ Reparations, they argue, played a 
secondary role in French schemes for reconstruction after 1 9 1 8.69  ^Indeed, France’s national 697
696 Kissinger 1957, p. 228.
697 Many historians today agree that France’s policy towards Germany during and after WWI was not 
merely punitive in character. According to Marc Trachtenberg, it was not France but Britain that resisted a 
moderate peace settlement. British reparation figures during the Versailles negotiations remained 
significantly higher than what the Americans and French were willing to accept. In the end, France agreed to 
support the British figures but only after President Wilson had made it clear that the US would not agree to a 
program of international control of the Ruhr. See Trachtenberg 1979, pp. 26-9; McDougall 1979, p. 11; 
Jacobson 1983.
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interest in 1918— like in 1945—called for a Germany which, though politically and militarily 
shackled, would be economically sound enough to provide the money, markets and material 
needed for the devastated French economy.698
The French government at the time of the First World War essentially hoped to 
solve French economic problems by fitting Germany into a framework o f international 
economic agreements which, thougjh initially favoring France through international control 
o f the Ruhr, would eventually be reworked into a mechanism for the equitable adjustment o f  
industrial and financial relationships between the two countries.699 During the war, French 
officials produced grandiose and detailed plans for the reorganization of the European 
economy, involving permanent inter-allied control of heavy industry raw materials. In 
substance what they envisaged was close in spirit to the arrangements which emerged after 
World War II.700 In the words o f one historian, “in striving permanently to limit German 
political and economic sovereignty after 1918, France was working to create the political 
climate in which a secure European integrative process could proceed”.701 The Americans 
and British, however, refused to cooperate with such ideas. A  few days before the 
armistice w ith Germany, Herbert Hoover, the US Government led it be known that it 
would ‘not agree to any program that even looks like inter-Allied control of our resources 
after peace’.702 a , -
698 See Gillingham 1991, p.1-3.
699 Trachtenberg 1979, p. 26; McDougall 1979, p. 9.
700 Ideas evolved around the establishment o f an international authority which would directly ration out at 
set prices the vast supplies of French and German raw materials and establish industrial and financial 
collaboration between the two countries. The principal architect behind the plans for Franco-German 
cooperation was Etienne Qémentel, French minister o f commerce during most o f the war. When the war 
ended France approached Germany (through Haguenin, the Berlin representative o f the French Foreign 
Ministry, and his assistant, René Massigli) to discus financial and economic reconstruction and industrial 
collaboration. Yet, these efforts came to null. See McDougall 1979, p. 9-11,17; Gillingham 1991, p. 1-3; 
Kriiger; and Trachtenberg 1979, p. 26.
701 McDougall 1979, p. 9.
702 When the peace conference convened in January, the French delegation therefore supported the British 
position that war costs should be included in die bill. Trachtenberg 1979, p. 28-9.
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Disappointed by the American position, the French government began in the 
spring of 1919 to talk directly to the Germans about the prospects for establishing a lasting 
framework for cooperation in the field o f heavy industry. Through Haguenin, the Berlin 
representative of the French Foreign Ministry, and his assistant Rene Massigli, the French 
government held out the possibility of substantial revision o f the armistice to be worked 
out through direct negotiation between France and Germany. The French Foreign 
Ministry indicated its intention to discuss both financial and economic questions, as well as 
reconstruction and industrial collaboration. What the French government had in mind 
went far beyond a more business arrangement with Germany. It was in fact aiming at the 
creation of an institutionalized framework for political and economic cooperation. 
However, the Germans were not particularly interested in the French overtures. 
Germany— despite its military defeat—remained the strongest power on the Continent.703 
From its position o f weakness, France had little to offer Germany which would make it 
consider to cooperate or any leverage with which Paris could cajole or appease the 
Germans into partnership.704 Thus French strategy reverted to the pursuit of a punitive 
policy. In 1923 the French policy of accommodation was definitively abandoned with the 
decision to occupy the Rhineland in a desperate attempt to use a  temporary French military' 
advantage to force a new structural relationship between France and Germany.705
703 \vwi led to a strengthening of German vis-à-vis France in both economic and population terms. In 
1913 France produced 41 mill, tons of coal compared with Germany’s 279 mill tons. By the 1930’$ the 
disparity was to widen to 47 mill, tons versus 351 tons in Germany. See Kissinger 1958,p. 228-9; Wight, p. 
201.
704 According to Walter McDougall, i f  new' realities of power had made it d ear to the German people that 
recovery of unity and full sovereignty were impossible they would have come to accept it over time, as after 
WWII. But after WWI France was too weak to coerce Germany into cooperation. Indeed, argues 
McDougall, “in light o f recent research revealing how powerful the Ruhr magnates had become after 1918 
we mav well ask what kind of peace would have won German cooperation”. McDougall 1979, p. 12-22; 
Krüger, p. 43; Trachtenberg 1979, p. 28; and Upgens and Loth 1985 p- 7.
705 See McDougall 1979, p. 13.
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III. G e n e r a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s
In this dissertation I have argued that states pursue integration as a way to address 
threats to their national security. The focus on security implies that my argument has more 
in common with geopolitical or ‘realist’ explanations for integration than with functionalist 
arguments or political economy theories. Nonetheless, my argument breaks with existing 
geopolitical explanations for integration in important ways. First, the evidence I have 
supplied discon firms the notion that external threat provides a key motivation for 
integration. In none of the cases I have looked at did external threat provide a decisive 
motivation for states to pool sovereignty7.
The evidence also disconfirms the hegemonic stability theory. Like hegemonic 
stability theory* would predict, I find that regional integration is typically associated with the 
presence o f a large, potentially dominant state. Yet, the reason for this is not that 
successful integration depends on a dominant regional power who acts as an enforcer o f 
rules or as regional paymaster. Integration does not succeed because of hegemonic 
leadership, rather it emerges to prevent hegemonic dominance.
A third and final way in which the findings o f  this dissertation contradict the 
wisdom o f conventional geopolitical explanations is that the cases I have looked at all 
suggest that international institutions have binding properties. In realist theory, 
international institutions (including those entailed in regional integration) are 
epiphenomenal, sustained by temporarily overlapping preferences. By contrast, I have 
argued that institutions can take on binding properties which prevent states from reneging 
on their prior commitments. Institutions, I have submitted, can establish binding 
constraints on state action which limit states’ discretion to use power arbitrarily. We saw 
this in the case of the United Provinces and w e witness it today in Western Europe.
234
Bibliography ■,
(1608). “A Briefe Declaration of the Proceedings of the Peace that is now entreating 
between the King o f Spaine, the Archduke, and the General States of the United 
Provinces: Together with an Abstract of divers weigh tie Reasons and Arguments by 
the Netherlanders, to prove that the General States ought not by any meanes to grant 
unto the discontinuance of their trade and trafficke into the East-Indies”. London.
(1675). “Historical Remarques Upon the late Revolutions in the United Provinces; Drawn 
from their own Papers, and evincing the Necessity of a Stadtholder to that 
Government as now re-establish’d in his Highness the present Prince of Orange”.
Savoy.
Abbott, Kenneth and Snidal, Duncan (1998). “Why States Act Through Formal 
International Organizations”. Journal o f  Conflict 'Resolution 42:1 (February): pp. 3-32.
Acheson, Dean (1969). Present a t the Creation. M y Years in the State Department. London: 
Hamish Hamilton.
Adenauer, Konrad (1965). Erinnerungen, 1945-1953. Stuttgart Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt.
Aegidi, Karl Ludwig (1965). A us der Vor^eit des ZoUvereins. Beitrag %ur Deutscken Geschichte, 
Hamburg: Verlag von Boyes & Geisler.
Aglionby, William (1669). The Present State o f  the United Provinces o f  the h o w  Countries as to th e 
Government, haw s, Forces, Riches, Manners, Customes, Revenue and Territory o f  the Dutch. 
London.
Aitzema, Lieuwe van (1653). Notable Revolutions; being a  true relation o f  what happened in the 
United Provinces o f  the Netherlands in the y ea r s  M D Ch and MDCL1. London: Printed by 
William Dugard.
Aizenman, Joshua (1992). “Foreign Direct Investment as a Commitment Mechanism in the 
presence o f Managed Trade”. NBER Working Paper; no. 41102 (June).
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene (1958). A  Diplomatic History o f  Europe since the Congress o f  Vienna. 
London: Methuen.
Alesina Alberto and Wacziarg, Romain (1999). “Is Europe Going too Far?”. Working Paper 
6883, National Bureau o f  Economic Research.
Andrews, David M. (19 ). “The Global Origins of the Maastrict Treaty on EMU: Closing 
the Window of Opportunity”.
Archer, Clive (1990). Organising Western Europe. London: Edward Arnold.
Aming, Hilde (1930). Hannovers SteUung pum Zollverein, Hannover: Gulemannssche 
Buchdruckerei.
235
Aron, Raymond (1966). Peace and War. A  Theory o f  International Relations. New York, N.Y: 
Doubleday.
Aron, Raymond and Lemer, David, eds., (1957). France Defeats EDC. New York, N.Y: 
Frederick A. Praeger.
Ash, Timothy Garton (1994). In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. New York, 
N.Y: Vintage Books.
Auberg du Maurier, Louis (1682). The Lives o f  A ll the Princes o f  Orange.
Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution o f  Cooperation. New York, N.Y: Basic Books.
Aybet, Giilnur (1997). The Dynamics o f  European Security Cooperation, 1945-91. New York, 
N.Y: St. Martin's Press.
Baelde, M. (1978). “The Pacification o f Ghent in 1576: Hope and uncertainty in the 
Netherlands’, h o w  Countries Year Book, xi, pp.1-7.
Benaerts, Pierre (1933). Les Origines de la Grande Industrie AUemande. Paris: F. H. Turot.
Baldwin, Richard (1994). Towards an integrated Europe. London: Centre for Economic Policy 
Research.
Ball, George W. (1982). The Past has A nother Pattern: Memoirs. New York, N.Y: Norton.
Banchoff, Thomas (1997). “German Policy Towards the European Union: The Effects o f 
Historical Memory”. German Politics 6:1 (April): pp. 60-76.
Bange, Oliver (2000). The EEC Crisis o f  1965. Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle and A denauer in 
Conflict. New York, N.Y: St. Martin’s Press.
Baun, Michael (1996). A n Imperfect Union: The Maastrict Treaty and the New Politics o f  European 
Integration. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
Becker, Joseph and Knipping, Fracz, eds., (1986). Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and Germany in a  postwar world, 1945-1950. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
Benoir, Emilie (1961). Europe at Sixes and Sevens, New York, N.Y: Columbia University 
Press.
Bentivoglio, Guido (1598/1652). H istorical relations o f  the United Provinces and o f  Flanders. 
London: Printed for Humphrey Moseley.
Bemauer, Thomas (1993). The Chemistry o f  Regime Formation: Explaining International 
C ooperationfora Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons. UNIDIR. Vermont.
Blainy, Geoffrey (1973). The Causes o f  War. London: Macmillan.
Blanning, T.C.W. (1986). Origins o f  the French Revolutionary Wars. London; New York: 
Longman.
236
Blondeel (1953). “The Schuman Plan: A Peaceful Revolution”. Address before the Harvard 
h aw  School Forum (22 October 1953).
Blockmans, W. P. (1999). “The Formation o f a Political Union, 1300-1600”. In Blom, J.C. 
and Lamberts, E., eds. History o f  the L ow Countries. New York, N.Y: Berghahn Books.
Boccia, Corso P. (1995). “The Kennedy Administration and the First Attempt to Enlarge 
the European Community”. In Griffith and Ward, eds., Courting the Common Market. The 
First Attempt to Enlarge the E C  and the French Veto, 1961-1963. London: Lothian 
Foundation Press.
Bok, Derek (1955). The First Three Years o f  the Schuman Plan. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press.
Boogman, J.C . (1980). “The Union o f Utrecht, its Genesis and Consequences”. In 
Boogman and van der Plaat, eds., Federalism: History and Current Significance o f  a Form o f  
Government. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Boogman, J.C ., and van der Plaat, G. eds., (1980). Federalism. History and Current Significance o f  
a Form o f  Government. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Boyer, Mark A. (1993). International Cooperation and Public Goods: Opportunities f o r  the Western 
Alliance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bromley, John Sehvyn and Kossmann, E., eds., (1960). Britain and the Netherlands. London: 
Chatto & Windus.
Brusse, Wendy A. (1995). “Alone with the Six: The Dutch Cabinet and the Problem of 
EEC Enlargement”. In Griffith and Ward, Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt 
to Enlarge the E C  and the French Veto., 1961-1963. London: Lothian Foundation Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Lalman, David (1992). War and  Reason: Domestic and 
International Imperatives. New Haven: Yale University Press.
________ (1988). “Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations o f
International Conflict”. World Politics 41: (October).
Bullen, Roger (1989). “Britain and Europe, 1950-1957”, in Serra, Enrico, ed., II Rilancio 
delTEwropa e i Trattati di Roma. Milano: Giuffre
Burges, Michael (1989). Federalism and European Union. Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in 
the European Community, 1972-1987. London: Routledge.
Burges, S. and Edwards, E. (1988). “The Six plus One: British Policy-making and the 
Question of European Economic Integration 1955”. International Affairs b 4:3.
Burrish, Onslow (1728/1742). Batavia Illustrata: or; A View o f  the policy, and commerce o f  the 
United Provinces: particularly o f  Holland. With an enquiry into the alliances o f  the States general\ 
with the emperor, France, Spain, and Great Britain (Second ed.). London: Printed for J . 
Osborn.
Calingaert, Michael (1996). European Integration Revisited. Progress, Prospects, and U.S. Interests. 
Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
237
Calleo, David (1978). The German Problem ReconsideredGermany and the World Order, 1879 to  
the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, Fraser (1999). The Foreign and Security Polity o f  the European Union. Past, Present and  
Future. Sheffield, England : Sheffield Academic Press.
Camps, Miriam (1964). Britain and the European Community 1955-1963. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press.
Caporaso, James and Keeler, John T.S. (1993). “The European Community and Regional 
Integration Theory”. Paper presented a t the Third Biennial International Conference o f  the 
European Community Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 27-29 May.
Carr, Edward H. (1939/1951). The Twenty Year Crisis, 1919-1939. A n Introduction to the Study 
o f  International Relations. London: Macmilan.
Carr, William (1991). The Origins o f  the Wars o f  German Unification, London; New York : 
Longman.
._______(1979). A  History o f  Germany 1815-1945. New York, N.Y: St. Martin’s Press.
Chalmers, Malcolm (1990). "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European 
Security Organization". W orldPolly J o u m a llx l  (Spring), pp. 215-250.
Charlton, Michael (1983). The Price o f  Victory. London: British Broadcasting Corporation.
Christensen, Thomas and Snyder, Jack (1990). “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting 
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity”. International Organisation 44:2, pp. 137-167.
Clairmonte, Frederick (1959) .“Frederick L ist and the Historical Concept o f  Balanced 
Growth”. The Indian Economic Review 4:3.
Clark, George Norman (1947). “The Birth o f  the Dutch Republic”. London: London, G. 
Cumberlege.
Claude, Inis (1962). Power and International Relations. New York, N.Y: Random House.
Cohen, Benjamin (1997). “The Political Economy of Currency regions”. In Mansfield and 
Milner, eds., The Political Economy o f  Regionalism.
Cole, Alastair (1993). “Looking on: France and the New Germany”. German Politics 2:3, pp. 
358-376.
Conybeare, J . (1992). “A  Portfolio Diversification Model o f Alliances: The Tnple Alliance 
and Triple Entente.” Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 36:1 (March), pp.__ .
Craig, Gordon A. (1978). Germany 1866-1945. New York, N.Y. Oxford University Press.
De Areilza, Jo se (1998). “Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty o f Amsterdam: Some 
Critical Remarks. Harvard JeanM onnet Working Paper 13198.
De Gaulle, Charles (1971). Memoirs o f  Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. New York, N.Y: Simon 
and Schuster.
238
_______ ___ (1961). Memorien 1942-1946. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
Dehio, Ludwig (1963). The Precarious balance. The Politics o f  Power in Europe 1494-1945. 
London: Alfred A. Knopf.
Deighton, Ann (1995). “The United Kingdom Application for EEC membership 1961-63. 
In Griffith & Ward, Courting the Common Market. The Eirst Attempt to Enlarge the EC and 
the French Veto, 1961-1969. London: Lothian Foundation Press.
Delfors, Leo (1941). Vie Anfänge der Utrecht Union.
Delors, Jacques (1994). “European Unification and European Security”, in European Security 
after the Cold War. Part 1. Adelphi paper No. 284. London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (January).
Dennison, Stanley R. (1955). The European Coal and Steel Community. London: Reprinted 
from Lloyds Bank Review (July).
Deubner (19 ) “The Expansion of West Germany and the Founding of Euratom”,
International Organisation 33: 2.
Deudney, Daniel (1996). “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in 
Philadelphian Systems”, in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty 
as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
______  (1995).“The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms control, and Balance o f
Power in the American States-union, circa 1787-1861”. International Organisation 49:2 
(Spring), pp. 191-228.
Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, John (1999). “The Nature and Sources o f Liberal 
International Order”. Review o f  International Studies 25 (April), pp. 179-196.
Deursen, A.T. van (1977), “Holland’s Experience o f War during the Revolt o f the
Netherlands’.
Deutsch, Karl et al. (1957). Political Community and the North A tlantic Area.
Diebold, William (1959). The Schuman Plan. A  Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959. New 
York, N.Y: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger.
Dinan, Desmond (1994). Ever Closer Union? An introduction to the European Community. 
Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Dockrill, Saki (1991). Britain’s  P o lig  f o r  West German Rearmament, 1950-55. New York, N.Y: 
Cambridge University Press.
Dogherty, James and Robert Pfaltzgraff (1981). Contending Theories o f  International Relations. 
New York, N.Y: Harper & Row.
Duchin, Brian R (1992). “The ‘Angonizing Reappraisal’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the 
European Defense Community”. D iplomaticH istog 16:2 (Spring).
Duke, Alastair C. and Tamse, C. A, eds., "Britian and the Netherlands: War and Society". 
Papers delivered f o r  the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference. The Hague.
Duke, Alastair C. (1990). Reformation and revolt in the b ow  Countries. Ronceverte, WV: 
Hambledon Press.
Duke, Simon (2000). The Elusive Q uest f o r  European Security. New York, N.Y: S t  M artin’s 
Press.
Duncan, George and Randolph Siverson (1982). “Flexibility o f Alliance Partner Choice in 
Multipolar Systems: Models and Tests”. International Studies Q uarterly 26:4.
Edmundson, George (1922). History o f  Holland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elrod, Richard (1976). “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System”. 
World Politics 28:2 (January), pp. 156-174.
Elazar, Daniel J. (1979). “The Role of Federalism in Political Integration”. In Elazar, ed., 
Federalism and Political Integration. Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Publishing.
Fearon, James D. (1998). “Commitment Problems and the Spread o f Ethnic Conflict”. In 
David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread o f  Ethnic Conflict: Fear, 
Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
_______ (1995). “Rationalist Explanations for War”. International Organisation 49:3, pp. 379-
414.
_______ (1994). “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes”. American Political Science Review 88 (September), pp. 577-592.
Ferejohn, John (1991). “Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Easly 
Stuart England”. In Monroe, Kristen., ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: a  critical 
reassessment o fth e theory o f  rational action. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Fest, Wilfried (1978). Dictionary o f  German History 1806-1945, London: George Prior 
Publishers.
Fitzmaurice, John (1993). “Belgium and Germany: An Enigmatic relationship”. In 
Verheyen Dick and Soe, Christian, eds., The Germans and th eir Neighbors. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.
Fisher, Wolfram (1984). “Der Deutsche Zollverein nach 150 Jahren—Modell einer 
erfolgreichen wirtschaftpolitischen Integration?” b s t  Foreign vol. 12, no 6. (September).
________ (1960). “The German Zollverein”, Kyklos 13:1.
Forsyth, Murray (1981). Unions o f  States. The Theory and Practice o f  Confederation. Leicester: 
Leicester University Press.
Friedjung, Heinrich (1935). The Struggle f o r  Supremay in Germany, 1859-1866. London: 
Macmillan.
Fursdon, Edward (1980). The European Defense Community: A  History. London: Macmillan.
240
Forland, Tor Egil (1997). “Autonomy-Community-Suzerainty. Decision-making Control 
and European Integration”. Cooperation and Conflict 32: 3, pp. 235-259.
Garrett, Geoffrey and Weingast, Barry (1993). “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: 
Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market”. In Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Garrett, Geoffrey. (1993). “The Politics o f Maastrict”. Economics and Politics 5, pp. 105-124.
------------------------  (1992). “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: the
European Community’s Internal Market”. International Organisation 46:2 (Spring), pp. 
533-560.
----------------------and Tsebelis, George (1996). “An Institutional Critique of Intergovem-
mentalism”. International Organisation 50:2 (Spring), pp. 269-299.
Gelderen, Martin van (1992). The Political Thought o f  the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Gerbert, Pierre (1997). “The Fouchet Negotiations for Political Union and the British 
Application”. In George Wilkes, ed., Britain’s fa ilure to enter the Community 1961-63 
London:______
Geyl Pieter (1964). The History o f  the Low Countries'. Episodes and Problems. London: MacMillan.
________ (1936, 1961). The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century. London: Cassell Publishers.
________ (1932/1988). The Revolt o f  the Netherlands 1555-1609. London: Cassel Publishers.
Gillingham, John (1991). Coal, S teel and the Rebirth o f  Europe, 1945-1955. The Germans and  
French from  Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____________ (2000). “A Test Case o f Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovemmentalist’
Approach to European Integration”, Journa l o f  Cold War Studies (Fall): 81-86.
Gilpin, Robert (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Glaser, Charles L. (1994/95). “Realist as Optimists. Cooperation as Self-Help”. International 
Security 19:3 (Winter), pp. 50-90.
Godefroi Louis Estiades: “Letter and negotiations”.
Gowa, Joanne (1994). Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton N.J: Princeton 
University Press.
_________  (1989). “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An
Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?”. World Politics 41: 3, pp. 307-24.
Grabbe, Heather and Hughes, Kirsty (1998). Enlarging the European Union Eastwards. 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
241
Grieco, Joseph (1995a). “State Interests and International Rule Trajectories: A N eorealist 
Interpretation o f the Maastrict Treaty and Economic and Monetary Union in Europe” .
Security Studies 4.
___________ (1995b). “The Maastrict Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the
Neo-realist Research Programme”. Review o f  International Studies 21, pp. 21-40.
___________ (1990). Cooperation Among Nations: 'Europe, A merica and N on-Tariff Barriers to
Trade. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Griffith, Richard (1990). “Die Benelux Staaten und die Schumanplan-Verhandlungen”. In 
Herbest, Vom Marschallplan %urEWG. Die Einleiderung derBundesrepublik Deutschland in th e 
Westliche Welt. Munich.
Griffith, Richard and Ward, Stephen (1955). “The End o f  the Thousand Years of History? 
The Origins o f  Britain Decision to Jo in the European Community, 1955-1961”. In 
Griffith and Ward, Courting the Common Market. The F irst A ttempt to Enlarge the E C  and th e 
French Veto, 1961-1963. London: Lothian Foundation Press.
Groom, A.J.R. and Taylor, Paul, eds. (1990). Functionalism . Theoiy and Practice in International 
Relations. London: Pinter.
Grosser, Alfred (1957). “Germany and France: A Confrontation”. In Daniel Lemer and 
Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC. New York, N.Y: Frederick A. Praeger.
Grossman, Gene and Helpman, Elhanan (1994). “Protection for Sale”. American Economic 
Review 84.
Gulick, Edward V . (1955). Europe*s Classical Balance o f  Power. A  Case Histoty o f  the Theoiy and  
Practice o f  One c f  the Great Concepts o f  European Statecrcft. New York, N.Y: Norton.
Haahr, Jens Henrik (1991). “The Same Old Game? The European Community in the 
International Political Economy, 1985-91”. Cooperation and Conflict 28:1 (March), pp. 73- 
101.
Haggard Stephan (1997). “Regionalism in Asia and the Americas”. In Helen Milner and 
Edward Mansfield, eds., The politica l Economy o f  Regionalism. New York, N.Y: Columbia 
University Press.
Haglund, David (1991). Alliance within the A lliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the 
European P illar o f  Defense. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Hahn, Hans-Werner (1984). Geschichte des Deutschen ZoUvereins. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht.
Haitsma Mulier, Eco (1980). The Myth o f  Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the 17th 
Century. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor (1996). “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”. Political Studies 44, p. 952-973.
Hamerow, Theodore (1958). Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, Economics and Politics.in Germany 
1815-1871. Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press.
242
Hanrieder, Wolfram (1989). Germany, America,. 'Europe. Yiftwy <?/" German Foreign Policy.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
__________ ed. (1980). IPej1/ German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979. Boulder, CO.: Westview
Press.
Harle, Vilho (1987). “From Superpower Deterrence to European Balance of Power 
Politics?”. In Vilho Harle, ed., Challenges and Responses in European Security. TAPRI 
Yearbook 1986, Aurbury.
Harsanyi, John C. (1986). “Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior”, in Jon Elster, 
ed., Rational Choice. New York, N.Y: New* York University Press.
Hart, Marjolein C/t (1993). The Making o f  a Bourgeois State. War,\ Politics and Finance during the 
Dutch Revolt. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Haas, Ernst and Schmitter, Phillippe (1964). “Economic and Differential Patterns o f 
Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America. International Organisation 
18 (Autumn), pp. 705-737.
Haas, Ernst (1971). “The Study o f Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and 
Anguish of Pretheorizing”. In Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration Theory 
and Research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Haas, Ernst (1975). The Obsolescence o f  Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley, CA: Institute o f  
International Studies, University o f California.
Healy, Brian and Stein, Arthur (1973). “The Balance of Power in International History:
Theory and Reality’”. Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 17:1.
Heilman, Gunther (1997). “The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is 
Listening? German Politics 6:2 (August), pp. 29-57.
Helmreich. Jonathan E. (1991). “The United States and the Formation of EURATOM”.
Diplomatic History 15:3 (Summer).
Henderson, W. O. (1983). Friedrich List. Economist and Visionary 1789-1846. London: 
Gainsborough House.
Hill, Christopher, and Karen E. Smith, eds., (2000). European Foreign Policy. Key Documents. 
London and New York: Routledge.
Hill, Joseph, “The Interest of these United Provinces”. New Haven, Conn., Research 
Publications. No. 2057.
Hill, Stephen, ed. (1993). Visions o f  Europe. London: Duckworth.
Hinsley, F. H. (1963). Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hirshman, Albert (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hodges, Michael, ed. (1972). European Integration. New York, N.Y: Penguin.
Hoffmann, Stanley (1995). The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.
___________(2000). “Comment on Moravcsik”, Journal o f  Cold W ar Studies 2:3 (Fall): 69-73-
___________and Keohane, Robert, eds. (1991). The New European Community: Derision-
Making and Institutional Change. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
___________and Maier, Charles (1984). The Marshall Plan: A. Retrospective. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
___________ (1966). “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation-State and the Case o f
Western Europe”. Daedalus 95 (Summer).
Hogan, Michael (1991). “European Integration and German Reintegration: Marshall 
Planners and the Search for Recovery and Security in Western Europe”. In Charles 
Maier and Günther Bischof, eds., The Marshall Plan and  Germany. West German 
Development within the Framework o f  the European Recovery Program. New York, N.Y: Berg.
Hope, Nicholas Martin (1973). “The Alternative to German Unification: the anti-Prussian 
Party: Frankfurt, Nassau, and the Two Hessen 1859-1867”. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts 
f ü r  Europäische Geschichte Mains^ vol. 65.
Hosli, Madeleine and Wolffenbuttel, Reinoud (2001). “New Voting Weights, Enlargement 
and the Council o f the European Union”. Paper presented at the 41st Annual Meeting 
of the International Studies Association, February 20-24,2001, Chicago.
Hosli, Madeleine (2000). Smaller States and the New Voting Weights in the C om a l Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations 'Clingen dael’ mimeo.
___________(1993). "The Admission o f the European Free Trade Association States to
the European Community”. International Organisation 47, pp. 629-643.
Howard, Michael (1983). The Causes o f  War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Huber (1957). Deutsche Vefassungsgeschichte seit 1789. Stuttgart:____
Hudemann, Rainer und Raymond Poidevin (1992). Die Saar 1945-1955: ein Problem der 
europäischen Geschichte. München: Oldenbourg.
Hudson, Richard (1891). “The Formation o f the North German Confederation”. Political 
SäenceQuarterly 6:3 (September).
Huelshoff, Michael G. (1994). “Domestic and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of 
Integration Theory”. International Studies Quarterly 38, pp. 255-279.
____________  (1993). “European Integration After the SEA: The Case of the Social
Charter”. Political Research Quarterly 46 (September): 619-637.
Huggett, Frank E. (1971). The M odem  Netherlands. New York, N.Y: Praeger Publishers.
Huusen, Arend H. (1998). H istorical Dictionary o f  the Netherlands. London: The Scarecrow 
Press.
2 4 4
Ikenberry, John G. (2001). After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restrains, and the Rebuilding o f  
Order i f  ter M ajor Wars. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
_ _______ (1998). “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Post
War Order” . International Security 23:3, pp. 43-79.
Israel, Jonathan (1995). The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Jacobson, Jon (1983). “Is there a New International History of the 1920?”, American 
Historical Rciiew  88.
Janning, Josef (1996). “A German Europe-a European Germany? On the debate over 
Germany’s foreign policy. International A ffairs 71:1, pp. 33-41.
Jervis, Robert (1985). “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation”. W orld Politics 38:1 (October): pp. 58-79.
Joffe, Joseph (1992). “Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and 
Dead Ends”. Survival 34:1 (Spring), pp. 36-50.
Kahler, Miles (1995). International Institutions and the Political Economy o f  Integration. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Kaiser, David (1990). Politics and War. European Conflict from  Philip II  to Hitler. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J . (1997) Tamed Power. Germany in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Keeler, John T.S. (2000). “A Response to Andrew Moravcsik”, Journa l o f  Cold War Studies 
2:3 (Fall): 74-76.
Kennedy, Paul (1987). The Rise and F all o f  the Great Powers. New York, N.Y: Random House.
Keohane, Robert and Martin, Lisa (1995). “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”. 
International Security 20:1 (Summer), pp. 39-51.
Keohane, Robert (1984). A fter Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Kersten, A. (19__). A  Welcome Surprise? The Netherlands and the Schuman Plan Negotiation.
Kiesewetter, Hubert (1987). “Economic Preconditions for Germany’s Nation-building in 
the 19th century” . In Hagen Schultz, ed., Nation-building in Central Europe. New York, 
N.Y: St. Martin’s Press.
Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy. New York, N.Y: Simon and Schuster.
_________ (1957). A  World Restored: Mettemich, Castkreagh, and the Problems o f  Peace, 1812-22.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
245
Kocs, Stephen (1995). Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic 
Choices, 1955-1995. Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers.
FCohr, Leopold (1960). “The History of the Common Market”. Journa l o f  Economic History.
Kolodziej, Edward (1990). “De Gaulle, Germany and the Superpowers: German 
Unification and the End of the Cold W ar”. French Politics and Society 8:4, pp. 41-61.
Kolodziej, Edward (1974). French International Polity under De Gaulle and Pompidou. The Politics 
o f  Grandeur. Ithaca: Cornell University" Press.
Kossman, E. and Millink, A. F. eds. (1974). Texts Concerning the Revolt o f  the Netherlands. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krugman, Paul (1991). “The Move Toward Free Trading Zones” in Polity Implications o f  
Trade and C urreny Zones', a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank o f 
Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 22-24. ... .
Kupchan, Charles (1998). “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and 
the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity”. International S ecuriy  23:2, pp. 40-80.
__________and Kupchan, Clifford (1991). “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future
of Europe”. International Securiy 16:1 (Summer), pp. 114-161.
L’Estrange, Roger (1673). A Brief Description o f  the Seven Provinces o f  the United Netherlands. 
London.
Landes, David (1969). The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development 
in Westerns Europe from  1750 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University7 Press.
Laursen, Finn and Vanhoonacker, Sophie, eds. (1992). The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies, and International Id en tiy o f  the European 
Communiy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Laursen, Finn (1992). “Toward European Political Union: An Analysis o f the 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union”. Paper Presented at the A nnual 
Convention o f  the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., 31. March-4 April.
Laursen, Finn (1990). “Explaining the EC’s New Momentum”, in Finn Laursen, ed., 
EFT A and the EC: Implications o f  1992. Maastrict.
Levy, Jack (2001). “Do Great Powers Balance Against Hegemonic Threats?” Paper 
presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting o f the International Studies Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, February 20-24.
-------------- (1987). “Declining Power and Preventive Motivation for War”, World Politics
40:1.
_____ (1985). “Theories of General War”. World' Politics 37:3 (April), pp. 344-374.
_____  (1981). “Alliance Formation and W ar Behavior: An Analysis of the Great
Powers, 1495-1975”. Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 25:4.
246
Limm, Peter (1989). The Dutch Revolt 1559-1648. London: Longman.
Lindberg, Leon (1963). The political Dynamics o f  European Integration. Stanford. CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart (1971). Regional Integration: Theory and Research. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lipgens, Walter and Loth, Wilfred, eds. (1985). Documents on the History o f  European 
Integration. Continental Plans f o r  European Union 1939-1945. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Lipgens, Walter (1982). A History o f  European Integration, 1945-1947. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Liska, George (1964). Europe Ascendant: The International Politics o f  Unification. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press.
____________(1962). Nations in Alliance: The Limits o f  Interdependence. Baltimore, MD; Johns
Hopkins Press.
Lister, Frederick (1996). The European Union, the United Nations, and the Revival of 
Confederal Governance. Westport, C onn .: Greenwood Press
___________ (1999). The Early Security Confederations. From A ncient Greeks to the United
Colonies o f  New England. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
Lister, Louis (1960). Europe's Coal and Steel Community. An Experiment in Economic Union. New 
York, N.Y: The Twentieth Century Fund.
Lodge, Juliet, ed. (1989). The European Community and the Challenge o f  the Future. London: 
Pinter.
Loth, Wilfried and Picht, Robert; eds. (1991). De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa. Germany: 
Leske & Budrich, Opladen.
Lothian, William (1780). The histoiy o f  the United Provinces o f  the Netherlands, from  the death o f  
Philip II. King o f  Spain, to the truce made with Albert and Isabella. Dublin: W. and H. 
Whitestone.
Ludlow, N. Piers (1997). Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First Britain Applications to the 
EEC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lynch, Frances (1984). “Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and 
International Planning in French Reconstruction. Economic H istory Review 37: 2, pp. 229- 
43.
Macmillan, Harold (1969). Tides o f  Fortune 1945-1955. London: Macmillan.
Mahant, Edelgard (1969). French and German Attitudes to the Negotiations about the EEC, 1955- 
1965. London: Mime.
247
Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2000). “Comparative-Historical Analysis: An 
Introduction”. Paper prepared for a conference on “Comparative-Historical Analysis”, 
Harvard University, November 10-11.
Maier, Charles and Bischof, Giinter, eds. (1991). The Marshal! Plan and Germany. West German 
Development within the Framework o f  the European R ecovey Program. Providence: Berg 
Publishers.
Mansfield, Edward and Milner, Helen eds. (1997). The Political Economy o f  Regionalism. New 
York, N.Y: Columbia University Press.
Maoz, Zeev and Felsenthal, Dan S. (19 ). “Self-binding Commitments and International 
Cooperation”.
Marjolin, Robert (1989). Architect o f  European Unity: Memoirs, 1911-1986. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
Marriott, J . A. R. and Robertson, C. (1915). The Evolution o f  Prussia. The Making o f  an Empire. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Martin, Lisa and Beth Simmons (1998). “Theories and empirical studies of international 
institutions”. International Organisation 52:4, pp. 729-59.
Martin, Lisa (1993). “The Rational State Choice o f Multilateralism”, in Ruggie, John, ed., 
Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis o f  the Institutional Form. New York, N.Y: 
Columbia University Press.
Mason, Henry L. (1955). The European Coal and S teel Community. Experiment in 
Stpranationalism. The Hague: Martinus Niijhoff.
Mattli, W alter (1999). The h og ic o f  Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond  New York, N.Y: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mayer, René (1956). Speeches by Monsieur Rene Mayer,\ President o f  the H igh Authority. Ordinary 
Session o f  the Common Assembly, Strasbourg, 8 May.
Mayne, Richard J. (1973). The Recovery o f  Europe, 1945-1973. New York, N.Y: Anchor Press.
McCall, Louis A. (1976). Regional Integration: A  Comparison o f  European and Central American 
Dynamics. California: SAGE Publications.
McCarthy, Patrick ed. (1993). France-Germany, 1983-1993. The Struggle to Cooperate. London: 
Macmilan.
McDougall, Walter A. (1979). “Political Economy versus National Sovereignty: French 
Structures for German Economic Integration after Versailles” . Journal o f  Modem H isto y  
51 (Spring), pp. 4-23.
McKenzie, Mary and Loedel, Peter, eds. (1998). The Promise and Reality o f  European Security 
Cooperation. States, Interests, and Institutions. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Mearsheimer, John (1990a). “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”. 
International Security 15:1 (Summer), pp. 5-56.
248
________ (1990b) “W hy We Will Soon Miss the Gold War”, Atlantic Monthly.
Merriam, Charles E. (1945). Systemic Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Mihvard, Alan (1992). The 'European Rescue o f  the Nation State. California: University of 
California Press.
_________ (2000). “A Comment on the Article by Andrew Moravcsik ”, Journal o f Cold War Studies
2:3 (Fall): 77-80.
_________ (1984). The Reconstruction o f  Western Europe 1945-1951. London: Methuen & Co.
Mitrany, David (1966). A Working Peace System. Chicago.
Monnet, Jean (1978). Memoirs. London.
Monnet, Jean (1952). Speeches Delivered by M onsieur Jean Monnet, President o f  the High Authority a t 
the inauguration o f  the High Authority on A ugust 10\ 1952 in  Luxembourg, and at the opening 
Session o f  the Assembly on September 11th 1952 in  Strasbourg. ECSC.
Moravsik, Andrew (1998) The Choice f o r  Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from  Messina to 
Maastrict. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
________ (2000). “De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of
French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part T). Journa l o f  Cold W ar Studies 2:2 (Spring): 3-43.
_________(2000). “De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of
French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part II), Journa l o f  Cold War Studies 2:3 (Fall): 4-68.
_________ (1993) “Preferences and power in the European Community”. Journal o f  Common
Market Studies 31, pp. 473-524.
________ (1991). “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community”. International Organisation 45:1, 
pp. 19-56.
Morgenthau, Hans (1985). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle f o r  Power and Peace. (Sixth 
Edition). New York, N.Y: Alfred A. Knopf.
Morrow, James (1996). “Modeling the forms of international cooperation”. International 
Organisation 48:3, pp. 387-420.
Morrow, James (1993). “Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security”.
International Organisation 47:2.
Mosse, W. E. (1958). The European powers and the German question, 1848-71. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Motley, John Lothrop (1855). The Rise o f  the Dutch Republic. From the Death o f  William the Silent 
to the Twelve Years*Truce-1609. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers
Mowat, R.C. (1973). Creating the European Community. London: Blandford Press.
Mutimer, David (1989). "1992 and the Political Integration o f Europe: Neo functionalism 
Reconsidered”./ ¿w W  o f  European Integration 13, pp. 75-101.
Nebenius, C.F. (1835). D er Deutsche Zollverein, Sein System und seine Zukunft
Neumann, Iver B. (1992). Regional Great Powers in International Politics. New York, N.Y: St. 
Martin’s Press.
Niou, M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1987). "Preventive War and the Balance o f Power: A  
Game-Theoretical Approach”. Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 31.
_________ and Rose, Gregory (19 ). “The Balance o f Power. Stability in International
Systems”
Nutting, Anthony (1966). Europe W ill Not W ait A  Warning and a  Way O ut London: Hollies 
and Carter.
Nye, Joseph (197 ). “Comparing Common Markets”
Nye, Joseph S. (1971). Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation. Boston: 
Little Brown & Co.
_________  (1968). “Comparative Regional Integration: Concepts and Measurement”.
International Organisation 22.
_________  ed. (1968). International Regionalism. Boston: Little, Brown & Co..
Olsen, Man cur, and Zeckhauser, Richard (1966). "An Economic Theory o f Alliances”. 
Review o f  Economics and Statistics 48:3, pp. 266-280.
Oncken, Herman and Saemisch, FE. (1934). Vorgeschichte und Begründung des deutchen 
Zollverein, 1815-34’, Akten der Staaten des Deutschen Bundes und der Europäischen M achte. 
Veröffentlichungen der Friedrich List-Gesellschaft, vol. 1-3. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing.
Organski, A. F. IC and Jacek Kugler, The W ar Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980.
Organski, A.K.F. (1968). World Politics. New York, N.Y: Knopf.
Overburry, Sir Thomas (1651). "Observations Upon the Provinces United and on The 
States o f France”. London: T. Maxey.
Parker, Geoffrey (1983). A  Political Geography o f  Community Europe. London: Butterworths.
________ (1979). Spain and the Netherlands 1559-1659: Ten Studies. Glasgow: Collins.
_________(1977). The Dutch Revolt. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Parsons, Craigh (2001). "Grand Visions and European Integration”. Paper presented at the 
Center for European Studies, Conference on Ideas, Discourse and European Integration, 
May 11-12,2001.
250
Pentland, Charles (1975). “International Theory and European Integration”. In Groom and 
Taylor, eds., Functionalism. Theory and Practice in International Relations.
Pierson, Paul and Skocpol, Theda (2000) “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary 
Political Science”, Paper f o r  Presentation at the American Political Sdence Association Meetings, 
Washington D.C., August 30-Sept.2.
Pierson, Paul (1996). “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies 29:2, pp. 123-163.
Pinder, John (1991). European Community ; The building o f  a Union. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press.
________ (1961). Britain and the Common Market. London, Cresset Press.
Poidevin, Raymond (1991). “Ambiguous Partnership: France, the Marshall Plan and the 
Problem of Germany”. In Charles Maier and Günther Bischof, eds., The M arshall Plan 
and Germany. West German Development mithin the Framework o f  the European Recovery Program. 
New York, N.Y: Berg.
__________ ed. (1986). Origins o f  the European Integration March 1948-May 1950.___
__________  and Jacques Bariety (1982). Frankreich und Deutschland : die Geschichte ihrer
Begehungen, 1815-1975. München: Beck.
Posen, Barry (1984). The Sources o f  Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the 
World Wars. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Pounds, Norman (1959). "Economic growth in Germany". In Hugh Aikten, ed. The state
and economic growth. N.Y., Social Science Research Council.
_________ and Parker, William (1957). C oal and Steel in Western Europe, the influence o f
resources and techniques on production, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Powell, Robert (1999). In the Shadow o f  Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
_________ (1996). “Stability and the Distribution of Power” World Politics 48, pp. 239-267.
Price, Arnold H. (1949/1973) The Evolution o f  the Zollverein. A  Study o f  the Ideas and Institutions 
Leading to German Unification Between 1815 and 1833. New York: Ortagon Books.
Price, J.L. (1994). Holland and the Dutch Republic in the 17th Centuiy. The Politics o f  Particularism. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Priest, George Madison (1915). Germany since 1740. New York: N.Y: Ginn Sc Co.
Pryce, Roy, ed. (1987). The Dynamics o f  European Union. London:
Przeworski, Adam (1991). Democracy and the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rappaport, Armin, “The United States and European Integration: The First Phase”. 
Diplomatic History 5:2 (Spring 1981).
251
Rasmussen, Mette and Verdier, Daniel (2001). “European Integration as a Solution to 
War”. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Convention, Chicago 20-24 
February.
Rathkolb, Oliver (1995). “The Austrian Case: From Neutral Association to a ‘Special 
Arrangement’ with the EEC, 1961-61”. In Griffith & Ward, Courting the Common M arket 
The First A ttempt to Enlarge the E C and th e French Veto, 1961-1963. London: Lothian 
Foundation Press.
Reitsma, Richard (1982). Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in the Early Dutch 'Republic: The States 
o f  Overijssel, 1566-1600. Amsterdam: Rodopi (distributed by Ronald Rupke, Weston, 
Canada).
Rhenisch, Thomas and Zimmermann, Hubert (1995). “Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle: The 
West German Government and the Exclusion of Britain from Europe”. In Griffith & 
Ward, Courting the Common M arket The F irst A ttempt to Enlarge the E C  and the French Veto, 
1961-1963. London: Lothian Foundation Press.
Risse, Thomas. “To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the 
European Union. EUI Working Paper RSC No. 98/9., Florence: European University 
Institute.,
Rothstein, Robert (19xx). Alliances and Small P ow ers.___
Rosecrance, Richard and Lo, Chih-Cheng (1996). “Balancing, Stability' and War. The 
Mysterious Case o f the Napoleonic International System”. International Studies Quarterly 
40, pp. 479-500
Rothstein, Robert (1968). Alliances and Small Powers. New York, N.Y: Columbia University 
Press.
Roussakis, Emmanuel (1968). Friedrich List, th e Zollverein and the United o f  Europe, Bruges: 
College o f Europe.
Rowen, Herbert H. (198 ). “The Dutch Revolt: What Kind of Revolution?”. Renaissance 
Quarterly
Rowen, Herbert H. (1988). The Princes o f  Orange. The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
___________(1972). The h o w  Countries in Early M odem  Times. New York, N.Y: Walker & Co.
Rowenied, H. (1972). The Low Countries in Early M odem  Times.
Ruggie, John (1983). “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a 
Neorealist Synthesis”. World Politics 35:2 (January): pp. 261-85.
Sabrosky, A.N. (1980). “Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the expansion o f War”. 
In J . D. Singer, ed., The Correlates o f  W ar II. N ew York: Free Press.
Saeter, Halvor (1995). Tysklands Samling. Maastrictavtalan og Sammenbruddet i  EMS. ARENA 
Paper, 95/2. Oslo: Norsk Udenrigspolitisk Institut.
252
Salmon, Trevor and Nicoli, William, eds. (1997). building European Union. A Documentary 
History and Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Sandholtz, Wayne (1993). “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastrict”. International 
Organisation 47, pp. 1-40.
__________ (1992). High-tech Europe: The politics o f  international cooperation. Berkeley:
University o f California Press.
_________ and Zysman, John (1989). “1992: Recasting the European Bargain”. World
Politics XLII, pp. 95-128.
Sandler, Todd (1977). “Impurity of Defense”.
Sandler, Todd and Cauley, John (1975). “On the Economic Theory o f Alliances”.
Scharpf, Fntz (1988). “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and 
European Integration, Public Administration 66 :3 .
Schmidt, Gustav (1997). “Master-Minding* a New Western Europe: The Key Actors at 
Brussels in the Superpower Conflict”. In George Wilkes, ed., Britain’s  Failure to E nter the 
European Community 1961-61. The Enlargement Negotiations and Crisis in European, A tlantic 
and Commonwealth Relations. London: Frank Cass.
Schroeder, Paul (1994). “Historical Reality Versus Neo-Realist Theory”. International Security.
_________ (1994). The Transformation o f  European Politics, 1763-1848. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
_________ (1976). “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management”.
In Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions o f  National Security Problems. Lawrence, Kansas.
Schuman, Robert, FurE urvpa_______
Schwabe, Klaus, ed. (1988). The Beginnings o f  the Schuman-Plan. Contributions to the 
Symposium in Aachen, May 28-19, 1986. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.
Schweller, Randall (1994). “Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back 
In”. International Security 19:1 (Summer), pp. 72-107.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1991). “Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government 
Commitment”. In Bourdieu and Coleman, eds., Social Theory f o r  a  Changing Society. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Simon, Herbert (1982). M odels o f  Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Simonian, Haig (1985). The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations and the EC, 1969- 
1984. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Siverson, Randal, and Tennefoss, Michael (1984). “Power, Alliance, and the Escalation o f 
International Conflict 1815-1965” American Political Science Review 78.
2 5 3
Skocpol, Theda and Somers, Margaret (1980). “Uses of Comparative History in 
Macrosocial Inquiry”. ____________.
Smit, J.W . (1970). “The Netherlands Revolution”, in Robert Forster & Jack P. Greene, 
eds., Preconditions f o r  Revolution in Early M odem  Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press.
Snidal, Duncan (1986). ‘T h e  Game Theory o f International Politics”. In Kenneth Oye, ed., 
Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Snyder, Glenn (1997). AUiance Politics._______________
__________(1984). “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”. W orld Politics 36:4.
Soetendorp, Ben (1999). Foreign Policy in the European Union. Theory, History and Practice. 
Harlow, E ssex : Longman.
Spanier, John and Wendtzd, Robert (1996). Games Nations Play.
Spierenburg, Dirk and Poidevin, Raymond (1994). The History o f  the High Authority o f  the 
European Coal and S teel Community. Supranationality in Operation. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson.
Stam, Alan and Bennet, Scott (1999). “Is Instrumental Rationality a Universal 
Phenomenon? Paper presented at the Ohlin Institute, Harvard University.
Stein, G. J. (1990). Benelux Security Cooperation. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
Stein mo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (1992). Structuring Politics. Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stirk, Peter and Weigall, David, eds. (1992). The Origins and d evelopm en t o f  the European 
Community. Leicester Leicester University Press.
Stirk, Peter (1989). European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period. London: Pinter.
T.W. (1673). “An Exact Survey o f the United Provinces of the Netherlands, of their Cities, 
Castles, Fortieses, and other their Dominions then”. London.
Taylor, A. P. (1971). The Struggle f o r  Mastery o f  Europe. New York, N.Y: Oxford University 
Press.
Taylor (1954) p. 213. (zollverein)
Taylor, Michael (1987). The Possibility o f  Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Taylor, Paul (1989). “The New Dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s”. In Juliet Lodge, 
ed., The European Community and the Challenge o f  the Future. London: Pinter.
Temple, Sir William (1687, 1932). Observations Upon the United Provinces o f  the Netherlands. 
Edited by Sir George Clark. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.
254
Thatcher, Margaret (1993a). The D om ing S tm t Years. New York: HarperCollins.
_________  (1993b). “____ In Stephen Hill, ed., Visions o f  Europe. London: Duckworth.
Thies, Wallace (1987). “Alliances and Collective Goods. A Reappraisal” Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution 31:2, pp. 298-332.
Thompson, William R. (1983). “Uneven Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and 
Global Wars.” International Studies Quarterly 27.
Trachtenberg, Marc (1999). A Constructed Peace: The Making o f  the European Settlement, 1945- 
1963. Princeton, N J :  Princeton University Press.
____________(2000). “De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe”, Journal o f  Cold War Studies 2:3
(Fall): 101-116.
____________(1979). “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference. Journal o f  Modem History
51 (Spring): pp. 24-55.
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe (1991). “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A 
Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC”. Millenium  20, pp. 1-22.
Treitschke, Heinrich von, Deutsche Geschichte im  neun^ehnten Jahrbundert. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 
1887. Voi. 4.
Trevelyan, Mary C. (1930). “William the Third and the Defence o f Holland 1672-74”. 
London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Tuck, Richard (1993). Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
United States Department of State (1951). “Understanding the Schuman Plan”. Office of 
Public Affairs, July.
United States Senate (1953). 83rd, Congress. Foreign Relations Committee. “Hearing on the 
European Coals and Steel Community”, June 4-5.
Vaisse (1997). “De Gaulle and the British ‘application’ to join the Common Market”. In 
George Wilkes, ed., Britain's Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-61. The 
Enlargement Negotiations and Crisis in European, A tlantic and Commonwealth Relations. 
London: Frank Cass.
van Evera, Stephen (1997). Guide to Methods f o r  Students o f  Political Science. Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press.
van Gelderen, Martin (1992). Political Thought o f  the Dutch Remit. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Vanke, Jeffrey (2000). “Reconstructing De Gaulle”, Journal o f  Cold War Studies (Fall): 87-100.
Vanthoor, Win F.V. (1996). European Monetary Union since 1848. A  Political and Historical 
Analysis. Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Verheyen, Dick and Soe, Christian (1993). The Germans and their Neighbors. Boulder, CO., 
Westview Press.
Viner, Jacob (1950). The Customs Union Issue.
Voorhoeve, Boris J.C . (19 ). Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study o f  Dutch Foreign Policy.
Wagner, Harrison. (1986). “The Theory of Games and the Balance o f Power”. World Politics 
38:4 (July), pp. 546-576.
Wallace, Michael (1987) “Alliances and Collective Goods”.
Wallace, William (1991). “West European Unity: Implications for Peace and Security. In 
Karl E. Bimbaum, Joseph Binter and Sten Badzik eds., Tomarás and  Future European Peace 
Order? Hampshire: Macmillan Academic Ltd.
__________________ (1990). The Dynamics o f  European Integration. London: Pinter.
Wallschmitt, Ferdinand (1904). D er Eintritt Badens in den Zollverein. Inaugural-Dissertation. 
Hanau: Waisenhaus Buchdruckerei.
Walt, Stephen (1987). The Origins o f  Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth (1993) “The Emerging Structure o f International Politics”. International 
Security____ (Fall), pp. 44-79.
Waltz, Kenneth (1986). “Reductionist and Systemic Theories”. In Robert Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and its Critics.
Waltz, Kenneth (1979). Theory o f  International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Ward, Adolphus (1916). Germany, 1815-1890. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weigall, David and Peter Stirk, eds .(1992). The Origins and Development o f  the European 
Community. Leicester Leicester University Press.
Wells, G. E. (1982). A ntwerp and the Government o f  Philip U  1555-1567. Cornell University 
Ph.D. thesis.
Wemer, George S. (1977). Bavaria in the German Confederation, 1820-1848. London: 
Associated University Press. - .
Wight, Martin (1977). Pow er Politics. Leichesten Leichester University Press.
Wilkes, George, ed. (1997). Britain’s Failure to  E nter the European Community 1961-61. The 
Enlargement Negotiations and Crisis in European, A tlantic and Commonwealth Relations. 
London: Frank Cass.
Williamson, Oliver (1985)




• . i : t i v p 5’  >t r r r ..................----------nirti“ niiwiinMi IttttJ
Woolcock, Stephan et al. (1991). Britain, Germany, and 1992. London: Pinter.
Wyatt-Walter, Holly, The'European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979-92. New York : 
St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
Yost, David (1990). “France in the New Europe”. Foreign Affairs, 69:5 (Winter).
Young, John, ed. (1988). The Foreign Polity o f  Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955. 
Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Zagorin, Perez (1982). Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660. VoL II. P roiin cia l Rebellion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Zechlin, E. (1967). Die deutsche Einheitsbewegung, Frankfurt.








( l í V MT ,
*
